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Full-Text Articles in Insurance Law

The Unaffordable Health Care Act - A Reponse To Professors Bagley And Horwitz, Douglas A. Kahn, Jeffrey H. Kahn Jan 2011

The Unaffordable Health Care Act - A Reponse To Professors Bagley And Horwitz, Douglas A. Kahn, Jeffrey H. Kahn

Articles

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 has stirred considerable controversy. In the public debate over the program, many of its proponents have defended it by focusing on what is sometimes called the “free-rider” problem. In a prior article, we contended that the free-rider problem has been greatly exaggerated and was not a significant factor in the congressional decision to adopt the Act. We maintained that the free-rider issue is a red herring advanced to trigger an emotional attraction to the Act and distract attention from the actual issues that favor and disfavor its adoption. In a recently …


Who Pays? Who Benefits? Unfairness In American Health Care, Clark C. Havighurst, Barak D. Richman Jan 2011

Who Pays? Who Benefits? Unfairness In American Health Care, Clark C. Havighurst, Barak D. Richman

Faculty Scholarship

American-style health insurance greatly amplifies price-gouging opportunities for health care providers, who inflate prices both to enrich themselves and to subsidize and expand the nation’s health care enterprise. To the extent that lower- and middle-income Americans with private health coverage pay premiums that go to support and expand the system, they are subject to an unfair (regressive) “head tax” levied by unaccountable entities for ostensibly public but also private purposes. Lower-income premium payers also often pay for costly health coverage designed to suit the economic interests and values of professional and other elites rather than their own. They also appear …


Tontines For The Invincibles: Enticing Low Risks Into The Health-Insurance Pool With An Idea From Insurance History And Behavioral Economics, Peter Siegelman, Tom Baker Jan 2010

Tontines For The Invincibles: Enticing Low Risks Into The Health-Insurance Pool With An Idea From Insurance History And Behavioral Economics, Peter Siegelman, Tom Baker

Faculty Articles and Papers

Over one-third of the uninsured adults in the U.S. below retirement age are between nineteen and twenty-nine years old. Young adults, especially men, often go without insurance, even when buying it is mandatory and sometimes even when it is a low-cost employment benefit. This Article proposes a new form of health insurance targeted at this group, the "young invincibles"-those who (wrongly) believe that they do not need health insurance because they will not get sick. Our proposal offers a cash bonus to those who turn out to be right in their belief that they did not really need health insurance. …


Cost Containment And The Patient Protection And Affordable Care Act, David Orentlicher Jan 2010

Cost Containment And The Patient Protection And Affordable Care Act, David Orentlicher

Scholarly Works

In this article, Professor Orentlicher discusses the need for containing costs, as well as increasing access, for health case in the United States. He argues that for decades, the U.S. health care system has grappled with two key problems - inadequate access to coverage and increasingly unaffordable health care costs. During the debate that led to the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, public officials recognized the need to address the problems of both access and cost, but in the end, the Act does far more about increasing access than it does about cutting costs. Professor Orentlicher …


Vebas To The Rescue: Evaluating One Alternative For Public Sector Retiree Health Benefits, 42 J. Marshall L. Rev. 879 (2009), Susan E. Cancelosi Jan 2009

Vebas To The Rescue: Evaluating One Alternative For Public Sector Retiree Health Benefits, 42 J. Marshall L. Rev. 879 (2009), Susan E. Cancelosi

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate Purchase Of Insurance, Victor P. Goldberg Jan 2009

The Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate Purchase Of Insurance, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

Despite the fact that public corporations ought to be risk neutral, they often carry insurance. This note first considers why insurance (or more precisely, the package of services provided by insurance companies) might create value, regardless of the risk preferences of managers, shareholders, or other corporate stakeholders. One motive is that their contractual counterparties – buyers, lessors, and lenders – require that they carry insurance. Three explanations for why the requirement might be value enhancing are proposed.


The Future Of Social Security: Principles To Guide Reform, 41 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1061 (2008), Kathryn L. Moore Jan 2008

The Future Of Social Security: Principles To Guide Reform, 41 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1061 (2008), Kathryn L. Moore

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Vesting, Modification, And Financing Of Public Retiree Health Benefits In Light Of New Accounting Rules, 41 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1147 (2008), John Sanchez Jan 2008

The Vesting, Modification, And Financing Of Public Retiree Health Benefits In Light Of New Accounting Rules, 41 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1147 (2008), John Sanchez

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Virtues Of Medicare, Jill R. Horwitz Jan 2008

The Virtues Of Medicare, Jill R. Horwitz

Reviews

Most of us look forward to a heaven where people don't get sick. But if they do, health care would be traded among fully informed patients and providers in perfectly competitive and frictionless markets. In that perfect world, sick citizens simply shop for doctors the way they shop for other consumer goods. The better doctors, like the most elegant hotel rooms and fanciest cars, would cost more than inferior doctors. Patients would consult their utility meters and, with appropriate attention to discounting over an infinite lifetime, choose accordingly. After each treatment, the patients would know the quality of their outcome …


Offsetting Risks, Ariel Porat Nov 2007

Offsetting Risks, Ariel Porat

Michigan Law Review

Under prevailing tort law, an injurer who must choose between Course of Action A, which creates a risk of 500 (there is a probability of .1 that a harm of 5000 will result), and Course of Action B, which creates a risk of 400 (there is a probability of.] that a harm of 4000 will result), and who negligently opts for the former will be held liable for the entire harm of 5000 that materializes. This full liability forces the injurer to pay damages that are five times higher than would be necessary to internalize the risk of 100 that …


A Complete Property Right Amendment, John H. Ryskamp Oct 2006

A Complete Property Right Amendment, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

The trend of the eminent domain reform and "Kelo plus" initiatives is toward a comprehensive Constitutional property right incorporating the elements of level of review, nature of government action, and extent of compensation. This article contains a draft amendment which reflects these concerns.


Bond Repudiation, Tax Codes, The Appropriations Process And Restitution Post-Eminent Domain Reform, John H. Ryskamp Jun 2006

Bond Repudiation, Tax Codes, The Appropriations Process And Restitution Post-Eminent Domain Reform, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

This brief comment suggests where the anti-eminent domain movement might be heading next.


Fluconomics--Preserving Our Hospital Infrastructure During And After A Pandemic, Vickie Williams Mar 2006

Fluconomics--Preserving Our Hospital Infrastructure During And After A Pandemic, Vickie Williams

ExpressO

Influenza pandemics occur regularly. The deadly Spanish flu pandemic of 1918 infected more than 25% of the United States population, and killed 2.5% of those infected. Virtually all experts agree that it is not a question of if another influenza pandemic as deadly as the Spanish flu will occur, but a question of when. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that the direct and indirect medical costs in the United States associated with a “medium-level” influenza pandemic would range from $71 billion to $167 billion.

Although public health officials are rapidly implementing pandemic preparedness plans on both the …


“It’S The [Tort System], Stupid:” Consumer Deductibles; How To More Equitably Distribute The Risks Of Medical Malpractice And Adequately Compensate Victims Without Statutory Damage Caps., Bradford Luke Ledbetter Feb 2006

“It’S The [Tort System], Stupid:” Consumer Deductibles; How To More Equitably Distribute The Risks Of Medical Malpractice And Adequately Compensate Victims Without Statutory Damage Caps., Bradford Luke Ledbetter

ExpressO

No abstract provided.


An Economic Assessment Of Damage Caps In Medical Malpracitce Litigation Imposed By State Laws And The Implications For Federal Policy And Law, Paul Wazzan Sep 2005

An Economic Assessment Of Damage Caps In Medical Malpracitce Litigation Imposed By State Laws And The Implications For Federal Policy And Law, Paul Wazzan

ExpressO

Many states have implemented laws which limit non-economic (e.g., pain and suffering) damages as a result of medical malpractice. These laws are seen by proponents as reducing medical malpractice insurance costs and preserving access to health care – especially for lower income individuals. Opponents believe that individuals are harmed through being prevented from seeking a full measure of redress for medical malpractice incidents, by reducing access to the court system, and that these laws simply enrich insurance companies and doctors.

Federal lawmakers are currently studying the potential effect of uniform medical malpractice damage limits at the national level. It is …


Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor Sep 2005

Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor

ExpressO

No abstract provided.


Strict Liability For Gatekeepers: A Reply To Professor Coffee, Frank Partnoy Oct 2004

Strict Liability For Gatekeepers: A Reply To Professor Coffee, Frank Partnoy

University of San Diego Law and Economics Research Paper Series

This article responds to a proposal by Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. for a modified form of strict liability for gatekeepers. Professor Coffee’s proposal would convert gatekeepers into insurers, but cap their insurance obligations based on a multiple of the highest annual revenues the gatekeepers recently had received from their wrongdoing clients. My proposal, advanced in 2001, would allow gatekeepers to contract for a percentage of issuer damages, after settlement or judgment, subject to a legislatively-imposed floor. This article compares the proposals and concludes that a contractual system based on a percentage of the issuer’s liability would be preferable to …


Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, Peter Siegelman Jan 2004

Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, Peter Siegelman

Faculty Articles and Papers

The thesis of this Essay is that although theory demonstrates that adverse selection can occur, and some instances have certainly been documented, neither the theoretical models nor the empirical studies provide much support for its widespread importance in insurance markets. The nature of selection pressures turns out to be vastly more complicated than the rhetoric of courts and academic commentators would suggest. And while the economic theory of adverse selection in insurance markets has become enormously sophisticated, much of it is devoted to rarified analysis of the nature and existence of equilibria. It has thus managed to obscure some essential …


Insuring Against Terrorism And Crime, Saul Levmore, Kyle D. Logue May 2003

Insuring Against Terrorism And Crime, Saul Levmore, Kyle D. Logue

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

The attacks of September 11th produced staggering losses of life and property. They also brought forth substantial private insurance payouts, as well as federal relief for the City of New York and for the families of individuals who perished on that day. The losses suffered in and after the attacks, and the structure of the relief effort, have raised questions about the availability of insurance against terrorism, the role of government in providing for, subsidizing, or ensuring the presence of such insurance, and the interaction between relief and the incentives for future precaution taking. In response to such losses, and …


Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, And Insurance, Kyle D. Logue, Ronen Avraham Jan 2003

Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, And Insurance, Kyle D. Logue, Ronen Avraham

Articles

From the beginning of the law and economics movement, normative legal economists have focused almost exclusively on evaluating the efficiency of alternative legal rules. The distributional consequences of legal rules, therefore, have largely been ignored. It is tempting to conclude that legal economists are hostile or indifferent to concerns of distributional fairness. In fact, however, the discipline of economics has a great deal to say about distributional policy. The normative branch of economics, known as welfare economics, has always been deeply concerned with distributional issues. It is not that welfare economists purport to know a priori the "right" or "optimal" …


Insuring Against Terrorism -- And Crime, Saul Levmore, Kyle D. Logue Jan 2003

Insuring Against Terrorism -- And Crime, Saul Levmore, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

The attacks of September 11th produced staggering losses of life and property. They also brought forth substantial private-insurance payouts, as well as federal relief for the City of New York and for the families of individuals who perished on that day. The losses suffered during and after the attacks, and the structure of the relief effort, have raised questions about the availability of insurance against terrorism, the role of government in providing for, subsidizing, or ensuring the presence of such insurance, as well as the interaction between relief and the incentives for taking precautions against similar losses in the future. …


The Genie And The Bottle: Collateral Sources Under The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, Kenneth S. Abraham, Kyle D. Logue Jan 2003

The Genie And The Bottle: Collateral Sources Under The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, Kenneth S. Abraham, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 (the Fund) was part of legislation enacted just eleven days after the terrorist attacks of September 11th in the wake of extraordinary national loss. It is possible, therefore, that the Fund will always be considered an urgent and unique response to the unprecedented events of September 11th. On that view, the character of the Fund will have little longterm policy significance. It is equally possible, however, that the enactment of the Fund will prove to be a seminal moment in the history of tort and compensation law. The Fund adopts a new …


A New Old Look At Terrorism Insurance: Jack Hirshleifer's War Damage Insurance After Fifty Years, Peter Siegelman Jan 2002

A New Old Look At Terrorism Insurance: Jack Hirshleifer's War Damage Insurance After Fifty Years, Peter Siegelman

Faculty Articles and Papers

No abstract provided.


Insurer Moral Hazard In The Workers' Compensation Crisis: Reforming Cost Inflation, Not Rate Suppression, Martha T. Mccluskey Jan 2001

Insurer Moral Hazard In The Workers' Compensation Crisis: Reforming Cost Inflation, Not Rate Suppression, Martha T. Mccluskey

Journal Articles

This article challenges the standard story of the insurance crisis that led to the near-collapse and major reform of a number of states’ workers’ compensation programs in the 1980s and 1990s.

In the prevailing account, insurance costs rose due to expanding costs of benefits for injured workers’, much of which was blamed on wasteful or abusive "moral hazard" by workers and their lawyers and doctors. Because state regulators had substantial power to control insurance rates, this account claims governments tried to suppress prices in the face of rising benefit costs in a misguided attempt to avoid political trade-offs between labor …


An Inconsistently Sensitive Mind: Richard Posner's Celebration Of Insurance Law And Continuing Blind Spots Of Econominalism, Jeffrey W. Stempel Jan 2001

An Inconsistently Sensitive Mind: Richard Posner's Celebration Of Insurance Law And Continuing Blind Spots Of Econominalism, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner is well known for bringing economic analysis to bear on a host of issues, including infamously controversial notions such the market for baby sale. Not surprisingly, Posner's insurance law opinions reflect economics, but perhaps not to the degree one would expect. A review of Posner's 20 years of opinions relating to insurance issues reviews his pragmatic jurisprudence as well. Decisions frequently reflect not only economics but also situational context and considerations of business reality as well as a sophisticated grasp of basic insurance doctrine and contract law. As a general matter, Posner also displays considerably …


The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How The Law Should Respond, Kyle D. Logue Jan 2001

The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How The Law Should Respond, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

This article explores some of the issues raised by the new evidence of underinsurance. Part I explores the initial theoretical question: why do people buy life insurance? Put differently, what function does life insurance serve? Part II provides some background on the life insurance market as it currently exists. Thus, Part II summarizes the major types of life insurance that are currently offered and summarizes the main elements of the current regulatory regime for life insurance companies. Part III then provides support for the claim that households tend to drastically underconsume life insurance. Section A of that Part summarizes the …


Toward A Tax-Based Explanation Of The Liability Insurance Crisis, Kyle D. Logue Sep 1996

Toward A Tax-Based Explanation Of The Liability Insurance Crisis, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

The so-called liability insurance crisis of 1985 and 1986 transformed the way we think about tort law and about liability insurance markets. The crisis phenomena, which first appeared in late 1984 and lasted until mid-1986, consisted of enormous increases in liability insurance premiums and alarming reductions in the availability of certain types of liability coverage. In the two principal liability lines of insurance (Other Liability and Medical Malpractice), premiums increased by hundreds (in some cases thousands) of percentage points in a matter of months. At the same time, the availability of liability insurance contracted sharply. The liability policies that were …


Faculty Spotlight - Kyle D. Logue, Kyle D. Logue Jan 1996

Faculty Spotlight - Kyle D. Logue, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

Most of my teaching and research efforts are currently spent in two general fields of law - taxation and insurance. Which raises an interesting question: Why would a rational person decide to devote a good portion of his academic career to areas of law that many people - lawyers and nonlawyers alike - find painfully boring and unreasonably complicated? The ta and insurance lawyers in the audience, of course, already know the answer - that ta ation and insuran e are e ceptionally interesting topics and that, if one wants to understand how the real world works (in particular, the …


Solving The Judgment-Proof Problem, Kyle D. Logue Jan 1994

Solving The Judgment-Proof Problem, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

A tortfeasor who cannot fully pay for the harms that it causes is said to be "judgment proof." Commentators have long recognized that the existence of judgment-proof tortfeasors seriously undermines the deterrence and insurance goals of tort law. The deterrence goal is undermined because, irrespective of the liability rule, judgment-proof tortfeasors will not fully internalize the costs of the accidents they cause. The insurance goal will be undermined to the extent that the judgment-proof tortfeasor will not be able to compensate fully its victims and that first-party insurance markets do not provide an adequate response. Liability insurance can ameliorate these …


The Economics And Politics Of Emergency Health Care For The Poor: The Patient Dumping Dilemma, Maria O'Brien Hylton Nov 1992

The Economics And Politics Of Emergency Health Care For The Poor: The Patient Dumping Dilemma, Maria O'Brien Hylton

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.