Evidence Commons^™

Expert Evidence: The Gatekeeper Role Of Justice, Victor E. Schwartz

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

No abstract provided.

Assessing Evidence Of Secondary Considerations, Jason Reinecke

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

Evidence, John E. Hall Jr., W. Scott Henwood, Krysta Grymes

Mercer Law Review

In the decade following the adoption of Georgia’s new evidence code, courts throughout the state have analyzed and ruled upon complex issues involving the interpretation of the new rules, along with how to reconcile the new rules with the vast body of existing precedent. This Article discusses continuing interpretations of Georgia’s evidence rules in Title 24 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), for the period of June 1, 2022 through May 31, 2023, specifically delving into: (1) the admissibility of layperson opinion evidence; (2) the admissibilityof “other acts” evidence; and (3) judicial interpretations of “unfairprejudice” in relation to …

The Gptjudge: Justice In A Generative Ai World, Maura R. Grossman, Paul W. Grimm, Daniel G. Brown, Molly (Yiming) Xu

Duke Law & Technology Review

Generative AI (“GenAI”) systems such as ChatGPT recently have developed to the point where they can produce computer-generated text and images that are difficult to differentiate from human-generated text and images. Similarly, evidentiary materials such as documents, videos, and audio recordings that are AI-generated are becoming increasingly difficult to differentiate from those that are not AI-generated. These technological advancements present significant challenges to parties, their counsel, and the courts in determining whether evidence is authentic or fake. Moreover, the explosive proliferation and use of GenAI applications raises concerns about whether litigation costs will dramatically increase as parties are forced to …

Sentencing In An Era Of Plea Bargains, Jeffrey Bellin, Jeenia I. Turner

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The literature offers inconsistent answers to a question that is foundational to criminal law: Who imposes sentences? Traditional narratives place sentencing responsibility in the hands of the judge. Yet, in a country where 95% of criminal convictions come from guilty pleas (not trials), modern American scholars center prosecutors who control plea terms as the deciders of punishment. This Article highlights and seeks to resolve the tension between these conflicting narratives by charting the pathways by which sentences are determined in a system dominated by plea bargains. After reviewing the empirical literature on sentence variation, examining state and federal plea-bargaining rules …

Clemency: A Tool For Extreme And Discriminatory Sentences, Kathryn Miller, Jonathan H. Oberman, Cardozo Criminal Defense Clinic

Cardozo News 2023

This article appeared in the 2023 edition of Cardozo Life magazine.

For Joaquin Winfield, April 7, 2023, will forever be a day to remember. That is when he was granted clemency by New York Gov. Kathy Hochul after serving 26 years in prison for possession of 4.6 ounces of crack. The disparity in sentences given to people from different races for similar crimes has been widely written about in recent years. Winfield was sentenced under the now-repealed Rockefeller Drug Laws of the 1970s and 1980s. He was sentenced to 37.5 years to life, one of the longest prison sentences in …

Brief Of Fourth Amendment Scholars As Amici Curiae In Support Of Defendant-Appellant On The Good Faith Exception Issue, U.S. V. Holcomb, Ninth Circuit Court Of Appeals Docket No. 23-469, David B. Owens, Rachel Nowlin-Sohl, Averill L. Aubrey, Megan Haygood, Kayleigh Mcniel, Michael C. Orehek

Court Briefs

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

When the Fourth Amendment is violated by an unconstitutional search, the suppression of wrongfully obtained evidence (the exclusionary rule) is often the only viable remedy that might deter government overreach and provide some redress for the constitutional violation. Though the Supreme Court has long treated remedial mechanisms as separate from their underlying rights, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and while limited exceptions to the suppression requirement have existed for years, recent expansion of the “good faith exception” in the digital age imposes unprecedented threats to privacy and security.

A porous or expansive view …

The Bharatiya Sakshya Bill, 2023: A New And Unimproved Evidence Act, Kunal Ambasta

Popular Media

The secrecy in drafting the bill to replace the Evidence Act is reminiscent of colonial legislation by committee. The lack of consultation has meant that the interpretative confusions in existing law remain unresolved.

Evidence Law’S Blind Spots, James Macleod

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Binding Hercules: A Proposal For Bench Trials, Maggie Wittlin

Vanderbilt Law Review

If you were a federal judge presiding over a bench trial, you probably would not want the Federal Rules of Evidence to apply to you. Sure, you might want to be insulated from privileged information. But you are, no doubt, capable of cool-headed, rational reasoning, and you have a realistic understanding of how the world works; if you got evidence that was unreliable or easy to overvalue, you could handle it appropriately. But surely, you would have the same desire if you were a juror--it is not your position as a judge that makes you want all the relevant evidence. …

A New Baseline For Character Evidence, Julia Simon-Kerr

Vanderbilt Law Review

Perhaps no rules of evidence are as contested as the rules governing character evidence. To ward off the danger of a fact finder's mistaking evidence of character for evidence of action, the rules exclude much contextual information about the people at the center of the proceeding. This prohibition on character propensity evidence is a bedrock principle of American law. Yet despite its centrality, it is uncertain of both content and application. Contributing to this uncertainty is a definitional lacuna. Although a logical first question in thinking about character evidence is how to define it, the Federal Rules of Evidence have …

Models And Limits Of Federal Rule Of Evidence 609 Reform, Anna Roberts

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Introduction, Edward K. Cheng

Vanderbilt Law Review

Prior to the eighteenth century, cartographers would often fill uncharted areas of maps with sea monsters, other artwork, or even rank speculation-a phenomenon labeled "horror vacui," or fear of empty spaces. For example, in Paolo Forlani's world map of 1565, a yet- to-be-discovered southern continent was depicted with anticipated mountain chains and animals. The possible explanations for horror vacui are varied, but one reason may have been a desire "to hide [the mapmakers'] ignorance." Not until "maps began to be thought of as more purely scientific instruments . . . [did] cartographers . . . restrain their concern about spaces …

Ignorance Of The Rules Of Omission: An Essay On Privilege Law, Rebecca Wexler

Vanderbilt Law Review

Evidentiary privileges--that is, rules that empower people to withhold evidence from legal proceedings-are one thread in a mesh of secrecy powers that control the flow of information in society. They are part and parcel of the laws, rules, norms, and practicalities that determine who can conceal and who can compel, that allocate power based on access to knowledge and its opposite. Despite the significance of privileges and of the harms that they produce, our understanding of this body of law has profound gaps.5 The questions posed above turn out to be more challenging than they might at first appear. Notwithstanding …

How Machines Reveal The Gaps In Evidence Law, Andrea Roth --

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Symposium asks participants to reimagine the Federal Rules of Evidence on the fiftieth anniversary of their effective date. As part of that conversation, this short Essay argues that the Rules of Evidence contain critical gaps in terms of empowering litigants to meaningfully challenge the credibility of evidence. Specifically, the increasing use of machine-generated proof has made clear that evidence law does not offer sufficiently meaningful opportunities to scrutinize conveyances of information whose flaws cannot be exposed through cross-examination. These underscrutinized conveyances include machine-generated output, information conveyed by animals, and statements made by absent hearsay declarants. Even for some witnesses …

On Proving Mabrus And Zorgs, Michael S. Pardo

Vanderbilt Law Review

An unfortunate disconnect exists in modern evidence scholarship. On one hand, a rich literature has explored the process of legal proof in general and legal standards of proof in particular. Call this the "macro level" of legal proof. On the other hand, a rich literature has explored the admissibility rules that regulate the admission or exclusion of particular types of evidence (such as hearsay, character evidence, expert testimony, and so on). Call this the "micro level" of legal proof. Little attention, however, has focused on how the issues discussed in these two distinct strands of evidence scholarship intertwine. One important …

"Pics Or It Didn't Happen" And "Show Me The Receipts": A Folk Evidentiary Rule, Timothy Lau

Vanderbilt Law Review

"Pics or It Didn't Happen," "Show Me the Receipts," and related refrains are frequently encountered in online discussion threads today. They are typically invoked to demand corroboration in support of a claim or to declare from the outset that a claim is supported by some sort of proof In many ways, they are the functional counterpart of legal evidentiary objections in online discussions. They embody a folk evidentiary rule, democratically and organically developed by the people.

The topic of "Pics or It Didn't Happen" is much broader than can be covered in a symposium piece. As such, this Article seeks …

One Size Does Not Fit All: Alternatives To The Federal Rules Of Evidence, Henry Zhuhao Wang

Vanderbilt Law Review

The Federal Rules of Evidence have been so successful that many people equate them to the whole field of evidence law. But this is a false equivalence. Our world is complicated, diversified, and dynamic. So, too, is evidence law, which is like a rainforest in which the Federal Rules are simply the largest tree, not a forest unto themselves. In fact, the Federal Rules of Evidence are limited in their applicability due to three fundamental assumptions: the presence of a jury trial, an adversarial process, and witness oral testimony. The universe of dispute resolution, however, extends far beyond a contour …

The Superfluous Rules Of Evidence, Jeffrey Bellin

Vanderbilt Law Review

There are few American legal codifications as successful as the Federal Rules of Evidence. But this success masks the project's uncertain beginnings. The drafters of the Federal Rules worried that lawmakers would not adopt the new rules and that judges would not follow them. As a result, they included at least thirty rules of evidence that do not, in fact, alter the admissibility of evidence. Instead, these rules: (1) market the rules project, and (2) guide judges away from anticipated errors in applying the (other) nonsuperfluous rules.

Given the superfluous rules' covert mission, it should not be surprising that the …

Evidence-Based Hearsay, Justin Sevier

Vanderbilt Law Review

The hearsay rule initially appears straightforward and sensible. It forbids witnesses from repeating secondhand, untested gossip in court, and who among us prefers to resolve legal disputes through untested gossip? Nonetheless, the rule's unpopularity in the legal profession is well-known and far-reaching. It is almost cliche to say that the rule confounds law students, confuses practicing attorneys, and vexes trial judges, who routinely make incorrect calls at trial with respect to hearsay admissibility. The rule fares no better in the halls of legal academia. Although defenses exist, scholars have unleashed a parade of pejoratives at the rule over the years, …

Race, Gatekeeping, Magical Words, And The Rules Of Evidence, Bennet Capers --

Vanderbilt Law Review

Although it might not be apparent from the Federal Rules of Evidence themselves, or the common law that preceded them, there is a long history in this country of tying evidence-what is deemed relevant, what is deemed trustworthy-to race. And increasingly, evidence scholars are excavating that history. Indeed, not just excavating, but showing how that history has racial effects that continue into the present.

One area that has escaped racialized scrutiny-at least of the type I am interested in-is that of expert testimony. Even in my own work on race and evidence, I have avoided discussion of expert testimony. In …

Models And Limits Of Federal Rule Of Evidence 609 Reform, Anna Roberts

Vanderbilt Law Review

A Symposium focusing on Reimagining the Rules of Evidence at 50 makes one turn to the federal rule that governs one's designated topic--prior conviction impeachment--and think about how that rule could be altered. Part I of this Article does just that, drawing inspiration from state models to propose ways in which the multiple criticisms of the existing federal rule might be addressed. But recent scholarship by Alice Ristroph, focusing on ways in which criminal law scholars talk to their students about "the rules," gives one pause. Ristroph identifies a pedagogical tendency to erase the many humans who turn rules into …

Shifting The Male Gaze Of Evidence, Teneille R. Brown

Vanderbilt Law Review

Rationality is deeply embedded in both the Rules themselves and the ways they are interpreted. David Leonard stated that rationality "lies at the heart of modern evidentiary principles" because relevance itself is "grounded in rationality." Of the many reasons we have evidence rules-to streamline trials, foster legitimacy and predictability, and promote due process-encouraging "rational fact- finding" is often at the top of this list.

In contemporary evidence law the hegemonic goal-of-rationality is "often taken for granted" and can be traced "from Bentham through Wigmore to the present day." It is a "remarkably homogeneous" view that has "dominated legal scholarship for …

Symposium: Reimagining The Rules Of Evidence At 50, Edward K. Cheng

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Prior to the eighteenth century, cartographers would often fill uncharted areas of maps with sea monsters, other artwork, or even rank speculation—a phenomenon labeled “horror vacui,” or fear of empty spaces. For example, in Paolo Forlani’s world map of 1565, a yet to-be-discovered southern continent was depicted with anticipated mountain chains and animals. The possible explanations for horror vacui are varied, but one reason may have been a desire “to hide [the mapmakers’] ignorance.” Not until “maps began to be thought of as more purely scientific instruments . . . [did] cartographers . . . restrain their concern about spaces …

The Superfluous Rules Of Evidence, Jeffrey Bellin

Faculty Publications

There are few American legal codifications as successful as the Federal Rules of Evidence. But this success masks the project’s uncertain beginnings. The drafters of the Federal Rules worried that lawmakers would not adopt the new rules and that judges would not follow them. As a result, they included at least thirty rules of evidence that do not, in fact, alter the admissibility of evidence. Instead, these rules: (1) market the rules project, and (2) guide judges away from anticipated errors in applying the (other) nonsuperfluous rules.

Given the superfluous rules’ covert mission, it should not be surprising that the …

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

Table of Contents

Bending The Rules Of Evidence, Edward K. Cheng, G. Alexander Nunn, Julia Simon-Kerr

Northwestern University Law Review

The evidence rules have well-established, standard textual meanings—meanings that evidence professors teach their law students every year. Yet, despite the rules’ clarity, courts misapply them across a wide array of cases: Judges allow past acts to bypass the propensity prohibition, squeeze hearsay into facially inapplicable exceptions, and poke holes in supposedly ironclad privileges. And that’s just the beginning.

The evidence literature sees these misapplications as mistakes by inept trial judges. This Article takes a very different view. These “mistakes” are often not mistakes at all, but rather instances in which courts are intentionally bending the rules of evidence. Codified evidentiary …

Bending The Rules Of Evidence, Edward K. Cheng, G. Alexander Nunn, Julia Simon-Kerr

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The evidence rules have well-established, standard textual meanings—meanings that evidence professors teach their law students every year. Yet, despite the rules’ clarity, courts misapply them across a wide array of cases: Judges allow past acts to bypass the propensity prohibition, squeeze hearsay into facially inapplicable exceptions, and poke holes in supposedly ironclad privileges. And that’s just the beginning.

The evidence literature sees these misapplications as mistakes by inept trial judges. This Article takes a very different view. These “mistakes” are often not mistakes at all, but rather instances in which courts are intentionally bending the rules of evidence. Codified evidentiary …

Bending The Rules Of Evidence, Edward K. Cheng, G. Alexander Nunn, Julia Simon-Kerr

Faculty Scholarship

The evidence rules have well-established, standard textual meanings—meanings that evidence professors teach their law students every year. Yet, despite the rules’ clarity, courts misapply them across a wide array of cases: Judges allow past acts to bypass the propensity prohibition, squeeze hearsay into facially inapplicable exceptions, and poke holes in supposedly ironclad privileges. And that’s just the beginning.

The evidence literature sees these misapplications as mistakes by inept trial judges. This Article takes a very different view. These “mistakes” are often not mistakes at all, but rather instances in which courts are intentionally bending the rules of evidence. Codified evidentiary …

The Death Knell And The Wild West: Two Dangers Of Domestic Discovery In Foreign Adjudications, Shay M. Collins

Michigan Law Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), parties to foreign legal proceedings can obtain discovery orders from United States federal courts. In other words, if a foreign party needs physical evidence located in—or testimony from a person residing in—the United States to support their claim or defense, they can ask a district court to order the production of that evidence. For almost two decades, § 1782(a) practice has operated as a procedural Wild West. Judges routinely consider § 1782(a) applications ex parte—that is, without giving the parties subject to the resulting discovery orders a chance to oppose them—and grant those applications at …