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Penn State Dickinson Law

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Articles 31 - 60 of 63

Full-Text Articles in Evidence

Identification, Individualization, Uniqueness, David H. Kaye Jan 2009

Identification, Individualization, Uniqueness, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

Criminalists and many forensic scientists concerned with the identification of trace evidence have distinguished between identification and individualization, but they have not distinguished as precisely between individualization and uniqueness. This paper clarifies these terms and discusses the relationships among identification, individualization, and uniqueness in forensic-science evidence.


'False But Highly Persuasive:' How Wrong Were The Probability Estimates In Mcdaniel V. Brown?, David H. Kaye Jan 2009

'False But Highly Persuasive:' How Wrong Were The Probability Estimates In Mcdaniel V. Brown?, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

In McDaniel v. Brown, the Supreme Court will review the use of DNA evidence in a 1994 trial for sexual assault and attempted murder. The Court granted certiorari to consider two procedural issues - the standard of federal postconviction review of a state jury verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, and the district court's decision to allow the prisoner to supplement the record of trials, appeals, and state postconviction proceedings with a geneticist's letter twelve years after the trial.

This essay clarifies the nature and extent of the errors in the presentation of the DNA evidence in Brown. It questions …


Trawling Dna Databases For Partial Matches: What Is The Fbi Afraid Of?, David H. Kaye Jan 2009

Trawling Dna Databases For Partial Matches: What Is The Fbi Afraid Of?, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

DNA evidence is often presented as the “gold standard” for forensic science. But this was not always the case. For years, eminent scientists complained that the estimates of the tiny frequencies of DNA types were unfounded. It took scores of research papers, dozens of judicial opinions, and two committees of the National Academy of Sciences to resolve the dispute by the mid-1990s. Since 2000, however, reports have surfaced of shocking numbers of “partial matches” among samples within large DNA databases, and some scientists have complained that the infinitesimal figures used in court to estimate the probability of a random match …


Rounding Up The Usual Suspects: A Logical And Legal Analysis Of Dna Trawling Cases, David H. Kaye Jan 2009

Rounding Up The Usual Suspects: A Logical And Legal Analysis Of Dna Trawling Cases, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

Courts are beginning to confront a problem that has divided the scientific community - whether identifying a defendant by fishing through a database of DNA types to find a match to a crime-scene sample reduces the significance of a match. For years, the problem seemed academic. Now that the U.S. has more than five million DNA profiles from convicted offenders and suspects in a national, computer-searchable database, the question has assumed more urgency. Increasingly, individuals are being charged with crimes as a result of a match between their recorded profile and the DNA from a victim or scene of a …


Case Comment - People V. Nelson: A Tale Of Two Statistics, David H. Kaye Jan 2008

Case Comment - People V. Nelson: A Tale Of Two Statistics, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, defendants who were identified as a result of a search through a database of DNA profiles have argued that the probability that a randomly selected person would match a crime-scene stain overstates the probative value of the match. The statistical literature is divided, with most statisticians who have written on the subject rejecting this claim. In People v. Nelson, the Supreme Court of California held that when the random-match probability is so small as to make it exceedingly unlikely that any unrelated individual has the incriminating DNA profile, this statistic is admissible in a database-search case. …


Wiretapping And Eavesdropping: Surveillance In The Internet Age, 3rd Ed., Anne T. Mckenna, Clifford S. Fishman Jan 2007

Wiretapping And Eavesdropping: Surveillance In The Internet Age, 3rd Ed., Anne T. Mckenna, Clifford S. Fishman

Books

The third edition of the seminal “Fishman & McKenna” Wiretapping treatise analyzes federal and state law and the rapidly evolving civil and criminal legal issues and privacy issues surrounding the Internet, computers, cellular devices, electronic location tracking, drones, and biometrics. Since its publication, this treatise has been cited in multiple published federal and state judicial opinions, including by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in August 2010 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in August 2014. The third edition is a well-known resource for attorneys working in private practice and in …


Please, Let's Bury The Junk: The Codis Loci And The Revelation Of Private Information, David H. Kaye Jan 2007

Please, Let's Bury The Junk: The Codis Loci And The Revelation Of Private Information, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

This Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy paper describes the four possible ways in which genetic loci could possess predictive or diagnostic value with regard to diseases and explains why these mechanisms have not led, and probably cannot lead, to useful screening tests with the Convicted Offender DNA Index System (CODIS) profiles in national, state, and local databases. It then considers the phenotypes and familial relationships that the CODIS STRs can be used to identify. The profiles carry limited information about an individual's race and familial relationships, and the article places the resulting privacy issues in perspective. Finally, the paper comments …


Revisiting 'Dreyfus': A More Complete Account Of A Trial By Mathematics, David H. Kaye Jan 2007

Revisiting 'Dreyfus': A More Complete Account Of A Trial By Mathematics, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

Legal literature and case law depicts the infamous conviction of Alfred Dreyfus for treason and espionage in 1899 as a prime example of the irresistible power of even grossly fallacious mathematical demonstrations to overwhelm a legal tribunal. This essay shows that Dreyfus is not a case of mathematics run amok, unchecked and uncomprehended. To the contrary, the defects in the mathematical proof were dramatically exposed, and this evidence did not lead Dreyfus's judges to condemn him. This history undercuts the reliance of modern courts and commentators on Dreyfus as an indication or illustration of the alleged dangers of probability evidence …


The Science Of Dna Identification: From The Laboratory To The Courtroom (And Beyond), David H. Kaye Jan 2007

The Science Of Dna Identification: From The Laboratory To The Courtroom (And Beyond), David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

This article focuses on sequences of DNA base-pairs, which are becoming increasingly important in the field of law. These DNA sequences are used by forensic scientists to discover evidence such as blood stains, semen, saliva, and hair, and has become highly useful in the courtroom with regard to exonerating the innocent and convicting the guilty. Part I of the article examines how courts may (or may not) admit DNA evidence in court through four phases: uncritical acceptance; serious challenges to analytical methods and statistical interpretation of the results; renewed acceptance of DNA evidence; and acceptance of advance systems of DNA …


Behavioral Genetics Research And Criminal Dna Databanks, David H. Kaye Jan 2006

Behavioral Genetics Research And Criminal Dna Databanks, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

This article examines the current concerns about whether DNA databases may be used for actions other than to apprehend criminals, such as genetic research, in particular, searching for a "crime gene". Part II considers the perspective that these databases may be useful for research. The information within a DNA sample consists of a limited number of DNA base-pair variations, which are important to identification, but not necessarily to genetic research. However, while it may be difficult to conduct genetic research, it is not impossible. Part III examines state and federal database legislation. There are examples of three states' statutes and …


Jones On Evidence: Civil And Criminal 7th Ed., Anne T. Mckenna, Clifford S. Fishman Jan 2004

Jones On Evidence: Civil And Criminal 7th Ed., Anne T. Mckenna, Clifford S. Fishman

Books

In 2004, Anne began co-authoring this seminal evidence treatise, which is in its second century of publication. Jones on Evidence (“Jones”) currently contains 5 hardbound volumes and a softbound appendix of new chapters with two new hardbound volumes forthcoming. All volumes are updated yearly. Jones enables civil and criminal practitioners in private and public practice to learn and understand evidentiary issues and evidentiary rules, including the Federal Rules of Evidence, and to use evidence effectively, whether the issue is admission, exclusion, preservation or relevance. Jones has been cited in numerous federal and state court opinions and law review …


Dna Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, And The Case For Population-Wide Coverage, David H. Kaye, Michael E. Smith Jan 2003

Dna Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, And The Case For Population-Wide Coverage, David H. Kaye, Michael E. Smith

Faculty Scholarship

Over the past decade, law enforcement authorities have amassed huge collections of DNA samples and the identifying profiles derived from them. Large DNA databanks routinely help to identify the guilty and to exonerate the innocent, but as the databanks grow, so do fears about civil liberties. Perhaps the most controversial policy issue in the creation of these databases is the question of coverage: Whose DNA profiles should be stored in them? The possibilities extend from convicted violent sex offenders to all convicted felons, to everyone arrested, to the entire population. This Article questions the rationales for drawing the line at …


Two Fallacies About Dna Data Banks For Law Enforcement, David H. Kaye Jan 2001

Two Fallacies About Dna Data Banks For Law Enforcement, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

This commentary on the article Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 127 (2001), by Mark Rothstein and Sandra Carnahan, argues that the case for confining law enforcement DNA databases to noncoding loci and to samples from individuals convicted of violent crimes is quite weak.

It describes alternative approaches, including the possibility of a population-wide database; the privacy implications of the loci now used in forensic identification; the law governing DNA dragnets; and the limits on DNA databases imposed by recent cases on searches and seizures. It notes the …


The Dynamics Of Daubert: Methodology, Conclusions, And Fit In Statistical And Econometric Studies, David H. Kaye Jan 2001

The Dynamics Of Daubert: Methodology, Conclusions, And Fit In Statistical And Econometric Studies, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

This paper reviews the development of the law governing the admissibility of statistical studies. It analyzes the leading cases on scientific evidence and suggests that both the "reliability" and the "general acceptance" standards raise two major difficulties - the "boundary problem" of identifying the type of evidence that warrants careful screening and the "usurpation problem" of keeping the trial judge from closing the gate on evidence that should be left for the jury to assess.

The paper proposes partial solutions to these problems, and it applies them to statistical and econometric proof, particularly in the context of a recent antitrust …


The Constitutionality Of Dna Sampling On Arrest, David H. Kaye Jan 2001

The Constitutionality Of Dna Sampling On Arrest, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

Every state now collects DNA from people convicted of certain offenses. Law enforcement authorities promote offender DNA databanking on the theory that it will identify offenders who commit additional crimes while or probation or parole, or after they have finished serving their sentences. Even relatively small databases have yielded such dividends. As these database searches uncover the perpetrators of rapes, murders, and other offenses, the pressure builds to expand the coverage of the databases.

Recent proposals call for extending not merely the scope of crimes for which DNA databanking would be used, but also the point at which the samples …


Choice And Boundary Problems In Logerquist, Hummert, And Kumho Tire, David H. Kaye Jan 2001

Choice And Boundary Problems In Logerquist, Hummert, And Kumho Tire, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

This article, part of a symposium on the opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court in Logerquist v. McVey, questions that court’s rationales for refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to psychiatric testimony about the retrieval of repressed memories. It also challenges the court’s use of a “personal observations” exception to the heightened scrutiny standard of Frye v. United States. It proposes that a better solution to problems of scientific and expert evidence would be to adopt a sliding scale that attends to the use to which the evidence is put and the degree to which it has been shown to be …


Dna Typing: Emerging Or Neglected Issues, David H. Kaye, Edward J. Imwinkelried Jan 2001

Dna Typing: Emerging Or Neglected Issues, David H. Kaye, Edward J. Imwinkelried

Faculty Scholarship

DNA typing has had a major impact on the criminal justice system. There are hundreds of opinions and thousands of cases dealing with DNA evidence. Yet, at virtually every stage of the process, there are important issues that are just emerging or that have been neglected.

At the investigative stage, courts have barely begun to focus on the legal limitations on the power of the police to obtain samples directly from suspects and to use the data from DNA samples in various ways. Issues such as the propriety of "DNA dragnets" (in which large numbers of individuals in a geographic …


How Good Is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under Daubert And Kuhmo, David H. Kaye, David L. Faigman, Michael J. Saks, Joseph Sanders Jan 2000

How Good Is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under Daubert And Kuhmo, David H. Kaye, David L. Faigman, Michael J. Saks, Joseph Sanders

Faculty Scholarship

This essay is a response to Professor Edward Imwinkelried's article, "Should the Courts Incorporate a Best Evidence Rule into the Standard Determining the Admissibility of Scientific Testimony?: Enough is Enough When it is not the Best." The authors have two basic points. First, the authors wish to make it clear that they never proposed the "best evidence rule" that he so vigorously attacks, and they think his suggestion that they did so is strained. Second, they wish to reiterate that courts sometimes should do more than they have to ensure that expert testimony is reasonably sound. The important debate underway …


Dna Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics, And The Courts, David H. Kaye Jan 1993

Dna Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics, And The Courts, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

To help meet the challenge of presenting properly performed DNA tests within the post-Daubert legal framework, this article outlines the statistical procedures that have been employed or proposed to provide judges and juries with quantitative measures of probative value, describes more fully how the courts have dealt with these procedures, and evaluates the opinions and the statistical analyses from the standpoint of the law of evidence.

Specifically, the article outlines the procedure used to declare whether two samples of DNA "match," and how shrinking the size of the "match window," as some defendants have urged, will decrease the risk of …


Proof In Law And Science, David H. Kaye Jan 1992

Proof In Law And Science, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

This article addresses proof in both science and law. Both disciplines utilize proof of facts and proof of theories, but for different purposes and, consequently, in different ways. Some similarities exist, however, in how both disciplines use a series of premises followed by a conclusion to form an argument, and thus constitute a logic. This article analyzes the ways in which legal logic and scientific logic differ. Finding facts in law involves the same logic but quite different procedures than scientific fact-finding. Finding, or rather constructing, the law is also very different from scientific theorizing. But such differences do not …


Credal Probability, David H. Kaye Jan 1991

Credal Probability, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

This article responds to Paul Bergman and Al Moore's doubt that ideal triers of facts would be Bayesians. They argue that Bayes' rule, and probability theory in general, fails as a theoretical factfinding model. While probability has long been an accepted measure of belief in empirical propositions and the validity of inductive arguments, this articles addresses Bergman and Moore's doubts directly. It shows how their examples demonstrating the "frequentist" character of Bayesian methodology or the fallacies in Bayesian analysis are easily handled without a frequentist interpretation of probability. Then it shows that an ideal juror's partial beliefs will conform to …


Evidence Engendered, Kit Kinports Jan 1991

Evidence Engendered, Kit Kinports

Faculty Scholarship

Part I of this article briefly describes feminist legal theory and its evolution. Part II then discusses the extent to which evidence as a whole is a gendered topic that reflects predominantly male traits and ideals, and Part III analyzes various specific evidentiary doctrines from a feminist perspective. Finally, Part IV examines way of incorporating feminist theories in teaching an evidence course.


The Admissibility Of Dna Evidence, David H. Kaye Jan 1991

The Admissibility Of Dna Evidence, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

In contrast to the widespread acceptance of red blood cell grouping, blood serum protein and enzyme analysis, and HLA typing, the evidentiary status of forensic applications of recombinant-DNA technology is in flux. A proper evidentiary analysis must attend to the fact that there is no single method of DNA typing. As with the more established genetic tests, the probative value of the laboratory findings depends both on the procedure employed and the genetic characteristics that are discerned. This paper describes some of these procedures and the theory that lies behind them, and then considers the developing case law. Given the …


The Unsolved Problem In Taking Evidence Abroad: The Non-Rule Of Aerospatiale, William L. Wilks, Nancy E. Goldberg Jan 1988

The Unsolved Problem In Taking Evidence Abroad: The Non-Rule Of Aerospatiale, William L. Wilks, Nancy E. Goldberg

Penn State International Law Review (1982 - 2011)

In the Aerospatiale decision, the United States Supreme Court attempts to define the powers of American courts to compel discovery from foreign litigants in those courts, in light of the Hague Evidence Convention. This article initially examines the various interpretations of the Convention used to solve the "apples/oranges" problem, encountered by litigants from different nations and incompatible jurisprudential systems, when they seek to obtain evidence located outside the U.S. or in the control of a foreign litigant. The Court's response to this problem is later addressed by an analysis of its decision, which seems to confuse the situation further, for …


What Is Bayesianism? A Guide For The Perplexed, David H. Kaye Jan 1988

What Is Bayesianism? A Guide For The Perplexed, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

Bayes' Theorem, Bayesian statistics and Bayesian inference have been the subject of sharp dispute in various writings about legal rules of evidence and proof. This article disentangles the many meanings of "Bayesianism." It sketches several competing interpretations of probability, some leading schools of statistical inference, and the elements of Bayesian decision theory. In the process, it notes the aspects of Bayesian theory that have been applied in studies of forensic proof.


Plemel As A Primer On Proving Paternity, David H. Kaye Jan 1988

Plemel As A Primer On Proving Paternity, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

Although in the past courts only permitted genetic evidence in paternity suits to prove that an accused man was not the father, with the advent of new genetic tests, which easily can exclude ninety to nitey-five percent of the population in most cases, the supreme courts of Massachusetts, Oregon, and Utah have held that various genetic tests may be used to prove paternity. While a positive move, the admissibility of genetic proof of paternity raises serious questions as to the manner in which this evidence should be presented in court. In the interests of efficiency, some jurisdictions seem to dispense …


The Validity Of Tests: Caveant Omnes, David H. Kaye Jan 1987

The Validity Of Tests: Caveant Omnes, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

A great debate swirls about the use of polygraph tests in criminal cases. Similar concerns about individual privacy and freedom arise with proposals and projects involving widespread testing of government employees for drugs and deception. Required diagnostic testing for certain diseases - most notoriously, for AIDS - raises similar concerns. Incorrect conclusions about who has taken illicit drugs, who has AIDS, and who is lying can be devastating. Yet, perfect knowledge is unattainable. Errors are inevitable. Questions of what the tendency is for these tests to err, which measures are appropriate for deciding whether to use a screening test, and …


Do We Need A Calculus Of Weight To Understand Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt?, David H. Kaye Jan 1986

Do We Need A Calculus Of Weight To Understand Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt?, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

The commentary on a paper by L.J. Cohen, prepared for a symposium on probability and inference in the law of evidence, shows that the legal requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt can be understood simply as demanding a sufficiently high probability that the prosecution's narrative or story of the facts, which captures all the elements of the offense, is true. No separate measure of the "weight" of the totality of the evidence is required to understand the burden of persuasion. Any incompleteness in the evidence can be accounted for by a conditional probability that includes the presence of any …


Is Proof Of Statistical Significance Relevant?, David H. Kaye Jan 1986

Is Proof Of Statistical Significance Relevant?, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

The classic treatises on evidence note that the court or jury must weigh the evidence, and upon weighing it, determine whether the plaintiff or the defendant prevails. Some courts, however, have indicated that statistical evidence should not be admitted unless it is subjected to a procedure known as 'hypothesis testing.' There are many rather mechanical procedures for performing these tests and a number of judges, attorneys, and law professors have suggested that hypothesis testing provides an objective, scientific means of settling disputed questions on which statistical evidence is brought to bear. Yet, many circumstances arise in which courts or administrators …


Statistical Significance And The Burden Of Persuasion, David H. Kaye Jan 1983

Statistical Significance And The Burden Of Persuasion, David H. Kaye

Faculty Scholarship

In most endeavors concerned with the acquisition of knowledge, quantitative information is welcomed. In law, however, it appears sometimes that scientific or numerical evidence makes cases harder, not easier. Nevertheless, there are many cases and administrative proceedings, in such areas as environmental law, food and drug regulation, and civil rights, in which statistical data obtained by observation or experiment are readily accepted as assisting in the proper resolution of disputed issues of fact. When courts or administrators confront scientific and statistical evidence in these proceedings, they are not always certain of how to weigh the evidence or whether they should …