Evidence Commons^™

Crawford, Davis, And Way Beyond, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

Until 1965, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution hardly mattered. It was not applicable against the states, and therefore had no role whatsoever in the vast majority of prosecutions. Moreover, if a federal court was inclined to exclude evidence of an out-of-court statement, it made little practical difference whether the court termed the statement hearsay or held that the evidence did not comply with the Confrontation Clause.

Child Statements In A Post-Crawford World: What The United States Supreme Court Failed To Consider With Regard To Child Victims And Witnesses, Allie Phillips

ExpressO

With the issuance of Crawford v. Washington, 514 U.S. 36 (2004), by the United States Supreme Court on March 8, 2004, wide spread confusion and concern swept through the nation’s prosecutorial community. The new rule announced in Crawford created too many questions and provided few answers by the Court. In particular, anxiety arose from the child protection community in regard to one primary issue: Are forensic interviews of child victims and witnesses, and other statements made by children, considered “testimonial statements” according to Crawford, thus requiring the child to take the witness stand? The Court further confused the new rule …

Daubert And The Disappearing Jury Trial, Allan Kanner

ExpressO

Since being decided by the Supreme Court in 1993, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals has earned its place as one of the most misinterpreted and misapplied decisions in modern history. Meant to liberalize the standards for admissions of proof, the decision has had the opposite effect. The gatekeeper powers given to judges via Daubert, coupled with the internal and external incentives to prevent jury trials, has placed our entire civil justice system at risk.

A Complete Property Right Amendment, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

The trend of the eminent domain reform and "Kelo plus" initiatives is toward a comprehensive Constitutional property right incorporating the elements of level of review, nature of government action, and extent of compensation. This article contains a draft amendment which reflects these concerns.

Keynote Address: Secret Evidence In The Age Of National Security, Adam Liptak

Cardozo Public Law, Policy & Ethics Journal

The article explores the tension between national security and the First Amendment, arguing that while the First Amendment remains a robust protection against government censorship, recent trends threaten press freedom, particularly in protecting confidential sources and accessing information. The author, drawing on personal experience as a media lawyer and reporter, emphasizes the importance of procedural safeguards and judicial oversight to prevent government overreach and ensure transparency.

Conversational Standing: A New Approach To An Old Privacy Problem, Christopher M. Drake

ExpressO

American society has long considered certain conversations private amongst the participants in those conversations. In other words, when two or more people are conversing in a variety of settings and through a variety of media, there are times when all parties to the conversation can reasonably expect freedom from improper government intrusion, whether through direct participation or secret monitoring. This shared expectation of privacy has been slow to gain judicial recognition. Courts have indicated that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution only protects certain elements of the conversation, such as where and how it takes place, but that …

Bond Repudiation, Tax Codes, The Appropriations Process And Restitution Post-Eminent Domain Reform, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

This brief comment suggests where the anti-eminent domain movement might be heading next.

Zoning And Eminent Domain Under The New Minimum Scrutiny, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

Recently the Supreme Court has made it clearer that minimum scrutiny is a factual analysis. Whether in any government action there is a rational relation to a legitimate interest is a matter of determining whether there is a policy maintaining important facts. This has come about in the Court’s emerging emphasis on developing fact-based criteria for determining government purpose. Thus, those who want to affect zoning and eminent domain outcomes should look to what the Court sees as important facts, and whether government action is maintaining those facts with its proposed land use or eminent domain action.

Yissacharov V. Chief Military Prosecutor, Dorit Beinisch, Aharon Barak, Eliezer Rivlin, Ayala Procaccia, Edmond E. Levy, Miriam Naor, Salim Joubran, Mishael Cheshin, Asher Grunis

Translated Opinions

Facts: While being admitted into prison for being absent from the army without leave, the appellant was found to have a dangerous drug in his possession. When he was interrogated about this, the interrogator failed to advise the appellant that he had a right to consult a lawyer. This omission, which was omitted by the prosecution, was held by the trial court to have been illegal and intentional. In the course of the interrogation, the appellant confessed that he had, on three occasions while he was a soldier, made use of dangerous drugs.

The appellant argued that the confession should …

Finding New Constitutional Rights Through The Supreme Court’S Evolving “Government Purpose” Test Under Minimum Scrutiny, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

By now we all are familiar with the litany of cases which refused to find elevated scrutiny for so-called “affirmative” or “social” rights such as education, welfare or housing: Lindsey v. Normet, San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, Dandridge v. Williams, DeShaney v. Winnebago County. There didn’t seem to be anything in minimum scrutiny which could protect such facts as education or housing, from government action. However, unobtrusively and over the years, the Supreme Court has clarified and articulated one aspect of minimum scrutiny which holds promise for vindicating facts. You will recall that under minimum scrutiny government’s action is …

Using Capture Theory And Chronology In Eminent Domain Proceedings, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

Capture theory--in which private purpose is substituted for government purpose--sheds light on a technique which is coming into greater use post-Kelo v. New London. That case affirmed that eminent domain use need only be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Capture theory focuses litigators' attention on "government purpose." That is a question of fact for the trier of fact. This article shows how to use civil discovery in order to show the Court that private purpose has been substituted for government purpose. If it has, the eminent domain use fails, because the use does not meet minimum scrutiny. This …

Confrontation, Equity, And The Misnamed Exception For "Forfeiture" By Wrongdoing, James F. Flanagan

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

No abstract provided.

Fixing The Constable's Blunder: Can One Trial Judge In One County In One State Nudge A Nation Beyond The Exclusionary Rule?, H. Mitchell Caldwell

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Manson V. Brathwaite: The Supreme Court's Misunderstanding Of Eyewitness Identification, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 539 (2006), Ruth Yacona

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Dostoyevsky And The Therapeutic Jurisprudence Confession, 40 J. Marshall L. Rev. 41 (2006), Amy D. Ronner

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, And The Supreme Court: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Joan S. Meier

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The Supreme Court’s consolidated decision in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana offers something for everyone: by “splitting the difference” between the two cases—affirming one and reversing the other—the opinion provides much grist for advocates’ mills on both sides of this issue. While advocates for defendants’ rights are celebrating the opinion’s continued revitalization of the right to confrontation, which began in Crawford v. Washington, advocates for victims have cause for celebration as well: the decision is notable for its reflection of the Court’s growing—albeit incomplete— awareness and understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence and their implications for justice. …

Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana, Andrew C. Fine

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Clarification of the Supreme Court’s newly minted interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was desperately needed, and Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana promised to provide it. Two terms earlier, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court had worked a revolutionary transformation of Confrontation Clause analysis by overruling Ohio v. Roberts and severing the link between hearsay jurisprudence and the Clause. Crawford was hailed by the criminal defense bar, since it seemed to presage a sharp reduction in the frequency of so-called “victimless” trials by holding that “testimonial” hearsay, no matter how reliable, was constitutionally inadmissible in the absence of …

Davis And Hammon: A Step Forward, Or A Step Back?, Tom Lininger

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and lower court judges hoped that the Supreme Court’s ruling in the consolidated cases of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereafter simply Davis) would provide a primer on testimonial hearsay. In retrospect, these hopes were somewhat unrealistic. The Davis ruling could not possibly clear up all the confusion that followed Crawford v. Washington, the landmark 2004 case in which the Court strengthened the right of the accused to confront declarants of testimonial hearsay. In Davis, the Court focused on the facts under review and developed a taxonomy that will be useful in similar cases, but …

Still "Left In The Dark": The Confrontation Clause And Child Abuse Cases After Davis V. Washington, Anthony J. Franze, Jacob E. Smiles

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In his concurring opinion in Crawford v. Washington, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for holding that the Confrontation Clause applies to “testimonial” statements but leaving for “another day” any effort to define sufficiently what “testimonial” means. Prosecutors and defendants, he said, “should not be left in the dark in this manner.” Over the next two years, both sides grappled with the meaning of testimonial, each gleaning import from sections of Crawford that seemingly proved their test was the right one. When the Court granted certiorari in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereinafter Davis), hopes were high that …

Circling Around The Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not A Robust Right, Lisa Kern Griffin

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The Supreme Court’s consolidated ruling in United States v. Davis and United States v. Hammon is a classic of the genre of consensus opinions to which the Roberts Court aspired in its first, transitional term. The opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, contains practical accommodations unusual in a decision by the Court’s fiercest proponent of first principles. The restraint that characterized the term is, of course, more about considerations of logistics (including the desire to avoid re-arguments after the mid-term replacement of Justice O’Connor) than about the alignment of logic. Because it reflects temporary institutional constraints rather than intellectual agreement, the …

Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana: Beating Expectations, Robert P. Mosteller

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

I begin with a question of effectiveness: does the new Confrontation Clause doctrine effectively protect defendants with respect to the most im-portant types of problematic out-of-court statements? Although they leave much room for the introduction of hearsay in the immediate aftermath of crime generally, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (together hereinafter Davis) are better opinions from that broad perspective than I had feared. The new doctrine now covers and provides substantial procedural protection for a very important class of problematic hearsay—statements made to government agents investigating past crime.

Dickerson V. United States: The Case That Disappointed Miranda's Critics - And Then Its Supporters, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

It is difficult, if not impossible, to discuss Dickerson1 intelligently without discussing Miranda whose constitutional status Dickerson reaffirmed (or, one might say, resuscitated). It is also difficult, if not impossible, to discuss the Dickerson case intelligently without discussing cases the Court has handed down in the five years since Dickerson was decided. The hard truth is that in those five years the reaffirmation of Miranda's constitutional status has become less and less meaningful. In this chapter I focus on the Court's characterization of statements elicited in violation of the Miranda warnings as not actually "coerced" or "compelled" but obtained merely …

We Really (For The Most Part) Mean It!, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

I closed my petition for certiorari in Hammon v. Indiana by declaring, “ ‘We really mean it!’ is the message that lower courts need to hear, and that decision of this case can send.” The prior year, Crawford v. Washington had transformed the law of the Confrontation Clause, holding that an out-ofcourt statement that is testimonial in nature may be admitted against an accused only if the maker of the statement is unavailable and the accused has had an opportunity to cross-examine her. But Crawford deliberately left undetermined what the term “testimonial” meant. Many lower courts gave it a grudging …

Leakers, Bloggers, And Fourth Estate Inmates: The Misguided Pursuit Of A Reporter's Privilege, Randall D. Eliason

Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Crawford At Two: Testimonial Hearsay And The Confrontation Clause, H. Patrick Furman

Publications

This article addresses the response of Colorado courts, and that of certain other jurisdictions, to the 2004 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Crawford v. Washington.

Miranda's Reprieve: How Rehnquist Spared The Landmark Confession Case, But Weakened Its Impact, Yale Kamisar

Articles

June marks the 40th anniversary of one of the most praised, most maligned-and probably one of the most misunderstood-U.S. Supreme Court cases in American history, Miranda v. Arizona. The opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren conditions police questioning of people in custody on the giving of warnings about the right to remain silent, the right to counsel and the waiver of those rights. 384 U.S. 436. This ruling represents a compromise of sorts between the former elusive, ambiguous and subjective voluntariness/totality-of-the-circumstances test and extreme proposals that would have eliminated police interrogation altogether. But William H. Rehnquist didn't see Miranda that …

Videotaped Confessions And The Genre Of Documentary, Jessica Silbey

Faculty Scholarship

This essay begins the exploration of two contemporary and related film trends: the recent popular enthusiasm over the previously arty documentary film and the mandatory filming of custodial interrogations and confessions.

The history and criticism of documentary film, indeed contemporary movie-going, understands the documentary genre as political and social advocacy (recent examples are Michael Moore's Farenheit 9/11 and Errol Morris's Fog of War). Judges, advocates, and legislatures, however, assume that films of custodial interrogations and confessions reveal a truth and lack a distorting point of view. As this Article explains, the trend at law, although aimed at furthering venerable criminal …

Using Suppression Hearing Testimony To Prove Good Faith Under United States V. Leon, John E. Taylor

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

True Lies: The Constitutional And Evidentiary Bases For Admitting Prior False Accusation Evidence In Sexual Assault Prosecutions, Jules Epstein

ExpressO

The admission of false accusation evidence in sexual assault prosecutions has been ruled on inconsistently by courts nationally. This article identifies the constitutional bases for admitting false accusation evidence as both impeachment and substantive (non-character) proof, and re-focuses Confrontation Clause analysis post-Crawford on the scope of the cross-examination right; offers a definition for what constitutes a false accusation and the level of proof requisite to its admission; and addresses social and policy concerns attendant to its presentation.