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Articles 61 - 90 of 236
Full-Text Articles in Criminal Procedure
Cross-Examination Earlier Or Later: When Is It Enough To Satisfy Crawford?, Christopher B. Mueller
Cross-Examination Earlier Or Later: When Is It Enough To Satisfy Crawford?, Christopher B. Mueller
Publications
No abstract provided.
Crawford And Davis: A Personal Reflection, Richard D. Friedman
Crawford And Davis: A Personal Reflection, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
I have to say that when I stood up to argue Hammon I felt the wind at my back. I was basically a lawyer with an easy case, and there wasn't anything particularly unpredictable at the argument of Hammon. Now it got a little bit interesting, as I will explain later, because to a certain extent I was trying to argue the other case as well. But Hammon itself was sort of ordinary, normal law.
Holmes V. South Carolina Upholds Trial By Jury, Samuel R. Gross
Holmes V. South Carolina Upholds Trial By Jury, Samuel R. Gross
Articles
Bobby Lee Holmes was convicted of a brutal rape-murder and sentenced to death. The only evidence that connected him to the crime was forensic: a palm print, and blood and fiber evidence. (Biological samples taken from the victim for two rape kits were compromised and yielded no identifiable evidence.) Holmes claimed that the state's forensic evidence was planted and mishandled, and that the rape and murder were committed by another man, Jimmy McCaw White. At a pretrial hearing three witnesses testified that they saw White near the victim's house at about the time of the crime, and four others testified …
Crawford, Davis, And Way Beyond, Richard D. Friedman
Crawford, Davis, And Way Beyond, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
Until 1965, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution hardly mattered. It was not applicable against the states, and therefore had no role whatsoever in the vast majority of prosecutions. Moreover, if a federal court was inclined to exclude evidence of an out-of-court statement, it made little practical difference whether the court termed the statement hearsay or held that the evidence did not comply with the Confrontation Clause.
Structural Reform In Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims, Eve Brensike Primus
Structural Reform In Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims, Eve Brensike Primus
Articles
This Article suggests a structural reform that could solve two different problems in criminal defense representation. The first problem is that the right to effective trial counsel lacks a meaningful remedy. Defendants are generally not permitted to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims until collateral review. Given that collateral review typically occurs years after trial, most convicted defendants have completed their sentences by that time and therefore have little incentive to pursue ineffectiveness claims. Moreover, there is no right to counsel on collateral review, and it is unrealistic to expect defendants to navigate the complicated terrain of an ineffectiveness claim …
On The Fortieth Anniversary Of The Miranda Case: Why We Needed It, How We Got It--And What Happened To It, Yale Kamisar
On The Fortieth Anniversary Of The Miranda Case: Why We Needed It, How We Got It--And What Happened To It, Yale Kamisar
Articles
Last year (the year I gave the talk on which this article is based) marked the fortieth anniversary of Miranda v. Arizona,' one of the most praised, most maligned-and probably one of the most misunderstood-Supreme Court cases in American history. It is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate Miranda without looking back at the test for the admissibility of confessions that preceded it.
Forfeiture Of The Confrontation Right After Crawford And Davis, Richard D. Friedman
Forfeiture Of The Confrontation Right After Crawford And Davis, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
So my topic this morning is on forfeiture of the confrontation right, which I think plays a central role in confrontation doctrine. And to try to present that, let me state the entirety of confrontation doctrine as briefly as I can. This is, at least, what I think the doctrine is and what it can be: A testimonial statement should not be admissible against an accused to prove the truth of what it asserts unless the accused either has had or will have an opportunity to confront the witness-which should occur at trial unless the witness is then unavailable-or has …
Section 5: Criminal Procedure, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Section 5: Criminal Procedure, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Supreme Court Preview
No abstract provided.
Stevens's Ratchet: When The Court Should Decide Not To Decide, Joel A. Flaxman
Stevens's Ratchet: When The Court Should Decide Not To Decide, Joel A. Flaxman
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Hidden underneath the racy death penalty issues in Kansas v. Marsh lurks a seemingly dull procedural issue addressed only in separate opinions by Justices Stevens and Scalia: whether the Court should have heard the case in the first place. As he did in three cases from the Court’s 2005 term, Justice Stevens argued in Marsh that the Court has no legitimate interest in reviewing state court decisions that overprotect federal constitutional rights. Instead, the Supreme Court should exercise its certiorari power to tip the scales against states and in favor of individuals. Granting certiorari in Marsh, Stevens argued, was not …
The High Court Remains As Divided As Ever Over The Death Penalty, George H. Kendall
The High Court Remains As Divided As Ever Over The Death Penalty, George H. Kendall
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
More than three decades ago, in Furman v. Georgia, a sharply divided Supreme Court struck down all existing capital punishment schemes be-cause the results they generated were arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasoned. No member of that Court remains on the Court today, and the Court has grown increasingly conservative ever since. Nevertheless, impor-tant questions concerning the administration of capital punishment continue to wrought deep divisions within the Court, for instance in determining whether racial bias influences the system, in determining the sufficiency of new evidence of innocence to justify review of a defaulted claim in habeas corpus proceedings, in determining a …
Putting The Guesswork Back Into Capital Sentencing, Sean D. O'Brien
Putting The Guesswork Back Into Capital Sentencing, Sean D. O'Brien
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court deemed it “incon-testable” that a death sentence is cruel and unusual if inflicted “by reason of [the defendant’s] race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.” Arbitrary and discriminatory patterns in capital sentencing moved the Court to strike down death penalty statutes that required judges or juries to cast thumbs-up or thumbs-down verdicts against offenders found guilty of capi-tal crimes. The issue of innocence was barely a footnote in Furman; the Court’s concerns focused on …
The Revolution Enters The Court: The Constitutional Significance Of Wrongful Convictions In Contemporary Constitutional Regulation Of The Death Penalty, Jordan Steiker
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Over the last decade, the most important events in American death pen-alty law have occurred outside the courts. The discovery of numerous wrongfully convicted death-sentenced inmates in Illinois led to the most substantial reflection on the American death penalty system since the late 1960s and early 1970s. Former Illinois Governor George Ryan, a Republi-can, first declared a moratorium on executions in 2000 and eventually commuted all 167 inmates on Illinois’s death row in 2003. The events in Illinois reverberated nationwide. Almost overnight, state legislative agendas shifted from expanding or maintaining the prevailing reach of the death penalty to studying its …
Legitimizing Error, Rebecca E. Woodman
Legitimizing Error, Rebecca E. Woodman
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Since Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court has sought to harmonize competing constitutional demands under Eighth Amendment rules regulat-ing the two-step eligibility and selection stages of the capital decision-making process. Furman’s demand for rationality and consistency requires that, at the eligibility stage, the sentencer’s discretion be limited and guided by clear and objective fact-based standards that rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. The selection stage requires a determination of whether a specific death-eligible defendant actually deserves that punish-ment, as distinguished from other death-eligible defendants. Here, fundamental fairness and respect for the uniqueness of the individual are the cornerstones of …
Dickerson V. United States: The Case That Disappointed Miranda's Critics - And Then Its Supporters, Yale Kamisar
Dickerson V. United States: The Case That Disappointed Miranda's Critics - And Then Its Supporters, Yale Kamisar
Book Chapters
It is difficult, if not impossible, to discuss Dickerson1 intelligently without discussing Miranda whose constitutional status Dickerson reaffirmed (or, one might say, resuscitated). It is also difficult, if not impossible, to discuss the Dickerson case intelligently without discussing cases the Court has handed down in the five years since Dickerson was decided. The hard truth is that in those five years the reaffirmation of Miranda's constitutional status has become less and less meaningful. In this chapter I focus on the Court's characterization of statements elicited in violation of the Miranda warnings as not actually "coerced" or "compelled" but obtained merely …
Miranda's Reprieve: How Rehnquist Spared The Landmark Confession Case, But Weakened Its Impact, Yale Kamisar
Miranda's Reprieve: How Rehnquist Spared The Landmark Confession Case, But Weakened Its Impact, Yale Kamisar
Articles
June marks the 40th anniversary of one of the most praised, most maligned-and probably one of the most misunderstood-U.S. Supreme Court cases in American history, Miranda v. Arizona. The opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren conditions police questioning of people in custody on the giving of warnings about the right to remain silent, the right to counsel and the waiver of those rights. 384 U.S. 436. This ruling represents a compromise of sorts between the former elusive, ambiguous and subjective voluntariness/totality-of-the-circumstances test and extreme proposals that would have eliminated police interrogation altogether. But William H. Rehnquist didn't see Miranda that …
We Really (For The Most Part) Mean It!, Richard D. Friedman
We Really (For The Most Part) Mean It!, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
I closed my petition for certiorari in Hammon v. Indiana by declaring, “ ‘We really mean it!’ is the message that lower courts need to hear, and that decision of this case can send.” The prior year, Crawford v. Washington had transformed the law of the Confrontation Clause, holding that an out-ofcourt statement that is testimonial in nature may be admitted against an accused only if the maker of the statement is unavailable and the accused has had an opportunity to cross-examine her. But Crawford deliberately left undetermined what the term “testimonial” meant. Many lower courts gave it a grudging …
Souter Passant, Scalia Rampant: Combat In The Marsh, Samuel R. Gross
Souter Passant, Scalia Rampant: Combat In The Marsh, Samuel R. Gross
Articles
Kansas law provides that unless a capital sentencing jury concludes that the mitigating factors that apply to the defendant’s crime outweigh the aggravating factors, it must sentence the defendant to death. The Kansas Supreme Court held that this law violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because it “impermissibly mandates the death penalty when the jury finds that the mitigating and aggravating circumstances are in equipoise.” On June 26, in Kansas v. Marsh, the Supreme Court reversed in a 5 to 4 opinion by Justice Thomas.
Signatures Of Ideology: The Case Of The Supreme Court's Criminal Docket, Ward Farnsworth
Signatures Of Ideology: The Case Of The Supreme Court's Criminal Docket, Ward Farnsworth
Michigan Law Review
Everyone suspects that Supreme Court justices' own views of policy play a part in their decisions, but the size and nature of the part is a matter of vague impression and frequent dispute. Do their preferences exert some pressure at the margin or are they better viewed as the mainsprings of decision? The latter claim, identified with legal realism, has been lent some support by political scientists who point out that some justices regularly vote for or against certain kinds of claims (for example, under the Fourth Amendment), or that votes in some areas are broadly predictable according to a …
Section 7: Criminal Procedure, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Section 7: Criminal Procedure, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Supreme Court Preview
No abstract provided.
Earl Warren: Law Enforcement Leads To Defendants' Rights, Yale Kamisar
Earl Warren: Law Enforcement Leads To Defendants' Rights, Yale Kamisar
Articles
Before becoming governor of California, Earl Warren spent 22 years in law enforcement: five as a deputy district attorney (1920- 25); thirteen as head of the Alameda County district attorney's office (1925-38); and four as state attorney general (1939-42). My thesis is that Warren's many years in law enforcement significantly affected his work as Chief Justice of the United States.
Confrontation After Crawford, Richard D. Friedman
Confrontation After Crawford, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
The following edit excerpt, drawn from "The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed," 2003-04 Cato Supreme Court Review 439 (2004), by Law School Professor Richard D. Friedman, discusses the impact, effects, and questions generated by the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Crawford v. Washington last year that a defendant is entitled to confront and cross-examine any testimonial statement presented against him. In Crawford, the defendant, charged with attacking another man with a knife, contested the trial court's admission of a tape-recorded statement his wife made to police without giving him the opportunity to cross-examine. The tiral court admitted the statement, and …
Taking Miranda's Pulse, William T. Pizzi, Morris B. Hoffman
Taking Miranda's Pulse, William T. Pizzi, Morris B. Hoffman
Publications
No abstract provided.
How Earl Warren's Twenty-Two Years In Law Enforcement Affected His Work As Chief Justice, Yale Kamisar
How Earl Warren's Twenty-Two Years In Law Enforcement Affected His Work As Chief Justice, Yale Kamisar
Articles
Before becoming governor of California, Earl Warren had spent his entire legal career, twenty-two years, in law enforcement. Professor Kamisar maintains that this experience significantly influenced Warren's work as a Supreme Court justice and gave him a unique perspective into police interrogation and other police practices. This article discusses some of Warren's experiences in law enforcement and searches for evidence of that experience in Warren's opinions. For example, when Warren was head of the Alameda County District Attorney's Office, he and his deputies not only relied on confessions in many homicide cases but also themselves interrogated homicide suspects. The seeds …
Crawford Surprises: Mostly Unpleasant, Richard D. Friedman
Crawford Surprises: Mostly Unpleasant, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
Crawford v. Washington should not have been surprising. The Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The doctrine of Ohio v. Roberts, treating the clause as a general proscription against the admission of hearsay-except hearsay that fits within a "firmly rooted" exception or is otherwise deemed reliable-had so little to do with the constitutional text, or with the history or principle behind it, that eventually it was bound to be discarded. And the appeal of a testimonial approach to the clause seemed sufficiently strong to yield high hopes that ultimately the …
Grappling With The Meaning Of 'Testimonial', Richard D. Friedman
Grappling With The Meaning Of 'Testimonial', Richard D. Friedman
Articles
Crawford v. Washington, has adopted a testimonial approach to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Under this approach, a statement that is deemed to be testimonial in nature may not be introduced at trial against an accused unless he has had an opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the statement and that person is unavailable to testify at trial. If a statement is not deemed to be testimonial, then the Confrontation Clause poses little if any obstacle to its admission.2 A great deal therefore now rides on the meaning of the word "testimonial."
Section 5: Criminal Procedure, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Section 5: Criminal Procedure, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School
Supreme Court Preview
No abstract provided.
Adjusting To Crawford: High Court Decision Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, Richard D. Friedman
Adjusting To Crawford: High Court Decision Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
In Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court radically transformed its doctrine governing the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Craitiord is a very positive development, restoring to its central position one of the basic protections of the common law system of criminal justice. But the decision leaves many open questions, and all lawyers involved in the criminal justice process will have to adjust to the new regime that it creates. This article outlines and summarizes the problems with the law as it stood before Crait/brd. It then explains the theoretical …
Yale Kamisar: Warrior Scholar, Francis A. Allen
Yale Kamisar: Warrior Scholar, Francis A. Allen
Michigan Law Review
My association with Yale Kamisar dates back to the 1950s. At that time I became aware of the interesting publications of a young faculty member at the University of Minnesota. The articles were well done, most of them dealing with the Supreme Court's notable expansion of constitutional doctrine relating to criminal procedure, then at full tide, a field in which I also was writing. In addition, Yale had published a remarkable article on the subject of euthanasia, impressive for the thoroughness of its research and the clarity and force of its argument. Fortunately, I decided to write to Yale and …
Postscript: Another Look At Patane And Seibert, The 2004 Miranda 'Poisoned Fruit' Cases, Yale Kamisar
Postscript: Another Look At Patane And Seibert, The 2004 Miranda 'Poisoned Fruit' Cases, Yale Kamisar
Articles
Some months after I finished writing an article that, inter alia, discussed the lower court opinions in Patane and Seibert (an article that appears elsewhere in this issue of the Journa),1 the Supreme Court handed down its decisions in those cases.2 In Patane, a 5-4 majority held admissible a Glock pistol located as a result of a failure to comply with Miranda. In Seibert, a 5-4 majority agreed with the state court that a "second confession," one obtained after the police had deliberately used a two-stage interrogation technique designed to undermine the Miranda warnings, was inadmissible. 3 In Patane, Justice …
The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted And Transformed, Richard D. Friedman
The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted And Transformed, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
For several centuries, prosecution witnesses in criminal cases have given their testimony under oath, face to face with the accused, and subject to cross-examination at trial. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the procedure, providing that ‘‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witness against him.’’ In recent decades, however, judicial protection of the right has been lax, because the U.S. Supreme Court has tolerated admission of outof- court statements against the accused, without cross-examination, if the statements are deemed ‘‘reliable’’ or ‘‘trustworthy.’’ …