Criminal Procedure Commons^™

Special Administrative Measures And The War On Terror: When Do Extreme Pretrial Detention Measures Offend The Constitution?, Andrew Dalack

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

Our criminal justice system is founded upon a belief that one is innocent until proven guilty. This belief is what foists the burden of proving a person’s guilt upon the government and belies a statutory presumption in favor of allowing a defendant to remain free pending trial at the federal level. Though there are certainly circumstances in which a federal magistrate judge may—and sometimes must—remand a defendant to jail pending trial, it is well-settled that pretrial detention itself inherently prejudices the quality of a person’s defense. In some cases, a defendant’s pretrial conditions become so onerous that they become punitive …

The Illusory Eighth Amendment, John F. Stinneford

UF Law Faculty Publications

Although there is no obvious doctrinal connection between the Supreme Court’s Miranda jurisprudence and its Eighth Amendment excessive punishments jurisprudence, the two are deeply connected at the level of methodology. In both areas, the Supreme Court has been criticized for creating “prophylactic” rules that invalidate government actions because they create a mere risk of constitutional violation. In reality, however, both sets of rules deny constitutional protection to a far greater number of individuals with plausible claims of unconstitutional treatment than they protect.

This dysfunctional combination of over- and underprotection arises from the Supreme Court’s use of implementation rules as a …

Presumed Guilty, Terrence Cain

Law Faculty Scholarship

It would probably surprise the average American to learn that prosecutors need only prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt sometimes. Although the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution require that the government prove each element of an alleged criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the use of statutory presumptions has relieved the government of this responsibility, and in some cases, has even shifted the burden to the defendant to disprove the presumption. Likewise, the Sixth Amendment grants a criminal defendant the right to have the jury and the jury alone determine whether the government has met its burden and ultimately …

A Deal Is A Deal: Plea Bargains And Double Jeopardy After Ohio V. Johnson, Philip Chinn

Seattle University Law Review

The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person will “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” On March 10, 2004, Pedro Cabrera made a statement that cost him fourteen years of his life: he proclaimed his innocence. The court accepted this plea and ordered a finding of guilty with a recommended sentence of six years. However, during an exchange that followed, Mr. Cabrera asserted that he was actually innocent but that he preferred “to take the time” instead of proceeding to trial. The judge then refused to accept Mr. Cabrera’s guilty …

The Right To Counsel For Indians Accused Of Crime: A Tribal And Congressional Imperative, Barbara L. Creel

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

Native American Indians charged in tribal court criminal proceedings are not entitled to court appointed defense counsel. Under well-settled principles of tribal sovereignty, Indian tribes are not bound by Fifth Amendment due process guarantees or Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Instead, they are bound by the procedural protections established by Congress in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. Under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Indian defendants have the right to counsel at their own expense. This Article excavates the historical background of the lack of counsel in the tribal court arena and exposes the myriad problems that it …

The Sanctity Of The Attorney-Client Relationship – Undermined By The Federal Interpretation Of The Right To Counsel - People V. Borukhova, Tara Laterza

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

United States V. Salvucci: The Problematic Absence Of Automatic Standing, William C. Bollard

Pepperdine Law Review

The United States Supreme Court recently abolished the automatic standing rule in United States v. Salvucci. The author analyzes the difficulties created for the criminal defendant charged with a possessory crime. In particular, this note focuses on the inequitable position the defendant is placed in when his suppression hearing testimony is used as a tool to impeach subsequent testimony offered at trial. The author continues by pointing out that the "prosecutorial self-contradiction," sought to be abolished in Salvucci, remains a part of our present judicial system. In conclusion, the author offers several considerations that will necessarily be an integral part …

Neurotechnologies At The Intersection Of Criminal Procedure And Constitutional Law, Amanda C. Pustilnik

Faculty Scholarship

The rapid development of neurotechnologies poses novel constitutional issues for criminal law and criminal procedure. These technologies can identify directly from brain waves whether a person is familiar with a stimulus like a face or a weapon, can model blood flow in the brain to indicate whether a person is lying, and can even interfere with brain processes themselves via high-powered magnets to cause a person to be less likely to lie to an investigator. These technologies implicate the constitutional privilege against compelled, self-incriminating speech under the Fifth Amendment and the right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure …

The Pastor, The Burning House, And The Double Jeopardy Clause: The True Story Behind Evans V. Michigan, David A. Moran

Articles

The true story behind Evans v. Michigan is that a man who was probably innocent, and who would almost certainly have been acquitted by the jury, had his trial shortened after it became obvious to the judge that the police had picked up a man who had nothing to do with the fire. In other words, the facts set forth by the Michigan Supreme Court, and repeated by Alito, were grossly misleading. And because I, like Alito, believed the Michigan Supreme Court’s version of the facts, I made a silly mistake when I agreed to take the case. That silly …

A Rejoinder To Professor Schauer's Commentary, Yale Kamisar

Articles

It is quite a treat to have Professor Frederick Schauer comment on my Miranda article.1 Professor Schauer is a renowned authority on freedom of speech and the author of many thoughtful, probing articles in other areas as well, especially jurisprudence. I am pleased that in large measure, Schauer, too, laments the erosion of Miranda in the last four-and-a-half decades2 and that he, too, was unhappy with the pre-Miranda due process/“totality of circumstances”/“voluntariness” test.3 I also like what Schauer had to say about “prophylactic rules,” a term that has sometimes been used to disparage the Miranda rules.4 As Schauer observes, the …

Court Of Appeals Of New York - In Re Suarez, Malaika Makembe

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Court Of Appeals Of New York - People V. White, Rosalinde Casalini

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Law Enforcement And Criminal Law Decisions, Erwin Chemerinsky

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Separate But Equal: Miranda's Rights To Silence And Counsel, Steven P. Grossman

All Faculty Scholarship

Three decades ago, the Supreme Court created a dubious distinction between the rights accorded to suspects in custody who invoke their right to silence and who invoke their right to counsel. This distinction significantly disadvantages those who do not have the good sense or good fortune to specify they want an attorney when they invoke their right to remain silent. This article argues that this distinction was flawed at its genesis and that it has led to judicial decisions that are inconsistent, make little sense, and permit police behavior that substantially diminishes the right to silence as described in Miranda …

Turn-Coat Disclosure: The Importance Of Following Procedure - Turturro V. City Of New York, Brittany A. Fiorenza

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

I’Ll Take “Improper Declarations Of Mistrial” For $2,000.00: Applying The Protection Against Double Jeopardy - Robar V. Labuda, Daniel Fier

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

New York’S Grant Of Greater Fifth Amendment Rights To Sexual Predators In Somta Proceedings - New York V. Suggs, Lina R. Carbuccia

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Trial Error Blunder: Compounded Use Of Defendant’S Post-Arrest Silence For Impeachment And Summation Purposes Is Not Harmless - People V. Tucker, Robert Mitchell

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Empty Promises: Miranda Warnings In Noncustodial Interrogations, Aurora Maoz

Michigan Law Review

You have the right to remain silent; anything you say can be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney; if you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided to you at the state's expense. In 2010, the Supreme Court declined an opportunity to resolve the question of what courts should do when officers administer Miranda warnings in a situation where a suspect is not already in custody-in other words, when officers are not constitutionally required to give or honor these warnings. While most courts have found a superfluous warning to be …

You Have The Right To Remain Silent. Now Please Repeat Your Confession: Missouri V. Seibert And The Court's Attempt To Put An End To The Question-First Technique, Eric English

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

International Travel With A "Digital Briefcase": If Customs Officials Can Search A Laptop, Will The Right Against Self-Incrimination Contravene This Authority?, Ashley H. Verdon

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Miranda’S Hidden Right, Laurent Sacharoff

Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

When the Court in Miranda v. Arizona applied the Fifth Amendment “right to remain silent” to the stationhouse, it also created an inherent contradiction that has bedeviled Miranda cases since. That is, the Court in Miranda said that a suspect can waive her right to remain silent but also that she must invoke it. Numerous courts have repeated this incantation, including most recently last summer in Berghuis v. Thompkins. But how can both be true about the same right? Either the suspect has the right and can waive it or does not yet enjoy it and must therefore invoke it. …

Prosecution Appeals Of Court-Ordered Midtrial Acquittals: Permissible Under The Double Jeopardy Clause?, David S. Rudstein

Catholic University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Freeing The Guilty Without Protecting The Innocent: Some Skeptical Observations On Proposed New “Innocence” Procedures, Paul G. Cassell

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Requiring Miranda Warnings For The Christmas Day Bomber And Other Terrorists, Malvina Halberstam

Articles

No abstract provided.

J.D.B. V. North Carolina And The Reasonable Person, Christopher Jackson

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

This Term, the Supreme Court was presented with a prime opportunity to provide some much-needed clarification on a "backdrop" issue of law-one of many topics that arises in a variety of legal contexts, but is rarely analyzed on its own terms. In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court considered whether age was a relevant factor in determining if a suspect is "in custody" for Miranda purposes, and thus must have her rights read to her before being questioned by the police. Miranda, like dozens of other areas of law, employs a reasonable person test on the custodial question: it asks …

State V. Burgess: A Limitation On A Defendant’S Right To Remain Innocent, Elizabeth Lahey

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] “This note will explore the current state of the privilege against self-incrimination, particularly in regard to whether it works to bar negative inferences from being drawn from a defendant’s silence during sentencing in order to determine his remorse for the crime of which he has been convicted. I will focus primarily on the issue in the context of the recent New Hampshire case State v. Burgess. In that case, the court recognized the application of the privilege at sentencing, but nonetheless carved out a unique exception which made negative inferences permissible at sentencing when the defendant has admitted to …

How Much Does It Matter Whether Courts Work Within The "Clearly Marked" Provisions Of The Bill Of Rights Or With The "Generalities" Of The Fourteenth Amendment?, Yale Kamisar

Articles

We know that it really mattered to Justice Hugo Black. As he made clear in his famous dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California] Black was convinced that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to apply the complete protection of the Bill of Rights to the states.2 And, as he also made plain in his Adamson dissent, he was equally convinced that working with the "specific" or "explicit" guarantees of the first Eight Amendments would furnish Americans more protection than would applying the generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment.3

The Meaning Of Life (Or Limb): An Originalist Proposal For Double Jeopardy Reform, Justin W. Curtin

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Declining To State A Name In Consideration Of The Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause And Law Enforcement Databases After Hiibel, Joseph R. Ashby

Michigan Law Review

In response to a report of an argument on a public sidewalk, a police officer approaches two people standing in the vicinity of the reported dispute. The officer requests that each person provide her name so the officer can run the names through databases to which the police department subscribes. After searching each name through various databases, the officer might discover that one of the individuals made several purchases of cold medicine containing pseudoephedrine and that the other just received a license from the State to procure certain hazardous chemicals. These two people might be in the early stages of …