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Articles 151 - 180 of 229

Full-Text Articles in Criminal Procedure

Excessive Sanctions For Governmental Misconduct In Criminal Cases, Richard A. Posner Nov 1982

Excessive Sanctions For Governmental Misconduct In Criminal Cases, Richard A. Posner

Washington Law Review

The fourth amendment, as is well known, forbids unreasonable searches and seizures by government officers; if the government tries to introduce evidence in a criminal trial that was seized in violation of the fourth amendment, the defendant can get the evidence suppressed. If the evidence is vital to conviction, this means that the defendant will be acquitted simply because the evidence was obtained illegally. This is the famous exclusionary rule of the law of search and seizure. The exclusionary rule is one example of a sanction for governmental miconduct: evidence that may be essential to convicting a dangerous criminal is …


The Exclusionary Rule, Deterrence And Posner's Economic Analysis Of Law, Arval A. Morris Nov 1982

The Exclusionary Rule, Deterrence And Posner's Economic Analysis Of Law, Arval A. Morris

Washington Law Review

Judge Posner holds economic theory demonstrates that the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule and other judicially developed doctrines implementing the Constitution impose excessive sanctions for governmental misconduct in criminal cases. This Article, focusing on the exclusionary rule, aims to place his economic argument in historical context and to assess it.


Recidivist Statutes—Application Of Proportionality And Overbreadth Doctrines To Repeat Offenders—Wanstreet V. Bordenkircher, 276 S.E.2d 205 (W. Va. 1981), Marc G. Wilhelm Jul 1982

Recidivist Statutes—Application Of Proportionality And Overbreadth Doctrines To Repeat Offenders—Wanstreet V. Bordenkircher, 276 S.E.2d 205 (W. Va. 1981), Marc G. Wilhelm

Washington Law Review

In 1967 George Wanstreet was convicted of forging a forty-three dollar check and received a life sentence under West Virginia's recidivist statute. This statute, one of the two harshest in the nation, requires life imprisonment for persons convicted of three felonies. Wanstreet had been convicted in 1951 for forging an eighteen dollar check and in 1955 for arson of a barn valued at $490. He had been in prison more than ten years for the 1967 conviction when the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held, in Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, that his sentence violated the proportionality clause of the West …


The Death Penalty In Washington: An Historical Perspective, Leonie G. Hellwig Jul 1982

The Death Penalty In Washington: An Historical Perspective, Leonie G. Hellwig

Washington Law Review

This Comment follows the evolution of Washington's capital punishment law through the 1981 legislation and analyzes the two cases that invalidated the 1977 death penalty statute. The Comment favors the reasoning behind the dissenting opinions of Martin and Frampton as more consistent with established principles of statutory construction. The Comment concludes with a discussion of Washington's new capital punishment legislation enacted in response to the supreme court's decisions.


The Fifth Amendment, Self-Incrimination, And Foreign Prosecution: The Saga Of The Ryuyo Maru, Jeff M. Feldman Jan 1982

The Fifth Amendment, Self-Incrimination, And Foreign Prosecution: The Saga Of The Ryuyo Maru, Jeff M. Feldman

Articles

In 1979, the M/V Ryuyo Maru No. 2, a Japanese fishing vessel, went aground off the coast of Alaska. During the course ofthe United States Coast Guard's investigation into the cause of themarine casualty, the captain of the vessel and several seamen attempted to avoid giving testimony at the Coast Guard inquest onthe ground that their testimony would tend to incriminate the munder the law of Japan. The ensuing litigation' over the extent towhich the fifth amendment protects witnesses from compulsory self-incrimination where the sole threat of criminal prosecution is by a foreign government contributes to a recent line of …


Criminal Procedure In Alaska, Jeff M. Feldman Jan 1980

Criminal Procedure In Alaska, Jeff M. Feldman

Articles

Two years ago this review published an article which reviewed search and seizure law in Alaska. Because the local barand bench seem to have found that article to be useful, it appeared worthwhile to put together a similar review of the remainder of Alaska's law of criminal procedure. Like its predecessor, this article will review and analyze the law of criminal procedure in Alaska, isolating those areas in which the Alaska Legislature or the Alaska Supreme Court has departed from the prevailing approach to procedure in criminal cases and predicting probable outcomes to procedural issues still unresolved in Alaska.


Proposed Rule Of Evidence 609: Impeachment Of Criminal Defendants By Prior Convictions, D. Joseph Hurson Dec 1978

Proposed Rule Of Evidence 609: Impeachment Of Criminal Defendants By Prior Convictions, D. Joseph Hurson

Washington Law Review

This comment describes current Washington law on the use of criminal convictions to impeach the testimony of criminal defendants and examines the factors which are relevant to the formation of a more acceptable rule. Adoption of the proposed rule would also affect the rules for impeaching nondefendant witnesses. Only a criminal defendant, however, is in jeopardy of actually being convicted as a result of a jury's misuse of evidence of prior convictions. Because the interests of the criminal defendant witness will be so drastically affected by the prior conviction rule which the Washington Supreme Court ultimately adopts, this comment will …


Women's Self-Defense Under Washington Law—State V. Wanrow, 88 Wn. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977), Jennifer Marsh Dec 1978

Women's Self-Defense Under Washington Law—State V. Wanrow, 88 Wn. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977), Jennifer Marsh

Washington Law Review

The Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Wanrow, examined the issue of self-defense for women under Washington law and held that the application of traditional self-defense rules resulted in prejudicial treatment of women defendants. This note will examine the meaning of the Wanrow decision and offer support for its holding in light of available psychological and sociological data. Additionally, this note will suggest a special analytical framework utilizing social science data to test accepted legal doctrines for latent sex discrimination. The importance of these data in exposing such discrimination will be shown by examining related cases in the area of …


Criminal Procedure—Preservation Of Due Process When Evidence Is Destroyed Or Tested—State V. Wright, 87 Wn. 2d 783, 557 P.2d 1 (1976), Maxine Stansell May 1978

Criminal Procedure—Preservation Of Due Process When Evidence Is Destroyed Or Tested—State V. Wright, 87 Wn. 2d 783, 557 P.2d 1 (1976), Maxine Stansell

Washington Law Review

The purpose of this note is to identify uncertainties in the future application of the Wright rule and to predict their probable resolution. Analysis of Wright and the cases on which it relies leads to the conclusion that failure to use the notice-petition procedure before disposition or testing of evidence will result in sanctions only if the defense can show that evidence destroyed, or chemically changed in testing, was potentially material, and only if the state is unable to show that the failure to preserve was reasonable. In addition, the Wright rule implies a defense right to observe or participate …


Procedural Due Process And The Rules Of Evidence—Federal Impeachment Of The Voucher Rules—Welcome V. Vincent, 549 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), Cert. Denied, 97 S. Ct. 2960 (1977), Bruce D. Garrison Feb 1978

Procedural Due Process And The Rules Of Evidence—Federal Impeachment Of The Voucher Rules—Welcome V. Vincent, 549 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), Cert. Denied, 97 S. Ct. 2960 (1977), Bruce D. Garrison

Washington Law Review

Appellant, Ernest Welcome, was convicted in a New York state supreme court on charges of murdering two real estate brokers in their Bronx office. Before indicting Welcome, the State tried another party, Albert Cunningham, for the same offenses. Cunningham had admitted his participation in the crimes to police, giving an accurate account of the date, time, and location of the shootings. After a separate evidentiary hearing, the state court held that his confession to police had been voluntary and thus was admissible against him. Nevertheless, the charges against Cunningham were dropped in mid-trial. At his trial, Welcome called Cunningham as …


Evidence—Admissibility Of The Victim's Past Sexual Behavior Under Washington's Rape Evidence Law—Wash. Rev. Code § 9.79.150 (1976), Evelyn Sroufe Oct 1977

Evidence—Admissibility Of The Victim's Past Sexual Behavior Under Washington's Rape Evidence Law—Wash. Rev. Code § 9.79.150 (1976), Evelyn Sroufe

Washington Law Review

Although R.C.W. § 9.79.150 deals with many sex crimes, this note is limited to its application in forcible rape cases. Part I examines various exclusionary rules of evidence in order to develop a framework for analysis of Washington's new law. Part II discusses the relevance of the victim's sexual history to her credibility as a witness; it concludes that the complete exclusion of past sexual history to attack credibility may be unconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court holding in Davis v. Alaska. On the other hand, Part III suggests that R.C.W. § 9.79.150 should be redrafted to limit further …


Search And Seizure In Alaska: A Comprehensive Review, Jeff M. Feldman Jan 1977

Search And Seizure In Alaska: A Comprehensive Review, Jeff M. Feldman

Articles

In the eighteen years since Alaska achieved statehood, fifty-two cases involving issues of search and seizure have reached the Alaska Supreme Court. This article will analyze these cases with an eyetowards outlining the law of search and seizure in Alaska, isolating those areas in which the Alaska Supreme Court has departed from prevailing search and seizure doctrine, and using past decisions to predict the probable outcomes to search and seizure issues still unresolved in Alaska.


Criminal Law—Affirmative Defenses In The Washington Criminal Code—The Impact Of Mullaney V. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), Pamela Cowan Oct 1976

Criminal Law—Affirmative Defenses In The Washington Criminal Code—The Impact Of Mullaney V. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), Pamela Cowan

Washington Law Review

A Maine jury found Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr., guilty of murder after the prosecution's proof of two elements: (1) that the homicide was unlawful, and (2) that it was intentional. Wilbur offered no evidence on his behalf to negate or otherwise refute the state's case other than his statement that he attacked the deceased in a frenzy provoked by a homosexual advance. The trial judge instructed the jury that if the prosecution established the above two elements, malice aforethought was to be conclusively inferred, unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he had acted in …


Criminal Procedure—Filing By Information: Determination Of Probable Cause Required Before Extended Restraint On Liberty—Gerstein V. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), Cynthia B. Whitaker Mar 1976

Criminal Procedure—Filing By Information: Determination Of Probable Cause Required Before Extended Restraint On Liberty—Gerstein V. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), Cynthia B. Whitaker

Washington Law Review

Robert Pugh was arrested in Florida without a warrant and charged by prosecutor's information. Pugh and other incarcerated arrestees charged by information without a preliminary hearing brought a class action suit in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the charging procedure. Plaintiffs maintained that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required that accused persons be accorded a determination of probable cause for detention soon after their arrest. They also argued that the prosecuting attorney was not sufficiently neutral or detached to make the necessary determination. The district court accepted the plaintiffs' arguments, and the Court of Appeals …


Criminal Procedure—Personal Search Of Suspect Incident To Custodial Arrest Is Per Se "Reasonable" And Requires No Additional Justification—United States V. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson V. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), David C. Anson Aug 1974

Criminal Procedure—Personal Search Of Suspect Incident To Custodial Arrest Is Per Se "Reasonable" And Requires No Additional Justification—United States V. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson V. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), David C. Anson

Washington Law Review

Defendant Robinson was stopped by a District of Columbia police officer for driving an automobile after revocation of his operator's permit and for obtaining a substitute permit by false representation. Robinson was placed in custody, advised of his rights and frisked by the arresting officer. During the frisk, the officer felt a bulge in Robinson's overcoat pocket; he reached into the pocket and removed a crumpled cigarette package containing small round objects. The officer opened the package and discovered gelatin capsules, later found to contain heroin. At trial for possession of heroin, the capsules were introduced into evidence over the …


Criminal Procedure—Preaccusation Delay As Violation Of Due Process: Absence Of Statute Of Limitations Is Factor To Be Weighed Against Murder Defendant's Allegations Of Actual Prejudice—State V. Haga, 8 Wn. App .481, 507 P.2d 159 (1973), Review Denied 82 Wn. 2d 1006 (1973), Richard A. Hansen May 1974

Criminal Procedure—Preaccusation Delay As Violation Of Due Process: Absence Of Statute Of Limitations Is Factor To Be Weighed Against Murder Defendant's Allegations Of Actual Prejudice—State V. Haga, 8 Wn. App .481, 507 P.2d 159 (1973), Review Denied 82 Wn. 2d 1006 (1973), Richard A. Hansen

Washington Law Review

On July 6, 1966, the wife and an infant daughter of Eric L. Haga were found strangled to death in the Haga home. Although Haga had slept in the house the night of the murders, no evidence linked him directly to the crime. There was, however, evidence that Haga and his wife had separated the previous summer, that Mrs. Haga had lived with another man during the separation, and that Haga had taken out a family life insurance policy shortly before the murders. The prosecuting attorney chose not to prosecute Haga; more than five years later, however, a newly elected …


Discretion In Felony Sentencing—A Study Of Influencing Factors, Barbara L. Johnston, Nicholas P. Miller, Ronald Schoenberg, Laurence Ross Weatherly Aug 1973

Discretion In Felony Sentencing—A Study Of Influencing Factors, Barbara L. Johnston, Nicholas P. Miller, Ronald Schoenberg, Laurence Ross Weatherly

Washington Law Review

The desirability and constitutionality of discretionary criminal sentencing can be ascertained only if the factors influencing sentencing decisions are known. The authors analyze data generated by a 1971 survey of Washington State superior court trial judges in order to identify the significant factors and to evaluate their relative importance in criminal sentencing. The results indicate that discretionary sentencing is influenced strongly by social biases in no way dependent upon the culpability of the offender, his personal behavior patterns, or circumstances of the crime.


Criminal Procedure—Dismissals In The Futherance Of Justice—State V. Sonneland, 80 Wn. 2d 343, 494 P.2d 469 (1972), K. D. K. May 1973

Criminal Procedure—Dismissals In The Futherance Of Justice—State V. Sonneland, 80 Wn. 2d 343, 494 P.2d 469 (1972), K. D. K.

Washington Law Review

In March 1969, Sonneland was charged with possession of marijuana, then a felony. His offer to plead guilty to a gross misdemeanor was accepted. Subsequently, a second bargain was made whereby Sonneland agreed to furnish information leading to the arrest of three dealers in exchange for a promise to dismiss all the charges against him. A continuance was granted to provide a cover, and in August 1969, Sonneland gave a tip which culminated in the arrest of three men. It was disputed whether all were dealers. In February 1970, the prosecuting attorney concluded that Sonneland would provide no further information …


Criminal Procedure—Immunity: Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Eclipsed By Use Immunity—Kastigar V. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), W. J. M. May 1973

Criminal Procedure—Immunity: Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Eclipsed By Use Immunity—Kastigar V. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), W. J. M.

Washington Law Review

Kastigar refused to answer questions during federal grand jury proceedings despite an order commanding him to answer and granting him use and derivative use immunity, protecting him from the use of his testimony or any evidence derived from it. Kastigar's refusal to testify was premised on the theory that the grant of immunity extended to him was constitutionally deficient and that only transactional immunity could supplant his fifth amendment privilege. The trial court found Kastigar in civil contempt and ordered him confined pursuant to section 301(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. The United States Court of Appeals …


Pretrial Disclosure Of Federal Grand Jury Testimony, William J. Knudsen, Jr. Feb 1973

Pretrial Disclosure Of Federal Grand Jury Testimony, William J. Knudsen, Jr.

Washington Law Review

The scope of this study is limited to what is probably the most criticized aspect of the traditional grand jury system, the restrictions on disclosure of grand jury proceedings, especially the criminal defendant's lack of access to a transcript of the testimony given before the grand jury which indicted him. Examining the history of the grand jury as it relates to the tradition of secrecy, this study discusses the philosophies underlying the practice and analyzes the impact of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, federal statutes, and certain Supreme Court decisions on this tradition. This study concludes that there is …


Criminal Procedure—Right To Counsel In Investigative Grand Jury Proceedings: Washington Criminal Investigatory Act Of 1971—R.C.W. §§ 10.27.120-.140 (1971), Anon May 1972

Criminal Procedure—Right To Counsel In Investigative Grand Jury Proceedings: Washington Criminal Investigatory Act Of 1971—R.C.W. §§ 10.27.120-.140 (1971), Anon

Washington Law Review

The Criminal Investigatory Act's provision for counsel appears justified when one considers the witness' delicate position and recent extensions of the right to counsel at other stages of the criminal process. Washington's statute, however, is a significant departure from grand jury protections provided in other jurisdictions because it provides for the presence of counsel as a matter of right. This note examines the policy basis for Washington's statute and the effect this additional protection for the witness may have on the investigative efficiency of the grand jury.


Criminal Procedure—Juveniles: Retroactive Application Of In Re Gault Denied In Washington—Brumley V. Charles Denny Juvenile Center, 77 Wn.2d 702, 466 P.2d 481 (1970), Anon Oct 1971

Criminal Procedure—Juveniles: Retroactive Application Of In Re Gault Denied In Washington—Brumley V. Charles Denny Juvenile Center, 77 Wn.2d 702, 466 P.2d 481 (1970), Anon

Washington Law Review

Genevieve Fay Brumley was adjudged a delinquent child by the juvenile court of Snohomish County on December 12, 1966 after she admitted telephoning bomb threats to local schools. Present at the adjudicatory hearing were court personnel, her parents, a welfare caseworker, a probation officer, and a policeman. She was not represented by counsel. During her subsequent incarceration, the United States Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to juvenile proceedings in In re Gault. In August of 1968, Miss Brumley petitioned the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the Gault decision required a reversal of her …


Indians—Criminal Procedure: Habeas Corpus As An Enforcement Procedure Under The Indian Civil Rights Act Of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302-1303, Anon May 1971

Indians—Criminal Procedure: Habeas Corpus As An Enforcement Procedure Under The Indian Civil Rights Act Of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302-1303, Anon

Washington Law Review

The Indian Civil Rights Act, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, extended portions of the Bill of Rights to individual Indians as against their tribal governments and provided federal habeas corpus relief to review alleged violations of these rights. The Indian Bill of Rights marked the culmination of a complete reversal in federal recognition of Indian constitutional rights. Until 1965 federal courts had recognized Indian tribes as quasi-sovereign entities. Individual Indians were guaranteed their constitutional rights in relations with federal and state governments, but not with their tribal governments. The only rights Indian governments recognized when dealing …


Criminal Procedure—Re-Arrest Of Parolees: Washington Legislative Standards And Constitutional Considerations—Ch. 98, Wash. Laws Of 1968, Anon Oct 1970

Criminal Procedure—Re-Arrest Of Parolees: Washington Legislative Standards And Constitutional Considerations—Ch. 98, Wash. Laws Of 1968, Anon

Washington Law Review

During its 1969 Regular Session the Washington Legislature enacted legislation governing parole revocation hearings and re-enacted existing provisions concerning the arrest and initial detention of suspected parole violators. The re-enacted portion of the statute provides that any parole or probation officer may arrest a parolee without a warrant when he has "reason to believe" that a convicted person has violated any state statute or a condition of his parole. The prisoner is not to be released until the board acts to reinstate his parole status


Opinions—Criminal Procedure—Misdemeanant's Right To Counsel: Legislative Inaction Resolves Constitutional Doubts?—Hendrix V. Seattle, 76 Wn. 2d 142, 456 P.2d 696 (1969), Anon Oct 1970

Opinions—Criminal Procedure—Misdemeanant's Right To Counsel: Legislative Inaction Resolves Constitutional Doubts?—Hendrix V. Seattle, 76 Wn. 2d 142, 456 P.2d 696 (1969), Anon

Washington Law Review

Since Gideon v. Wainwright was decided, a major question has been: to what crimes does the indligent's constitutional right to trial counsel at public expense extend? The Washington and Oregon Supreme Courts recently considered the question and reached conflicting results.


Criminal Procedure—Search And Seizure—Electronic Eavesdropping—Abortion: Recording Of Voluntary Conversation Between Police Agent And Defendant Admissible In Evidence.—State V. Wright, 74 Wn. 2d 355, 444 P.2d 867 (1968), Anon Apr 1970

Criminal Procedure—Search And Seizure—Electronic Eavesdropping—Abortion: Recording Of Voluntary Conversation Between Police Agent And Defendant Admissible In Evidence.—State V. Wright, 74 Wn. 2d 355, 444 P.2d 867 (1968), Anon

Washington Law Review

Informed that defendant had committed an abortion in his home, the police hired a female agent who made arrangements with the defendant by telephonic conversations, which were monitored and recorded. The agent, equipped with a hidden transmitter, kept her appointment and transmitted defendant's explanation of the abortion to the police, who again monitored and recorded the conversation. That evening she returned to defendant's home and paid the fee, and, as defendant prepared her for the operation, sent the conversation to monitoring police, who recorded it. All monitoring was done without prior court order. Just before the operation was to occur, …


Criminal Procedure—Lineups—Right To Counsel: "Independence" Of In-Court Identification Of Criminal Defendant From Previous Lineup Identification Inadmissible Due To Absence Of Counsel.—State V. Redmond, 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 64, 448 P.2d 938 (1968, Anon Mar 1970

Criminal Procedure—Lineups—Right To Counsel: "Independence" Of In-Court Identification Of Criminal Defendant From Previous Lineup Identification Inadmissible Due To Absence Of Counsel.—State V. Redmond, 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 64, 448 P.2d 938 (1968, Anon

Washington Law Review

Virginia Rohn, alone in her beverage store, was robbed by an unmasked man who remained in the store for approximately five minutes. At a police lineup, five days later, she identified defendant as the robber. Defendant's counsel filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the lineup identification because defendant had not been afforded prior opportunity to contact counsel and counsel had not been present at the lineup. After a preliminary hearing, the trial judge suppressed the lineup identification but ruled that Virginia Rohn was not legally precluded from making an in-court identification. Upon conviction, defendant appealed assigning error to the admission …


The Right To Counsel In Misdemeanor Cases, John M. Junker Apr 1968

The Right To Counsel In Misdemeanor Cases, John M. Junker

Washington Law Review

These then are the focal tasks of the present inquiry: first, to examine the present status of the misdemeanant's right to counsel under the Constitution; second, to evaluate possible substitutes for the felony standard; and finally, to attempt to explain the longevity of the felony standard in the face of powerful doctrinal and social forces for change. The present status, of the misdemeanant's right to appointed counsel, both in law and in fact, is detailed in the Appendix.


The Right To Counsel In Misdemeanor Cases, John M. Junker Apr 1968

The Right To Counsel In Misdemeanor Cases, John M. Junker

Washington Law Review

These then are the focal tasks of the present inquiry: first, to examine the present status of the misdemeanant's right to counsel under the Constitution; second, to evaluate possible substitutes for the felony standard; and finally, to attempt to explain the longevity of the felony standard in the face of powerful doctrinal and social forces for change. The present status, of the misdemeanant's right to appointed counsel, both in law and in fact, is detailed in the Appendix.


Criminal Insanity, Arval A. Morris Mar 1968

Criminal Insanity, Arval A. Morris

Washington Law Review

Mental capacity becomes relevant to the criminal law as soon as a peace officer apprehends a person who has committed an anti-social act. Policemen, and later prosecutors, must decide whether the offender is "well" (sane), responsible for his acts, and the proper subject of criminal proceedings or whether he is "sick" (insane), not responsible for his acts, and the proper subject of civil commitment or similar process. These are threshhold questions in criminal law enforcement. If criminal processes are used, then the trial stage presents twin questions: whether an accused is capable of standing trial, and whether he was insane …