Criminal Procedure Commons^™

Misplaced Angst---Another Look At Consent-Search Jurisprudence, Daniel R. Williams

ExpressO

Conventional scholarship misunderstands the judicial invocation of voluntariness when evaluating a purported consensual search. The key is to nail down more precisely what we mean by the term, consent. Most commentators mistakenly entwine consent and waiver, wrongly treating the act of consenting (to a search, to questioning, etc.) as an instance where the actor is waiving a constitutional right. That conceptual error promotes the view that consent refers to a subjective condition, a psychological state, which, in turn, spurs the expectation that voluntariness refers to a person's inner experience. On this view of consent, the person's inner experience is what …

The Suffocation Of Free Speech Under The Gravity Of Danger Of Terrorism, Tim Davis

ExpressO

On July 14, 2005, Ali al-Timimi was sentenced to life in prison plus 70 years for acts of pure speech. The United States government contended that Timimi, through his lectures and direct personal appeals, induced and/or aided and abetted local Muslim men to leave the country and pursue jihad training with the intent to defend the Taliban against all potential enemies, including the United States. Buried in nearly 200 pages of jury instructions was a single paragraph that unceremoniously described the law of protected speech under Brandenburg v. Ohio. At first blush, Brandenburg seemed to unequivocally lay down the rule …

Torture: Considering A Framework For Limiting Use, Scott J. Goldberg

ExpressO

Abu Graib, Guantanamo, the War on Terror—the debate over the use of torture is still very much alive in the world today. The debate can be divided into two questions: (1) whether there should be an actual absolute ban where torture is never allowed either ethically or legally, and (2) if torture should be allowed under certain circumstances what form of regulation is best able to ensure that it is used only in those most limited circumstances. Currently, there is an absolute ban in place, yet world leaders, applying a case-by-case utilitarian approach, in fact permit the use of torture …

American Indians, Crime, And The Law, Kevin K. Washburn

Michigan Law Review

This Article evaluates the federal Indian country criminal justice regime, not against norms of Indian law and policy, but against those of criminal law and policy. Specifically, this Article evaluates the federal constitutional norms that lie at the heart of American criminal justice and that are designed to ensure the legitimacy of federal criminal trials. Toward that end, Part I presents a critical description of key facets of the federal Indian country criminal justice system. Part II begins the critical evaluation by evaluating a key institutional player in the federal system, the federal prosecutor. It highlights the handicaps faced by …

The Price Of Pretrial Release: Can We Afford To Keep Our Fourth Amendment Rights?, Melanie D. Wilson

Scholarly Articles

The Fourth Amendment serves an important constitutional function. It protects the privacy of Americans from intrusions on their personal security. Few rights are held more sacred. When a person is arrested and faces the real likelihood of pretrial detention in jail, the person risks not only a reduction in his privacy rights, but also a loss of his liberty. In such circumstances, the arrested person should be able to bargain away some of his Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for the additional freedoms associated with release to home.

Undoubtedly, defendants forced to choose between incarceration and Fourth Amendment rights will …

Manson V. Brathwaite: The Supreme Court's Misunderstanding Of Eyewitness Identification, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 539 (2006), Ruth Yacona

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Adjudicated On The Merits?: Why The Aedpa Requires State Courts To Exhibit Their Reasoning, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 995 (2006), Ezra Spilke

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Dostoyevsky And The Therapeutic Jurisprudence Confession, 40 J. Marshall L. Rev. 41 (2006), Amy D. Ronner

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Second Chance For Justice: Reevaluation Of The United States Double Jeopardy Standard, 40 J. Marshall L. Rev. 371 (2006), Andrea Koklys

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, And The Supreme Court: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Joan S. Meier

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The Supreme Court’s consolidated decision in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana offers something for everyone: by “splitting the difference” between the two cases—affirming one and reversing the other—the opinion provides much grist for advocates’ mills on both sides of this issue. While advocates for defendants’ rights are celebrating the opinion’s continued revitalization of the right to confrontation, which began in Crawford v. Washington, advocates for victims have cause for celebration as well: the decision is notable for its reflection of the Court’s growing—albeit incomplete— awareness and understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence and their implications for justice. …

Stevens's Ratchet: When The Court Should Decide Not To Decide, Joel A. Flaxman

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Hidden underneath the racy death penalty issues in Kansas v. Marsh lurks a seemingly dull procedural issue addressed only in separate opinions by Justices Stevens and Scalia: whether the Court should have heard the case in the first place. As he did in three cases from the Court’s 2005 term, Justice Stevens argued in Marsh that the Court has no legitimate interest in reviewing state court decisions that overprotect federal constitutional rights. Instead, the Supreme Court should exercise its certiorari power to tip the scales against states and in favor of individuals. Granting certiorari in Marsh, Stevens argued, was not …

The High Court Remains As Divided As Ever Over The Death Penalty, George H. Kendall

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

More than three decades ago, in Furman v. Georgia, a sharply divided Supreme Court struck down all existing capital punishment schemes be-cause the results they generated were arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasoned. No member of that Court remains on the Court today, and the Court has grown increasingly conservative ever since. Nevertheless, impor-tant questions concerning the administration of capital punishment continue to wrought deep divisions within the Court, for instance in determining whether racial bias influences the system, in determining the sufficiency of new evidence of innocence to justify review of a defaulted claim in habeas corpus proceedings, in determining a …

Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana, Andrew C. Fine

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Clarification of the Supreme Court’s newly minted interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was desperately needed, and Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana promised to provide it. Two terms earlier, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court had worked a revolutionary transformation of Confrontation Clause analysis by overruling Ohio v. Roberts and severing the link between hearsay jurisprudence and the Clause. Crawford was hailed by the criminal defense bar, since it seemed to presage a sharp reduction in the frequency of so-called “victimless” trials by holding that “testimonial” hearsay, no matter how reliable, was constitutionally inadmissible in the absence of …

Davis And Hammon: A Step Forward, Or A Step Back?, Tom Lininger

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and lower court judges hoped that the Supreme Court’s ruling in the consolidated cases of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereafter simply Davis) would provide a primer on testimonial hearsay. In retrospect, these hopes were somewhat unrealistic. The Davis ruling could not possibly clear up all the confusion that followed Crawford v. Washington, the landmark 2004 case in which the Court strengthened the right of the accused to confront declarants of testimonial hearsay. In Davis, the Court focused on the facts under review and developed a taxonomy that will be useful in similar cases, but …

Still "Left In The Dark": The Confrontation Clause And Child Abuse Cases After Davis V. Washington, Anthony J. Franze, Jacob E. Smiles

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In his concurring opinion in Crawford v. Washington, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for holding that the Confrontation Clause applies to “testimonial” statements but leaving for “another day” any effort to define sufficiently what “testimonial” means. Prosecutors and defendants, he said, “should not be left in the dark in this manner.” Over the next two years, both sides grappled with the meaning of testimonial, each gleaning import from sections of Crawford that seemingly proved their test was the right one. When the Court granted certiorari in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereinafter Davis), hopes were high that …

Putting The Guesswork Back Into Capital Sentencing, Sean D. O'Brien

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court deemed it “incon-testable” that a death sentence is cruel and unusual if inflicted “by reason of [the defendant’s] race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.” Arbitrary and discriminatory patterns in capital sentencing moved the Court to strike down death penalty statutes that required judges or juries to cast thumbs-up or thumbs-down verdicts against offenders found guilty of capi-tal crimes. The issue of innocence was barely a footnote in Furman; the Court’s concerns focused on …

The Revolution Enters The Court: The Constitutional Significance Of Wrongful Convictions In Contemporary Constitutional Regulation Of The Death Penalty, Jordan Steiker

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Over the last decade, the most important events in American death pen-alty law have occurred outside the courts. The discovery of numerous wrongfully convicted death-sentenced inmates in Illinois led to the most substantial reflection on the American death penalty system since the late 1960s and early 1970s. Former Illinois Governor George Ryan, a Republi-can, first declared a moratorium on executions in 2000 and eventually commuted all 167 inmates on Illinois’s death row in 2003. The events in Illinois reverberated nationwide. Almost overnight, state legislative agendas shifted from expanding or maintaining the prevailing reach of the death penalty to studying its …

Legitimizing Error, Rebecca E. Woodman

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Since Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court has sought to harmonize competing constitutional demands under Eighth Amendment rules regulat-ing the two-step eligibility and selection stages of the capital decision-making process. Furman’s demand for rationality and consistency requires that, at the eligibility stage, the sentencer’s discretion be limited and guided by clear and objective fact-based standards that rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. The selection stage requires a determination of whether a specific death-eligible defendant actually deserves that punish-ment, as distinguished from other death-eligible defendants. Here, fundamental fairness and respect for the uniqueness of the individual are the cornerstones of …

Circling Around The Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not A Robust Right, Lisa Kern Griffin

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The Supreme Court’s consolidated ruling in United States v. Davis and United States v. Hammon is a classic of the genre of consensus opinions to which the Roberts Court aspired in its first, transitional term. The opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, contains practical accommodations unusual in a decision by the Court’s fiercest proponent of first principles. The restraint that characterized the term is, of course, more about considerations of logistics (including the desire to avoid re-arguments after the mid-term replacement of Justice O’Connor) than about the alignment of logic. Because it reflects temporary institutional constraints rather than intellectual agreement, the …

Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana: Beating Expectations, Robert P. Mosteller

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

I begin with a question of effectiveness: does the new Confrontation Clause doctrine effectively protect defendants with respect to the most im-portant types of problematic out-of-court statements? Although they leave much room for the introduction of hearsay in the immediate aftermath of crime generally, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (together hereinafter Davis) are better opinions from that broad perspective than I had feared. The new doctrine now covers and provides substantial procedural protection for a very important class of problematic hearsay—statements made to government agents investigating past crime.

Limiting The Presidency To Natural Born Citizens Violates Due Process, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1343 (2006), Paul A. Clark

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Dickerson V. United States: The Case That Disappointed Miranda's Critics - And Then Its Supporters, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

It is difficult, if not impossible, to discuss Dickerson1 intelligently without discussing Miranda whose constitutional status Dickerson reaffirmed (or, one might say, resuscitated). It is also difficult, if not impossible, to discuss the Dickerson case intelligently without discussing cases the Court has handed down in the five years since Dickerson was decided. The hard truth is that in those five years the reaffirmation of Miranda's constitutional status has become less and less meaningful. In this chapter I focus on the Court's characterization of statements elicited in violation of the Miranda warnings as not actually "coerced" or "compelled" but obtained merely …

Learning From All Fifty States: How To Apply The Fourth Amendment And Its State Analogs To Protect Third Party Information From Unreasonable Search, Stephen E. Henderson

Faculty Articles

We are all aware of, and many commentators are critical of, the Supreme Court's third-party doctrine, under which information provided to third parties receives no Fourth Amendment protection. This constitutional void becomes increasingly important as technology and social norms dictate that increasing amounts of disparate information are available to third parties. But we are not solely dependent upon the Federal Constitution. We may have more constitutional protection as citizens of states, each of which has a constitutional cognate or analog to the Federal Fourth Amendment. As Justice Brennan urged in a famous 1977 article, those provisions should be interpreted to …

Reflections On Brady V. Maryland, Bennett L. Gershman

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

Part I of this Article describes the evolution of the Brady rule over the past forty-three years. Part I sketches the origins of the rule and its doctrinal developments. Part II closely examines Brady's impact on constitutional criminal procedure. Part II suggests that Brady's essential goal has been eroded by the courts, subverted by prosecutors, and ignored by disciplinary bodies. Part III proposes that only through expanding a defendant's right to discovery can the goal of Brady be realized. The Article concludes that Brady, more than any other rule of constitutional criminal procedure, has been the most fertile and widespread …

Silence Should Be Golden: A Case Against The Use Of A Defendant's Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence As Evidence Of Guilt, Marty Skrapka

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

Indecent Standards: The Case Of U.S. Versus Weldon Angelos, Eva Nilsen

Faculty Scholarship

In today's highly punitive culture, perhaps Weldon Angelos' fifty-five-year sentence does not seem unusual. He's a 25-year-old man who was convicted in December 2003 of selling marijuana, possessing firearms while drug dealing, and money laundering. ³ The facts proven at trial are that on three occasions in June and July, 2002, Angelos sold eight one-ounce bags of marijuana for $350 each to a government informant. ⁴ The purchaser testified that a firearm was visible during two of these drug sales.⁵ Police seized another gun from Angelos' home five months later pursuant to a warrant.⁶ At no time was …

Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident, Alien Defendants, Austen L. Parrish

Articles by Maurer Faculty

The Due Process Clause with its focus on a defendant's liberty interest has become the key, if not only, limitation on a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction. This due process jurisdictional limitation is universally assumed to apply with equal force to alien defendants as to domestic defendants. With few exceptions, scholars do not distinguish between the two. Neither do the courts. Countless cases assume that foreigners have all the rights of United States citizens to object to extraterritorial assertions of personal jurisdiction.

But is this assumption sound? This Article explores the uncritical assumption that the same due process considerations apply …

Circling Around The Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not A Robust Right, Lisa Kern Griffin

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s consolidated ruling in United States v. Davis and United States v. Hammon is a classic of the genre of consensus opinions to which the Roberts Court aspired in its first, transitional term. The opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, contains practical accommodations unusual in a decision by the Court’s fiercest proponent of first principles. The restraint that characterized the term is, of course, more about considerations of logistics (including the desire to avoid re-arguments after the mid-term replacement of Justice O’Connor) than about the alignment of logic. Because it reflects temporary institutional constraints rather than intellectual agreement, the …

Miranda's Reprieve: How Rehnquist Spared The Landmark Confession Case, But Weakened Its Impact, Yale Kamisar

Articles

June marks the 40th anniversary of one of the most praised, most maligned-and probably one of the most misunderstood-U.S. Supreme Court cases in American history, Miranda v. Arizona. The opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren conditions police questioning of people in custody on the giving of warnings about the right to remain silent, the right to counsel and the waiver of those rights. 384 U.S. 436. This ruling represents a compromise of sorts between the former elusive, ambiguous and subjective voluntariness/totality-of-the-circumstances test and extreme proposals that would have eliminated police interrogation altogether. But William H. Rehnquist didn't see Miranda that …

We Really (For The Most Part) Mean It!, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

I closed my petition for certiorari in Hammon v. Indiana by declaring, “ ‘We really mean it!’ is the message that lower courts need to hear, and that decision of this case can send.” The prior year, Crawford v. Washington had transformed the law of the Confrontation Clause, holding that an out-ofcourt statement that is testimonial in nature may be admitted against an accused only if the maker of the statement is unavailable and the accused has had an opportunity to cross-examine her. But Crawford deliberately left undetermined what the term “testimonial” meant. Many lower courts gave it a grudging …