Courts Commons^™

A General Defense Of Erie Railroad Co. V. Tompkins, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins was the most important federalism decision of the Twentieth Century. Justice Brandeis’s opinion for the Court stated unequivocally that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. . . . There is no federal general common law.” Seventy-five years later, however, Erie finds itself under siege. Critics have claimed that it is “bereft of serious intellectual or constitutional support” (Michael Greve), based on a “myth” that must be “repressed” (Craig Green), and even “the worst decision …

Judicial Ethics And Supreme Court Exceptionalism, Amanda Frost

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

In his 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, Chief Justice John Roberts cast doubt on Congress’s authority to regulate the Justices’ ethical conduct, declaring that the constitutionality of such legislation has “never been tested.” Roberts’ comments not only raise important questions about the relationship between Congress and the Supreme Court, they also call into question the constitutionality of a number of existing and proposed ethics statutes. Thus, the topic deserves close attention.

This Essay contends that Congress has broad constitutional authority to regulate the Justices’ ethical conduct, just as it has exercised control over other vital aspects of the …

In Praise Of Judge Fletcher-And Of General Standing Principles, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Foreign Affairs Federalism And The Limits On Executive Power, Zachary D. Clopton

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

On February 23 of this year, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a California statute permitting victims of the Armenian genocide to file insurance claims, finding that the state's use of the label "Genocide" intruded on the federal government's conduct of foreign affairs. This decision, Movsesian v. Versicherung AG, addresses foreign affairs federalism—the division of authority between the states and the federal government. Just one month later, the Supreme Court weighed in on another foreign affairs issue: the separation of foreign relations powers within the federal government. In Zivotofsky v. Clinton, the Supreme Court ordered the lower courts to …

Blackmun (And Scalia) At The Bat: The Court's Separation-Of-Powers Strike Out In Freytag, Tuan Samahon

Nevada Law Journal

No abstract provided.

What Federalism & Why? Science Versus Doctrine, Stephen E. Gottlieb

Pepperdine Law Review

The Constitution does not use the words federal or federalism. It gives Congress a set of powers and prohibits the national government, the states or both from doing some things. The Court has inferred principles of federalism from those provisions. The political science community has treated the advantages of federalism as contingent on whether federalism deepens or diffuses conflict or opens competition for power. The United States Supreme Court's approach does neither; it has been trying to clarify and police a very different boundary. Even on its own terms, however, the Court's justifications do not work - a problem made …

Congress's Power To Regulate The Federal Judiciary: What The First Congress And The First Federal Courts Can Teach Today's Congress And Courts , Paul Taylor

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Chief Or The Court: Article Ii And The Appointment Of Inferior Judicial Officers, James E. Pfander

Faculty Working Papers

Each year, the Chief Justice of the United States makes a number of appointments to offices within the Article III judicial establishment. On its face, such a Chief-based appointment practice seems hard to square with the text of Article II, which provides for the appointment of inferior officers by the "courts of law." Scholars have noted the switch from a court-based to a Chief-based appointment system, but generally regard the Chief's authority as constitutionally benign. This Essay explores the origins of the Constitution's choice of the "courts" as the repository of appointment power. The decision was made against the backdrop …

Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem In Statutory Interpretation, Deborah Widiss

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Statutory overrides — that is, amendments to supersede a judicial interpretation of a statute — are the primary mechanism by which Congress signals disagreement with court interpretations; they are essential to protect the separation of powers and the promise of legislative supremacy. But in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, the Supreme Court held that Congress’s override of a judicial interpretation of Title VII did not control the interpretation of identical language in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and further that Congress’s “neglecting” to amend the ADEA when it amended Title VII was a clear signal that Congress intended the …

Limiting Legislative Courts: Protecting Article Iii From Article I Evisceration, Kenneth G. Coffin

Barry Law Review

This article will analyze possible limitations on Congress’ Article I power, concluding that separation of powers jurisprudence offers a practical and appropriate manner in which to check Congressional overreach. Part I traces the development of Congress’ power to create Article I courts. Part II critically evaluates the Northern Pipeline opinions, ultimately finding neither Justice Brennan’s nor Justice White’s conflicting opinions satisfactory. Part III briefly discusses several possible limiting principles on Article I courts before concluding that separation of powers jurisprudence offers a meaningful and pragmatic solution to the problem. Part IV tests the practicality of this new separation of powers …

Head Of State Immunity As Sole Executive Lawmaking, Lewis S. Yelin

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

At the request of the Executive Branch, courts routinely dismiss private suits against sitting heads of foreign states. Congress has never delegated authority to the Executive Branch to identify principles governing head of state immunity. The courts' practice thus appears inconsistent with the conventional view that the Executive Branch lacks authority to affect private rights unless authorized by Congress to do so. This Article argues that the Executive Branch's practice of determining head of state immunity is an example of sole executive lawmaking, deriving from the President's constitutional responsibility as the only authorized representative of the United States in its …

Cy Pres Relief And The Pathologies Of The Modern Class Action: A Normative And Empirical Analysis, Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian, Samantha Zyontz

Faculty Scholarship

Since the mid 1970s, federal courts have taken the doctrine of cy pres relief from the venerable law of trusts and adapted it for use in the modern class action proceeding. In its original context, cy pres was utilized as a means of judicially designating a charitable recipient when, for whatever reason, it was no longer possible to fulfill the original goal of the maker of the trust. The purpose of cy pres was to provide “the next best relief” by finding a recipient who would resemble the original donor’s recipient as much as possible. In the context of class …

Did The Madisonian Compromise Survive Detention At Guantanamo?, Lumen N. Mulligan

Faculty Works

In this essay, I take up the Court’s less heralded second holding in Boumediene v. Bush - that a federal habeas court must have the institutional capacity to find facts, which in Boumediene itself meant that a federal district court must be available to the petitioners. Although this has gone largely unnoticed, I contend that this holding is inconsistent with the Madisonian Compromise - the standard view that the Constitution does not require jurisdiction in any federal court, except the Supreme Court. In fact, it appears that the Court adopted Justice Story’s position that the Constitution requires vesting of jurisdiction …

Federal Courts Not Federal Tribunals, Lumen N. Mulligan

Faculty Works

The Court has employed inferred-cause-of-action doctrine to foster the rights of individuals, from injured workers to female college applicants to defrauded investors and targets of racial discrimination. Although the question of whether the federal courts ought to infer causes of action from federal statutes is an old chestnut in the federal-courts field, a new basis for barring such a practice has arisen, requiring fresh attention to the Court's inferred-cause-of-action doctrine. This new position asserts that inferring a cause of action is not merely poor judicial policy but extra-jurisdictional under either 28 U.S.C. - 1331 or Article III. Borrowing a phrase …

Equitable Balancing In The Age Of Statutes, Jared Goldstein

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Shadow Precedents And The Separation Of Powers: Statutory Interpretation Of Congressional Overrides, Deborah Widiss

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In both judicial decisions and critical commentary on statutory interpretation, the possibility of congressional override is generally considered a significant balance to the countermajoritarian reality that courts, through statutory interpretation, make policy. This Article demonstrates that the "check" on judicial power provided by overrides is not as robust as is typically assumed. One might assume that overridden precedents are functionally erased or reversed. But because Congress technically cannot overrule a prior decision, courts must determine whether the enactment of an override fully supersedes the prior judicial interpretation. Overrides thus raise unique, and previously largely ignored, questions of statutory interpretation. Using …

The President's Signing Statement Upon Signing The National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2008: Hearing Before The Subcomm. On Oversight And Investigations Of The H. Comm. On Armed Services,, 110th Cong., Mar. 11, 2008 (Statement Of Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Geo. U. L. Center), Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

Preemption And Federal Common Law, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Accounting: Habeas Corpus And Enemy Combatants, Emily Calhoun

Publications

The judiciary should impose a heavy burden of justification on the executive when a habeas petitioner challenges the accuracy of facts on which an enemy combatant designation rests. A heavy burden of justification will ensure that the essential institutional purposes of the writ--and legitimate, separated-powers government--are preserved, even during times of national exigency. The institutional purposes of the writ argue for robust judicial review rather than deference to the executive. Moreover, the procedural flexibility traditionally associated with the writ gives the judiciary the tools to ensure that a heavy burden of justification can be imposed.

Law Casebook Description And Table Of Contents: Constitutional Environmental And Natural Resources Law [Outline], Jim May, Robin Craig

The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

6 pages.

"James May, Widener University School of Law" -- Agenda

The United States Federal Judiciary May Not Be A Third, Co-Equal Branch Of Government - What Are The Implications For The Irish Debate On Judicial Activism, Lawrence Donnelly

San Diego International Law Journal

In support of this argument, this essay first examines the language of Article III of the United States Constitution and then briefly reviews the origins of the widely held perception that the federal judiciary is a "co-equal" branch of government. It next considers Borkian constitutionalism, opining that if one is to read the Constitution as Bork urges, this essay's tentative proposition can't be far off the mark. The focus then shifts to the express language of the Irish Constitution, which accords a far greater responsibility to the judiciary than its American counterpart. In this context, it reviews some pronouncements in …

Complete Preemption And The Separation Of Powers, Trevor W. Morrison

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This is a short response, published in Pennumbra (the online companion to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review), to Gil Seinfeld's recent article, "The Puzzle of Complete Preemption."

I first sound some notes of agreement with Professor Seinfeld's critique of the Supreme Court's complete preemption doctrine. I then turn to his proposed reshaping of the doctrine around the interest in federal legal uniformity. Although certainly more satisfying than the Court's account, Professor Seinfeld's refashioning of the doctrine raises a number of new difficulties. In particular, it invites the federal courts to engage in a range of line-drawing exercises to which …

Presidential Signing Statements Under The Bush Administration: A Threat To Checks And Balances And The Rule Of Law?: Hearing Before The H. Comm. On The Judiciary, 110th Cong., Jan. 31, 2007 (Statement Of Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

Non-Pecuniary Interests And The Injudicious Limits Of Appellate Standing In Bankruptcy, S. Todd Brown

Journal Articles

Standing to appeal bankruptcy court orders today is limited to those with a pecuniary interest. This prudential limitation is based on the person aggrieved requirement of Section 39(c) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 - a requirement that was not included in the Bankruptcy Code. This article examines the extensive differences between the Act and the Code, the potential justifications for extending the pecuniary interest test in spite of the omission of the person aggrieved requirement, and the potential ramifications for parties and the integrity of the bankruptcy process. This analysis suggests that standing to appeal bankruptcy orders should be …

The State Secrets Privilege And Separation Of Powers, Amanda Frost

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

Since September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has repeatedly invoked the state secrets privilege in cases challenging executive conduct in the war on terror, arguing that the very subject matter of these cases must be kept secret to protect national security. The executive's recent assertion of the privilege is unusual, in that it is seeking dismissal, pre-discovery, of all challenges to the legality of specific executive branch programs, rather than asking for limits on discovery in individual cases. This essay contends that the executive's assertion of the privilege is therefore akin to a claim that the courts lack jurisdiction to …

Constitutional Avoidance In The Executive Branch, Trevor W. Morrison

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

When executive branch actors interpret statutes, should they use the same methods as the courts? This Article takes up the question by considering a rule frequently invoked by the courts-the canon of constitutional avoidance. In addition to being a cardinal principle of judicial statutory interpretation, the avoidance canon also appears regularly and prominently in the work of the executive branch. It has played a central role, for example, in some of the most hotly debated episodes of executive branch statutory interpretation in the "war on terror." Typically, executive invocations of avoidance are supported by citation to one or more Supreme …

Separation Of Powers And The Governor's Office In West Virginia: Advocating A More Deferential Approach To The Chief Executive From The Judiciary, Jason C. Pizatella

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

Sherman's March (In)To The Sea, Andrew S. Oldham

ExpressO

This Article argues that the Sherman Act is unconstitutional. At the very least, scholars and jurists must not take for granted Congress's ability to statutorily deputize the federal courts with common-lawmaking powers. The federal antitrust statute—which has been described as the Magna Carta of free enterprise—raises serious constitutional questions that have heretofore gone unexplored and unanswered. Specifically, it is difficult (if not impossible) to reconcile the Sherman Act with the separation of powers, the nondelegation doctrine, and the Supremacy Clause.

Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before The S. Comm. On The Judiciary, 109th Cong., June 27, 2006 (Statement Of Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

When Worlds Collide: Federal Construction Of State Institutional Competence, Marcia L. Mccormick

ExpressO

The federal courts routinely encounter issues of state law. Often a state court will have already analyzed the law at issue, either in a separate case or in the very situation before the federal court. In every one of those cases, the federal courts must decide whether to defer to the state court analysis and, if so, how much. The federal courts will often defer, but many times have not done so, and they rarely explain the reasons for the departures they make. While this lack of transparency gives the federal courts the greatest amount of discretion and power, it …