Courts Commons^™

Article Iii's Constraints On The Legislative Power, Elizabeth Earle Beske

William & Mary Law Review

Article III’s heightened concreteness standard for statutory harms takes federal judges deep into legislative terrain, jeopardizing statutory damage provisions and confining Congress to post hoc solutions rather than preemptive strikes. The Supreme Court has insisted that creating a cause of action is a legislative function. At the same time, its recent standing cases instruct lower federal courts to permit suit on statutory injuries only when they find actual harm that bears a tight connection to injuries recognized at common law. This new harm requirement rests uneasily with countless statutes featuring statutory damage provisions that are in place precisely because damages …

The Vanishing Enforcer: Consumer Protection In An Era Of Dual Retrenchment, Alisher Juzgenbayev

Northwestern University Law Review

Recent developments, including reductions in the federal workforce, effective suspension of certain enforcement activities, and attempted centralization of independent agency rulemaking in the White House, have significantly weakened administrative agencies. This administrative retrenchment is concerning as private enforcement of a number of consumer protection statutes has been simultaneously curtailed through the Supreme Court’s decisions in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins and TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which dramatically narrowed plaintiffs’ standing. These decisions rely in part on a vision of strong executive authority, positing that broad private standing conflicts with an Article II framework where a politically accountable President faithfully implements laws …

Electoral Due Process, Michael S. Kang

Northwestern University Law Review

Hyperpartisanship has hit century-long highs in American politics and is emboldening state government attempts to undermine election outcomes by using control over state lawmaking structure to strip away authority, and sometimes outright unseat, partisan opponents after they win elected office. Even as traditional norms against such moves have eroded, the Supreme Court has taken a pro-partisanship turn in removing judicial checks against such moves under equal protection and constitutional structure. This Article proposes shifting from challenges under those doctrines to a new approach under electoral due process for confronting this new generation of antidemocracy. Federal due process law restricts the …

Reconstituting A Constitution, And A Republic: The Architecture Of Authoritarian Rule, J. Maria Glover

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

A constitution can be remade without tearing it down, or even changing a single word. It is done by law.

“The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may establish,” whose “province and duty” it is to “say what the law is.” U.S. Const. Art. III §1; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 (Cranch) 137 (1803). It is not the power to remake the Constitution that grants it.

The Supreme Court is turning the inherited powers that hold power to law into instruments of its own aggrandizement. It is taking authority from …

Constitutional Obiter Dicta On Male-Male Sex And Fundamental Rights In Singapore, Benjamin Joshua Ong

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

The Singapore Court of Appeal held a law prohibiting male–male sexual intercourse (s 377A of the Penal Code) unenforceable on non-rights-based grounds. The court's remarks about the rights to life and liberty (including whether sexual orientation is mutable), freedom of expression, and equality are obiter. But they are significant, since in Singapore, there are few constitutional rights cases and the courts focus on spelling out the limits to executive and legislative power without necessarily striking down exercises of such power on rights grounds. Indeed, the obiter dicta prompted the Legislature to repeal s 377A. Given the repeal, the obiter dicta …

Climate Exceptionalism In Court, Zachary D. Clopton, David A. Dana

Northwestern University Law Review

Across a range of cases, fossil fuel companies, government actors, and some judges have conceded that climate change is an exceptional phenomenon, only to argue that its exceptional nature is a reason to keep climate change out of court. These parties and judges thus seek to avoid the adjudication of climate cases on the merits, even when the neutral application of existing law would provide for jurisdiction in these cases. We term this phenomenon “climate jurisdiction exceptionalism.”

This Article provides a comprehensive account of climate jurisdiction exceptionalism, focusing on two main threads: Article III standing and state court jurisdiction. First, …

The Ideational Dimension Of Judicial Power, Allen C. Sumrall

Marquette Law Review

The judiciary dominates contemporary American politics. In the United States, courts have overcome their humble origins to act as central figures in nearly every major policy dispute and separation of powers dispute. To explain this development, scholars have documented the increase in the federal judiciary’s institutional capacity and resources. Most accounts of the judiciary’s changing role in American constitutional politics focus on the courts’ expanded jurisdiction, the statutes that channel judicial review, the courts’ material resources, or changes to how politicians harness or respond to the judiciary. But focusing on these more formal institutional changes only gets us so far. …

Our Partisan Supreme Court And An Essential First Step Toward Reclaiming What's Been Lost, Gary Simson

Articles

Partisan decision-making by even only one Supreme Court Justice in a single case is not a trivial matter. The ill effects are greatly compounded when five or more Justices of a similar partisan bent regularly deliberate about, and decide, cases in a partisan way. At that point, we’ve got what can fairly be described as a partisan Supreme Court.

I argue in this Article that, to all of our great misfortune, a partisan Supreme Court is very much what we’ve got today. On a more hopeful note, though, I also argue that although reforming the Court to be a much …

“In Defiance Of Gifts”: The Dutch Origins Of The Foreign Emoluments Clause, Liam E. Cronan

Touro Law Review

Starting in 2017, a series of lawsuits against President Donald Trump grounded their arguments on a long-overlooked portion of the Constitution: the Foreign Emoluments Clause, which in its most basic form bans government officials from accepting gifts, or “emoluments,” from foreign entities. Until 2017, few courts or scholars had ever scrutinized this provision. But with Trump’s presidency and enduring reports of his foreign business dealings, this oft-shunned area of the law suddenly garnered the attention of courts and scholars alike. Because of a clear “lack of precedent” on this matter, federal judges soon parsed historical records to determine the Clause’s …

Statutory Liquidation, Daniel Deacon

Articles

When might practice by the political branches settle the meaning of legal text? That question has mostly been taken up in the constitutional setting, with one strand of scholarship taking inspiration from Madison's statement in Federalist No. 37, that "{a}ll new laws ... are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series ef particular discussions and aqjudications." The prospect that post-enactment practice might liquidate the meaning of statutory text has been comparatively underexamined. That's not surprising. Under modern textualism, post-enactment considerations would seem to have little place. And under Chevron …

A Conversation With Justice Brett Kavanaugh, Brett M. Kavanaugh, J. Joel Alicea

Catholic University Law Review

On Thursday, September 26th, 2024, the Center for the Constitution and the Catholic Intellectual Tradition at The Catholic University of America hosted a conversation between Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh and Professor J. Joel Alicea. This was the inaugural event of the new Center. The conversation covered topics such as constitutional interpretation, the separation of powers, religious liberty, and the Catholic intellectual tradition. This is a transcript of the conversation, and the text appears substantially as it was delivered. The video of the event may be found at this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2sKvSwzkmqo.

The Appeal Of The Apex Court In Botswana: The Case Of Carter Morupisi V. State, Muna B. Ndulo, Louis Koen, Samantha Smit

SAIPAR Case Review

This case note discusses the Botswana Court of Appeal's ruling in Carter Morupisi v State, which addressed the High Court's unprecedented attempt to review a decision of the Court of Appeal. The commentary highlights the fundamental principle of judicial hierarchy and the separation of powers in Botswana's constitutional framework. The Court of Appeal emphatically rejected the High Court's jurisdiction to review its judgments, reaffirming its position as the final arbiter (highest judicial authority). The authors emphasise that while the High Court may raise constitutional questions with regards to Apex courts decisions, it cannot adjudicate on them, reinforcing the concept of …

Implied Consent In Administrative Adjudication, Grace Moore

Washington and Lee Law Review Online

Article III of the Constitution mandates that judges exercising the federal judicial power receive life tenure and that their pay not be diminished. Nonetheless, certain forms of adjudication have always taken place outside of Article III—in state courts, military tribunals, territorial courts, and administrative tribunals. Administrative law judges, employed by various federal administrative agencies, decide thousands of cases each year. A vast majority of the cases they decide deal with public rights, which generally include claims involving federal statutory rights or cases in which the federal government is a party. With litigant consent, however, the Supreme Court has upheld administrative …

The Right To Remove In Agency Adjudication, Christopher J. Walker, David Zaring

Articles

In SEC v. Jarkesy, the Supreme Court will decide the constitutional future of agency adjudication, especially in the context of agency enforcement actions and the imposition of civil penalties. If the Court agrees with the Fifth Circuit on any of its three independent reasons for unconstitutionality, agency enforcement and adjudication schemes across the federal regulatory state will be severely disrupted, in ways that are detrimental to both the regulator and the regulated. In this Essay, we propose a path forward: In certain circumstances, the regulated party should have a right to remove an enforcement action from an in-house agency adjudication …

The False Promise Of Jurisdiction Stripping, Daniel Epps, Alan M. Trammell

Scholarly Articles

Jurisdiction stripping is seen as a nuclear option. Its logic is simple: By depriving federal courts of jurisdiction over some set of cases, Congress ensures those courts cannot render bad decisions. To its proponents, it offers the ultimate check on unelected and unaccountable judges. To its critics, it poses a grave threat to the separation of powers. Both sides agree, though, that jurisdiction stripping is a powerful weapon. On this understanding, politicians, activists, and scholars throughout American history have proposed jurisdiction-stripping measures as a way for Congress to reclaim policymaking authority from the courts.

The conventional understanding is wrong. Whatever …

White-Collar Courts, Merritt E. Mcalister

UF Law Faculty Publications

Article III courts are white-collar courts. They are, scholars have said, “special.” They sit atop the judicial hierarchy, and they are the courts of the one percent. We inculcate that sense of specialness in a variety of ways: federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they are the subject of a (perhaps overrated) class in law school; we privilege clerkships with federal judges more than with state-court judges; and we focus more scholarly attention on federal courts than state courts. They are, in short, the courts of the elite—jurisdictionally, doctrinally, and socially. Perhaps the singular importance of federal courts was …

States Of Emergency: Covid-19 And Separation Of Powers In The States, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

No event in recent years has shone a brighter spotlight on state separation of powers than the COVID-19 pandemic. Over a more than two-year period, governors exercised unprecedented authority through suspending laws and regulations, limiting business activities and gatherings, restricting individual movement, and imposing public health requirements. Many state legislatures endorsed these measures or were content to let governors take the lead, but in some states the legislature pushed back, particularly — albeit not only—where the governor and legislative majorities were of different political parties. Some of these conflicts wound up in state supreme courts.

This Essay examines the states’ …

Health Choice Or Health Coercion? The Osha Emergency Temporary Standard Covid-19 Vaccination Mandates: Ax Or Vax, Savannah Snyder

Helm's School of Government Conference - 2021-2024

No abstract provided.

Do Seven Members Of Congress Have Article Iii Standing To Sue The Executive Branch?: Why The D.C. Circuit’S Divided Decision In Maloney V. Murphy Was Wrongly Decided In Light Of Two Prior District Court Decisions And Historical Separation Of Powers Jurisprudence, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

The D.C. Circuit’s divided decision in Maloney v. Murphy granting standing to minority party members of the House Oversight Committee appears questionable in light of two prior district court decisions in Waxman and Cummings that had denied standing in similar circumstances. Most importantly, Maloney is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent regarding standing for individual members of Congress. In Raines v. Byrd, the Supreme Court held that individual members of Congress generally do not have standing to enforce institutional congressional interests such as whether a statute is constitutional, but that one or both Houses of Congress must sue as an institution. …

Reasoning V. Rhetoric: The Strange Case Of “Unconstitutional Beyond A Reasonable Doubt”, Hugh D. Spitzer

Articles

An odd formulation has frequented American constitutional discourse for 125 years: a declaration that courts should not overturn a statute on constitutional grounds unless it is “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” This concept has been thought of as a presumption, a standard, a doctrine, or a philosophy of coordinate branch respect and judicial restraint. Yet it has been criticized because “beyond a reasonable doubt” is at root an evidentiary standard of proof in criminal cases rather than a workable theory or standard for deciding constitutional law cases. This article discusses the history and use of “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt,” …

House Rules: Congress And The Attorney-Client Privilege, David Rapallo

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In 2020, the Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision in Trump v. Mazars establishing four factors for determining the validity of congressional subpoenas for a sitting president’s personal papers. In an unanticipated move, Chief Justice John Roberts added that recipients of congressional subpoenas have “long been understood” to retain not only constitutional privileges, but common law privileges developed by judges, including the attorney-client privilege. This was particularly surprising since Trump was not relying on the attorney-client privilege and the Court had never treated this common law privilege as overriding Congress’s Article I power to set its own procedures for conducting …

Federalism Limits On Non-Article Iii Adjudication, F. Andrew Hessick

Pepperdine Law Review

Although Article III of the Constitution vests the federal judicial power in the Article III courts, the Supreme Court has created a patchwork of exceptions permitting non-Article III tribunals to adjudicate various disputes. In doing so, the Court has focused on the separation of powers, concluding that these non-Article III adjudications do not unduly infringe on the judicial power of the Article III courts. But separation of powers is not the only consideration relevant to the lawfulness of non-Article III adjudication. Article I adjudications also implicate federalism. Permitting Article I tribunals threatens the role of state courts by expanding federal …

Against Congressional Case Snatching, Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Atticus Deprospro

William & Mary Law Review

Congress has developed a deeply problematic habit of aggrandizing itself by snatching cases from the Article III courts. One form of contemporary case snatching involves directly legislating the outcome of pending litigation by statute. These laws do not involve generic amendments to existing statutes but rather dictate specific rulings by the Article III courts in particular cases. Another form of congressional case snatching involves rendering ongoing judicial proceedings essentially advisory by unilaterally permitting a disgruntled litigant to transfer a pending case from an Article III court to an executive agency for resolution. Both practices involve Congress reallocating the business of …

Neither Safe, Nor Legal, Nor Rare: The D.C. Circuit’S Use Of The Doctrine Of Ratification To Shield Agency Action From Appointments Clause Challenges, Damien M. Schiff

Seattle University Law Review

Key to the constitutional design of the federal government is the separation of powers. An important support for that separation is the Appointments Clause, which governs how officers of the United States are installed in their positions. Although the separation of powers generally, and the Appointments Clause specifically, support democratically accountable government, they also protect individual citizens against abusive government power. But without a judicial remedy, such protection is ineffectual—a mere parchment barrier.

Such has become the fate of the Appointments Clause in the D.C. Circuit, thanks to that court’s adoption—and zealous employment—of the rule that agency action, otherwise unconstitutional …

An Invisible Border Wall And The Dangers Of Internal Agency Control, Jill E. Family

Lewis & Clark Law Review

Administrative law has long struggled to determine the appropriate balance between internal and external control over federal agencies. Some scholars posit that internal agency controls (those from within the executive branch) are optimal checks on agency behavior. In fact, some argue that external control (from Congress or the courts) is detrimental to agency governance. This Article presents a cautionary tale for those who discount the role of external control; it depicts a case study that poses a major challenge to those who theorize that internal agency controls are a sufficient check on agency behavior.

This case study analyzes the Trump …

The People's Court: On The Intellectual Origins Of American Judicial Power, Ian C. Bartrum

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

This article enters into the modern debate between “consti- tutional departmentalists”—who contend that the executive and legislative branches share constitutional interpretive authority with the courts—and what are sometimes called “judicial supremacists.” After exploring the relevant history of political ideas, I join the modern minority of voices in the latter camp.

This is an intellectual history of two evolving political ideas—popular sovereignty and the separation of powers—which merged in the making of American judicial power, and I argue we can only understand the structural function of judicial review by bringing these ideas together into an integrated whole. Or, put another way, …

Historical Gloss, Madisonian Liquidation, And The Originalism Debate, Curtis A. Bradley, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Constitution is old, relatively brief, and very difficult to amend. In its original form, the Constitution was primarily a framework for a new national government, and for 230 years the national government has operated under that framework even as conditions have changed in ways beyond the Founders’ conceivable imaginations. The framework has survived in no small part because government institutions have themselves played an important role in helping to fill in and clarify the framework through their practices and interactions, informed by the realities of governance. Courts, the political branches, and academic commentators commonly give weight to such …

Chevron Deference In The States: Lessons From Three States, Carrie Townsend Ingram

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

The appointment of Justice Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court of the United States has left many wondering if a change to the Chevron doctrine is impending. Justice Gorsuch’s colleague on the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas, shares similar views on Chevron. This article will compare the federal rule to three different states: Indiana, Delaware, and Arizona. Each state has taken a different path in determining that the judiciary should not give deference to an agency’s interpretation of the statutes that it is charged with enforcing. Delaware has affirmatively declared that the Chevron doctrine is not applicable in its state. A …

Neither Fish Nor Fowl: The Separation Of Powers And The Office Of Administrative Hearings, Ann E. Cohen, Elise Larson

Mitchell Hamline Law Review

No abstract provided.

Testimony Of Rebecca Ingber Before The United States Senate Committee On The Judiciary On The Nomination Of Brett Kavanaugh For Associate Justice Of The U.S. Supreme Court, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Rebecca Ingber testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee as it considered the nomination of Brett Kavanaugh for Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Her testimony focused on Judge Kavanaugh's national security and international law jurisprudence, in particular, the court's role in considering international law constraints on the President's war powers, and the potential effects of this judicial approach on executive power.