Courts Commons^™

Judicial Independence And The Scope Of Article Iii--A View From The Federalist, Michael G. Collins

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Resorting To External Norms And Principles In Constitutional Decision-Making, Alvin L. Goldman

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Given the very significant role of constitutional law in the American political system and the fact that Supreme Court Justices are appointed through a political process, it is understandable that the appropriate judicial approach to resolving constitutional issues often is the subject of political commentary. Unfortunately, discourse by politicians concerning this issue seldom rises to the deserved level of wisdom. One of President George W. Bush's public mantras is illustrative of political commentary respecting federal judicial appointments: "I'm going to put strict constructionists on the bench." On its face, and as understood by politically naive audiences, the statement appears to …

Constitutional Existence Conditions And Judicial Review, Matthew D. Adler, Michael C. Dorf

Faculty Scholarship

Although critics of judicial review sometimes call for making the entire Constitution nonjusticiable, many familiar norms of constitutional law state what we call "existence conditions" that are necessarily enforced by judicial actors charged with the responsibility of applying, and thus as a preliminary step, identifying, propositions of sub-constitutional law such as statutes. Article I, Section 7, which sets forth the procedures by which a bill becomes a law, is an example: a putative law that did not go through the Article I, Section 7 process and does not satisfy an alternative test for legal validity (such as the treaty-making provision …

The Dormant Commerce Clause And The Hormones Problem, Donald H. Regan

Book Chapters

It is obvious that no anti-discrimination regime can stop at forbidding explicit discrimination of the relevant sort. If only explicit discrimination is forbidden, lawmakers who want to discriminate can hide their discriminatory intentions behind facially neutral classifications that are nonetheless chosen because they differentially burden the protected class. So, we must be prepared to invalidate some facially neutral laws that have "discriminatory effect" or, as American lawyers often call it, "disparate impact." On the other hand, we cannot possibly invalidate all laws which have a disparate impact on a protected class; many perfectly reasonable laws adopted for completely innocent purposes …

Supreme Court Section 1983 Decisions: (October 2001 Term), Martin A. Schwartz

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

Jon O. Newman And The Abortion Decisions: A Remarkable First Year, Andrew D. Hurwitz

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Jon Newman’S Theory Of Disparagement And The First Amendment In The Administrative State, Edward L. Rubin

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Law Of Nations And The Offenses Clause Of The Constitution: A Defense Of Federalism, Michael T. Morley

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

Free-Standing Due Process And Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court's Search For Interpretive Guidelines, Jerold H. Israel

Articles

When I was first introduced to the constitutional regulation of criminal procedure in the mid-1950s, a single issue dominated the field: To what extent did the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment impose upon states the same constitutional restraints that the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments imposed upon the federal government? While those Bill of Rights provisions, as even then construed, imposed a broad range of constitutional restraints upon the federal criminal justice system, the federal system was (and still is) minuscule as compared to the combined systems of the fifty states. With the Bill of Rights provisions …

Supreme Court Federalism Decisions, Leon Friedman

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Is Progressive Constitutionalism Possible?, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Progressivism is in part a particular moral and political response to the sadness of lesser lives, lives unnecessarily diminished by economic, psychic and physical insecurity in the midst of a society or world that offers plenty. This insecurity is unjust and should end; the suffering should be alleviated, and those lives should be enriched. To do so must be one of the goals of a morally just or justifiable state. Not all suffering and not all lesser lives, of course, give rise to such a response. The suffering attendant to accident, disease, war and happenstance is neither entirely chargeable to …

Beyond The Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation As Litigation, Margo Schlanger

Reviews

In 1955, in its second decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court suggested that federal courts might be called upon to engage in long-term oversight of once-segregated schools. Through the 1960s, southern resistance pushed federal district and appellate judges to turn that possibility into a reality. The impact of this saga on litigation practice extended beyond school desegregation, and even beyond the struggle for African-American equality; through implementation of Brown, the nation’s litigants, lawyers, and judges grew accustomed both to issuance of permanent injunctions against state and local public institutions, and to extended court oversight of compliance. …

Constitutions And Spontaneous Orders: A Response To Professor Mcginnis, Adam C. Pritchard, Todd J. Zywicki

Articles

Professor John McGinnis has written a perceptive and provocative comment on our economic analysis of the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation.1 A brief summary of our areas of agreement and disagreement may help set the stage for this response. It appears that Professor McGinnis substantially agrees with the two central propositions of our article. First, he appears to agree with our definition of efficient traditions as those evolving over long periods of time from decentralized processes.2 Second, he explicitly agrees that Justices Scalia and Souter have adopted sub-optimal models of tradition because they rely on sources that lack the …

Finding The Constitution: An Economic Analysis Of Tradition's Role In Constitutional Interpretation, Adam C. Pritchard, Todd J. Zywicki

Articles

In this Article, Professor Pritchard and Professor Zywicki examine the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation, a topic that has received significant attention in recent years. After outlining the current debate over the use of tradition, the authors discuss the efficiency purposes of constitutionalism--precommitment and the reduction of agency costs--and demonstrate how the use of tradition in constitutional interpretation can serve these purposes. Rejecting both Justice Scalia's majoritarian model, which focuses on legislative sources of tradition, and Justice Souter's common-law model, which focuses on Supreme Court precedent as a source of tradition, the authors propose an alternative model--the "finding model"-- …

The Uniform Commercial Code Meets The Seventh Amendment: The Demise Of Jury Trials Under Article 5?, Margaret L. Moses

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Court Of Appeals Ballentine V. Koch (Decided October 22, 1996)

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation, Judith S. Kaye

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Brown V. State Of New York: Judge Simons Says New York State Can Be Held Liable For Money Damages, Eric J. Stockel

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Ex Post Facto Laws: Supreme Court New York County People V. Griffin (Decided December 5, 1996

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

To Act Or Not? That Is The Question: Self-Incrimination And The Sole Proprietor, Raymond G. Keenan

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Court And The Changing Constitution: A Discussion, Carl Sividorski, James Gardner, Barry Latzer, Peter Galie

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Tragic Irony Of American Federalism: National Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty In Slavery And In Freedom, The Federalism In The 21st Century: Historical Perspectives, Robert J. Kaczorowski

Faculty Scholarship

A plurality on the Supreme Court seeks to establish a state-sovereignty based theory of federalism that imposes sharp limitations on Congress's legislative powers. Using history as authority, they admonish a return to the constitutional "first principles" of the Founders. These "first principles," in their view, attribute all governmental authority to "the consent of the people of each individual state, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole." Because the people of each state are the source of all governmental power, they maintain, "where the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular power-that is, …

Where's The Buck?: Juror Misperception Of Sentencing Responsibility In Death Penalty Cases, Joseph L. Hoffmann

Indiana Law Journal

Symposium: The Capital Jury Project

A Theory Of Compulsory Process Clause Discovery Rights, Jean Montoya

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Civil Service Appointments And Promotions

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Cruel & Unusual Punishment

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Regulation Of Water Use And Takings—The Government Lawyer’S Perspective, Richard M. Frank

Regulatory Takings and Resources: What Are the Constitutional Limits? (Summer Conference, June 13-15)

11 pages.

Contains 3 pages of references.

Searching For Basinwide Solutions To Endangered Species Problems Of The South Platte Of Colorado, James S. Lochhead

Regulatory Takings and Resources: What Are the Constitutional Limits? (Summer Conference, June 13-15)

42 pages (includes illustrations and map).

Contains endnotes.

Incorporating The Suspension Clause: Is There A Constitutional Right To Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners?, Jordan Steiker

Michigan Law Review

In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court adopted generous standards governing federal habeas petitions by state prisoners. At that time, the Court suggested, rather surprisingly, that its solicitude toward such petitions might be constitutionally mandated by the Suspension Clause, the only provision in the Constitution that explicitly refers to the "Writ of Habeas Corpus." Now, thirty years later, the Court has essentially overruled those expansive rulings, and Congress has considered, though not yet enacted, further limitations on the availability of the writ. Despite these significant assaults on the habeas forum, the constitutional argument appears to have been entirely abandoned. The …

Coconspirator Statements And Former Testimony In New York And Federal Courts With Some Comments On Codification, Randolph N. Jonakait

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.