Courts Commons^™

Adjudicated On The Merits?: Why The Aedpa Requires State Courts To Exhibit Their Reasoning, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 995 (2006), Ezra Spilke

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Why Legislative Findings Can Pad-Lock Redistricting Plans In Racial-Gerrymandering Cases, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1371 (2006), Frank Adams

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Dostoyevsky And The Therapeutic Jurisprudence Confession, 40 J. Marshall L. Rev. 41 (2006), Amy D. Ronner

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Second Chance For Justice: Reevaluation Of The United States Double Jeopardy Standard, 40 J. Marshall L. Rev. 371 (2006), Andrea Koklys

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Always Low Prices, Always At A Cost: A Call To Arms Against The Wal-Martization Of America, 40 J. Marshall L. Rev. 267 (2006), Justin R. Watkins

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

How Much Justice Can We Afford?: Defining The Courts' Roles And Deciding The Appropriate Number Of Trials, Settlement Signals, And Other Elements Needed To Administer Justice, John M. Lande

Faculty Publications

This article discusses how the U.S. court system can function optimally given declining trial rates and the limited resources available. The question of how much justice we can afford is a challenge that becomes more difficult as budgets fall behind the increasing demand for and cost of court services. Presumably most analysts would agree that courts should try cases when appropriate - and help litigants find just resolutions without trial when it is not needed. The courts' ability to provide trials in some cases is possible only if the vast majority of other cases are not tried.This article provides background …

Revisiting Anna Moscowitz's Kross's Critique Of New York City's Women's Court: The Continued Problem Of Solving The "Problem" Of Prostitution With Specialized Criminal Courts, Mae C. Quinn

Journal Articles

No abstract provided.

Goodbye To Affidavits - Improving The Federal Affidavit Substitute Statute, Ira Shiflett

Cleveland State Law Review

Thirty years ago, Congress recognized that the costs of notarization generally outweighed the benefits. In 1976, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1746, intending to limit the circumstances in which a notary would be required. Section 1746 provides that whenever a document is required to be supported by a notarized statement other than a deposition, an oath of office, or an oath required to be taken before an official other than a notary, a declaration under penalty of perjury is a sufficient substitute. Congress recognized that it could be inconvenient to find a notary, especially on the weekends or for people …

A New Prescription For America's Medical Liability System, Paul J. Barringer Iii

Journal of Health Care Law and Policy

No abstract provided.

Reform Of Medical Liability And Patient Safety: Are Health Courts And Medicare The Keys To Effective Change?, Randall R. Bovbjerg

Journal of Health Care Law and Policy

No abstract provided.

Health Courts And Malpractice Claims Adjudication Through Medicare: Some Questions, Timothy Stoltzfus Jost

Journal of Health Care Law and Policy

No abstract provided.

An Advocate's Response To Professor Sage, Toby S. Edelman

Journal of Health Care Law and Policy

No abstract provided.

Revisiting The Tense Relationship Between The U.S. Supreme Court, Administrative Procedure, And The National Environmental Policy Act, Jason J. Czarnezki

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This Article addresses the possibility, under the prevailing understanding of NEPA, that an agency might draft a comprehensive report containing information about potential environmental effects and alternate approaches to a proposed plan--and then wholly disregard all of this information in making its final decision. Although an agency may contend that it has “considered” the environmental consequences of alternative courses of action, what if these factors have no actual impact on its final decision? Hypothetically, an agency could simply “steamroll” toward its preferred decision, hurdling NEPA's procedural obstacles without genuinely considering potential environmental harms or the means to avoid them.

This …

The Dilution Solution: Populating The Trademark A-List, Scott C. Wilcox

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In our celebrity-conscious culture, the media serve as arbiters of fame. The editors of Us Weekly and People wield significant influence over public recognition of celebrities. Since the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”) amended the Lanham Act in 1995, federal courts have adopted similar roles as arbiters of fame, determining which trademarks are sufficiently famous to receive federal protection against dilution. Recent changes to the Lanham Act, however, reserve the availability of dilution actions to “A-list” marks. These changes fulfill the objectives of trademark law while achieving Congress’s intent in enacting the FTDA.

Stevens's Ratchet: When The Court Should Decide Not To Decide, Joel A. Flaxman

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Hidden underneath the racy death penalty issues in Kansas v. Marsh lurks a seemingly dull procedural issue addressed only in separate opinions by Justices Stevens and Scalia: whether the Court should have heard the case in the first place. As he did in three cases from the Court’s 2005 term, Justice Stevens argued in Marsh that the Court has no legitimate interest in reviewing state court decisions that overprotect federal constitutional rights. Instead, the Supreme Court should exercise its certiorari power to tip the scales against states and in favor of individuals. Granting certiorari in Marsh, Stevens argued, was not …

The High Court Remains As Divided As Ever Over The Death Penalty, George H. Kendall

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

More than three decades ago, in Furman v. Georgia, a sharply divided Supreme Court struck down all existing capital punishment schemes be-cause the results they generated were arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasoned. No member of that Court remains on the Court today, and the Court has grown increasingly conservative ever since. Nevertheless, impor-tant questions concerning the administration of capital punishment continue to wrought deep divisions within the Court, for instance in determining whether racial bias influences the system, in determining the sufficiency of new evidence of innocence to justify review of a defaulted claim in habeas corpus proceedings, in determining a …

The Trademark Dilution Revision Act Of 2006: A Welcome—And Needed—Change, Dale M. Cendali, Bonnie L. Schriefer

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Some have argued that the changes to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (the “FTDA”) embodied in the recently enacted Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (the “TDRA”) threaten to infringe upon the right to free speech. This is simply not the case. The FTDA has always protected First Amendment rights, and the TDRA clarifies and strengthens those protections. While the concept of dilution was introduced in 1927, there was no federal dilution law in the United States until 1995, when Congress passed the FTDA. Since then, various federal courts have reached different conclusions regarding issues such as: (1) what constituted …

What Is Dilution, Anyway?, Stacey L. Dogan

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Ever since the Supreme Court decided Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. in 2003, an amendment to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”) has appeared inevitable. Congress almost certainly meant to adopt a “likelihood of dilution” standard in the original statute, and the 2006 revisions correct its sloppy drafting. Substituting a “likelihood of dilution” standard for “actual dilution,” however, does not resolve a deeper philosophical question that has always lurked in the dilution debate: what is dilution, and how does one prove or disprove its probability? The statutory definition notwithstanding, this issue remains largely unanswered, leaving the courts with the …

Dilution's (Still) Uncertain Future, Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Mark D. Janis

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Dilution looked to be a potent weapon when Congress introduced it as § 43(c) of the Lanham Act in 1995. Indeed, some observers feared that it would be too potent (and in some contexts, such as cybersquatting, it successfully augmented traditional causes of action). But a series of court decisions, culminating in the Supreme Court’s 2003 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue opinion, weakened dilution protection so profoundly that what remained wasn’t of much consequence. Congress has recently sought to breathe new life into dilution law, enacting the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (“TDRA”). Some might see this as a …

Putting The Guesswork Back Into Capital Sentencing, Sean D. O'Brien

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court deemed it “incon-testable” that a death sentence is cruel and unusual if inflicted “by reason of [the defendant’s] race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.” Arbitrary and discriminatory patterns in capital sentencing moved the Court to strike down death penalty statutes that required judges or juries to cast thumbs-up or thumbs-down verdicts against offenders found guilty of capi-tal crimes. The issue of innocence was barely a footnote in Furman; the Court’s concerns focused on …

The Revolution Enters The Court: The Constitutional Significance Of Wrongful Convictions In Contemporary Constitutional Regulation Of The Death Penalty, Jordan Steiker

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Over the last decade, the most important events in American death pen-alty law have occurred outside the courts. The discovery of numerous wrongfully convicted death-sentenced inmates in Illinois led to the most substantial reflection on the American death penalty system since the late 1960s and early 1970s. Former Illinois Governor George Ryan, a Republi-can, first declared a moratorium on executions in 2000 and eventually commuted all 167 inmates on Illinois’s death row in 2003. The events in Illinois reverberated nationwide. Almost overnight, state legislative agendas shifted from expanding or maintaining the prevailing reach of the death penalty to studying its …

Legitimizing Error, Rebecca E. Woodman

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Since Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court has sought to harmonize competing constitutional demands under Eighth Amendment rules regulat-ing the two-step eligibility and selection stages of the capital decision-making process. Furman’s demand for rationality and consistency requires that, at the eligibility stage, the sentencer’s discretion be limited and guided by clear and objective fact-based standards that rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. The selection stage requires a determination of whether a specific death-eligible defendant actually deserves that punish-ment, as distinguished from other death-eligible defendants. Here, fundamental fairness and respect for the uniqueness of the individual are the cornerstones of …

Appellate Review Of Racist Summations: Redeeming The Promise Of Searching Analysis, Ryan Patrick Alford

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

This Article addresses the question of the appropriate response of appellate counsel for Black defendants tarred at trial by the indirect deployment of powerful racial stereotypes. The crux of the problem is that even now, the courts only take exception to blatant racist appeals, even though indirectly racist summations can have a determinative impact at trial. In laying out the contours of the problem, we must draw upon the discipline of rhetoric, or persuasion through oration, to describe various techniques of intentional indirectness that prosecutors use to obviate the possibility of appellate review under the stringent standards of the Fourteenth …

The Color Of Perspective: Affirmative Action And The Constitutional Rhetoric Of White Innocence, Cecil J. Hunt Ii

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

This Article discusses the Supreme Court's use of the rhetoric of White innocence in deciding racially-inflected claims of constitutional shelter. It argues that the Court's use of this rhetoric reveals its adoption of a distinctly White-centered perspective, representing a one-sided view of racial reality that distorts the Court's ability to accurately appreciate the true nature of racial reality in contemporary America. This Article examines the Court's habit of using a White-centered perspective in constitutional race cases. Specifically, it looks at the Court's use of the rhetoric of White innocence in the context of the Court's concern with protecting "innocent" Whites …

The Endorsement Court, Jay D. Wexler

Faculty Scholarship

Since 1986, when William H. Rehnquist was confirmed as the sixteenth Chief Justice of the United States, the Supreme Court has virtually rewritten the entire law regarding the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses. With respect to the Free Exercise Clause, the Court, in its 1990 Employment Division v. Smith decision, reversed years of jurisprudence and held that the First Amendment does not entitle religious believers to exemptions from neutral laws of general application. On the Establishment Clause side, the Court recently overturned a series of its earlier decisions on its way to creating a body of law quite amenable to the …

Comparative Fiscal Federalism: What Can The U.S. Supreme Court And The European Court Of Justice Learn From Each Other's Tax Jurisprudence?, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Articles

In October 2005, a group of distinguished tax experts from the European Union and the United States, who had never met before, convened at the University of Michigan Law School for a conference on "Comparative Fiscal Federalism: Comparing the U.S. Supreme Court and European Court of Justice Tax Jurisprudence." The purpose of the conference was to shed comparative light on the very different approaches taken by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the U.S. Supreme Court to the question of fiscal federalism. The conference was sponsored by the U-M Law School, U-M's European Union Center, and Harvard Law School's …

Supremacy And Diplomacy: The International Law Of The U.S. Supreme Court, Harlan G. Cohen

Scholarly Works

In 2003-2004, a Presidential campaign year dominated by debates about international affairs and international law, the U.S. Supreme Court took an unusual number of cases of international import. The Court considered the Alien Tort Claims Act and the future of human rights suits in U.S. courts, the applicability of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act to claims involving Nazi-stolen artwork, the applicability of American antitrust law to foreign anticompetitive activity, and the legality of the Guantanamo detentions. A great deal of ink has been spilled analyzing the individual impacts of each of these cases. What has been less considered is how …

What We Know, And What We Should Know About American Trial Trends, Margo Schlanger

Articles

More than a few people noticed that the American court system was seeing ever fewer trials before Marc Galanter named the phenomenon.' But until Galanter mobilized lawyers2 and scholars to look systematically at the issue, inquiry was both piecemeal and sparse. Over the past three years, in contrast, Galanter's research 3 and his idea entrepreneurship, crystallized in the "Vanishing Trial" label, has spawned if not a huge literature at least a substantial one. We have now gotten the benefit of sustained scholarly inquiry by researchers of many stripes. Their work has been largely, though not entirely, empirical, and so we …

State Convicts And Federal Courts: Reopening The Habeas Corpus Debate, Larry Yackle

Faculty Scholarship

I know what you are thinking. Of all the things that can conceivably happen in this field, the least likely (the very least likely) is that Congress will take a fresh look at federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. It was only in 1996 that Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),' which ostensibly "reformed" the scheme by which prisoners employ federal habeas to challenge state criminal convictions or sentences. 2 Passing a bill of this magnitude is no small feat. Once such legislation receives approval from both houses of Congress and the President, no one has …

From St. Ives To Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion Of The Medieval ‘Law Merchant’, Stephen E. Sachs

Faculty Scholarship

Modern advocates of corporate self-regulation have drawn unlikely inspiration from the Middle Ages. On the traditional view of history, medieval merchants who wandered from fair to fair were not governed by domestic laws, but by their own lex mercatoria, or "law merchant. " This law, which uniformly regulated commerce across Europe, was supposedly produced by an autonomous merchant class, interpreted in private courts, and enforced through private sanctions rather than state coercion. Contemporary writers have treated global corporations as descendants of these itinerant traders, urging them to replace conflicting national laws with a transnational law of their own creation. The …