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Articles 481 - 510 of 1724

Full-Text Articles in Courts

Restoring The Genetic Commons: A Common Sense Approach To Biotechnology Patents In The Wake Of Ksr V. Teleflex , Anna Bartow Laakmann Jan 2007

Restoring The Genetic Commons: A Common Sense Approach To Biotechnology Patents In The Wake Of Ksr V. Teleflex , Anna Bartow Laakmann

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

In this Article, I argue that a new approach to biotechnology patenting is necessary to fully realize the tremendous potential of recent advances in our understanding of the human genome. Part I places the gene patenting debate in context by highlighting the key landmarks that have shaped the biotechnology industry and outlining the products and stakeholders that comprise the industry. Part II describes the current state of the law on biotechnology patents, summarizing the Federal Circuit's application of the various doctrines that collectively define the patent landscape's parameters. In this Part, I explain how the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence is tied …

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Secondhand Smoke Signals From Prison, Scott C. Wilcox Jan 2007

Secondhand Smoke Signals From Prison, Scott C. Wilcox

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that courts should acknowledge current societal and medical perspectives on second hand smoke (SHS) and afford real protection to prisoners against SHS through injunctive relief. Part I examines evidence that conclusively demonstrates the serious risk of harm posed by SHS to the health of inmates. It reports that inmates' long-term exposure to SHS increases their risk of contracting lung cancer, heart disease, and other potentially life threatening conditions. Part II argues that, as required by the Helling standard, contemporary society does not tolerate involuntary, long-term exposure to SHS and that prison officials exhibit deliberate indifference by allowing …

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A Gambling Paradox: Why An Origin-Neutral 'Zero-Quota' Is Not A Quota Under Gats Article Xvi, Donald H. Regan Jan 2007

A Gambling Paradox: Why An Origin-Neutral 'Zero-Quota' Is Not A Quota Under Gats Article Xvi, Donald H. Regan

Articles

In US-Gambling, the Appellate Body held that an origin-neutral prohibition on remote gambling (which is how they mostly viewed the United States law) was "in effect" a "zero-quota", and that such a "zero-quota" violated GATS Article XVI:2. That holding has been widely criticized, especially for what critics refer to as the Appellate Body's "effects test". This article argues that the Appellate Body's "in effect" analysis is not an "effects test" and is not the real problem. The real mistake is regarding a so-called "zero-quota" as a quota under Article XVI. That is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the word …

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The Kerr Principle, State Action, And Legal Rights, Donald J. Herzog Jan 2007

The Kerr Principle, State Action, And Legal Rights, Donald J. Herzog

Articles

A Baltimore library refused to admit Louise Kerr to a training program because she was black. Not that it had anything against blacks, but its patrons did. When Kerr launched a civil suit against the library alleging a violation of equal protection of the laws, the courts credited the library's claim that it had no racist purpose, but Kerr still prevailed-even though the case occurred before Title VII and Brown v. Board of Education. Here a neutral and generally applicable rule ("serve the patrons"), when coupled with particular facts about private parties (the white patrons dislike blacks), yielded an …

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Crawford, Davis, And Way Beyond, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2007

Crawford, Davis, And Way Beyond, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

Until 1965, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution hardly mattered. It was not applicable against the states, and therefore had no role whatsoever in the vast majority of prosecutions. Moreover, if a federal court was inclined to exclude evidence of an out-of-court statement, it made little practical difference whether the court termed the statement hearsay or held that the evidence did not comply with the Confrontation Clause.

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Forfeiture Of The Confrontation Right After Crawford And Davis, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2007

Forfeiture Of The Confrontation Right After Crawford And Davis, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

So my topic this morning is on forfeiture of the confrontation right, which I think plays a central role in confrontation doctrine. And to try to present that, let me state the entirety of confrontation doctrine as briefly as I can. This is, at least, what I think the doctrine is and what it can be: A testimonial statement should not be admissible against an accused to prove the truth of what it asserts unless the accused either has had or will have an opportunity to confront the witness-which should occur at trial unless the witness is then unavailable-or has …

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Crawford And Davis: A Personal Reflection, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2007

Crawford And Davis: A Personal Reflection, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

I have to say that when I stood up to argue Hammon I felt the wind at my back. I was basically a lawyer with an easy case, and there wasn't anything particularly unpredictable at the argument of Hammon. Now it got a little bit interesting, as I will explain later, because to a certain extent I was trying to argue the other case as well. But Hammon itself was sort of ordinary, normal law.

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The Supreme Court And The Federal Circuit: Visitation And Custody Of Patent Law, Rebecca S. Eisenberg Jan 2007

The Supreme Court And The Federal Circuit: Visitation And Custody Of Patent Law, Rebecca S. Eisenberg

Articles

The U.S. Supreme Court’s relationship to patent law sometimes seems like that of a non-custodial parent who spends an occasional weekend with the kids. The custodial parent is, of course, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 consolidated intermediate appellate jurisdiction over patent law cases in this single court, which hears appeals from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), the U.S. District Courts, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, and the U.S. In-ternational Trade Commission. Day to day it is the Federal Circuit that reviews contested decisions of the institutions …

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Beyond Mitigation: Towards A Theory Of Allocution, Kimberly A. Thomas Jan 2007

Beyond Mitigation: Towards A Theory Of Allocution, Kimberly A. Thomas

Articles

THE COURT: I don't think I have time to listen .... I am not going to reexamine your guilt or innocence here. That is not the purpose of a sentence.. THE DEFENDANT: I did not have the chance to tell you .... THE DEFENDANT: But, your Honor, listen to me-1 Should the court hear this defendant? Is the story of innocence relevant at allocution-the defendant's opportunity to speak on his or her own behalf at the sentencing hearing prior to the imposition of sentence? Or, is the purpose of allocution something different, as the judge suggests? The answers depend on …

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Structural Reform In Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims, Eve Brensike Primus Jan 2007

Structural Reform In Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims, Eve Brensike Primus

Articles

This Article suggests a structural reform that could solve two different problems in criminal defense representation. The first problem is that the right to effective trial counsel lacks a meaningful remedy. Defendants are generally not permitted to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims until collateral review. Given that collateral review typically occurs years after trial, most convicted defendants have completed their sentences by that time and therefore have little incentive to pursue ineffectiveness claims. Moreover, there is no right to counsel on collateral review, and it is unrealistic to expect defendants to navigate the complicated terrain of an ineffectiveness claim …

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Reviving The Right To Vote, Ellen D. Katz Jan 2007

Reviving The Right To Vote, Ellen D. Katz

Articles

Losers in partisan districting battles have long challenged the resulting districting plans under seemingly unrelated legal doctrines. They have filed lawsuits alleging malapportionment, racial gerrymandering, and racial vote dilution, and they periodically prevail. Many election law scholars worry about these lawsuits, claiming that they needlessly "racialize" fundamentally political disputes, distort important legal doctrines designed for other purposes, and provide an inadequate remedy for a fundamentally distinct electoral problem. I am not convinced. This Article argues that the application of distinct doctrines to invalidate or diminish what are indisputably partisan gerrymanders is not necessarily problematic, and that the practice may well …

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The Puzzle Of Complete Preemption, Gil Seinfeld Jan 2007

The Puzzle Of Complete Preemption, Gil Seinfeld

Articles

Part I introduces the central themes in the law of federal question jurisdiction. It describes the prevailing interpretations of the constitutional and statutory texts governing the federal courts' jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes involving questions of federal law, and it explores the reasons for the establishment of such jurisdiction. This Part also introduces the well-pleaded complaint rule and examines the reasons for its adoption by the Supreme Court. Part II provides a detailed account of complete preemption doctrine, under which parties are permitted to usher state-law claims into the federal courts despite the apparent absence of any federal question on the …

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The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence V. Texas, Brian Hawkins Nov 2006

The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence V. Texas, Brian Hawkins

Michigan Law Review

On their faces, Washington v. Glucksberg and Lawrence v. Texas seem to have little in common. In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court upheld a law prohibiting assisted suicide and rejected a claim that the Constitution protects a "right to die"; in Lawrence, the Court struck down a law prohibiting homosexual sodomy and embraced a claim that the Constitution protects homosexual persons' choices to engage in intimate relationships. Thus, in both subject matter and result, Lawrence and Glucksberg appear far apart. The Lawrence Court, however, faced a peculiar challenge in reaching its decision, and its response to that challenge brings …

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There's No "I" In "League": Professional Sports Leagues And The Single Entity Defense, Nathaniel Grow Oct 2006

There's No "I" In "League": Professional Sports Leagues And The Single Entity Defense, Nathaniel Grow

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that outside of labor disputes, sports leagues should be presumed to be single entities. Part I argues that professional sports leagues are single entities in disputes regarding league-wide, non-labor policy. In particular, the focus of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on economic reality rather than organizational form necessitates a finding that professional sports leagues are single entities in non-labor disputes. Part II argues that professional sports leagues are not single entities for purposes of labor disputes; sports leagues, on the whole, do not involve a unity of interest for labor matters. More importantly, existing precedent outside of the …

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Concurring In Part & Concurring In The Confusion, Sonja R. West Aug 2006

Concurring In Part & Concurring In The Confusion, Sonja R. West

Michigan Law Review

When a federal appellate court decided last year that two reporters must either reveal their confidential sources to a grand jury or face jail time, the court did not hesitate in relying on the majority opinion in the Supreme Court's sole comment on the reporter's privilege-Branzburg v. Hayes. "The Highest Court has spoken and never revisited the question. Without doubt, that is the end of the matter," Judge Sentelle wrote for the three-judge panel of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. By this declaration, the court dismissed with a wave of its judicial hand the arguments …

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Pathological Patenting: The Pto As Cause Or Cure, Rochelle Dreyfuss May 2006

Pathological Patenting: The Pto As Cause Or Cure, Rochelle Dreyfuss

Michigan Law Review

The Patent Act was last revised in 1952. The hydrogen bomb was exploded that year, vividly demonstrating the power of the nucleus; in the ensuing postwar period, the Next Big Thing was clearly the molecule. Novel compounds were synthesized in the hopes of finding new medicines; solid-state devices exploited the special characteristics of germanium and other semiconductors; as investments in polymer chemistry soared, advice to the college graduate soon boiled down to "one word ... just one word[:] ... Plastics." Over the next half-century, things changed dramatically. "Better living through chemistry" has begun to sound dated (if not sinister). Genomics …

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Contra Proferentem: The Allure Of Ambiguous Boilerplate, Michelle E. Boardman Mar 2006

Contra Proferentem: The Allure Of Ambiguous Boilerplate, Michelle E. Boardman

Michigan Law Review

Bad boilerplate can shake one' s faith in evolution; not only does it not die away, it multiplies. The puzzle is why. Much of boilerplate is ambiguous or incomprehensible. This alienates consumers and is i ncreasingly punished by courts construing the language against the drafter. There must, therefore, be some hidden allure to ambiguous boilerplate. The popular theory is trickery: drafters lure consumers in with promising language that comes to nothing in court. But this trick would require consumers to do three things they do not do-read the language, understand it, and take comfort in it. There is a hidden …

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Introducing The Construct Of The Jury Into Family Violence Proceedings And Family Court Jurisprudence, Melissa L. Breger Jan 2006

Introducing The Construct Of The Jury Into Family Violence Proceedings And Family Court Jurisprudence, Melissa L. Breger

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

This Article draws upon both the theory of and research on procedural justice holding that litigants often focus on the appearance of fairness rather than on the actual outcome. Thus, when litigants are able to choose the modality of fact-finding, they may be more accepting of the legal process, even if the outcome is not favorable to them. Allowing the option of a jury, even if not exercised, may dramatically improve the perceptions of litigants and may affect the legitimacy and longevity of case outcomes.

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The Dilution Solution: Populating The Trademark A-List, Scott C. Wilcox Jan 2006

The Dilution Solution: Populating The Trademark A-List, Scott C. Wilcox

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In our celebrity-conscious culture, the media serve as arbiters of fame. The editors of Us Weekly and People wield significant influence over public recognition of celebrities. Since the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”) amended the Lanham Act in 1995, federal courts have adopted similar roles as arbiters of fame, determining which trademarks are sufficiently famous to receive federal protection against dilution. Recent changes to the Lanham Act, however, reserve the availability of dilution actions to “A-list” marks. These changes fulfill the objectives of trademark law while achieving Congress’s intent in enacting the FTDA.

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Stevens's Ratchet: When The Court Should Decide Not To Decide, Joel A. Flaxman Jan 2006

Stevens's Ratchet: When The Court Should Decide Not To Decide, Joel A. Flaxman

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Hidden underneath the racy death penalty issues in Kansas v. Marsh lurks a seemingly dull procedural issue addressed only in separate opinions by Justices Stevens and Scalia: whether the Court should have heard the case in the first place. As he did in three cases from the Court’s 2005 term, Justice Stevens argued in Marsh that the Court has no legitimate interest in reviewing state court decisions that overprotect federal constitutional rights. Instead, the Supreme Court should exercise its certiorari power to tip the scales against states and in favor of individuals. Granting certiorari in Marsh, Stevens argued, was not …

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The High Court Remains As Divided As Ever Over The Death Penalty, George H. Kendall Jan 2006

The High Court Remains As Divided As Ever Over The Death Penalty, George H. Kendall

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

More than three decades ago, in Furman v. Georgia, a sharply divided Supreme Court struck down all existing capital punishment schemes be-cause the results they generated were arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasoned. No member of that Court remains on the Court today, and the Court has grown increasingly conservative ever since. Nevertheless, impor-tant questions concerning the administration of capital punishment continue to wrought deep divisions within the Court, for instance in determining whether racial bias influences the system, in determining the sufficiency of new evidence of innocence to justify review of a defaulted claim in habeas corpus proceedings, in determining a …

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The Trademark Dilution Revision Act Of 2006: A Welcome—And Needed—Change, Dale M. Cendali, Bonnie L. Schriefer Jan 2006

The Trademark Dilution Revision Act Of 2006: A Welcome—And Needed—Change, Dale M. Cendali, Bonnie L. Schriefer

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Some have argued that the changes to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (the “FTDA”) embodied in the recently enacted Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (the “TDRA”) threaten to infringe upon the right to free speech. This is simply not the case. The FTDA has always protected First Amendment rights, and the TDRA clarifies and strengthens those protections. While the concept of dilution was introduced in 1927, there was no federal dilution law in the United States until 1995, when Congress passed the FTDA. Since then, various federal courts have reached different conclusions regarding issues such as: (1) what constituted …

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What Is Dilution, Anyway?, Stacey L. Dogan Jan 2006

What Is Dilution, Anyway?, Stacey L. Dogan

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Ever since the Supreme Court decided Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. in 2003, an amendment to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”) has appeared inevitable. Congress almost certainly meant to adopt a “likelihood of dilution” standard in the original statute, and the 2006 revisions correct its sloppy drafting. Substituting a “likelihood of dilution” standard for “actual dilution,” however, does not resolve a deeper philosophical question that has always lurked in the dilution debate: what is dilution, and how does one prove or disprove its probability? The statutory definition notwithstanding, this issue remains largely unanswered, leaving the courts with the …

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Dilution's (Still) Uncertain Future, Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Mark D. Janis Jan 2006

Dilution's (Still) Uncertain Future, Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Mark D. Janis

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Dilution looked to be a potent weapon when Congress introduced it as § 43(c) of the Lanham Act in 1995. Indeed, some observers feared that it would be too potent (and in some contexts, such as cybersquatting, it successfully augmented traditional causes of action). But a series of court decisions, culminating in the Supreme Court’s 2003 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue opinion, weakened dilution protection so profoundly that what remained wasn’t of much consequence. Congress has recently sought to breathe new life into dilution law, enacting the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (“TDRA”). Some might see this as a …

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Putting The Guesswork Back Into Capital Sentencing, Sean D. O'Brien Jan 2006

Putting The Guesswork Back Into Capital Sentencing, Sean D. O'Brien

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court deemed it “incon-testable” that a death sentence is cruel and unusual if inflicted “by reason of [the defendant’s] race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.” Arbitrary and discriminatory patterns in capital sentencing moved the Court to strike down death penalty statutes that required judges or juries to cast thumbs-up or thumbs-down verdicts against offenders found guilty of capi-tal crimes. The issue of innocence was barely a footnote in Furman; the Court’s concerns focused on …

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The Revolution Enters The Court: The Constitutional Significance Of Wrongful Convictions In Contemporary Constitutional Regulation Of The Death Penalty, Jordan Steiker Jan 2006

The Revolution Enters The Court: The Constitutional Significance Of Wrongful Convictions In Contemporary Constitutional Regulation Of The Death Penalty, Jordan Steiker

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Over the last decade, the most important events in American death pen-alty law have occurred outside the courts. The discovery of numerous wrongfully convicted death-sentenced inmates in Illinois led to the most substantial reflection on the American death penalty system since the late 1960s and early 1970s. Former Illinois Governor George Ryan, a Republi-can, first declared a moratorium on executions in 2000 and eventually commuted all 167 inmates on Illinois’s death row in 2003. The events in Illinois reverberated nationwide. Almost overnight, state legislative agendas shifted from expanding or maintaining the prevailing reach of the death penalty to studying its …

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Legitimizing Error, Rebecca E. Woodman Jan 2006

Legitimizing Error, Rebecca E. Woodman

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Since Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court has sought to harmonize competing constitutional demands under Eighth Amendment rules regulat-ing the two-step eligibility and selection stages of the capital decision-making process. Furman’s demand for rationality and consistency requires that, at the eligibility stage, the sentencer’s discretion be limited and guided by clear and objective fact-based standards that rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. The selection stage requires a determination of whether a specific death-eligible defendant actually deserves that punish-ment, as distinguished from other death-eligible defendants. Here, fundamental fairness and respect for the uniqueness of the individual are the cornerstones of …

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Comparative Fiscal Federalism: What Can The U.S. Supreme Court And The European Court Of Justice Learn From Each Other's Tax Jurisprudence?, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah Jan 2006

Comparative Fiscal Federalism: What Can The U.S. Supreme Court And The European Court Of Justice Learn From Each Other's Tax Jurisprudence?, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Articles

In October 2005, a group of distinguished tax experts from the European Union and the United States, who had never met before, convened at the University of Michigan Law School for a conference on "Comparative Fiscal Federalism: Comparing the U.S. Supreme Court and European Court of Justice Tax Jurisprudence." The purpose of the conference was to shed comparative light on the very different approaches taken by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the U.S. Supreme Court to the question of fiscal federalism. The conference was sponsored by the U-M Law School, U-M's European Union Center, and Harvard Law School's …

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Appellate Review Of Racist Summations: Redeeming The Promise Of Searching Analysis, Ryan Patrick Alford Jan 2006

Appellate Review Of Racist Summations: Redeeming The Promise Of Searching Analysis, Ryan Patrick Alford

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

This Article addresses the question of the appropriate response of appellate counsel for Black defendants tarred at trial by the indirect deployment of powerful racial stereotypes. The crux of the problem is that even now, the courts only take exception to blatant racist appeals, even though indirectly racist summations can have a determinative impact at trial. In laying out the contours of the problem, we must draw upon the discipline of rhetoric, or persuasion through oration, to describe various techniques of intentional indirectness that prosecutors use to obviate the possibility of appellate review under the stringent standards of the Fourteenth …

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The Color Of Perspective: Affirmative Action And The Constitutional Rhetoric Of White Innocence, Cecil J. Hunt Ii Jan 2006

The Color Of Perspective: Affirmative Action And The Constitutional Rhetoric Of White Innocence, Cecil J. Hunt Ii

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

This Article discusses the Supreme Court's use of the rhetoric of White innocence in deciding racially-inflected claims of constitutional shelter. It argues that the Court's use of this rhetoric reveals its adoption of a distinctly White-centered perspective, representing a one-sided view of racial reality that distorts the Court's ability to accurately appreciate the true nature of racial reality in contemporary America. This Article examines the Court's habit of using a White-centered perspective in constitutional race cases. Specifically, it looks at the Court's use of the rhetoric of White innocence in the context of the Court's concern with protecting "innocent" Whites …

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