Constitutional Law Commons^™

Non-Judicial Review, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Professor Mark Tushnet challenges the view that democratic constitutionalism requires courts to dominate constitutional review. He provides three diverse examples of non-judicial institutions involved in constitutional review and examines the institutional incentives to get the analysis" right." Through these examples, Professor Tushnet argues that non-judicial actors may perform constitutional review that is accurate, effective, and capable of gaining public acceptance. Professor Tushnet recommends that scholars conduct further research into non-judicial review to determine whether ultimately more or less judicial review is necessary in constitutional democracies.

Alternative Forms Of Judicial Review, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The invention in the late twentieth century of what I call weak-form systems of judicial review provides us with the chance to see in a new light some traditional debates within U.S. constitutional law and theory, which are predicated on the fact that the United States has strong-form judicial review. Strong- and weak-form systems operate on the level of constitutional design, in the sense that their characteristics are specified in constitutional documents or in deep-rooted constitutional traditions. After sketching the differences between strong- and weak-form systems, I turn to design features that operate at the next lower level. Here legislatures …

Conflicts Of Interest And The Constitution, David Orentlicher

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Applying The War Powers Resolution To The War On Terrorism: Hearing Before The S. Comm. On The Judiciary, 107th Cong., Apr. 17, 2002 (Statement Of Jane E. Stromseth, Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), Jane E. Stromseth

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

Department Of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before The S. Comm. On The Judiciary, 107th Cong., Dec. 6, 2001 (Statement Of Neal Kumar Katyal, Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), Neal K. Katyal

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

The Imperial Sovereign: Sovereign Immunity & The Ada, Judith Olans Brown, Wendy E. Parmet

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Professors Brown and Parmet examine the impact of the Supreme Court's resurrection of state sovereign immunity on the rights of individuals protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act in light of the recent decision, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett. Placing Garrett within the context of the Rehnquist Court's evolving reallocation of state and federal authority, they argue that the Court has relied upon a mythic and dangerous notion of sovereignty that is foreign to the Framers' understanding. Brown and Parmet go on to show that, by determining that federalism compels constraining congressional power to …

Publicity And The Judicial Power, Daniel N. Hoffman

The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process

The judicial branch was created in order to ensure that the rule of law and not the rule of man prevailed. Judges must use reasoning and analysis to fulfill this role. Making decisions based on mere coin tosses or without giving a reason for the decision detracts from the rule of law. Issuing decisions that cannot be published or cited also detracts the judicial role of ensuring that law rules the land.

Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation Of Judicial Decision-Making, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Modern federal courts scholars have been fascinated by the question of Congress' power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts.' This fascination is not difficult to explain: the question is theoretically profound and raises fundamental issues about the roles of Congress and the federal courts in the constitutional order.2 As a practical matter, however, the question has proven to be of limited significance. Despite a recent spate of legislation restricting access to courts by prisoners and immigrants,3 people talk about wholesale jurisdiction-stripping far more than they actually do it.

Foreign Affairs Federalism And The Separation Of Powers, John C. Yoo

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

Dissing Congress , Ruth Colker, James J. Brudney

Faculty Scholarship

This article adopts a novel separation of powers framework to analyze the Rehnquist Court's recent decisions under the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. We demonstrate in historical terms how the Court's methods for assessing the constitutional adequacy of federal laws have changed dramatically since the mid-1990s, and we argue that these new methods are undermining the proper role of Congress and producing a significant shift in the balance of power between the Branches. We identify two distinct methodologies employed by the Rehnquist Court that have resulted in growing disrespect for Congress - the "crystal ball" and …

Printz, The Unitary Executive, And The Fire In The Trash Can: Has Justice Scalia Picked The Court's Pocket?, Jay S. Bybee

Scholarly Works

In Printz v. United States (1997), the Court held that certain sections of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act were unconstitutional. Until the Attorney General set up a national system, the Act required the chief local law enforcement official to make certain background checks. The Court held that Congress exceeded its authority by requiring local law enforcement officials to take this action. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia “conclude[d] categorically . . . ‘The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.” ’ The Court offered two justifications. First, these commands to the …

Subconstitutional Constitutional Law: Supplement, Sham, Or Substitute?, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this brief Comment I make two points. First, the subconstitutional doctrines appear to have the advantage of allowing elected lawmakers to pursue whatever course they wish, as long as they satisfy the requirements of these subconstitutional doctrines. In practice, however, what appears to be a provisional invalidation based on subconstitutional law turns out to be - and, indeed, might be expected at the moment of decision to be - a final, unrevisable decision. Further, courts might strategically deploy these sub constitutional doctrines to avoid the sting of the charge that they are foreclosing legislative choice while effectively doing so. …

Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, Neal K. Katyal

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This is an Essay about "the how" of constitutional interpretation. Much attention has been devoted to the question of how the Constitution is interpreted in courts. Rather little attention has been devoted to the question of how the Constitution is interpreted elsewhere in the government. The Constitution tells us that Congress, the President, and state legislators and courts must adhere to its terms, but it does not tell us how much interpretive power each actor should have, nor does it prescribe rules for each actor to use when interpreting the text. I argue that constitutional interpretation by Congress is, and …

"Shut Up He Explained", Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Part I of this Commentary examines the conversational model of politics. I argue that the virtues Bennett finds in the conversational model exist only when, and to the extent that, participants in civil and political society can engage in undominated conversation. The requirement that conversation be undominated generates a substantial set of social prerequisites, mostly dealing with equality. And yet, determining what social arrangements actually satisfy those prerequisites is itself a matter of constitutional controversy. Resolving such controversies through politics is no solution, because the political arena is where we seek to ensure that nondomination prevails in civil society, and, …

Towards A Constitutional Architecture For Cooperative Federalism, Philip J. Weiser

Publications

In this Article, Professor Weiser calls for a new conception of federal-state relations to justify existing political practice under cooperative federalism regulatory programs. In particular, Professor Weiser highlights how Congress favors cooperative federalism programs--that combine federal and state authority in creative ways--and has rejected the dual federalism model of regulation--with separate spheres of state and federal authority that current judicial rhetoric often celebrates. Given the increasing dissonance between prevailing political practice and judicial rhetoric, courts will ultimately have to confront three fault lines for current cooperative federalism programs: the legal source of authority for state agencies to implement federal law, …

Checking Congress And Balancing Federalism: A Lesson From Separation-Of-Powers Jurisprudence, Keith Werham

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Double Jeopardy And Punishment: Why An As Applied Approach, As Applied To Separation Of Powers Doctrines, Is Unconstitutional, Todd W. Wyatt

Seattle University Law Review

This Comment will argue that an as applied approach allows the executive branch, whether at the state or federal level, to encroach into the legislative realm by rendering a statute unconstitutional as a result of the way the statute is administered. Section II of this Comment will begin by examining the history of the as applied and on its face double jeopardy approaches during the last 20 years. After a close examination of the decisions in Halper and Hudson in sections II.B and II.C, this Comment will explain why the holding of Hudson, though correct in its result, was …

The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison, And The Future Of Federal Antidiscrimination Law, Margaret H. Lemos, Samuel Estreicher

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Presidential Non-Enforcement Of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, Dawn E. Johnsen

Articles by Maurer Faculty

This article, published in Law & Contemporary Problems, was presented at a Duke Law School conference, The Constitution Under Clinton: A Critical Assessment. It examines a recurring, unsettled issue of executive power: how the President best fulfills his constitutional responsibilities when confronted with the enforcement of a statute that he believes is unconstitutional. What should the President do if he believes enforcing a statutory provision would violate the Constitution? Should, for example, a President comply with a congressional command that he believes would violate the constitutional rights of individuals or compromise presidential power? The article examines the two prevailing approaches …

Impeachment As Congressional Constitutional Interpretation, Neal K. Katyal

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Constitutionalists have assumed, too quickly in my view, that symmetry should exist between the interpretive styles of the courts and Congress. This assumption, which I shall call the myth of interpretive symmetry, slights the many reasons why an interpretive method may work well in one area and not work as well in another. Instead of mapping out all these possible divergences, I illustrate the point with three examples: the roles of history, precedent, and moral philosophy. I show how, in each instance, arguments can be made to suggest that divergent institutional roles should be taken into account in formulating a …

Institutional Design And The Lingering Legacy Of Antifederalist Separation Of Powers Ideals In The States, Jim Rossi

Vanderbilt Law Review

In confronting important constitutional issues, state courts face a range of interpretive questions, many unanswered by the texts of state constitutions. Where a constitutional text fails to answer the question posed, a state court, much like its federal counterparts,' must look to extra-textual interpretive tools to aid in its decision- making task. The literature on state constitutional law provides important insights into how interpretation operates within a single state's. system of governance. But rarely does it attempt to under- stand and appreciate how or why the interpretive practices of state and federal constitutional systems differ.

This is unfortunate. Understood through …

Institutional Design And The Lingering Legacy Of Antifederalist Separation Of Powers Ideals In The States, Jim A. Rossi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article applies comparative institutional analysis to separation of powers under state constitutions, with a particular focus on the nondelegation doctrine and states' acceptance of Chadha-like restrictions on legislative oversight. The Article begins by contrasting state and federal doctrine and enforcement levels in each of these separation of powers contexts. Most state courts, unlike their federal counterparts, adhere to a strong nondelegation doctrine. In addition, many states accept (de facto if not de jure) even more explicit and sweeping legislative vetoes than the federal system. The Article highlights the contrast of federal and state approaches by identifying their similarity with …

Invading An Article Iii Court's Inherent Equitable Powers: Separation Of Powers And The Immediate Termination Provisions Of The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Theodore K. Cheng

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Standing Of The United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show That Standing Doctrine Is Looking For Answers In All The Wrong Places, Edward A. Hartnett

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court insists that Article III of the Constitution requires a litigant to have standing in order for her request for judicial intervention to constitute a "case" or "controversy" within the jurisdiction of a federal court; it also insists that the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing requires (1) that the litigant suffer an "injury in fact"; (2) that the person against whom the judicial intervention is sought have caused the injury; and (3) that the requested judicial intervention redress the injury. The requisite injury in fact, the Court repeatedly declares, must be "personal," "concrete and particularized," and "actual or …

The Executive Line Item Veto And The Judicial Power To Sever: What's The Difference?, Lars Noah

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Vertical Separation Of Powers, Victoria Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Standard understandings of the separation of powers begin with the concept of function. The author argues that function alone cannot predict important changes in structural incentives and thus serves as a poor proxy for assessing real risks to governmental structure. To illustrate this point, the article returns to proposals considered at the Constitutional Convention and considers difficult contemporary cases such as Morrison v. Olson, Clinton v. Jones, and the Supreme Court's more recent federalism decisions. In each instance, function appears to steer us wrong because it fails to understand separation of powers questions as ones of structural incentive …

Independent Counsel Law Improvements For The Next Five Years, John Q. Barrett

Faculty Publications

This Article is adapted from remarks made in New Orleans on January 8, 1999, as part of an Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Administrative Law Section panel discussion entitled, "Separation of Powers Revisited: Should the Independent Counsel Law Be Renewed?" Our topic is "Should the Independent Counsel Law Be Renewed?" and my answer is, "Not exactly." I will not be, in other words, defending the status quo. Indeed, the empty chair you see here on the dais nicely contains the only "defender" of the status quo of whom I know. What I would like to do is remind us …

Constitutions And Spontaneous Orders: A Response To Professor Mcginnis, Adam C. Pritchard, Todd J. Zywicki

Articles

Professor John McGinnis has written a perceptive and provocative comment on our economic analysis of the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation.1 A brief summary of our areas of agreement and disagreement may help set the stage for this response. It appears that Professor McGinnis substantially agrees with the two central propositions of our article. First, he appears to agree with our definition of efficient traditions as those evolving over long periods of time from decentralized processes.2 Second, he explicitly agrees that Justices Scalia and Souter have adopted sub-optimal models of tradition because they rely on sources that lack the …

Nineteenth-Century Orthodoxy, Richard B. Collins

Publications

No abstract provided.

Finding The Constitution: An Economic Analysis Of Tradition's Role In Constitutional Interpretation, Adam C. Pritchard, Todd J. Zywicki

Articles

In this Article, Professor Pritchard and Professor Zywicki examine the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation, a topic that has received significant attention in recent years. After outlining the current debate over the use of tradition, the authors discuss the efficiency purposes of constitutionalism--precommitment and the reduction of agency costs--and demonstrate how the use of tradition in constitutional interpretation can serve these purposes. Rejecting both Justice Scalia's majoritarian model, which focuses on legislative sources of tradition, and Justice Souter's common-law model, which focuses on Supreme Court precedent as a source of tradition, the authors propose an alternative model--the "finding model"-- …