Constitutional Law Commons^™

International Law And Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander In Chief Clause Reconsidered, Ingrid Brunk Wuerth

Michigan Law Review

The Commander in Chief Clause is a difficult, underexplored area of constitutional interpretation. It is also a context in which international law is often mentioned, but not fully defended, as a possible method of interpreting the Constitution. This Article analyzes why the Commander in Chief Clause is difficult and argues that international law helps resolve some of the problems that the Clause presents. Because of weaknesses in originalist analysis, changes over time, and lack of judicial competence in military matters, the Court and commentators have relied on second-order interpretive norms like congressional authorization and executive branch practice in interpreting the …

Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal Agencies Usurping Congressional And State Authority?: Hearing Before The S. Comm. On The Judiciary,, 110th Cong., Sept. 12, 2007 (Statement Of Viet D. Dinh, Geo. U. L. Center), Viet D. Dinh

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

Regulatory Preemption: Hearing Before The S. Comm. On The Judiciary, 110th Cong., Sept. 12, 2007 (Statement Of David C. Vladeck, Geo. U. L. Center), David C. Vladeck

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

Law Casebook Description And Table Of Contents: Constitutional Environmental And Natural Resources Law [Outline], Jim May, Robin Craig

The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

6 pages.

"James May, Widener University School of Law" -- Agenda

The United States Federal Judiciary May Not Be A Third, Co-Equal Branch Of Government - What Are The Implications For The Irish Debate On Judicial Activism, Lawrence Donnelly

San Diego International Law Journal

In support of this argument, this essay first examines the language of Article III of the United States Constitution and then briefly reviews the origins of the widely held perception that the federal judiciary is a "co-equal" branch of government. It next considers Borkian constitutionalism, opining that if one is to read the Constitution as Bork urges, this essay's tentative proposition can't be far off the mark. The focus then shifts to the express language of the Irish Constitution, which accords a far greater responsibility to the judiciary than its American counterpart. In this context, it reviews some pronouncements in …

Constitutional Isolationism And The Limits Of State Separation Of Powers As A Barrier To Interstate Compacts, Jim Rossi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this Essay, I address the question of which branch of state government ought to have the authority to negotiate interstate compacts - a question of state separation of powers. Recent case law interpreting state constitutions in the context of Indian gambling compacts provides a particularly fertile ground for exploring this question, as it illustrates how courts are struggling to find a way to allow state executive officials greater autonomy to negotiate interstate compacts. Part I illustrates how traditional notions of separation of powers under state constitutions can be understood to pose a barrier to executive branch negotiation of interstate …

Amending Executive Order 12866: Good Governance Or Regulatory Usurpation? Part I And Part Ii: Hearing Before The H. Comm. On Science And Technology, 110th Cong., Feb. 13, 2007 (Statement Of Professor David C. Vladeck, Geo. U. L. Center), David C. Vladeck

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

Presidential Signing Statements Under The Bush Administration: A Threat To Checks And Balances And The Rule Of Law?: Hearing Before The H. Comm. On The Judiciary, 110th Cong., Jan. 31, 2007 (Statement Of Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

Youngstown, Hamdan, And “Inherent” Emergency Presidential Policymaking Powers, Gordon G. Young

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

Silences And Peculiarities Of The Hamdan Opinions, Peter E. Quint

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

Hamdan As An Assertion Of Judicial Power , Jana Singer

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

You Ain’T Seen Nothin’ Yet: The Inevitable Post- Hamdan Conflict Between The Supreme Court And The Political Branches, Michael Greenberger

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

Double Jeopardy Law And The Separation Of Powers, Alex Tsiatsos

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

In Defense Of The Roosevelt Court, Wilson Ray Huhn

Florida A & M University Law Review

The overriding purpose of the New Deal was to create opportunities for the common person to acquire a stake in society. The Roosevelt appointees to the Supreme Court were unwilling to allow either entrenched wealth or arbitrary governmental action to interfere with that objective. They remade the Constitution, but in so doing they returned the Constitution to its original purpose--the protection of personal liberty. The Roosevelt Court laid the foundation for a jurisprudence of human rights upon which the Warren Court and subsequent Supreme Courts have continued to build. Two justices presently serving on the Supreme Court--Justice Antonin Scalia and …

Non-Pecuniary Interests And The Injudicious Limits Of Appellate Standing In Bankruptcy, S. Todd Brown

Journal Articles

Standing to appeal bankruptcy court orders today is limited to those with a pecuniary interest. This prudential limitation is based on the person aggrieved requirement of Section 39(c) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 - a requirement that was not included in the Bankruptcy Code. This article examines the extensive differences between the Act and the Code, the potential justifications for extending the pecuniary interest test in spite of the omission of the person aggrieved requirement, and the potential ramifications for parties and the integrity of the bankruptcy process. This analysis suggests that standing to appeal bankruptcy orders should be …

The State Secrets Privilege And Separation Of Powers, Amanda Frost

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

Since September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has repeatedly invoked the state secrets privilege in cases challenging executive conduct in the war on terror, arguing that the very subject matter of these cases must be kept secret to protect national security. The executive's recent assertion of the privilege is unusual, in that it is seeking dismissal, pre-discovery, of all challenges to the legality of specific executive branch programs, rather than asking for limits on discovery in individual cases. This essay contends that the executive's assertion of the privilege is therefore akin to a claim that the courts lack jurisdiction to …

The Incompatibility Principle, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

The D'Oh! Of Popular Constitutionalism, Neal Devins

Michigan Law Review

This Review will be divided into three parts. Part I will both summarize The Most Democratic Branch and highlight some of the difficulties that the Supreme Court would face in implementing Rosen's decision-making model. In particular, by allowing the Court to invalidate laws for a host of "antidemocratic" reasons, Rosen's matrix does not constrain the Court in a predictable way. Part II will examine some of the empirical evidence about public attitudes toward the Supreme Court, including public awareness of Supreme Court decisions. I will contend that the Court cannot look to the people to sort out the Constitution's meaning …

Federalism And Accountability: State Attorneys General, Regulatory Litigation, And The New Federalism, Timothy Meyer

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Avoidance In The Executive Branch, Trevor W. Morrison

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

When executive actors interpret statutes, the prevailing assumption is that they can and should use the tools that courts use. Is that assumption sound? This Article takes up the question by considering a rule frequently invoked by the courts - the canon of constitutional avoidance.

Executive branch actors regularly use the avoidance canon. Indeed, some of the most hotly debated episodes of executive branch statutory interpretation in recent years - including the initial torture memorandum issued by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, the President's signing statement regarding the McCain Amendment's ban on the mistreatment of detainees, and the …

Lost Constitutional Moorings: Recovering The War Power, Louis Fisher

Indiana Law Journal

For the past half century, Presidents have claimed constitutional authority to take the country from a state of peace to a state of war against another nation. That was precisely the power that the Framers denied to the President and vested exclusively in Congress. That allocation of power was understood by all three branches until President Harry Truman went to war against North Korea in 1950. He never came to Congress for authority before he acted or at any time thereafter. Similar false claims of authority have been made by Presidents since that time. These constitutional violations have been assisted …

Constitutional Avoidance In The Executive Branch, Trevor W. Morrison

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

When executive branch actors interpret statutes, should they use the same methods as the courts? This Article takes up the question by considering a rule frequently invoked by the courts-the canon of constitutional avoidance. In addition to being a cardinal principle of judicial statutory interpretation, the avoidance canon also appears regularly and prominently in the work of the executive branch. It has played a central role, for example, in some of the most hotly debated episodes of executive branch statutory interpretation in the "war on terror." Typically, executive invocations of avoidance are supported by citation to one or more Supreme …

Separation Of Powers And The Governor's Office In West Virginia: Advocating A More Deferential Approach To The Chief Executive From The Judiciary, Jason C. Pizatella

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

Domestic Surveillance For International Terrorists: Presidential Power And Fourth Amendment Limits, Richard H. Seamon

ExpressO

This article examines the recently disclosed, presidentially authorized program of warrantless electronic surveillance by the National Security Agency (NSA). Critics of the program say it violates the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) and the Fourth Amendment. Supporters counter that it falls within the President's congressionally irreducible power to protect national security and within the relaxed Fourth Amendment governing national security searches. This article focuses on an aspect of the controversy to which neither critics nor supporters have paid much attention: the connection between the issues of whether the NSA program violates FISA and whether it violates the Fourth …

The Foreign Affairs Power: Does The Constitution Matter?, D. A. Jeremy Telman

ExpressO

Peter Irons’ WAR POWERS favors congressional initiative in questions of war and peace but makes a historical argument that our government has strayed from the constitutional design in the service of an imperialist foreign policy. John Yoo’s THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE seeks to overthrow the traditional perspective on war powers espoused by Irons in favor of executive initiative in war. Yoo also pursues a revisionist perspective on the treaty power, which favors executive initiative in treaty negotiation and interpretation but insists on congressional implementation so as to minimize the impact of international obligations on domestic law. This Essay …

Sherman's March (In)To The Sea, Andrew S. Oldham

ExpressO

This Article argues that the Sherman Act is unconstitutional. At the very least, scholars and jurists must not take for granted Congress's ability to statutorily deputize the federal courts with common-lawmaking powers. The federal antitrust statute—which has been described as the Magna Carta of free enterprise—raises serious constitutional questions that have heretofore gone unexplored and unanswered. Specifically, it is difficult (if not impossible) to reconcile the Sherman Act with the separation of powers, the nondelegation doctrine, and the Supremacy Clause.

Secularization, Religiosity, And The United States Constitution, Christopher L. Eisgruber

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

This article draws upon leading works in the sociology of religion to assess what I shall call "the secularization claim" regarding the United States. It endeavors, in particular to clarify the possible meanings of "secularization,"and then to use these conceptual refinements to examine what sort of evidence exists that the United States has been secularized. Though it is not possible to falsify every version of the secularization claim, there is little evidence to support it, especially in its most prominent and politically relevant variations. The article then goes on to offer a preliminary analysis of to what extent, if any, …

Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before The S. Comm. On The Judiciary, 109th Cong., June 27, 2006 (Statement Of Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

Some Modest Uses Of Transnational Legal Perspectives In First-Year Constitutional Law, Neil S. Siegel

Journal of Legal Education

No abstract provided.

Line-Item Veto: Constitutional Issues: Hearing Before The H. Comm. On The Budget, 109th Cong., June 8, 2006 (Statement Of Viet D. Dinh, Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), Viet D. Dinh

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.