Constitutional Law Commons^™

Originalism And The Natural Born Citizen Clause, Lawrence B. Solum

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The enigmatic phrase “natural born citizen” poses a series of problems for contemporary originalism. New Originalists, like Justice Scalia, focus on the original public meaning of the constitutional text. The notion of a “natural born citizen” was likely a term of art derived from the idea of a “natural born subject” in English law—a category that most likely did not extend to persons, like Senator McCain, who were born outside sovereign territory. But the Constitution speaks of “citizens” and not “subjects,” introducing uncertainties and ambiguities that might (or might not) make McCain eligible for the presidency.

In The Trenches: Searches And The Misunderstood Common-Law History Of Suspicion And Probable Cause, Fabio Arcila

Scholarly Works

A detailed analysis of the common law during the Framers’ era, and of how it reflected the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions, shows that many judges believed they could issue search warrants without independently assessing the adequacy of probable cause, and that this view persisted even after the Fourth Amendment became effective. This conclusion challenges the leading originalist account of the Fourth Amendment, which Professor Thomas Davies published in the Michigan Law Review in 1999.

Learned treatises in particular, and to a lesser extent a few case decisions, had articulated a judicial duty to monitor probable cause. But it is a mistake …

A Response To Professor Steinberg’S Fourth Amendment Chutzpah, Fabio Arcila

Scholarly Works

Professor David Steinberg believes that the Fourth Amendment was intended only to provide some protection against physical searches of homes through imposition of a specific warrant requirement because the Framers' only object in promulgating the Fourth Amendment was to ban physical searches of homes under general warrants or no warrants at all. This response essay takes issue with his thesis by (1) discussing its implications, (2) reviewing some concerns with his methodology in reviewing the historical record, and (3) examining the theoretical implication underlying his thesis that, except as to homes, we have a majoritarian Fourth Amendment, and questioning whether …

Of Inkblots And Originalism: Historical Ambiguity And The Case Of The Ninth Amendment, Kurt T. Lash

Law Faculty Publications

Ever since Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Ninth Amendment has been a flashpoint in debates over the merits of originalism as an interpretive theory. Judge Bork's comparison of interpreting the Ninth Amendment to reading a text obscured by an inkblot has been particularly subjected to intense criticism. The metaphor has been attacked as erasing the Ninth Amendment from the Constitution, and as representing the inevitably selective and inconsistent use of

text and history by so-called originalists.

It turns out, however, that not only was Judge Bork right to reject Justice Goldberg's reading of the Ninth Amendment, …

Incorporation And Originalist Theory, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Does the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution incorporate the Bill of Rights contained in the first eight amendments? And how should an originalist answer that question? This paper focuses on the latter question--the issues of originalist theory that are raised by judicial and scholarly debates over what is called "incorporation."

The inquiry proceeds in six parts. Part I answers the questions: "What is incorporation?" and "What is originalism?" Part II examines the theoretical framework for an investigation of incorporation that operates within the narrow confines of interpretation of the linguistic meaning text based on the assumption that the …

Constitutional Clichés, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Popular discourse on constitutional interpretation and judicial review tend to employ a series of catch phrases that have become constitutional clichés. Phrases such as “judicial activism,” “judicial restraint,” “strict construction,” “not legislating from the bench,” “Framers’ intent,” the “dead hand of the past,” and “stare decisis” so dominate public commentary on the Constitution and the courts that quite often that is all one hears. Unfortunately, even law professors are not immune. There was a time when each of these catch phrases meant something and, although each could mean something again, in current debates all have become trite and largely devoid …

Take-Ings, William Michael Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The word property had many meanings in 1789, as it does today, and a critical aspect of the ongoing debate about the meaning of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause has centered on how the word should be read in the context of the Clause. Property has been read by Professor Thomas Merrill to refer to "ownership" interests, by Richard Epstein in terms of a broad Blackstonian conception of the individual control of the possession, use, and disposition of resources, by Benjamin Barros as reflective of constructions through individual expectations and state law, and by the author as physical control of …

The Choice Between Madison And Fdr, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This exchange is about three clauses that have often been used by the courts since the New Deal to expand federal power: the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Taxation Clause, from which the spending power has (at least until today) been construed. This Essay addresses the originalist interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause.

The Intriguing Federalist Future Of Reproductive Rights, Scott A. Moss, Douglas M. Raines

Publications

As the decline of Roe v. Wade inspires renewed efforts to restrict federal constitutional abortion rights, the serious shortcomings of abortion rights advocates' strategies for preserving such rights will become increasingly apparent. Continued reliance on Roe is likely to fail with an increasingly unsympathetic Supreme Court. Even abortion rights supporters have begun to criticize the decision for weak reasoning, which is difficult to remedy at this late stage of federal abortion jurisprudence. Moreover, although autonomy and gender equality arguments for abortion rights would improve upon Roe's privacy rationale, such arguments would require abrogating substantial precedent and are, therefore, of limited …

When Should Original Meanings Matter?, Richard A. Primus

Articles

Constitutional theory lacks an account of when each of the familiar sources of authority-text, original meaning, precedent, and so on-should be given weight. The dominant tendency is to regard all sources as potentially applicable in every case. In contrast, this Article proposes that each source of authority is pertinent in some categories of cases but not in others, much as a physical tool is appropriate for some but not all kinds of household tasks. The Article then applies this approach to identify the categories of cases in which original meaning is, or is not, a valid factor in constitutional decisionmaking.

The Conservative Case For Precedent, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay offers some reasons why conservatives should favor giving great weight to precedent in constitutional adjudication. Let me start with some preliminary observations about the debate between originalism and precedent more generally.

First, the debate has been dominated to far too great an extent by specific cases, Roe v. Wade in particular. It is distressing that the only issue that has seemed to matter in recent confirmation hearings is what a nominee thinks about Roe v. Wade. Similarly, in the precedent versus originalism debate, much of the discussion – even in the law reviews – is animated by …

Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, And The Case Of Amar's Bill Of Rights, William Michael Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Championed on the Supreme Court by Justices Scalia and Thomas and championed in academia most prominently by Professor Akhil Amar, textualism has in the past twenty years emerged as a leading school of constitutional interpretation. Textualists argue that the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with its original public meaning and, in seeking that meaning, they closely parse the Constitution's words and grammar and the placement of clauses in the document. They have assumed that this close parsing recaptures original meaning, but, perhaps because it seems obviously correct, that assumption has neither been defended nor challenged. This article uses Professor …

Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, And The Case Of Amar's Bill Of Rights, William Michael Treanor

Michigan Law Review

Championed on the Supreme Court by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas and in academia most prominently by Professor Akhil Amar textualism has emerged within the past twenty years as a leading school of constitutional interpretation. Textualists argue that the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with its original public meaning, and in seeking that meaning, they closely parse the Constitution's words and grammar and the placement of clauses in the document. They have assumed that this close parsing recaptures original meaning, but, perhaps because it seems obviously correct, that assumption has neither been defended nor challenged. This Article uses Professor …

International Law And Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander In Chief Clause Reconsidered, Ingrid Brunk Wuerth

Michigan Law Review

The Commander in Chief Clause is a difficult, underexplored area of constitutional interpretation. It is also a context in which international law is often mentioned, but not fully defended, as a possible method of interpreting the Constitution. This Article analyzes why the Commander in Chief Clause is difficult and argues that international law helps resolve some of the problems that the Clause presents. Because of weaknesses in originalist analysis, changes over time, and lack of judicial competence in military matters, the Court and commentators have relied on second-order interpretive norms like congressional authorization and executive branch practice in interpreting the …

The Inescapable Federalism Of The Ninth Amendment, Kurt T. Lash

ExpressO

For the past several decades, the majority of courts and commentators have viewed the Ninth Amendment as a provision justifying judicial enforcement of unenumerated individual rights against state and federal abridgment. The most influential advocate of this libertarian reading of the Ninth has been Professor Randy Barnett who has argued in a number of articles and books that the Ninth was originally understood as guarding unenumerated natural rights. Recently uncovered historical evidence, however, suggests that those who framed and ratified the Ninth Amendment understood the Clause as a guardian of the retained right to local self-government. Recognizing the challenge this …

Why Justice Scalia Should Be A Constitutional Comparativist ... Sometimes, David C. Gray

Faculty Scholarship

The burgeoning literature on transjudicialism and constitutional comparativism generally reaffirms the familiar lines of contest between textualists and those more inclined to read the Constitution as a living document. As a consequence, it tends to be politicized, if not polemic. This article begins to shift the debate toward a more rigorous focus on first principles. In particular, it argues that full faith to the basic commitments of originalism, as advanced in Justice Scalia's writings, opinions, and speeches, requires domestic courts to consult contemporary foreign sources when interpreting universalist language found in the Constitution. While the article does not propose a …

The Perpetual Anxiety Of Living Constitutionalism, Ethan J. Leib

Faculty Scholarship

It certainly seems like the originalists are winning. Professor Jack Balkin--finding that he couldn't beat 'em--joined them. Living constitutionalists used to turn to Balkin as a reliable advocate; he recently wrote “we are all living constitutionalists now.” But Balkin has forsaken them. Losing such an important advocate might be a sign that what some once deemed the “ascendant” and dominant theory in constitutional interpretation is on the decline. Still, don't count living constitutionalism out of the game just yet--and don't think one can embrace Balkin's approach and a true living constitutionalism at the same time.

Why Supermajoritarianism Does Not Illuminate The Interpretive Debate Between Originalists And Non-Originalists, Ethan J. Leib

Faculty Scholarship

In A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, they seek to explain why supermajoritarianism furnishes a new pragmatic defense of originalism. In this Essay, I dispute each of their substantive claims. First, I argue that there is nothing newly pragmatic about their defense. Although they claim to want to make originalists and pragmatists friends, nothing about their project is likely to accomplish this matchmaking. Second, I argue that there is no reason to believe that constitutional entrenchments produced under supermajoritarian decision rules are any more desirable as a general matter than rules produced under other, more relaxed, decision rules. At the core …

Does Due Process Have An Original Meaning? On Originalism, Due Process, Procedural Innovation...And Parking Tickets, Lawrence Rosenthal

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

Storm In A Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’S Use Of Foreign Law, Austen L. Parrish

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In this Article, Professor Parrish explores the legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court's use of foreign law in constitutional adjudication. In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has used foreign law as persuasive authority in a number of highly contentious cases. The backlash has been spirited, with calls for foreign law to be categorically barred from constitutional adjudication, and even for Justices to be impeached if they cite to foreign sources. Last year, the condemnation of comparative constitutionalism reached a high note, as a barrage of scholarship decried the practice as illegitimate and a threat to our national sovereignty. The …

The Progressive Political Power Of Balkin's "Original Meaning", Dawn E. Johnsen

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Underlying Principles, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In his forthcoming article, Original Meaning and Abortion, Jack Balkin makes the startling disclosure that he is now an originalist. "[C]onstitutional interpretation," he writes, "requires fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution and to the principles that underlie the text. The task of interpretation is to look to original meaning and underlying principle and decide how best to apply them in current circumstances. I call this the method of text and principle."

In this brief reply, the author cautions that, to remain faithful to the Constitution when referring to underlying principles, we must never forget it is a text …

Originalism, Popular Sovereignty And Reverse Stare Decisis, Kurt T. Lash

Law Faculty Publications

Although all interpretive methods must grapple with the issue of stare decisis, the issue is particularly acute for originalists due to the potentially radical discontinuity between original meaning and modern doctrine. An unmediated enforcement of original understanding of the Constitution would likely reverse countless precedents and impose unacceptably high costs in terms of the rule of law. On the other hand, upholding a precedent despite its variance with the original understanding undermines the very legitimacy of legal review according to most theories of originalism. Focusing on the most common normative basis for originalism, popular sovereignty, the article identifies those cases …

The Balkanization Of Originalism, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Are we all originalists now? If anything would prompt that question, it would be Ronald Dworkin and Jack Balkin dressing up their theories in the garb of originalism (or, at any rate, being interpreted as originalists). For they are exemplars of two bete noires of originalism as conventionally understood: namely, the moral reading of the Constitution, and pragmatic, living constitutionalism, respectively.' Yet in recent years Dworkin has been interpreted as an abstract originalist2 and Balkin has now embraced the method of text and principle, which he presents as a form of abstract originalism.'

Book Review, Brian Leiter

Journal of Legal Education

No abstract provided.

Towards A Common Law Originalism, Bernadette Meyler

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Originalists' emphasis upon William Blackstone's "Commentaries on the Laws of England" tends to suggest that the common law of the Founding era consisted in a set of determinate rules that can be mined for the purposes of constitutional interpretation. This Article argues instead that disparate strands of the common law, some emanating from the colonies and others from England, some more archaic and others more innovative, co-existed at the time of the Founding. Furthermore, jurists and politicians of the Founding generation were not unaware that the common law constituted a disunified field; indeed, the jurisprudence of the common law suggested …

Towards A Common Law Originalism, Bernadette A. Meyler

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Originalists' emphasis upon William Blackstone's "Commentaries on the Laws of England" tends to suggest that the common law of the Founding era consisted in a set of determinate rules that can be mined for the purposes of constitutional interpretation. This Article argues instead that disparate strands of the common law, some emanating from the colonies and others from England, some more archaic and others more innovative, co-existed at the time of the Founding. Furthermore, jurists and politicians of the Founding generation were not unaware that the common law constituted a disunified field; indeed, the jurisprudence of the common law suggested …

The Foreign Affairs Power: Does The Constitution Matter?, D. A. Jeremy Telman

ExpressO

Peter Irons’ WAR POWERS favors congressional initiative in questions of war and peace but makes a historical argument that our government has strayed from the constitutional design in the service of an imperialist foreign policy. John Yoo’s THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE seeks to overthrow the traditional perspective on war powers espoused by Irons in favor of executive initiative in war. Yoo also pursues a revisionist perspective on the treaty power, which favors executive initiative in treaty negotiation and interpretation but insists on congressional implementation so as to minimize the impact of international obligations on domestic law. This Essay …

Searches And The Misunderstood History Of Suspicion And Probable Cause: Part One, Fabio Arcila

ExpressO

This article, the first of a two-part series, argues that during the Framers’ era many if not most judges believed they could issue search warrants without independently assessing the adequacy of probable cause, and that this view persisted even after the Fourth Amendment became effective. This argument challenges the leading originalist account of the Fourth Amendment, which Professor Thomas Davies published in the Michigan Law Review in 1999.

The focus in this first article is upon an analysis of the common law and how it reflected the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions. Learned treatises in particular, and to a lesser extent a …

Why Justice Scalia Should Be A Constitutional Comparativst . . . Sometimes, David C. Gray

ExpressO

The burgeoning literature on transjudicialism and constitutional comparativism generally reaffirms the familiar lines of contest between textualists and those more inclined to read the Constitution as a living document. As a consequence, it tends to be politicized, if not polemic. This essay begins to shift the debate toward a more rigorous focus on first principles. In particular, it argues that full faith to the basic commitments of originalism, as advanced in Justice Scalia’s writings, opinions, and speeches, requires domestic courts to consult contemporary foreign sources when interpreting universalist language found in the Constitution. While the essay does not propose a …