Constitutional Law Commons^™

Countering The Majoritarian Difficulty, Amy Coney Barrett

Journal Articles

In Our Republican Constitution, Randy Barnett argues that the United States Constitution rests on a foundation of individual rather than collective popular sovereignty. Grounding the legitimacy of the government in the authority given it by each individual rather than by the People as a whole echoes the thesis, advanced in Barnett’s prior work, that the government must justify incursions upon individual liberty. If the People as a body are sovereign and the Constitution is designed to facilitate democratic self-governance, legislation is presumptively legitimate because it represents the sovereign will of the democratic majority. If the individual is sovereign, by contrast, …

Enduring Originalism, Kevin C. Walsh

Law Faculty Publications

If our law requires originalism in constitutional interpretation, then that would be a good reason to be an originalist. This insight animates what many have begun to call the "positive turn" in originalism. Defenses of originalism in this vein are "positive" in that they are based on the status of the Constitution, and constitutional law, as positive law. This approach shifts focus away from abstract conceptual or normative arguments about interpretation and focuses instead on how we actually understand and apply the Constitution as law. On these grounds, originalism rests on a factual claim about the content of our law: …

Republicanism And Natural Rights At The Founding, Jud Campbell

Law Faculty Publications

Today we tend to think about natural rights as non-positivist claims to limits on governmental authority — typically claims derived from religion, morality, or logic. These “rights,” by their very definition, exist independent of governmental control. Indeed, that is what makes them “natural.” This Essay, responding to Randy Barnett's Our Republican Constitution, sketches a different view of Founding-Era natural rights, their relationship to governmental authority, and their enforceability. With the exception of certain “rights of the mind,” natural rights were not really “rights” at all, in the sense of being determinate legal privileges or immunities. Rather, embracing natural rights meant …

Fidelity To Our Imperfect Constitution: A Response To Five Views, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In my recent book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, I put forward a sustained critique of originalism in all its forms and defend what Ronald Dworkin called a "moral reading" of the U. S. Constitution and what Sotirios A. Barber and I have called a "philosophic approach" to constitutional interpretation. In this essay for the UNAM symposium on the book, I reply to five thoughtful commentaries. First, as against Barber's commentary, I justify responding to the "persistent resurgence of originalism" and attempting to "save the new originalists from themselves" by showing the extent to which many of them acknowledge …

Confronting Crawford: Justice Scalia, The Judicial Method, And The Adjudicative Limits Of Originalism, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

If you conduct an online search for something like “Justice Scalia’s most important opinions” or “Justice Scalia’s most influential opinions,” you will (or at least I did) almost always end up with a list that is top-heavy with dissents. That is not surprising. Dissenting opinions gave Justice Antonin Scalia the most freedom to exercise his considerable skills as a writer and were therefore more likely to produce memorable one-liners. They were also the best occasions for him to express his views can­didly and forcefully and thus served as the best vehicles for elaboration of his jurisprudential and doctrinal positions. Majority …

The Death Penalty And The Fifth Amendment, Joseph Blocher

Northwestern University Law Review

Can the Supreme Court find unconstitutional something that the text of the Constitution “contemplates”? If the Bill of Rights mentions a punishment, does that make it a “permissible legislative choice” immune to independent constitutional challenges?

Recent developments have given new hope to those seeking constitutional abolition of the death penalty. But some supporters of the death penalty continue to argue, as they have since Furman v. Georgia, that the death penalty must be constitutional because the Fifth Amendment explicitly contemplates it. The appeal of this argument is obvious, but its strength is largely superficial, and is also mostly irrelevant to …

Reflections Of An Empirical Reader (Or: Could Fleming Be Right This Time?), Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Jim Fleming’s new book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against Originalisms, purports to critique all forms of originalism from the perspective of Professor Fleming’s “moral reading” of, or “philosophic approach” to, the Constitution. I propose a somewhat different opposition: empirical reading versus moral reading. Empirical reading is necessarily originalist, but it focuses directly on the need to ground interpretation in theories of concepts, language, and communication. In this short comment, I outline the research agenda for a theory of empirical reading, explore the extent to which empirical readings and moral readings of the Constitution are …

The Moral Reading As A Practice: A Response To Three Comments On Fidelity To Our Imperfect Constitution, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, many originalists have claimed a monopoly on concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretation. In my book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 1 I reject originalisms—whether old or new, concrete or abstract, living or dead. Instead, I defend what Ronald Dworkin called a “moral reading” of the United States Constitution, or a “philosophic approach” to constitutional interpretation. I refer to conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political principles—not codifying concrete historical rules or practices—and of interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments about how they are best understood—not merely historical research to discover relatively …

Of Swords, Shields, And A Gun To The Head: Coercing Individuals, But Not States, Aviam Soifer

Seattle University Law Review

This Article begins with a brief reprise of what should be a textual “gotcha” about the Enforcement Clauses of the post-Civil War Amendments—if our current Supreme Court Justices actually cared about original texts, originalism, or a combination of the two. Next, the Article focuses on the gnarled issue of “coercion.” It argues that, contrary to a great deal of Anglo-American legal doctrine, coercion is best understood along a spectrum rather than as a binary phenomenon. Coercion is actually much contested and highly contextual across many legal categories. Federal coercion—also described as commandeering or dragooning— has become a particular constitutional focus …

Originalism And Same-Sex Marriage, Steven G. Calabresi, Hannah M. Begley

University of Miami Law Review

This article examines the original meaning of the equality guarantee in American constitutional law. It looks are the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth century roots of the modern doctrine, and it concludes that the Fourteenth Amendment bans the Hindu Caste system, European feudalism, the Black Codes, the Jim Crow laws, and the common law's denial to women of equal civil rights to those held by men. It then considers the constitutionality of bans on same sex marriage from an Originalist perspective, and it concludes that State laws banning same sex marriage violate the Fourteenth Amendment.

Clarence Thomas, Fisher V. University Of Texas, And The Future Of Affirmative Action In Higher Education, Scott D. Gerber

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Tribute To Justice Scalia: Why Bad Cases Make Bad Methodology, Brian T. Fitzpatrick

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The Vanderbilt Law Review asked me to write a short memorial tribute to my old boss, Justice Antonin Scalia, and I am fortunate that Dean Chemerinsky's new book provides an apt occasion to do so. To be as blunt as the Justice would have been: he would have hated this book. Not because Dean Chemerinsky is not a gifted writer; he most surely is. But because the entire methodology of the book-a methodology I call "bad-cases" reasoning-was anathema to the Justice. The Justice may not have been right about everything, but he was right about this: bad-cases reasoning is bad …

James Wilson In The State House Yard: Ratifying The Structures Of Popular Sovereignty, Ian C. Bartrum

Scholarly Works

There is an excellent (and rapidly growing) literature examining the influence of James Wilson's Scottish philosophical education on his later political ideas. In this Article, Professor Ian Bartrum makes two contributions to that scholarship. First, he reexamines several of the most important Scottish moral sentimentalists with a particular focus on the specific ontological and epistemological accounts that influenced Wilson. Second, he dissolves the seeming contradictions in Wilson's political thought by showing that, while he understood that representative bodies were essential to legitimate government, he nonetheless distrusted these institutions because they work to obscure, or even subvert, their members' individual experience …

When Scalia Wasn't Such An Originalist, Michael Lewyn

Scholarly Works

Although Justice Scalia generally described himself as an originalist, his opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council rejected originalist arguments. Why? This article suggests that pre-Lucas precedent and the ambiguity of the historical record might justify his methodology.

Congressional Originalism, Amy Coney Barrett, John Copeland` Nagle

Journal Articles

Precedent poses a notoriously difficult problem for originalists. Some decisions – so-called super precedents – are so well baked into government that reversing them would wreak havoc. Originalists have been pressed to either acknowledge that their theory could generate major disruption or identify a principled exception to their insistence that judges are bound to enforce the Constitution’s original public meaning. While the stylized process of adjudication narrows the questions presented to the Court, in Congress the question of a measure’s constitutionality is always on the table. And because framing constraints do not narrow the relevant and permissible grounds of decision …

Enduring Originalism, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Kevin C. Walsh

Journal Articles

If our law requires originalism in constitutional interpretation, then that would be a good reason to be an originalist. This insight animates what many have begun to call the “positive turn” in originalism. Defenses of originalism in this vein are “positive” in that they are based on the status of the Constitution, and constitutional law, as positive law. This approach shifts focus away from abstract conceptual or normative arguments about interpretation and focuses instead on how we actually understand and apply the Constitution as law. On these grounds, originalism rests on a factual claim about the content of our law: …

Rule Originalism, Jamal Greene

Faculty Scholarship

Constitutional rules are norms whose application depends on an interpreter's identification of a set of facts rather than on her exercise of practical judgment. This Article argues that constitutional interpreters in the United States tend to resolve ambiguity over constitutional rules by reference to originalist sources and tend to resolve uncertainty over the scope of constitutional standards by reference to nonoriginalist sources. This positive claim unsettles the frequent assumption that the Constitution's more specifw or structural provisions support straightforward interpretive inferences. Normatively, this Article offers a partial defense of what it calls "rule originalism," grounded in the fact of its …

A Nonoriginalism For Originalists, Jamal Greene

Faculty Scholarship

Originalism is an ideology, not a practice. It is a brand, an affiliation, a set of background principles, an often unstated set of restorative commitments. As James Fleming says in his book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, originalism is an "ism." As an "ism," Fleming writes, originalism did not exist before the 1970s: "Constitutional interpretation in light of original understanding did exist, but original understanding was seen as merely one source of constitutional decision-making among several-not as a general theory of constitutional interpretation, much less the exclusive legitimate theory."

This brief Comment on Fleming's book takes the practice Fleming identifies---"constitutional …

Originalism And Its Tools: A Few Caveats, David T. Hardy

ConLawNOW

In District of Columbia v. Heller, the United States Supreme Court adopted original public understanding as an interpretative tool. While this approach has the virtue of establishing meaning independent of a court’s personal values and preferences, this article explores some hazards which courts should try to avoid. First, one must resist the temptation to see historians as invariably objective; some are apt to push a personal agenda, or get a reputation as a “debunker,” at the cost of distorting, overlooking, or even inventing the historical record. Historical studies of this type have misled the Ninth Circuit, and a dissent …

Tone Deaf To The Past: More Qualms About Public Meaning Originalism, Jack Rakove

Fordham Law Review

    With some apologies for a vast degree of oversimplification, let us stipulate that there are two main forms of originalism. One is known as “semantic” or “public meaning” originalism. Its leading advocates include Lawrence Solum, Keith Whittington, and Randy Barnett (professional friends, all). The leading premise of semantic originalism is that the meaning of the constitutional text—or, more specifically, of its individual clauses—was fixed at the moment of its adoption. Under this view, the goal of constitutional interpretation is to recover that original meaning, and the best way to do that pivots on reconstructing how an informed reader, whether a …

Historians And The New Originalism: Contextualism, Historicism, And Constitutional Meaning, Martin S. Flaherty

Fordham Law Review

    Toward that end, this Foreword addresses three matters. First, it considers why the use of history in constitutional interpretation is inescapable. Next, it suggests that the Essays in this forum do not go far enough in debunking the idea of “public meaning” originalism as a serious alternative to previous approaches. Finally, the balance of this Foreword reviews the also perhaps inescapable misuses of history that constitutional interpretation invites and considers the type of misuse that public meaning originalism represents.

“To Assemble Together For Their Common Good”: History, Ethnography, And The Original Meanings Of The Rights Of Assembly And Speech, Saul Cornell

Fordham Law Review

    The Whiskey Rebellion is not generally a major focus in constitutional histories or casebooks. Given this fact, it is hardly surprising that the 1795 case Respublica v. Montgomery seldom figures as more than a minor footnote in scholarly writing about early American constitutional development, if it receives any attention at all. The case has little precedential value for modern First Amendment doctrine and only obliquely implicates larger jurisprudential questions about the rights of assembly and freedom of expression. In strictly doctrinal terms, Montgomery is primarily about the obligation of a justice of the peace to put down a riot, not …

Historicism And Holism: Failures Of Originalist Translation, Jonathan Gienapp

Fordham Law Review

    For as long as the U.S. Constitution has existed, Americans have appealed to the history of its creation to interpret its meaning. But only since the advent of originalism—the well-known constitutional theory that requires interpreting the Constitution today in accordance with its original meaning—has historical study been so immediately implicated by constitutional interpretation. Despite potential, though, for meaningful exchange between originalists and historians, little has taken place. That originalism plays an ever-growing role in contemporary political culture only makes the lack of dialogue all the more unfortunate.

Outsourcing The Law: History And The Disciplinary Limits Of Constitutional Reasoning, Helen Irving

Fordham Law Review

    Debates about the use of history in constitutional interpretation find their primary nourishment in the originalism debate. This has generated a vast amount of literature, but also narrowed the terms of the debate. Originalism is a normative commitment wrapped in a questionable methodological confidence. Regardless of the multiple forms originalism takes, originalists are confident that the meaning (in the sense of intention) that animated the framing of the Constitution can be ascertained and, indeed, that they can ascertain it. The debate has largely focused, then, on whether modern-day scholars and jurists can ascertain original historical meaning or, alternatively, whether they …

The Moral Reading All Down The Line, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Michael W. McConnell has written an elegant and illuminating article about constitutional interpretation.' He seeks to show how five major methodological approaches fit together. The five approaches he discusses are: "originalism, precedent, longstanding practice, judicial restraint, and living constitutionalism (here called the normative approach)."'2 He distinguishes two camps with respect to these approaches. One camp, he notes, "advocates for (or against) a particular approach ... on the assumption that these approaches are mutually inconsistent and that the task is to determine which is best . . . .3 The other camp "treats the various common approaches as mere tools in …

Originalism As Thin Description: An Interdisciplinary Critique, Saul Cornell

Res Gestae

My essay was intended as a critique of originalism from the perspective of intellectual history. I pointed out that originalism lacked a rigorous empirical method for analyzing what texts meant in the past. I suppose in some sense it is flattering that Solum has devoted much of his recent article to an attack on my earlier essay. Of course, flattery aside, it would have been more useful if Solum had stated my thesis correctly. For purposes of clarity, I have juxtaposed Solum’s description of my argument with what my essay actually said. Readers will be able to judge for themselves …

The Natural Born Citizen Clause As Originally Understood, Mary Brigid Mcmanamon

Catholic University Law Review

Article II of the Constitution requires that the President be a “natural born Citizen.” The phrase is derived from English common law, and the Supreme Court requires examination of that law to ascertain the phrase’s definition. This piece presents the pertinent English sources, combined with statements by early American jurists. Based on a reading of these materials, the article concludes that, in the eyes of the Framers, a presidential candidate must be born within the United States. The article is important because there has been a candidate who “pushed the envelope” on this question in many elections over the last …

Countersupermajoritarianism, Frederic Bloom, Nelson Tebbe

Michigan Law Review

Our Constitution can change. We can amend it, update it, improve it. And so we have—twenty-seven times by one count, many more by another. Everyone recognizes this. But fewer people appreciate that the mechanics of constitutional change can change as well. A method of alteration unaddressed at the founding can grow into established practice. A procedure built into constitutional text can slip into disuse. As much as citizens can change the substance of the Constitution, they can also change the ways they change it. In Originalism and the Good Constitution, John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport make an elegant and provocative …

Countersupermajoritarianism, Frederic M. Bloom, Nelson Tebbe

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

How should the Constitution change? In Originalism and the Good Constitution, John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport argue that it ought to change in only one way: through the formal mechanisms set out in the Constitution’s own Article V. This is so, they claim, because provisions adopted by supermajority vote are more likely to be substantively good. The original Constitution was ratified in just that way, they say, and subsequent changes should be implemented similarly. McGinnis and Rappaport also contend that this substantive goodness is preserved best by a mode of originalist interpretation.

In this Review, we press two main arguments. …

Judge Posner's Simple Law, Mitchell N. Berman

Michigan Law Review

The world is complex, Richard Posner observes in his most recent book, Reflections on Judging. It follows that, for judges to achieve “sensible” resolutions of real-world disputes—by which Judge Posner means “in a way that can be explained in ordinary language and justified as consistent with the expectations of normal people” (p. 354)—they must be able to navigate the world’s complexity successfully. To apply legal rules correctly and (where judicial lawmaking is called for) to formulate legal rules prudently, judges must understand the causal mechanisms and processes that undergird complex systems, and they must be able to draw sound factual …