Constitutional Law Commons^™

Lin-Manuel Miranda And The Future Of Originalism, Richard A. Primus

Book Chapters

This chapter discusses how Lin Manuel Miranda's Hamilton: An American Musical is changing the future of originalism. Originalism in constitutional law has recently had a generally conservative valence not because the Founders were an eighteenth-century version of the Federalist Society, but because readings of Founding era sources that favored right-leaning causes were generally predominant in the community of constitutional lawyers. Since 2015, however, the millions of Americans who have listened obsessively to Hamilton's cast album or packed theaters to see the show in person have been absorbing a new vision of the Founding. The blockbuster musical narrative has retold America's …

Foreign-Born Children Of Disloyal Parents: Adam Muthana, Mary Arcedeckne, And The Natural-Born, John Vlahoplus

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

Can Adam Muthana, the foreign-born child of an alien Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) combatant and a New Jersey-born ISIS adherent, grow up to be president of the United States? He can if he attains the age of thirty-five, resides in the United States for fourteen years, and is a natural-born citizen. He has a facial claim to statutory derivative citizenship at birth through his mother, and some scholars argue that anyone who is a citizen at birth is a natural-born citizen. Nevertheless, there are significant disputes over whether he will be allowed to reside here, whether …

Evaluating Originalism: Commerce And Emoluments, John Vlahoplus

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

This Article suggests that originalist theories share a core focus that meaningfully competes with pluralist theories. The contest is real and appears in centuries of debates within Anglo-American and civil law. The Article locates the Anglo-American origins of originalism in a novel seventeenth-century method of legal interpretation used to achieve a specific political end: to stifle opposition to the union of Scottish and English subjects of King James after his accession to the English crown in 1603. It details the novel method and the competing traditional method of English legal interpretation. It then evaluates originalist interpretations of the Commerce …

Habeas Corpus And The Politics Of History, Isaac Cui

Pomona Senior Theses

Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, a Tamil citizen of Sri Lanka, was apprehended after unlawfully entering the United States. Placed in expedited removal proceedings, which allows for streamlined deportation, Thuraissigiam sought asylum. However, he was found to lack the requisite credible fear of persecution based on a protected status. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to review the legality of that determination. But because the expedited removal process limits federal habeas jurisdiction, his petition was dismissed. He claims that limitation violates the U.S. Constitution’s Suspension Clause, which provides: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless …

Originalist Sin: The Failure Of Originalism To Justify The Unitary Executive Theory, Marc Mohan

Lewis & Clark Law Review

Originalists justify a “unitary executive” theory of presidential powers using the Constitution’s vesting of the executive power in “a President,” as opposed to a council or other multi-member setup. Inspite of this justification’s popularity with originalists, a deeper understanding of prerogative and power, as the Founders understood those key concepts, reveals that the unitary executivetheory cannot be justified through either the original intent orthe original meaning of our founding document. Intheabsence of this grounding, the unitary executive theory is underpinned by modern exigenciesand thereforeloses coherency as an originalist theory.

The 2019 Higgins Distinguished Visitor Lecture: The Subversive Side Of Textualism And Original Intent, Donald B. Ayer

Lewis & Clark Law Review

The Lorene Sails Higgins Charitable Trust provides the Lewis & Clark community access to leading legal scholars from around the world. Each year, the campus is graced with a visitor renowned in their field whose stay is funded by a grant from the trust. This lecture, given by the former Deputy Attorney General and Principal Deputy Solicitor General Donald B. Ayer during the course of his visit, discussed the changes in American legal thinking during his career.

Popular Constitutional Argument, Tom Donnelly

Vanderbilt Law Review

Critics have long attacked popular constitutionalists for offering few clues about how their theory might work in practice—-especially inside the courts. These critics are right. Popular constitutionalism—as a matter of both theory and practice—remains a work in progress. In this Article, I take up the challenge of developing an account of (what I call) popular constitutional argument. Briefly stated, popular constitutional argument is a form of argument that draws on the American people’s considered judgments as a source of constitutional authority—akin to traditional sources like text, history, structure, and doctrine. Turning to constitutional theory, I situate popular constitutional argument within …

Reconceptualizing Hybrid Rights, Dan T. Coenen

Scholarly Works

In landmark decisions on religious liberty and same-sex marriage, and many other cases as well, the Supreme Court has placed its imprimatur on so called “hybrid rights.” These rights spring from the interaction of two or more constitutional clauses, none of which alone suffices to give rise to the operative protection. Controversy surrounds hybrid rights in part because there exists no judicial account of their justifiability. To be sure, some scholarly treatments suggest that these rights emanate from the “structures” or “penumbras” of the Constitution. But critics respond that hybrid rights lack legitimacy for that very reason because structural and …

Legitimate Interpretation – Or Legitimate Adjudication?, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Current debate about the legitimacy of lawmaking by courts focuses on what constitutes legitimate interpretation. The debate has reached an impasse in that originalism and textualism appear to have the stronger case as a matter of theory while living constitutionalism and dynamic interpretation provide much account of actual practice. This Article argues that if we refocus the debate by asking what constitutes legitimate adjudication, as determined by the social practice of the parties and their lawyers who take part in adjudication, it is possible to develop an account of legitimacy that produces a much better fit between theory and practice. …

Fixing America's Founding, Maeve Glass

Faculty Scholarship

The forty-fifth presidency of the United States has sent lawyers reaching once more for the Founders’ dictionaries and legal treatises. In courtrooms, law schools, and media outlets across the country, the original meanings of the words etched into the U.S. Constitution in 1787 have become the staging ground for debates ranging from the power of a president to trademark his name in China to the rights of a legal permanent resident facing deportation. And yet, in this age when big data promises to solve potential challenges of interpretation and judges have for the most part agreed that original meaning should …

Let History Repeat Itself: Solving Originalism's History Problem In Interpreting The Establishment Clause, Neil Joseph

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is all over the place. The current justices have widely divergent views on the Establishment Clause's meaning, and the Lemon test has been widely panned by several justices. Originalist judges, however, have had a fairly consistent approach to interpreting the Establishment Clause. This largely stems from their reliance on history. This Note argues that their use of history in analyzing the Establishment Clause is flawed. Originalist Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been and is criticized for being unprincipled. And those criticisms are correct. Originalists encounter such criticism because the justices struggle to reconcile historical practice …

Katz, Carpenter, And Classical Conservatism, Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel

Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy

In 1967, in Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court adopted a privacy-based framework for determining whether government conduct constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. Under that standard, a search occurs when the government infringes on an expectation of privacy that "society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Although the Court qualified its commitment to Katz in 2012 by asserting that an older, property-based approach survived Katz and remains the first-line test for identifying Fourth Amendment searches, most of the Court today is committed to preserving a role for the Katz standard. Yet, most of the justices have also recognized problems …

From Language To Law: Interpretation And Construction In Early American Judicial Practice, Hillary Chutter-Ames

Northwestern University Law Review

This Note surveys evidence concerning how early American Supreme Court Justices approached interpretation and construction based on an analysis of Supreme Court opinions from 1795 to 1805. An evaluation of this evidence indicates two main trends. First, the Justices engaged in interpretation and construction as a single process, alternating between textual and normative reasoning to determine the intent of the Framers or of Congress. In some cases, textual reasoning seemed determinative; in others, normative reasoning was decisive. This finding illustrates some tension between the idea of limiting judicial discretion in construction and applying methods of interpretation and construction that would …

Originalism And Second-Order Ipse Dixit Reasoning In Chisholm V. Georgia, D.A. Jeremy Telman

Cleveland State Law Review

This Article presents a new perspective on the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence during the Early Republic. It focuses on what I am calling second-order ipse dixit reasoning, which occurs when Justices have to decide between two incommensurable interpretive modalities. If first-order ipse dixit is unreasoned decision-making, second-order ipse dixit involves an unreasoned choice between or among two or more equally valid interpretive options. The early Court often had recourse to second-order ipse dixit because methodological eclecticism characterized its constitutional jurisprudence, and the early Court established no fixed hierarchy among interpretive modalities.

Chisholm, the pre-Marshall Court’s most important constitutional decision, illustrates …

Prosecutors At The Periphery, Peter M. Shane

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Contrary to so-called unitary executive theory, Article II does not guarantee presidents the power to control federal criminal prosecution, a supervisory role Congress has placed by statute with the Attorney General. Nor is Congress without authority to protect federal prosecutors from policy-based dismissals. Rule-of-law values embodied in our system of checks and balances could alone justify these conclusions. But the same conclusions follow also from close attention to the entirety of the relevant constitutional text and from an understanding of how the Founding generation would have understood the relationship between executive power and criminal prosecution. In contemplating the newly proposed …

Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure Of The Great Debate, Lawrence B. Solum

Northwestern University Law Review

The great debate between originalism and living constitutionalism ought to focus on the merits, including normative arguments for and against various forms of each theory. Frequently, however, discussion turns to disputes about definitions and concepts. This Essay investigates the conceptual structure of the great debate. It lays out a variety of issues that arise when theorists attempt to define “originalism” and “living constitutionalism” and proposes criteria for settling definitional disputes.

Unifying Original Intent And Original Public Meaning, John O. Mcginnis, Michael B. Rappaport

Northwestern University Law Review

Original intent and original public meaning are generally thought to be opposing camps within originalism. Both theories assert that that the meaning of a constitutional provision was fixed at the time it was enacted. But they disagree fundamentally on the nature of interpretation. Original intent asserts that the meaning sought is that intended by the Constitution’s enactors. Original public meaning asserts that the meaning sought is that revealed by the text as reasonably understood by a well-informed reader at the time of the provision’s enactment.

In this Essay, we unite these two conflicting principles of originalism under the original methods …

Grounding Originalism, William Baude, Stephen E. Sachs

Northwestern University Law Review

How should we interpret the Constitution? The “positive turn” in legal scholarship treats constitutional interpretation, like the interpretation of statutes or contracts, as governed by legal rules grounded in actual practice. In our legal system, that practice requires a certain form of originalism: our system’s official story is that we follow the law of the Founding, plus all lawful changes made since.

Or so we’ve argued. Yet this answer produces its own set of questions. How can practice solve our problems, when there are so many theories of law, each giving practice a different role? Why look to an official …

Reshaping American Jurisprudence In The Trump Era - The Rise Of Originalist Judges, Jeffrey F. Addicott

Faculty Articles

One of the factors that is often cited as a key reason why President Donald J. Trump was elected as the forty-fifth president, was his pledge to the American people to "make America great again" by appointing "conservative judges" to the bench, particularly when it came to filling any vacancies that might open on the United States Supreme Court. Since the never ending fight for securing an ideological majority on the Supreme Court is always viewed with great concern by both political parties, many wondered whether then candidate Trump was simply telling potential voters what they wanted to hear, or …

Originalism And Structural Argument, Thomas B. Colby

Northwestern University Law Review

The “new originalism” is all about the text of the Constitution. Originalists insist that the whole point of originalism is to respect and follow the original meaning of the text, and that originalism derives its legitimacy from its unwavering focus on the text alone as the sole basis of higher law. And yet, many leading Supreme Court decisions in matters of great importance to conservatives—in opinions authored and joined by originalist judges, and often praised by originalist scholars—are seemingly not grounded in the constitutional text at all. They rest instead on abstract structural argument: on freestanding principles of federalism and …

Originalism And A Forgotten Conflict Over Martial Law, Bernadette Meyler

Northwestern University Law Review

This Symposium Essay asks what a largely forgotten conflict over habeas corpus and martial law in mid-eighteenth-century New York can tell us about originalist methods of constitutional interpretation. The episode, which involved Abraham Yates, Jr.—later a prominent Antifederalist—as well as Lord Loudoun, the commander of the British forces in America, and New York Acting Governor James De Lancey, furnishes insights into debates about martial law prior to the Founding and indicates that they may have bearing on originalist interpretations of the Suspension Clause. It also demonstrates how the British imperial context in which the American colonies were situated shaped discussions …

Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure Of The Great Debate, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Essay explores the conceptual structure of the great debate about “originalism” and “living constitutionalism.” The core of the great debate is substantive and addresses the normative question, “What is the best theory of constitutional interpretation and construction?” That question leads to others, including questions about the various forms and variations of originalism and living constitutionalism. Originalists argue that the meaning of the constitutional text is fixed and that it should bind constitutional actors. Living constitutionalists contend that constitutional law can and should evolve in response to changing circumstances and values. This Essay advances a metalinguistic proposal for classifying theories …

Originalism And James Bradley Thayer, Steven G. Calabresi

Northwestern University Law Review

This Essay provides an originalist appraisal of Professor James Bradley Thayer’s famous book on The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law. I critique Professor Thayer’s thesis on multiple levels, pointing out important aspects of the original understanding that the Framers would have had of the meaning and origins of the U.S. Constitution, as well as disputing Professor Thayer’s discussion of the history of American judicial review from 1790 to the publication of his book in 1893. I conclude that no person can be both an originalist and a Thayerian. The two theories contradict one another …

The Diverging Right(S) To Bear Arms: Private Armament And The Second And Fourteenth Amendments In Historical Context, Alexander Gouzoules

Faculty Publications

This article compares the historical evolution of the social understanding of private armament with contemporary legal doctrine on the right to bear arms. The District of Columbia v. Heller decision, which held that the Second Amendment protects a personal right to self-defense, and the McDonald v. City of Chicago decision, which held the Second Amendment to be incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, both turned on extensive historical analysis. But by reading a broad “individual right to self-defense” into both the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court assumed continuity between the social understandings at the time of these amendments’ respective ratifications. …

The Recent Unpleasantness: Understanding The Cycles Of Constitutional Time, Jack M. Balkin

Indiana Law Journal

In this Article, I will talk about what I expect is going to happen in the next five to ten years. Unlike eclipses, however, one can’t be entirely sure of the future. Politics is not astronomy, and human affairs do not operate like clockwork. Moreover, we can’t assume that everything is already foreordained: that if people simply sit on their hands and do nothing, the cycles I describe in this lecture will take care of themselves. Quite the contrary. I am telling a story about what happens in the long run, but it is not a deterministic story. The actions …

Smith, Scalia, And Originalism, Amul R. Thapar

Catholic University Law Review

To many principled Originalists and proponent of religious liberty, the opinion in Employment Division v. Smith poses a puzzle. Many commentators believe Smith contradicts the original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause and hinders the right to religious freedom. Yet it was written by Justice Scalia, a self-professed Originalist and lion of the law. I attempt to resolve this puzzle, reviewing Justice Scalia’s speeches and opinions on religious liberty. Ultimately, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith reflects his commitments to certain jurisprudential principles. Viewing these principles in the light of New Originalism, though, it becomes clear how Smith most likely does …

The Imaginary Constitution, Suzanna Sherry

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

How many ways can conservatives spin an originalist tale to support their deregulatory, small-government vision? The answer is apparently infinite. In a new book, Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman are the latest in a long line of scholars who insist that the real original meaning of the Constitution demands unwinding the regulatory state and substantially limiting the power of the federal government. They argue that the Constitution is a fiduciary instrument, specifically a power of attorney. After summarizing the book, this essay turns to three of its most important failings, each of which serves to make the book a work …

Functional Equivalence And Residual Rights Post-Carpenter: Framing A Test Consistent With Precedent And Original Meaning, Laura K. Donohue

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Carpenter Court held that warrantless access to seven or more days of cell site location information (CSLI) constitutes a violation of the reasonable expectation of privacy that individuals have in the whole of their physical movements. But the grounds on which the Court drew a line characterize all sorts of digital records—including those at issue in Miller and Smith, belying the majority’s claim that the decision leaves third-party doctrine intact. Instead of avoiding Katz’s pitfalls, moreover, the Court emphasized voluntary assumption of risk, doubling down on the subjective nature of judicial determination. The decision will likely lead to …

Constructing The Original Scope Of Constitutional Rights, Nathan Chapman

Scholarly Works

In this solicited response to Ingrid Wuerth's "The Due Process and Other Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations," I explain and justify Wuerth's methodology for constructing the original scope of constitutional rights. The original understanding of the Constitution, based on text and historical context, is a universally acknowledged part of constitutional law today. The original scope of constitutional rights — who was entitled to them, where they extended, and so on — is a particularly difficult question that requires a measure of construction based on the entire historical context. Wuerth rightly proceeds one right at a time with a careful consideration …

The Declaration Of Independence And The American Theory Of Government: “First Come Rights, And Then Comes Government”, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The topic of this panel is the Declaration of Independence, to which I devoted a chapter of my recent book, Our Republican Constitution. I want to draw on that book to make five points.