Constitutional Law Commons^™

Soft Supremacy, Corinna Barrett Lain

Law Faculty Publications

The debate over judicial supremacy has raged for more than a decade now, yet the conception of what it is we are arguing about remains grossly oversimplified and formalistic. My aim in this symposium contribution is to push the conversation in a more realistic direction; I want those who claim that judicial supremacy is antidemocratic to take on the concept as it actually exists. The stark truth is that judicial supremacy has remarkably little of the strength and hard edges that dominate the discourse in judicial supremacy debates. It is porous, contingent- soft. And the upshot of soft supremacy is …

From Parliamentary To Judicial Supremacy: Reflections In Honour Of The Constitutionalism Of Justice Moseneke, Peter G. Danchin

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Republicanism And Natural Rights At The Founding, Jud Campbell

Law Faculty Publications

Today we tend to think about natural rights as non-positivist claims to limits on governmental authority — typically claims derived from religion, morality, or logic. These “rights,” by their very definition, exist independent of governmental control. Indeed, that is what makes them “natural.” This Essay, responding to Randy Barnett's Our Republican Constitution, sketches a different view of Founding-Era natural rights, their relationship to governmental authority, and their enforceability. With the exception of certain “rights of the mind,” natural rights were not really “rights” at all, in the sense of being determinate legal privileges or immunities. Rather, embracing natural rights meant …

Ptab, Patents, And The Constitution, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

Tomorrow, the Supreme Court will hear arguments in Oil States vs. Greene’s Energy Group, et al. on whether the Patent and Trademark Office, acting through the Patent and Trial Appeal Board (PTAB), can decide the validity of existing patents. The question, in particular, is whether the PTAB is unconstitutionally extinguishing private property rights in a non-Article III forum without a jury. At stake, therefore, is a range of vital issues, including patents, property, and the right to be heard in a real court, with a jury.

An Empirical Study Of Implicit Takings., James E. Krier, Stewart E. Sterk

Articles

Takings scholarship has long focused on the niceties of Supreme Court doctrine, while ignoring the operation of takings law "on the ground" in the state and lower federal courts, which together decide the vast bulk of all takings cases. This study, based primarily on an empirical analysis of more than 2000 reported decisions ovcr the period 1979 through 2012, attempts to fill that void. This study establishes that the Supreme Court's categorical rules govern almost no state takings cases, and that takings claims based on government regulation almost invariably fail. By contrast, when takings claims arise out of government action …

Introduction: Is The Supreme Court Failing At Its Job, Or Are We Failing At Ours?, Suzanna Sherry

Vanderbilt Law Review

It is a pleasure and a privilege to write an introduction to this Symposium celebrating Dean Erwin Chemerinsky's important new book, The Case Against the Supreme Court. Chemerinsky is one of the leading constitutional scholars of our time and a frequent advocate before the U.S. Supreme Court. If he thinks there is a case to be made against the Court, we should all take it very seriously indeed. Chemerinsky's thesis may be stated in a few sentences. The primary role of the Supreme Court, in his view, is to "protect the rights of minorities who cannot rely on the political …

Thinking About The Supreme Court's Successes And Failures, Erwin Chemerinsky

Vanderbilt Law Review

The Supreme Court often has failed at its most important tasks and at the most important times. I set out this thesis at the beginning the book:

To be clear, I am not saying that the Supreme Court has failed at these crucial tasks every time. Making a case against the Supreme Court does not require taking such an extreme position. I also will talk about areas where the Court has succeeded in protecting minorities and in enforcing the limits of the Constitution. My claim is that the Court has often failed where and when it has been most needed. …

Declarations Of Unconstitutionality In India And The U.K.: Comparing The Space For Political Response, Chintan Chandrachud

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

What Judges Say And Do In Deciding National Security Cases: The Example Of The State Secrets Privilege, Anthony John Trenga

Duke Law Master of Judicial Studies Theses

From the criminal trial of Aaron Burr on charges of treason to modern-day litigation involving the CIA, the state secrets privilege presents a thorny issue for federal judges. Judge Trenga examines the legal issues at the heart of this privilege—separation of powers, non-justiciability, evidentiary privilege, national security interests, and military secrets—and the two primary doctrinal tracks judges invoke. Then, based on interviews with thirty-one federal judges, Judge Trenga offers insights into how judges think about applying the state secrets privilege to sensitive material.

Constitutional Avoidance As Interpretation And As Remedy, Eric S. Fish

Michigan Law Review

In a number of recent landmark decisions, the Supreme Court has used the canon of constitutional avoidance to essentially rewrite laws. Formally, the avoidance canon is understood as a method for resolving interpretive ambiguities: if there are two equally plausible readings of a statute, and one of them raises constitutional concerns, judges are instructed to choose the other one. Yet in challenges to the Affordable Care Act, the Voting Rights Act, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and other major statutes, the Supreme Court has used this canon to adopt interpretations that are not plausible. Jurists, scholars, and legal commentators have criticized …

Incidental Burdens And The Nature Of Judicial Review, Michael C. Dorf

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Activists and scholars contesting the meaning of the Second Amendment argue over a startling number of its twenty-seven words: "regulated," "Militia," "State," "people," "keep," "bear," and "Arms." Heller and McDonald sought to resolve most of these debates, but before Professors Joseph Blocher and Darrell Miller, no one noticed the potential for contestation over the Second Amendment's final word: "infringed." When does the application of a gun-neutral law infringe the right? In that deceptively simple question lurk important future debates over the Second Amendment, the Constitution, and law itself.

Justice-As-Fairness As Judicial Guiding Principle: Remembering John Rawls And The Warren Court, Michael Anthony Lawrence

Brooklyn Law Review

The decade-and-a-half period when Earl Warren served as the fourteenth Chief Justice (1953–1969) was marked by numerous landmark rulings in the areas of racial justice, criminal procedure, reproductive autonomy, First Amendment freedom of speech, association, and religion, voting rights, and more. These decisions led to positive, fundamental changes in the lives of millions of less advantaged Americans who had been historically disfavored because of their race, nationality, gender, socioeconomic class, or political views. The legacy of the Warren Court is one of an institution committed to “a dedication in the law to the timeless ideals of ‘human dignity, individual rights, …

Separations Of Wealth: Inequality And The Erosion Of Checks And Balances, Kate Andrias

Articles

American government is dysfunctional: Gridlock, filibusters, and expanding presidential power, everyone seems to agree, threaten our basic system of constitutional governance. Who, or what, is to blame? In the standard account, the fault lies with the increasing polarization of our political parties. That standard story, however, ignores an important culprit: Concentrated wealth and its organization to achieve political ends. The only way to understand our current constitutional predicament—and to rectify it—is to pay more attention to the role that organized wealth plays in our system of checks and balances. This Article shows that the increasing concentration of wealth and political …

The Challenges Of Fitting Principled Modern Government – A Unified Public Law – To An Eighteenth Century Constitution, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

The papers presented at a fall 2016 conference at Cambridge University, The Unity of Public Law?, generally addressed issues of judicial review in the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, often from a comparative perspective and the view that unifying impulses in “public law” arose from the common law. Accepting what Justice Harlan Fisk Stone once characterized as the ideal of “a unified system of judge-made and statute law woven into a seamless whole by [judges],” The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harvard L Rev 4 (1936), this paper considers a variety of issues that have complicated maintaining …

Constitutional Bad Faith, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

The concepts of good faith and bad faith play a central role in many areas of private law and international law. Typically associated with honesty, loyalty, and fair dealing, good faith is said to supply the fundamental principle of every legal system, if not the foundation of all law. With limited exceptions, however, good faith and bad faith go unmentioned in constitutional cases brought by or against government institutions. This doctrinal deficit is especially striking given that the U.S. Constitution twice refers to faithfulness and that insinuations of bad faith pervade constitutional discourse.

This Article investigates these points and their …

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act And The Separation Of Powers, Scott A. Boykin

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

Plenary Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power, Michael Kagan

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

For decades, scholars of immigration law have anticipated the demise of the plenary power doctrine. The Supreme Court could have accomplished this in its recent decision in Kerry v. Din, or it could have reaffirmed plenary power. Instead, the Court produced a splintered decision that did neither. This Essay examines the long process of attrition that has significantly gutted the traditional plenary power doctrine with regard to procedural due process, while leaving it largely intact with regard to substantive constitutional rights.

Three Variations Of The Supreme Court's Legal Mind, Albert Lebowitz

Akron Law Review

With their independence, the Justices emerged, not, as Madison imagined them, a unified definition of reason but with diverging strains of legal mindedness that, as they almost inevitably clashed with each other, developed that added strength which emerges from dialectic. Madison's vision may have been too simple.

Constitutional theory is heavily concentrated in the area of judicial review, and the three issues raised in Marbury v. Madison are still subjects of heated debate and controversy. It is remarkable how topical this opinion remains.

Can The Eu Be A Constitutional System Without Universal Access To Judical Review, Brian Libgober

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Comment engages with a central dilemma about the legal order of the European Union: is the EU a constitutional system, a treaty system, or a hybrid system for which we must develop a new conceptual vocabulary? Besides intrinsic interest, resolving this categorization problem is important for deciding a number of issues in European Union law. For example, are legal strategies that are normally available to parties in international law viable in the European legal order? Should Community law be supreme over national law? If so, what limits should be placed on that supremacy, and “who should have the ultimate …

Agency Adjudication And Judicial Nondelegation: An Article Iii Canon, Mila Sohoni

Northwestern University Law Review

The rules governing judicial review of adjudication by federal agencies are insensitive to a critical separation of powers principle. Article III jurisprudence requires different treatment of agency adjudication depending on whether the agency is adjudicating a “private right” or a “public right.” When agencies adjudicate private rights, review of the agency adjudication must be available to an Article III court on a direct appellate basis. In contrast, Article III jurisprudence does not require review to an Article III court on a direct appellate basis of agency adjudications of purely public rights. That means that federal courts reviewing agency adjudications of …

Constitutionalism Outside The Courts, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

This essay is a chapter to be included in the forthcoming Oxford Handbook on the U.S. Constitution. Using the actions of Arkansas Governor Orville Faubus during the Little Rock crisis of 1957 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Cooper v. Aaron as a lens, it explores constitutional interpretation and enforcement by extrajudicial institutions. I explore the critique of Cooper’s notion of judicial supremacy by departmentalists like Walter Murphy, empirical scholars skeptical of judicial efficacy like Gerald Rosenberg, and popular constitutionalists like Larry Kramer and Mark Tushnet. I also consider four distinct institutional forms of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation and …

Plenary Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, Michael Kagan

Scholarly Works

For decades, scholars of immigration law have anticipated the demise of the plenary power doctrine. The Supreme Court could have accomplished this in its recent decision in Kerry v. Din, or it could have re-affirmed plenary power. Instead, the Court produced a splintered decision that did neither. This essay examines the long process of attrition that has significantly gutted the traditional plenary power doctrine with regard to procedural due process, while leaving it largely intact with regard to substantive constitutional rights.

Agora: Reflections On Zivotofsky V. Kerry : Historical Gloss, The Recognition Power, And Judicial Review, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Introduction To Agora: Reflections On Zivotofsky V. Kerry, Curtis A. Bradley, Carlos M. Vazquez

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Separations Of Wealth: Inequality And The Erosion Of Checks And Balances, Kate Andrias

Faculty Scholarship

American government is dysfunctional: Gridlock, filibusters, and expanding presidential power, everyone seems to agree, threaten our basic system of constitutional governance. Who, or what, is to blame? In the standard account, the fault lies with the increasing polarization of our political parties. That standard story, however, ignores an important culprit: Concentrated wealth and its organization to achieve political ends. The only way to understand our current constitutional predicament – and to rectify it – is to pay more attention to the role that organized wealth plays in our system of checks and balances.

This Article shows that the increasing concentration …

What's A Lower Court To Do? Limiting Lawrence V. Texas And The Right To Sexual Autonomy, John Tuskey

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Constitution Making In The Countries Of Former Soviet Dominance: Current Development, Rett R. Ludwikowski

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Judicial Review And Non-Enforcement At The Founding, Matthew J. Steilen

Journal Articles

This Article examines the relationship between judicial review and presidential non-enforcement of statutory law. Defenders of non-enforcement regularly argue that the justification for judicial review that prevailed at the time of the founding also justifies the president in declining to enforce unconstitutional laws. The argument is unsound. This Article shows that there is essentially no historical evidence, from ratification through the first decade under the Constitution, in support of a non-enforcement power. It also shows that the framers repeatedly made statements inconsistent with the supposition that the president could refuse to enforce laws he deemed unconstitutional. In contrast, during this …

Substantive Habeas, Kimberly A. Thomas

Articles

Substantive Habeas identifies the US. Supreme Court's recent shift in its habeas jurisprudence from procedure to the substance of habeas review and explores the implications of this change. For decades, the US. Supreme Court has attempted to control the flood of habeas corpus petitions by imposing procedural requirements on prisoners seeking to challenge constitutional error in their cases. These restrictive procedural rules have remained at the center of habeas decision making until recently. Over the past few years, instead of further constraining the procedural gateway for habeas cases, the Supreme Court has shifted its focus to the substance of habeas. …

Democracy-Assisting Judicial Review And The Challenge Of Partisan Polarization, Terri Peretti

Utah Law Review

This Article recommends abandoning the democracy-assisting idea and instead exploring ways to prevent the Court from being enlisted in extreme and unrepresentative causes. Reform ideas should focus on increasing and regularizing turnover on the Court and encouraging the selection of more representative Justices, an outcome made more likely by increasing the representativeness of the elected officials who choose the Justices. Absent a crisis, of course, it is highly unlikely that any such reforms will be adopted. Nonetheless, it is a worthwhile exercise to think about how to enhance representational and consensus-building processes in the presence of growing partisan polarization. And …