Constitutional Law Commons^™

Considerations Of History And Purpose In Constitutional Borrowing, Robert Tsai

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

This essay is part of a symposium issue dedicated to "Constitutional Rights: Intersections, Synergies, and Conflicts" at William and Mary School of Law. I make four points. First, perfect harmony among rights might not always be normatively desirable. In fact, in some instances, such as when First Amendment and Second Amendment rights clash, we might wish to have expressive rights consistently trump gun rights. Second, we can't resolve clashes between rights in the abstract but instead must consult history in a broadly relevant rather than a narrowly "originalist" fashion. When we do so, we learn that armed expression and white …

Still In Exile? The Current Status Of The Contract Clause, James W. Ely

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The Contract Clause is no longer the subject of much judicial solicitude or academic interest.' Since the 1930s the once potent Contract Clause has been largely relegated to the outer reaches of constitutional law.2 This, of course, was not always the case. On the contrary, throughout the nineteenth century the Contract Clause was one of the most litigated provisions of the Constitution. In 1896, Justice George Shiras astutely commented: "No provision of the constitution of the United States has received more frequent consideration by this court than that which provides that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation …

A Constitution For The Age Of Demagogues: Using The Twenty-Fifth Amendment To Remove An Unfit President, Paul F. Campos

Publications

This Article argues that, properly understood, the 25th Amendment is designed to allow the executive and legislative branches, working together, to remove a president from office when it becomes evident that the person elevated to that office by the electoral process is manifestly unsuited for what can, without exaggeration, be described as the most important job in the world.

It argues further that the first two years of Donald Trump’s presidency have provided a great deal of evidence for the proposition that President Trump has in fact demonstrated the requisite level of fundamental unfitness for the office that would justify …

Fourth Amendment Gloss, Aziz Z. Huq

Northwestern University Law Review

Conventional wisdom suggests that a constitutional right should be defined so as to effectively constrain government actors. A right defined in terms of what state actors routinely do would seem to impose in practice an ineffectual brake on much intrusive state action—and so seems pointless. Nevertheless, in defining Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court frequently draws on the practice of contemporaneous government actors to define the constitutional floor for police action. The actions of the regulated thus define the content of regulation. This Article isolates and analyzes this seemingly paradoxical judicial practice, which it labels “Fourth Amendment gloss,” by analogy …

Dartmouth College V. Woodward And The Structure Of Civil Society, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Grounding Originalism, William Baude, Stephen E. Sachs

Faculty Scholarship

How should we interpret the Constitution? The “positive turn” in legal scholarship treats constitutional interpretation, like the interpretation of statutes or contracts, as governed by legal rules grounded in actual practice. In our legal system, that practice requires a certain form of originalism: our system’s official story is that we follow the law of the Founding, plus all lawful changes made since.

Or so we’ve argued. Yet this answer produces its own set of questions. How can practice solve our problems, when there are so many theories of law, each giving practice a different role? Why look to an official …

Evaluating Constitutional Hardball: Two Fallacies And A Research Agenda, Joseph Fishkin, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

This Reply addresses the responses by Professors David Bernstein and Jed Shugerman to our essay Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball. Bernstein's response, we argue, commits the common fallacy of equating reciprocity with symmetry: assuming that because constitutional hardball often "takes two" to play, both sides must be playing it in a similar manner. Shugerman's response, on the other hand, helps combat the common fallacy of equating aggressiveness with wrongfulness: assuming that because all acts of constitutional hardball strain norms of governance, all are similarly damaging to democracy. We suggest that whereas Bernstein's approach would set back the burgeoning effort to study constitutional …

Getting Past The Imperial Presidency, Deborah Pearlstein

Articles

In an age in which the “imperial presidency” seems to have reached its apex, perhaps most alarmingly surrounding the use of military force, conventional wisdom remains fixed that constitutional and international law play a negligible role in constraining executive branch decision-making in this realm. Yet as this Article explains, the factual case that supports the conventional view, based largely on highly selected incidents of presidential behavior, is meaningless in any standard empirical sense. Indeed, the canonical listing of presidential decisions to use force without prior authorization feeds a compliance-centered focus on the study of legal constraint rooted in long-since abandoned …

Revisionist History? Responding To Gun Violence Under Historical Limitations, Michael Ulrich

Faculty Scholarship

In the D.C. Circuit case Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), Judge Kavanaugh wrote that “Heller and McDonald leave little doubt that courts are to assess gun bans and regulations based on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny.” Now Justice Kavanaugh, will he find support on the highest court for what was then a dissenting view? Chief Justice Roberts, during oral arguments for Heller I, asked “Isn’t it enough to…look at the various regulations that were available at the time…and determine how these—how this restriction and the scope of this …

A Computational Analysis Of Constitutional Polarization, David E. Pozen, Eric L. Talley, Julian Nyarko

Faculty Scholarship

This Article is the first to use computational methods to investigate the ideological and partisan structure of constitutional discourse outside the courts. We apply a range of machine-learning and text-analysis techniques to a newly available data set comprising all remarks made on the U.S. House and Senate floors from 1873 to 2016, as well as a collection of more recent newspaper editorials. Among other findings, we demonstrate (1) that constitutional discourse has grown increasingly polarized over the past four decades; (2) that polarization has grown faster in constitutional discourse than in nonconstitutional discourse; (3) that conservative-leaning speakers have driven this …

Manufactured Emergencies, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

Emergencies are presumed to be unusual affairs, but the United States has been in one state of emergency or another for the last forty years. That is a problem. The erosion of democratic norms has led to not simply the collapse of the traditional conceptual boundary between ordinary rule and emergency governance, but also the emergence of an even graver problem: the manufactured crisis. In an age characterized by extreme partisanship, institutional gridlock, and technological manipulation of information, it has become exceedingly easy and far more tempting for a President to invoke extraordinary power by ginning up exigencies. To reduce …

Autonomy Isn't Everything: Some Cautionary Notes On Mccoy V. Louisiana, W. Bradley Wendel

St. Mary's Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics

The Supreme Court’s May 2018 decision in McCoy v. Louisiana has been hailed as a decisive statement of the priority of the value of a criminal defendant’s autonomy over the fairness and reliability interests that also inform both the Sixth Amendment and the ethical obligations of defense counsel. It also appears to be a victory for the vision of client-centered representation and the humanistic value of the inherent dignity of the accused. However, the decision is susceptible to being read too broadly in ways that harm certain categories of defendants. This paper offers a couple of cautionary notes, in response …

The Depravity Of The 1930s And The Modern Administrative State, Steven G. Calabresi, Gary Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Gillian Metzger’s 2017 Harvard Law Review foreword, entitled 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, is a paean to the modern administrative state, with its massive subdelegations of legislative and judicial power to so-called “expert” bureaucrats, who are layered well out of reach of electoral accountability yet do not have the constitutional status of Article III judges. We disagree with this celebration of technocratic government on just about every level, but this Article focuses on two relatively narrow points.

First, responding more to implicit assumptions that pervade modern discourse than specifically to Professor Metzger’s analysis, we challenge the normally unchallenged …

Lockett Symposium: Recollections On The Lockett Case In The U.S. Supreme Court, Joel Berger

ConLawNOW

Recollections of an NAACP Legal Defense Fund attorney who worked with Professor Amsterdam on the Lockett case.

Lockett Symposium: Is The Supreme Court's Command On Mitigating Circumstances A Spoonful Of Sugar With A Poison Pill For The Death Penalty?, Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier

ConLawNOW

This Article addresses how Lockett v. Ohio and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on mitigating factors in capital cases established a more humane death penalty while at the same time undermining the death penalty system. The Court’s emphasis on the constitutional importance of individualized sentencing has, in effect, helped return the U.S. death penalty system to an unconstitutional arbitrary and discriminatory system.

After the U.S. Supreme Court effectively struck down the existing death penalty statutes in 1972, state legislatures responded with new statutes designed to try to make a fairer and less arbitrary death penalty. When the Supreme Court reviewed these …

The Stored Communications Act: Property Law Enforcement Tool Or Instrument Of Oppression?, Raymond Boyce

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

Reassessing The Constitutional Foundation Of Delegated Legislation In Canada, Lorne Neudorf

Dalhousie Law Journal

This article assesses the constitutionalfoundation by which Parliament lends its lawmaking powers to the executive, which rests upon a century-old precedent established by the Supreme Court of Canada in a constitutional challenge to wartime legislation. While the case law demonstrates that courts have continued to follow this earlyprecedent to allow theparliamentary delegation of sweeping lawmaking powers to the executive, it is time for courts to reassess the constitutionality ofdelegation in light ofCanada's status as a liberal democracy embedded within a system of constitutional supremacy. Under the Constitution of Canada, Parliament is placed firmly at the centre ofpublic policymaking by being …

Special Justifications, Randy J. Kozel

Journal Articles

The Supreme Court commonly asks whether there is a “special justification” for departing from precedent. In this Response, which is part of a Constitutional Commentary symposium on Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent, I examine the existing law of special justifications and describe its areas of uncertainty. I also compare the Court’s current doctrine with a revised approach to special justifications designed to separate the question of overruling from deeper disagreements about legal interpretation. The aspiration is to establish precedent as a unifying force that enhances the impersonality of the Court and of the law, promoting values the Justices …

Ericsson, Inc. V. Regents Of The University Of Minnesota And A New Frontier For The Waiver By Litigation Conduct Doctrine, Jason Kornmehl

Pepperdine Law Review

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity is one of the most confusing areas of constitutional law. The waiver by litigation conduct doctrine represents a particularly complex aspect of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Courts, for example, have not precisely defined the extent to which waiver in a prior proceeding might extend to a future one. The Patent Trial and Appeals Board recently considered this issue in a novel context. In Ericsson, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, the Patent Trial and Appeals Board applied the waiver by litigation conduct doctrine in an inter partes review proceeding. Combining the Eleventh Amendment, non-Article III …

The Meaning Of Wrongdoing - A Crime Of Disrespecting The Flag: Grounds For Preserving National Unity, Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad

San Diego International Law Journal

To conclude on this issue, the rights of others, as individuals and as a whole, are formulated as the social protected interest that criminal law seeks to protect through criminal means, and it is with these rights that criminal law theory should be concerned in the first level of scrutiny. However, in the second level of scrutiny, an additional set of rights are brought into play; these are the rights of the individual, namely the actor, to exercise their constitutional rights e.g., free speech, liberty, free exercise of religion. The second level of scrutiny requires balancing those rights with the …

The Death Of Judicial Independence In Turkey: A Lesson For Others, Edwin L. Felter Jr., Oyku Didem Aydin

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Administrative Constitutionalism And The Unity Of Public Law, Matthew Lewans

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

Public law scholarship in the common law tradition often aims at elucidating a connection between law and constitutional values like equality, due process, and the rule of law. However, in their quest to reveal the morality of public law, common lawyers often focus their attention on judicial interpretations of constitutional values to the exclusion of other sources of constitutional jurisprudence. The author argues that the traditional fascination with courts as the primary or exclusive arbiters of constitutional values should be tempered and supplemented by recognizing the valuable contributions of administrative officials who interpret and enforce constitutional norms when exercising statutorily …

Section 5'S Forgotten Years: Congressional Power To Enforce The Fourteenth Amendment Before Katzenbach V. Morgan, Christopher W. Schmidt

Northwestern University Law Review

Few decisions in American constitutional law have frustrated, inspired, and puzzled more than Katzenbach v. Morgan. Justice Brennan’s 1966 opinion put forth the seemingly radical claim that Congress—through its power, based in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to “enforce, by appropriate legislation,” the rights enumerated in that Amendment—shared responsibility with the Court to define the meaning of Fourteenth Amendment rights. Although it spawned a cottage industry of scholarship, this claim has never been fully embraced by a subsequent Supreme Court majority, and in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court rejected the heart of the Morgan …

Abortion Rights And The Kavanaugh Nomination, John M. Greabe

Law Faculty Scholarship

[Excerpt] "Last week, President Trump nominated federal appeals court judge Brett Kavanaugh to fill the Supreme Court seat opened by the retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy. Immediately, coverage of the nomination focused on abortion and whether Judge Kavanaugh's confirmation would spell the end of the constitutional right recognized in Roe v. Wade. Let's explore why."

The Takings Keepings Clause: An Analysis Of Framing Effects From Labelling Constitutional Rights, Donald J. Kochan

Florida State University Law Review

Did you know that the "Takings Clause" was not called the "Takings Clause" by any court before 1955? That was the first time that any court of any jurisdiction referred to the provisions regarding takings of private property in either the federal or state constitutions under the label "Takings Clause." Did you know that justices of the U.S. Supreme Court did not use the moniker "Takings Clause" in any opinion before 1978? Given this history, the phrase "Takings Clause," whether an apt descriptor or not, certainly cannot be justified as the dominant way to refer to these provisions by contemporaneous …

Unusual: The Death Penalty For Inadvertent Killing, Brenner M. Fissell, Guyora Binder, Robert Weisberg

Faculty Publications

Can a burglar who frightens the occupant of a house, causing a fatal heart attack, be executed? More generally, does the Eighth Amendment permit capital punishment of one who causes death inadvertently? This scenario is possible in the significant minority of American jurisdictions that permit capital punishment for felony murder without requiring a mental state of intent to kill or reckless indifference to human life. Thus far, Eighth Amendment death penalty jurisprudence has required a culpable mental state of recklessness for execution of accomplices in a fatal felony, but has not yet addressed the culpability required for execution of the …

Equal Protection Under The Carceral State, Aya Gruber

Northwestern University Law Review

McCleskey v. Kemp, the case that upheld the death penalty despite undeniable evidence of its racially disparate impact, is indelibly marked by Justice William Brennan’s phrase, “a fear of too much justice.” The popular interpretation of this phrase is that the Supreme Court harbored what I call a “disparity-claim fear,” dreading a future docket of racial discrimination claims and erecting an impossibly high bar for proving an equal protection violation. A related interpretation is that the majority had a “color-consciousness fear” of remedying discrimination through race-remedial policies. In contrast to these conventional views, I argue that the primary anxiety …

Constitutional Shapeshifting: Giving The Fourth Amendment Substance In The Technology Driven World Of Criminal Investigation, Gerald S. Reamey

Faculty Articles

For the first hundred years of the Fourth Amendment's life, gains in the technology of surveillance were modest. With the advent of miniaturization and ever-increasing sophistication and capability of surveillance and detection devices, the Supreme Court has struggled to adapt its understanding of "search" to the constantly evolving devices and methods that challenge contemporary understanding of privacy. In response to surveillance innovations, the Court has taken varying positions, focusing first on property-based intrusions by government, then shifting to privacy expectations, and, more recently, resurrecting the view that a trespass to property can define search.

This article surveys this constitutional odyssey, …

Diversity Entitlement: Does Diversity-Benefits Ideology Undermine Inclusion?, Kyneshawau Hurd, Victoria C. Plaut

Northwestern University Law Review

Ideologies are most successful (or most dangerous) when they become common-sense—when they become widely accepted, taken-for-granted truths—because these truths subsequently provide implicit guidelines and expectations about what is moral, legitimate, and necessary in our society. In Regents of University of California v. Bakke, the Court, without a majority opinion, considered and dismissed all but one of several “common-sense” rationales for affirmative action in admissions. While eschewing rationales that focused on addressing discrimination and underrepresentation, the Court found that allowing all students to obtain the educational benefits that flow from diversity was a compelling rationale—essential, even, for a quality education. …

Judicial Engagement, New Originalism, And The Fortieth Anniversary Of Government By Judiciary, Eric J. Segall

Fordham Law Review Online

Part I briefly summarizes Berger’s originalist approach. Part II describes how the new Judicial Engagement originalists suggest judges should resolve constitutional cases. Part III explains why text and history do not support their judicially enforceable, libertarian political agendas. Part III does not suggest that this agenda leads to bad results, is harmful, or should not be adopted by today’s judges. But for the sake of governmental and academic transparency, judges, legal scholars, and politicians who embrace Judicial Engagement, should also accept that their theory of judicial review is not supported by either the Constitution’s text or history. Judicial Engagement can …