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Articles 121 - 150 of 423
Full-Text Articles in Constitutional Law
Why Enumeration Matters, Richard A. Primus
Why Enumeration Matters, Richard A. Primus
Michigan Law Review
The maxim that the federal government is a government of enumerated powers can be understood as a “continuity tender”: not a principle with practical consequences for governance, but a ritual statement with which practitioners identify themselves with a history from which they descend. This interpretation makes sense of the longstanding paradox whereby courts recite the enumeration principle but give it virtually no practical effect. On this understanding, the enumerated-powers maxim is analogous to the clause that Parliament still uses to open enacted statutes: “Be it enacted by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty.” That text might imply that the Queen is …
Congress And The Reconstruction Of Foreign Affairs Federalism, Ryan Baasch, Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash
Congress And The Reconstruction Of Foreign Affairs Federalism, Ryan Baasch, Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash
Michigan Law Review
Though the Constitution conspicuously bars some state involvement in foreign affairs, the states clearly retain some authority in foreign affairs. Correctly supposing that state participation may unnecessarily complicate or embarrass our nation’s foreign relations, the Supreme Court has embraced aggressive preemption doctrines that sporadically oust the states from discrete areas in foreign affairs. These doctrines are unprincipled, supply little guidance, and generate capricious results. Fortunately, there is a better way. While the Constitution permits the states a limited and continuing role, it never goes so far as guaranteeing them any foreign affairs authority. Furthermore, the Constitution authorizes Congress to enact …
Agenda-Setting In The Regulatory State: Theory And Evidence, Cary Coglianese, Daniel E. Walters
Agenda-Setting In The Regulatory State: Theory And Evidence, Cary Coglianese, Daniel E. Walters
Faculty Scholarship
Government officials who run administrative agencies must make countless decisions every day about what issues and work to prioritize. These agenda-setting decisions hold enormous implications for the shape of law and public policy, but they have received remarkably little attention by either administrative law scholars or social scientists who study the bureaucracy. Existing research offers few insights about the institutions, norms, and inputs that shape and constrain agency discretion over their agendas or about the strategies that officials employ in choosing to elevate certain issues while putting others on the back burner. In this article, we advance the study of …
Taking Care Of Federal Law, Leah Litman
Taking Care Of Federal Law, Leah Litman
Articles
Article II of the Constitution vests the “executive power” in the President and directs the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” But do these provisions mean that only the President may execute federal law? Two lines of Supreme Court precedent suggest conflicting answers to that question. In several prominent separation-of-powers cases, the Court has suggested that only the President may execute federal law: “The Constitution requires that a President chosen by the entire Nation oversee the execution of the laws.” Therefore, the Court has reasoned, Congress may not create private rights of action that allow nonexecutive …
James Madison And The Constitution's "Convention For Proposing Amendments", Robert G. Natelson
James Madison And The Constitution's "Convention For Proposing Amendments", Robert G. Natelson
Akron Law Review
The last of the limited-subject interstate gatherings is today the most famous. The Annapolis Convention of 1786 was to focus on “the trade and Commerce of the United States.” Its limited scope induced Madison, who served as a delegate, explicitly to distinguish it from a plenipotentiary convention. For the most part, all of these conventions—today we might call them “task forces”—remained within the scope of their calls. If there was an exception, it was the abortive assembly at Annapolis, and that exception was solely to express the “wish” and “opinion” that another convention be held to consider defects in the …
The Sweeping Domestic War Powers Of Congress, Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash
The Sweeping Domestic War Powers Of Congress, Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash
Michigan Law Review
With the Habeas Clause standing as a curious exception, the Constitution seems mysteriously mute regarding federal authority during invasions and rebellions. In truth, the Constitution speaks volumes about these domestic wars. The inability to perceive the contours of the domestic wartime Constitution stems, in part, from unfamiliarity with the multifarious emergency legislation enacted during the Revolutionary War. During that war, state and national legislatures authorized the seizure of property, military trial of civilians, and temporary dictatorships. Ratified against the backdrop of these fairly recent wartime measures, the Constitution, via the Necessary and Proper Clause and other provisions, rather clearly augmented …
Auxiliary Protections: Why The Founders’ Bicameral Congress Depended On Senators Elected By State Legislatures, Vince Eisinger
Auxiliary Protections: Why The Founders’ Bicameral Congress Depended On Senators Elected By State Legislatures, Vince Eisinger
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Problem Of Presidential Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve It?, John D. Feerick
The Problem Of Presidential Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve It?, John D. Feerick
Fordham Law Review
One of the most critical and intriguing constitutional questions ever presented for solution is: What happens when the President of the United States becomes incapable of discharging the powers and duties of his office? Does the Vice-President "become President" for the remainder of the term or does he merely "act as President" during the period of the inability? The Constitution is not explicit..
Setting Congress Up To Fail, Margaret B. Kwoka
Setting Congress Up To Fail, Margaret B. Kwoka
Journal of Race, Gender, and Ethnicity
No abstract provided.
Party Polarization And Congressional Committee Consideration Of Constitutional Questions, Neal Devins
Party Polarization And Congressional Committee Consideration Of Constitutional Questions, Neal Devins
Northwestern University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Congressional Arbitrage At The Executive's Expense: The Speech Or Debate Clause And The Unenforceable Stock Act, Anna Fodor
Northwestern University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Enforcing The Fifteenth Amendment, Ellen D. Katz
Enforcing The Fifteenth Amendment, Ellen D. Katz
Book Chapters
This chapter examines efforts to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment in the period from United States v. Reese through Shelby County v. Holder. Reese and Shelby County expose the most rigorous stance the Court has employed to review congressional efforts to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, while the years in-between show Congress and the Court working more in tandem, at times displaying remarkable indifference to blatant violations of the Fifteenth Amendment, and elsewhere working cooperatively to help vindicate the Amendment’s promise. Defying simple explanation, this vacillation between cooperation and resistance captures the complex and deeply consequential way concerns about federal power, …
A Quantum Congress, Jorge R. Roig
A Quantum Congress, Jorge R. Roig
Scholarly Works
This article tries to address the problem of a corrupt and broken electoral system that has been captured by special interests through big money spending in political campaigns, while at the same time preserving the spirit of the Free Speech Clause of our Constitution. In doing so, this article first reviews and summarizes the different alternatives proposed as potential fixes for the campaign finance problem. It then explains why none of the proposed alternatives can accomplish the dual goals set out above. Finally, the article briefly sketches a proposal for a fundamental reworking of our representative democracy by substituting legislative …
A Functional Theory Of Congressional Standing, Jonathan Remy Nash
A Functional Theory Of Congressional Standing, Jonathan Remy Nash
Michigan Law Review
The Supreme Court has offered scarce and inconsistent guidance on congressional standing—that is, when houses of Congress or members of Congress have Article III standing. The Court’s most recent foray into congressional standing has prompted lower courts to infuse analysis with separation-ofpowers concerns in order to erect a high standard for congressional standing. It has also invited the Department of Justice to argue that Congress lacks standing to enforce subpoenas against executive branch actors. Injury to congressional litigants should be defined by reference to Congress’s constitutional functions. Those functions include gathering relevant information, casting votes, and (even when no vote …
The Limits Of Enumeration, Richard A. Primus
The Limits Of Enumeration, Richard A. Primus
Articles
According to a well-known principle of constitutional interpretation here identified as the “internal-limits canon,” the powers of Congress must always be construed as authorizing less legislation than a general police power would. This Article argues that the internallimits canon is unsound. Whether the powers of Congress would in practice authorize any legislation that a police power would authorize is a matter of contingency: it depends on the relationship between the powers and the social world at a given time. There is no reason why, at a given time, the powers cannot turn out to authorize any legislation that a police …
Passing The Torch But Sailing Too Close To The Wind: Congress’S Role In Authorizing Administrative Branches To Promulgate Regulations That Contemplate Criminal Sanctions, Reem Sadik
Legislation and Policy Brief
The Supreme Court has stated that Congress must simply “lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle” to which the agency must conform. If this is done, a court will find the delegation of broad authority to the agency to be constitutional. There is, however, an open issue regarding whether the “intelligible principle” standard applies to delegations of authority that allow for the promulgation of both civil and criminal penalties. In Touby v. United States, the Supreme Court was asked whether “something more than an ‘intelligible principle’ is required” when Congress authorizes an agency to issue regulations that contemplate …
Congress's (Less) Limited Power To Represent Itself In Court: A Comment On Grove And Devins, Jack M. Beermann
Congress's (Less) Limited Power To Represent Itself In Court: A Comment On Grove And Devins, Jack M. Beermann
Faculty Scholarship
In their recent article, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 571 (2014) Tara Leigh Grove and Neal Devins make the case against congressional litigation in defense of the constitutionality of federal statutes. They conclude that Congress, or a single House of Congress, may not defend the constitutionality of federal statutes in court even when the Executive Branch has decided not to do so but may litigate only in furtherance of Congress’s investigatory and disciplinary powers. Grove and Devins claim that congressional litigation in support of the constitutionality of federal statutes violates two separate but …
Managing Political Polarization In Congress: A Case Study On The Use Of The Hastert Rule, Holly Fechner
Managing Political Polarization In Congress: A Case Study On The Use Of The Hastert Rule, Holly Fechner
Utah Law Review
This Article discusses the ideological polarization of Congress and of the Republican Party in particular. The rise of the Tea Party widened the ideological spectrum of members of the Republican caucus in Congress, especially in the House. To retain his leadership position and balance the competing factions in his caucus, Speaker Boehner routinely used a political and procedural tool known as the Hastert Rule.9 The Hastert Rule provides that the Speaker of the House will not schedule a bill for a floor vote unless a “majority of the majority” favors the legislation.
Holding The President Accountable To Constitutional Limits, Louis Fisher
Holding The President Accountable To Constitutional Limits, Louis Fisher
Utah Law Review
As with Congress and the judiciary, presidents have access to powers expressly stated in the Constitution and those necessarily implied in those grants. In highly limited circumstances, presidents may also exercise a “prerogative” (i.e., unilateral action), but that authority is frequently misunderstood and subject to abuse. Unlike those in the other branches, presidents lay claim to a host of powers far beyond enumerated and implied powers. In seizing steel mills in 1952 to prosecute the war in Korea, President Harry Truman acted on what he called an “inherent” power that was not subject to judicial or legislative checks. Presidents Richard …
Executive Power In The Obama Administration And The Decision To Seek Congressional Authorization For A Military Attack Against Syria: Implications For Theories Of Unilateral Action, Kenneth R. Mayer
Utah Law Review
The primary axiom of the unilateral-powers literature is that the institutional setting and political incentives that confront presidents push them to seek maximum discretion over policy. The straightforward implication is that presidents will seek control (Terry Moe calls it autonomy)—always contentious given the competitive political authority at the heart of separation of powers, but necessary to them given their interests and position in the political system. Empirically, presidents are expected to (and do) act unilaterally, moving first to put their stamp on policy and process, shape institutional structures, and alter the status quo to shift government outputs toward their preferred …
The Bond Court's Institutional Truce, Monica Hakimi
The Bond Court's Institutional Truce, Monica Hakimi
Articles
As many readers are aware, Bond v. United States is a quirky case. The federal government prosecuted under the implementing legislation for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) a betrayed wife who used chemical agents to try to harm her husband’s lover. The wife argued that, as applied to her, the implementing legislation violated the Tenth Amendment. She thus raised difficult questions about the scope of the treaty power and of Congress’s authority to implement treaties through the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Bond Court avoided those questions with a clear statement rule: “we can insist on a clear indication that …
A Pragmatic Republic, If You Can Keep It, William R. Sherman
A Pragmatic Republic, If You Can Keep It, William R. Sherman
Michigan Law Review
These things we know to be true: Our modern administrative state is a leviathan unimaginable by the Founders. It stands on thin constitutional ice, on cracks between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. It burdens and entangles state and local governments in schemes that threaten federalism. And it presents an irresolvable dilemma regarding democratic accountability and political independence. We know these things to be true because these precepts animate some of the most significant cases and public law scholarship of our time. Underlying our examination of administrative agencies is an assumption that the problems they present would have been bizarre …
Federalism And Phantom Economic Rights In Nfib V. Sibelius, Matthew Lindsay
Federalism And Phantom Economic Rights In Nfib V. Sibelius, Matthew Lindsay
All Faculty Scholarship
Few predicted that the constitutional fate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act would turn on Congress’ power to lay and collect taxes. Yet in NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court upheld the centerpiece of the Act — the minimum coverage provision (MCP), commonly known as the “individual mandate” — as a tax. The unexpected basis of the Court’s holding has deflected attention from what may prove to be the decision’s more constitutionally consequential feature: that a majority of the Court agreed that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to penalize people who decline to purchase health insurance. …
The Filibuster And The Framing: Why The Cloture Rule Is Unconstitutional And What To Do About It, Dan T. Coenen
The Filibuster And The Framing: Why The Cloture Rule Is Unconstitutional And What To Do About It, Dan T. Coenen
Scholarly Works
The U.S. Senate’s handling of filibusters has changed dramatically in recent decades. As a result, the current sixty-vote requirement for invoking cloture of debate does not produce protracted speechmaking on the Senate floor, as did predecessors of this rule in earlier periods of our history. Rather, the upper chamber now functions under a “stealth filibuster” system that in practical effect requires action by a supermajority to pass proposed bills. This Article demonstrates why this system offends a constitutional mandate of legislative majoritarianism in light of well-established Framing-era understandings and governing substance-over-form principles of interpretation. Having established the presence of a …
The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley
The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley
Articles
The presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action is a cornerstone of administrative law, accepted by courts and commentators alike as both legally appropriate and obviously desirable. Yet the presumption is puzzling. As with any canon of statutory construction that serves a substantive end, it should find a source in history, positive law, the Constitution, or sound policy considerations. None of these, however, offers a plausible justification for the presumption. As for history, the sort of judicial review that the presumption favors - appellate-style arbitrariness review - was not only unheard of prior to the twentieth century, but …
Enacted Legislative Findings And The Deference Problem, Daniel A. Crane
Enacted Legislative Findings And The Deference Problem, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
The constitutionality of federal legislation sometimes turns on the presence and sufficiency of congressional findings of predicate facts, such as the effects of conduct on interstate commerce, state discrimination justifying the abrogation of sovereign immunity, or market failures justifying intrusions on free speech. Sometimes a congressional committee makes these findings in legislative history. Other times, Congress recites its findings in a statutory preamble, thus enacting its findings as law. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has not distinguished between enacted and unenacted findings in deciding how much deference to accord congressional findings. This is striking because the difference between enactedness and unenactedness …
The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley
The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley
Articles
The presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action is a cornerstone of administrative law, accepted by courts and commentators alike as both legally appropriate and obviously desirable. Yet the presumption is puzzling. As with any canon of statutory construction that serves a substantive end, it should find a source in history, positive law, the Constitution, or sound policy considerations. None of these, however, offers a plausible justification for the presumption. As for history, the sort of judicial review that the presumption favors - appellate-style arbitrariness review - was not only unheard of prior to the twentieth century, but …
Reviving Legislative Generality, Evan C. Zoldan
Reviving Legislative Generality, Evan C. Zoldan
Marquette Law Review
The Supreme Court does not recognize a constitutional principle disfavoring special legislation, that is, legislation that singles out identifiable individuals for benefits or harms that are not applied to the rest of the population. As a result, both Congress and state legislatures routinely enact special legislation despite the fact that it has been linked to a variety of social harms, including corruption and the exacerbation of social inequality. But the Court’s weak protections against special legislation, and the resulting harms, are not inevitable. Instead, special legislation can be limited by what may be called a value of legislative generality, that …
Overrides: The Super-Study, Victoria Nourse
Overrides: The Super-Study, Victoria Nourse
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Overrides should be of interest to a far larger group of scholars than statutory interpretation enthusiasts. We have, in overrides, open inter branch encounters between Congress and the Courts far more typically found in the shadows of everyday Washington politics. Interestingly, Christiansen and Eskridge posit the court-congress relationship as more triadic than dyadic given the role played by agencies. One of their more interesting conclusions is that agencie are the big winners in the override game: agencies were present in seventy percent of the override cases and the agency view prevailed with Congress and against the Supreme Court in three-quarters …
The President And Congress: Separation Of Powers In The United States Of America, Harold H. Bruff
The President And Congress: Separation Of Powers In The United States Of America, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
Although the framers of the Australian Constitution adopted many features of the United States Constitution, they rejected the separation of legislative and executive power in favour of responsible government in a parliamentary system like that of the United Kingdom. In doing so, Australians depended on existing conventions about the nature of responsible government instead of specification of its attributes in constitutional text. The United States Constitution contains detailed provisions about separation of powers, but unwritten conventions have produced some central features of American government. This article reviews conventions developed by Congress that constrain Presidents in the domestic sphere with regard …