Constitutional Law Commons^™

Originalism And The Legislature, Joel Alicea

Scholarly Articles

While the extent to which Congress ought to be involved in interpreting the Constitution has been the subject of scholarly debate in recent years, the question of how Congress should interpret the document has been overlooked. This paper examines the justifications underlying several schools of originalist thought to tease out what these schools have to say about congressional constitutional interpretation. When the major originalist theories are scrutinized, the logical conclusion is that Congress ought to be originalist when engaging in constitutional interpretation. The paper thus breaks new ground in pointing out this radical implication of originalist thought, but its novel …

Is Constitutionalism Bad For Intersectional Feminists?, Beverley Baines

Penn State International Law Review (1982 - 2011)

No abstract provided.

The Constitutional Role Of Transnational Courts: Principled Legal Ideas In Three-Dimensional Political Space, Kim Lane Scheppele

Penn State International Law Review (1982 - 2011)

No abstract provided.

Adjudicating Socio-Economic Rights Under A Transformative Constitution, Linda Stewart

Penn State International Law Review (1982 - 2011)

No abstract provided.

Distributive Justice-Poverty And Economic Development, V.S. Elizabeth

Penn State International Law Review (1982 - 2011)

No abstract provided.

The Protection Of Laicism In Turkey And The Turkish Constitutional Court: The Example Of The Prohibition On The Use Of The Islamic Veil In Higher Education, Mehmet Cengiz Uzun

Penn State International Law Review (1982 - 2011)

No abstract provided.

Two Understandings Of Supremacy: An Essay, Vincent J. Samar

Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business

Does the supremacy provision of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution undermine the legal force of international law in the United States? Recently, there has been some debate on this issue arising out of the claim that if the U.S. Constitution is “the supreme law of the land,” and that only constitutional officers of the United States, in keeping with their responsibilities to uphold the Constitution, can decide what is international law for the U.S. Such debates are not new to the history of the world. For much of world history, national rulers have claimed that their legal authority derives …

Regulating Student Speech: Suppression Versus Punishment, Emily Gold Waldman

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This article examines the Supreme Court’s student speech framework and argues that, in focusing exclusively on the types of student speech that can be restricted, the framework fails to build in any differentiation as to how such speech can be restricted. This is true even though there are two very distinct types of speech restrictions in schools: suppression of the speech itself; and after-the-fact punishment of the student speaker. As the student speech landscape itself gets more complex – given schools’ experimentation with new disciplinary regimes along with the tremendous rise in student cyber-speech – the blurring of that distinction …

The Political Fourth Amendment, Thomas P. Crocker

Faculty Publications

The Political Fourth Amendment builds on Justice Ginsburg's recent dissent in Herring v. United States to argue for a "more majestic conception" of the Fourth Amendment focused on protecting political liberty. To put the point dramatically, we misread the Fourth Amendment when we read it exclusively as a criminal procedure provision focused entirely on either regulating police or protecting privacy. In order to see the Fourth Amendment as contributing to the Constitution's protections for political liberty, and not simply as an invitation to regulate police practice, we must take seriously the fact that the Fourth Amendment's textual purpose is to …

Freedom And Equality On The Installment Plan, Michael Halley

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

A response to Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 462 (2010). Crediting the perception that the Constitution is a poorly cut puzzle whose variously configured pieces don't match, Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai propose that the stand-alone parts of freedom and equality can be merged and mutually enlarged through the act of borrowing. They are mistaken. While Thomas Jefferson wrote that ideas may be appropriated without being diminished and so "freely spread from one to another over the globe," the equality and freedom the Constitution addresses as actualities are constrained by a basic, familiar, …

Redemption Song: Graham V. Florida And The Evolving Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, Robert Smith, G. Ben Choen

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentence of life without parole ("LWOP") for a juvenile under eighteen who commits a non-homicide offense. For Terrance Graham, who committed home-invasion robbery at seventeen, the decision does not mean necessarily that he someday will leave the brick walls of Florida's Taylor Annex Correctional Institution. Unlike previous Eighth Amendment decisions, such as Roper v. Simmons, where the Court barred the death penalty for juveniles, this new categorical rule does not translate into automatic relief for members of the exempted class: "A State need not guarantee the …

Slavery Jurisprudence On The Supreme Court Of North Carolina, 1828-1858: William Gaston And Thomas Ruffin, Timothy C. Meyer

Campbell Law Review

In the years preceding the Civil War, two North Carolina Supreme Court Justices, Chief Justice Thomas Ruffin and Associate Justice William Gaston, offered starkly different legal opinions on issues relating to slavery. Despite broad similarities in their backgrounds and their agreement on many other legal and judicial issues, Ruffin and Gaston approached slavery from sharply contrasting perspectives. Both men used their positions on the bench to influence the treatment and legal status of slaves. While Ruffin vigorously defended the peculiar institution and took the concept of chattel to a logical extreme, Gaston denounced many of its dehumanizing elements. In fact, …

Sliding Towards Educational Outcomes: A New Remedy For High-Stakes Education Lawsuits In A Post-Nclb World, Christopher A. Suarez

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

Sheff v. O'Neill ushered in a new wave of education reform litigation that may challenge the constitutionality of de facto segregation under state education clauses, but its remedy has been inadequate. This Note proposes a new desegregation remedy-the sliding scale remedy-to address socioeconomic isolation in this unique constitutional context. The remedy employs varying degrees of equity power depending on students' academic outcomes. It balances concerns over local control and separation of powers with the court's need to effectuate right, establishes a clear remedial principle, and ensures that states and school districts focus on students as they implement remedies.

The History And Constitutionality Of Maryland’S Pregnancy Speech Regulations, Mark L. Rienzi

Scholarly Articles

On December 4, 2009, Baltimore, Maryland enacted the nation's first law regulating the speech of individuals and groups who want to talk to pregnant women about whether to have an abortion. Less than two months later, nearby Montgomery County, Maryland enacted the second. These regulations only apply to speakers who want to talk about one particular subject: pregnancy. As a practical matter, the regulations only apply to speakers who oppose abortion. Counselors who work for organizations willing to provide abortions are entirely exempt. Immediately after these laws passed, abortion providers and their allies across the country began plans to pursue …

Comments: Keep It Clean: How Public Universities May Constitutionally Enforce Policies Limiting Student Speech At College Basketball Games, Jonathan Singer

University of Baltimore Law Review

No abstract provided.

Understanding Caperton: Judicial Disqualification Under The Due Process Clause, Dmitry Bam

Faculty Publications

It is virtually impossible to discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. without hearing some variant of the following response: “I can’t believe it was as close as it was.” And it does not matter whether you are chatting with your next-door neighbor who had never thought about judicial ethics in his life or discussing the case with a judicial-recusal expert. Nearly everyone seems to agree: Caperton was an “easy” case and that four justices dissented is an indication that there is something terribly wrong. Not only has Caperton elevated the issue of judicial impartiality …

Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, And Civil Rights Litigation, Howard M. Wasserman

Faculty Publications

Understanding the twin pleading cases of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal from the vantage point of only a few months (or even years) requires as much prediction as explanation. Early confusion is a product of the long-heralded link between substance and procedure. What we are seeing now may be less about Court-imposed changes to procedure as about changes to substantive law and a "mismatch " between new substance and the old procedure of the Federal Rules. Much of the current business of federal courts involves constitutional litigation under 42 U.S. C. §S 1983 and Bivens, …

Outsourcing Democracy: Redefining The Public Private Partnership In Election Administration, Gilda R. Daniels

All Faculty Scholarship

“We are left with a system in which almost every state still outsources its elections to what are actually private organizations.”

Federal, state and local governments are deeply indebted to private organizations, political parties, candidates, and private individuals to assist it, inter alia, in registering voters, getting citizens to the ballot box through get out the vote campaigns (GOTV), assisting limited English proficient (LEP) citizens, and monitoring Election Day activities. In a recent Supreme Court case, Crawford v. Marion County, Justice Souter recognized that voting legislation has “two competing interests,” the fundamental right to vote and the need for governmental …

Voter Deception, Gilda R. Daniels

All Faculty Scholarship

In our recent electoral history, deceptive practices have been utilized to suppress votes in an attempt to affect election results. In most major elections, citizens endure warnings of arrest, deportation, and even violence if they attempt to vote. In many instances, these warnings are part of a larger scheme to suppress particular voters, whom I call “unwanted voters,” from exercising the franchise. Recent advancements in technology provide additional opportunities for persons to deceive voters, such as calls alerting citizens that Republicans (Whites) vote on Tuesday and Democrats vote (Blacks) on Wednesday. In spite of this resurgence of deception, the statutes …

In Search Of "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism", Matthew Lindsay

All Faculty Scholarship

This article is a response to Professor Jed Shugerman’s Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, HARVARD LAW REVIEW (2010). Professor Shugerman argues that the widespread adoption of judicial elections in the 1850’s and the embrace by the first generation of elected judges of countermajoritarian rationales for judicial review helped to effect a transition from the active, industry-building state of the early nineteenth century to the "laissez-faire constitutionalism" of the Lochner era. This response argues that Professor Shugerman overstates the causal relationship between the elected judiciary’s robust constitutional defense of "vested rights" and the iconic, if …

Clear Statement Rules And Executive War Powers, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

This article is based on a presentation at the Annual Federalist Society National Student Symposium on Law and Public Policy that explored the theme of separation of powers in American constitutionalism.

The scope of the President’s independent war powers is notoriously unclear, and courts are understandably reluctant to issue constitutional rulings that might deprive the federal government as a whole of the flexibility needed to respond to crises. As a result, courts often look for signs that Congress has either supported or opposed the President’s actions and rest their decisions on statutory grounds. There have been both liberal and conservative …

The Forgotten Freedom Of Assembly, John D. Inazu

Faculty Scholarship

The freedom of assembly has been at the heart of some of the most important social movements in American history: antebellum abolitionism, women's suffrage in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the labor movement in the Progressive Era and after the New Deal, and the civil rights movement. Claims of assembly stood against the ideological tyranny that exploded during the first Red Scare in the years surrounding the First World War and the second Red Scare of 1950s McCarthyism. Abraham Lincoln once called 'the right of the people peaceably to assemble' part of 'the Constitutional substitute for revolution'. In 1939, the …

“Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’S Constitutional Vision, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

In this essay, Professor Siegel examines the nature and function of constitutional visions in the American constitutional order. He argues that Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg possesses such a vision and that her vision is defined by her oft-stated commitment to “full human stature,” to “equal citizenship stature.” He then defends Justice Ginsburg’s characteristically incremental and moderate approach to realizing her vision. He does so in part by establishing that President Barack Obama articulated a similar vision and approach in his Philadelphia speech on American race relations and illustrated its capacity to succeed during the 2008 presidential election.

The Strange Origins Of The Constitutional Right Of Association, John D. Inazu

Faculty Scholarship

Although much has been written about the freedom of association and its ongoing importance to American constitutionalism, much recent scholarship mistakenly relies on a truncated history that begins with Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), the case that divided constitutional association into intimate and expressive components. Roberts’s doctrinal framework has been rightly criticized. However, neither the right of association nor all of its doctrinal problems start there. The Supreme Court’s foray into the constitutional right of association began a generation earlier with NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). This article offers a new …

The United States And Human Rights Treaties: Race Relations, The Cold War, And Constitutionalism, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

The United States prides itself on being a champion of human rights and pressures other countries to improve their human rights practices, and yet appears less willing than other nations to embrace international human rights treaties. Many commentators attribute this phenomenon to the particular historical context that existed in the late 1940s and early 1950s when human rights treaties were first being developed. These commentators especially emphasize the race relations of the time, noting that some conservatives resisted the developing human rights regime because they saw it as an effort by the federal government to extend its authority to address …

A Post-Race Equal Protection?, Trina Jones, Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky

Faculty Scholarship

Most vividly demonstrated in the 2008 election of the first African-American President of the United States, post-race is a term that has been widely used to characterize a belief in the declining significance of race in the United States. Post-racialists, then, believe that racial discrimination is rare and aberrant behavior as evidenced by America’s pronounced racial progress. One practical consequence of a commitment to post-racialism is the belief that governments - both state and federal - should not consider race in their decision making. One might imagine that the recent explosion in post-racial discourse also portends a revised understanding of …

Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory Of Article I, Section 8, Neil S. Siegel, Robert D. Cooter

Faculty Scholarship

The Framers of the United States Constitution wrote Article I, Section 8 in order to address some daunting collective action problems facing the young nation. They especially wanted to protect the states from military warfare by foreigners and from commercial warfare against one another. The states acted individually when they needed to act collectively, and Congress lacked power under the Articles of Confederation to address these problems. Section 8 thus authorized Congress to promote the “general Welfare” of the United States by tackling many collective action problems that the states could not solve on their own.

Subsequent interpretations of Section …

The Unsettling ‘Well-Settled’ Law Of Freedom Of Association, John D. Inazu

Faculty Scholarship

This article brings historical, theoretical, and doctrinal critiques to bear upon the current framework for the constitutional right of association. It argues that the Supreme Court’s categories of expressive and intimate association first announced in the 1984 decision, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, are neither well-settled nor defensible. Intimate association and expressive association are indefensible categories, but they matter deeply. They matter to the Jaycees. They matter to the Chi Iota Colony of the Alpha Epsilon Pi fraternity, a now defunct Jewish social group at the College of Staten Island that had sought to limit its membership to men. They …

State Action And Corporate Human Rights Liability, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

This essay considers the requirement of state action in suits brought against private corporations under the Alien Tort Statute. It argues that, in addressing this requirement, courts have erred in applying the state action jurisprudence developed under the domestic civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It also argues that, even if it were appropriate to borrow in this manner from the Section 1983 cases, such borrowing would not support the allowance of aiding and abetting liability against corporations, and that this liability is also problematic on a number of other grounds.

A Coase Theorem For Constitutional Theory, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

There is much to admire about Barry Friedman’s new book, The Will of the People. Explaining how the institution of judicial review was made safe for democracy in America, Friedman’s story is extensively researched, beautifully written, scrupulously nonpartisan about the modern Court, and frequently humorous. What is more, his primary claim—that the Supreme Court of the United States is very much a democratic institution because judicial review always has been responsive to public opinion—is, to a large extent, convincing. I have taught The Will of the People in my first-year constitutional law course, and I plan to do so again. …