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Articles 61 - 90 of 576
Full-Text Articles in Constitutional Law
“Competition Policy In Its Broadest Sense:” Michael Pertschuk’S Chairmanship Of The Federal Trade Commission 1977-1981, William E. Kovacic
“Competition Policy In Its Broadest Sense:” Michael Pertschuk’S Chairmanship Of The Federal Trade Commission 1977-1981, William E. Kovacic
William & Mary Law Review
In the late 1960s and through the 1970s, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) undertook an ambitious program of reforms. Among other measures, the agency expanded the focus of antitrust enforcement to address economic concentration, including the use of Section 5 of the FTC Act to restructure dominant firms and oligopolies. In many ways Michael Pertschuk, who chaired the agency from 1977 to 1981, became the symbol of the FTC’s efforts to stretch the boundaries of antitrust policy—to pursue a conception of “competition policy in its broadest sense.” Despite a number of valuable accomplishments, the FTC achieved relatively few litigation successes, …
Antitrust And The Politics Of State Action, Thomas B. Nachbar
Antitrust And The Politics Of State Action, Thomas B. Nachbar
William & Mary Law Review
In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, the Court refused to exempt the board from the second element of Parker immunity—active supervision by the state—because the Board was made up largely of “active market participants.” This Article argues that the “active market participant” rule laid out in North Carolina State Board, while intuitively appealing, ignores important political values represented by antitrust law, values most evident in the context of state action immunity. By focusing on the potential market harm from self-interested regulators, the Court ignored a series of political harms inherent in the structure of the North …
Enforcing Principled Constitutional Limits On Federal Power: A Neo-Federalist Refinement Of Justice Cardozo's Jurisprudence, Robert J. Pushaw Jr.
Enforcing Principled Constitutional Limits On Federal Power: A Neo-Federalist Refinement Of Justice Cardozo's Jurisprudence, Robert J. Pushaw Jr.
William & Mary Law Review
Since the New Deal of the mid-1930s, Congress has asserted virtually absolute power to (1) “regulate Commerce ... among the States,” (2) tax and spend for the “general Welfare,” and (3) delegate “legislative Power[ ]” to the executive branch. From 1937 until 1994, the Supreme Court rejected every claim that such statutes had exceeded Congress’s Article I authority and usurped the states’ reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment. Over the past quarter century, conservative Justices have tried, and failed, to develop principled constitutional limits on the federal government while keeping the modern administrative and social welfare state largely intact.
The …
Taking Shelter Under The Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality Of Policing Methods At State-Sponsored Natural Disaster Shelters, Kyle M. Wood
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Theory And Practice Of Contestatory Federalism, James A. Gardner
The Theory And Practice Of Contestatory Federalism, James A. Gardner
William & Mary Law Review
Madisonian theory holds that a federal division of power is necessary to the protection of liberty, but that federalism is a naturally unstable form of government organization that is in constant danger of collapsing into either unitarism or fragmentation. Despite its inherent instability, this condition may be permanently maintained, according to Madison, through a constitutional design that keeps the system in equipoise by institutionalizing a form of perpetual contestation between national and subnational governments. The theory, however, does not specify how that contestation actually occurs, and by what means.
This paper investigates Madison’s hypothesis by documenting the methods actually deployed …
Replacing The Flawed Chevron Standard, Brian G. Slocum
Replacing The Flawed Chevron Standard, Brian G. Slocum
William & Mary Law Review
Judicial review of agency statutory interpretations depends heavily on the linguistic concept of ambiguity. Most significantly, under Chevron, judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation hinges on whether the court determines the statute to be ambiguous. Despite its importance, the ambiguity concept has been poorly developed by courts and deviates in important respects from how linguists approach ambiguity. For instance, courts conflate ambiguity identification and disambiguation and treat ambiguity as an umbrella concept that encompasses distinct forms of linguistic indeterminacy such as vagueness and generality. The resulting ambiguity standard is unpredictable and does not adequately perform its function of mediating between …
Constitutional Injury And Tangibility, Rachel Bayefsky
Constitutional Injury And Tangibility, Rachel Bayefsky
William & Mary Law Review
The Supreme Court, in the 2016 case Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, announced a framework for determining whether a plaintiff had alleged an injury that would permit entry into federal court. The Court indicated that a plaintiff, in order to have constitutional standing, needed to suffer harm that was “concrete” or “real.” In explaining how courts could ascertain whether an alleged harm was concrete, the Court created a category of “intangible” harm subject to a distinctive, and arguably more demanding, concreteness inquiry than “tangible” harm, a category that seemingly includes only physical or economic harm. In particular, Spokeo directed courts …
The Gerrymander And The Constitution: Two Avenues Of Analysis And The Quest For A Durable Precedent, Edward B. Foley
The Gerrymander And The Constitution: Two Avenues Of Analysis And The Quest For A Durable Precedent, Edward B. Foley
William & Mary Law Review
It has been notoriously difficult for the United States Supreme Court to develop a judicially manageable—and publicly comprehensible—standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims, a standard comparable in this respect to the extraordinarily successful “one person, one vote” principle articulated in the Reapportionment Revolution of the 1960s. This difficulty persists because the quest has been for a gerrymandering standard that is universalistic in the same way that “one person, one vote” is: derived from abstract ideas of political theory, like the equal right of citizens to participate in electoral politics. But other domains of constitutional law employ particularistic modes of reasoning …
Gerrymandering And Association, Daniel P. Tokaji
Gerrymandering And Association, Daniel P. Tokaji
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
Election Law “Federalism” And The Limits Of The Antidiscrimination Framework, Franita Tolson
Election Law “Federalism” And The Limits Of The Antidiscrimination Framework, Franita Tolson
William & Mary Law Review
If the United States Supreme Court conceived of the right to vote as an active entitlement that safeguards other fundamental rights rather than as a passive privilege that permits courts to prioritize state sovereignty over broad enfranchisement, then many of the errors that have become commonplace in our system of elections would not occur. It is unlikely, however, that the Court will take the steps necessary to extend the constitutional protections afforded to the right to vote. In recent years, the Court has sharply circumscribed Congress’s ability to protect the right to vote under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, rejecting …
The Constitution And The Language Of The Law, John O. Mcginnis, Michael B. Rappaport
The Constitution And The Language Of The Law, John O. Mcginnis, Michael B. Rappaport
William & Mary Law Review
A long-standing debate exists over whether the Constitution is written in ordinary or legal language. Yet no article has offered a framework for determining the nature of the Constitution’s language, let alone systematically canvassed the evidence.
This Article fills the gap. First, it shows that a distinctive legal language exists. This language in the Constitution includes terms, like “Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” that are unambiguously technical, and terms, like “good behavior,” that are ambiguous in that they have both an ordinary and legal meaning but are better interpreted according to the latter. It also includes legal interpretive rules such …
Being Seen Like A State: How Americans (And Britons) Built The Constitutional Infrastructure Of A Developing Nation, Daniel J. Hulsebosch
Being Seen Like A State: How Americans (And Britons) Built The Constitutional Infrastructure Of A Developing Nation, Daniel J. Hulsebosch
William & Mary Law Review
This Article develops the argument that the Federal Constitution of 1787 was conceptualized, drafted, and put into operation not only for American citizens but also for foreign audiences. In a world without supranational governing institutions, a constitution—at least, the Federal Constitution—might serve to promote peaceable international relations based on reciprocal trade and open credit. That at least was the Enlightenment-inflected hope.
Did it work? If early Americans engaged in constitution-making in large part to demonstrate their capacity for self-government, selfdiscipline, and commercial openness to foreign audiences, did anyone notice? Or was it all, regardless of diplomatic purposes and consistent with …
The Commercial Difference, Felix T. Wu
The Commercial Difference, Felix T. Wu
William & Mary Law Review
When it comes to the First Amendment, commerciality does, and should, matter. This Article develops the view that the key distinguishing characteristic of corporate or commercial speech is that the interest at stake is “derivative,” in the sense that we care about the speech interest for reasons other than caring about the rights of the entity directly asserting a claim under the First Amendment. To say that the interest is derivative is not to say that it is unimportant, and one could find corporate and commercial speech interests to be both derivative and strong enough to apply heightened scrutiny to …
The Power Canons, Lisa Heinzerling
The Power Canons, Lisa Heinzerling
William & Mary Law Review
With three recent decisions—Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, King v. Burwell, and Michigan v. EPA—the Supreme Court has embraced a new trio of canons of statutory interpretation. When an agency charged with administering a long-existing statute asserts regulatory authority it has not previously used, in a matter having large economic and political significance, its interpretation will be met with skepticism. When an agency charged with administering an ambiguous statutory provision answers a question of large economic and political significance, one central to the statutory regime, and the Court believes the agency is not an expert …
Judicial Supremacy Revisited: Independent Constitutional Authority In American Constitutional Law And Practice, Mark A. Graber
Judicial Supremacy Revisited: Independent Constitutional Authority In American Constitutional Law And Practice, Mark A. Graber
William & Mary Law Review
The Supreme Court exercises far less constitutional authority in American law and practice than one would gather from reading judicial opinions, presidential speeches, or the standard tomes for and against judicial supremacy. Lower federal court judges, state court justices, federal and state elected officials, persons charged with administering the law, and ordinary citizens often have the final say on particular constitutional controversies or exercise temporary constitutional authority in ways that have more influence on the parties to that controversy than the eventual Supreme Court decision. In many instances, Supreme Court doctrine sanctions or facilitates the exercise of independent constitutional authority …
The Annoying Constitution: Implications For The Allocation Of Interpretive Authority, Frederick Schauer
The Annoying Constitution: Implications For The Allocation Of Interpretive Authority, Frederick Schauer
William & Mary Law Review
Constitutional constraints often restrict unwise or immoral official policies and actions, but also often invalidate laws and other official acts that are sound as a matter of both morality and policy. These second-order side constraints—or trumps—on even official acts that are sound as a matter of first-order policy reflect deeper or longerterm values, and they are central to understanding the very idea of constitutionalism. Moreover, once we see the Constitution as restricting not only the unsound and the unwise but also the sound and the wise, we can understand why expecting those whose sound ideas and policies are nevertheless unconstitutional …
Soft Supremacy, Corinna Barrett Lain
Soft Supremacy, Corinna Barrett Lain
William & Mary Law Review
The debate over judicial supremacy has raged for more than a decade now, yet the conception of what it is we are arguing about remains grossly oversimplified and formalistic. My aim in this symposium contribution is to push the conversation in a more realistic direction; I want those who claim that judicial supremacy is antidemocratic to take on the concept as it actually exists. The stark truth is that judicial supremacy has remarkably little of the strength and hard edges that dominate the discourse in judicial supremacy debates. It is porous, contingent—soft. And the upshot of soft supremacy is this: …
Judicial Supremacy And Taking Conflicting Rights Seriously, Rebecca L. Brown
Judicial Supremacy And Taking Conflicting Rights Seriously, Rebecca L. Brown
William & Mary Law Review
The best arguments in favor of judicial supremacy rely on its essential role of protecting rights in a democracy. The doctrinal technique of strict scrutiny, developed to do the work of judicial supremacy, has been an important tool in our constitutional jurisprudence in the service of rights protection. When the Supreme Court reviews laws that themselves seek to enhance or preserve constitutional rights, however, strict scrutiny does not provide the right approach. Rather, the Court should consider very carefully the rights claims in favor of the statute as well as those launched by a challenger. In such cases of conflicting …
In Defense Of Judicial Supremacy, Erwin Chemerinsky
In Defense Of Judicial Supremacy, Erwin Chemerinsky
William & Mary Law Review
“Judicial supremacy” is the idea that the Supreme Court should be viewed as the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution and that we should deem its decisions as binding on the other branches and levels of government, until and unless constitutional amendment or subsequent decision overrules them. This is desirable because we want to have an authoritative interpreter of the Constitution and the Court is best suited to play this role. Under this view, doctrines which keep federal courts from enforcing constitutional provisions—such as denying standing for generalized grievances, the political question doctrine, and the state secrets doctrine—are misguided and should …
Much Ado About Nothing: Signing Statements, Vetoes, And Presidential Constitutional Interpretation, Keith E. Whittington
Much Ado About Nothing: Signing Statements, Vetoes, And Presidential Constitutional Interpretation, Keith E. Whittington
William & Mary Law Review
During the Bush presidency, presidential signing statements became briefly controversial. The controversy has faded, but the White House continues to issue statements when signing legislation. Those statements frequently point out constitutional difficulties in new statutes and sometimes warn that the executive branch will administer the statutes so as to avoid those constitutional difficulties. This Article argues that the criticisms of signing statements were mostly misguided. Signing statements as such present few problems and offer some benefits to the workings of the American political system. While there might be reason to object to the substantive constitutional positions adopted in any given …
Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins
Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins
William & Mary Law Review
Members of Congress largely acquiesce to judicial supremacy both on constitutional and statutory interpretation questions. Lawmakers, however, do not formally embrace judicial supremacy; they rarely think about the courts when enacting legislation. This Article explains why this is so, focusing on why lawmakers have both strong incentive to acquiesce to judicial power and little incentive to advance a coherent view of congressional power. In particular, lawmakers are interested in advancing favored policies, winning reelection, and gaining personal power within Congress. Abstract questions of institutional power do not interest lawmakers and judicial defeats are seen as opportunities to find some other …
Judicial Departmentalism: An Introduction, Kevin C. Walsh
Judicial Departmentalism: An Introduction, Kevin C. Walsh
William & Mary Law Review
This Article introduces the idea of judicial departmentalism and argues for its superiority to judicial supremacy. Judicial supremacy is the idea that the Constitution means for everybody what the Supreme Court says it means in deciding a case. Judicial departmentalism, by contrast, is the idea that the Constitution means in the judicial department what the Supreme Court says it means in deciding a case. Within the judicial department, the law of judgments, the law of remedies, and the law of precedent combine to enable resolutions by the judicial department to achieve certain kinds of settlements. Judicial departmentalism holds that these …
Pricing The Fourth Amendment, Miriam H. Baer
Pricing The Fourth Amendment, Miriam H. Baer
William & Mary Law Review
Critics have long decried the Fourth Amendment’s lack of an adequate remedy to secure its compliance. Neither the exclusionary rule nor the threat of civil liability deters police misconduct, leaving scholars to cast about for alternative measures. The emphasis on penalties, however, overlooks a different problem: detection. Because of policing’s fast-paced nature, even so-called “flagrant” Fourth Amendment violations trigger insufficient liability due to low probabilities of detection.
This Article addresses this problem by drawing on the Pigouvian tax literature. The Pigouvian tax—sometimes referred to as a “corrective tax”—is a pricing instrument imposed by regulators in an amount equal to the …
Legislative Exhaustion, Michael Sant’Ambrogio
Legislative Exhaustion, Michael Sant’Ambrogio
William & Mary Law Review
Legislative lawsuits are a recurring by-product of divided government. Yet the Supreme Court has never definitively resolved whether Congress may sue the executive branch over its execution of the law. Some scholars argue that Congress should be able to establish Article III standing when its interests are harmed by executive action or inaction just like private parties. Others, including most prominently the late Justice Antonin Scalia, argue that intergovernmental disputes do not constitute Article III “cases” or “controversies” at all. Rather, the Framers envisioned the political branches resolving their differences through nonjudicial means.
This Article proposes a different approach to …
Protean Statutory Interpretation In The Courts Of Appeals, James J. Brudney, Lawrence Baum
Protean Statutory Interpretation In The Courts Of Appeals, James J. Brudney, Lawrence Baum
William & Mary Law Review
This Article is the first in-depth empirical and doctrinal analysis of differences in statutory interpretation between the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. It is also among the first to anticipate how the Supreme Court’s interpretive approach may shift with the passing of Justice Scalia.
We begin by identifying factors that may contribute to interpretive divergence between the two judicial levels, based on their different institutional structures and operational realities. In doing so, we discuss normative implications that may follow from the prospect of such interpretive divergence. We then examine how three circuit courts have used dictionaries and legislative …
Personal Enough For Protection: The Fifth Amendment And Single-Member Llcs, Lila L. Inman
Personal Enough For Protection: The Fifth Amendment And Single-Member Llcs, Lila L. Inman
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
Punishing Sexual Fantasy, Andrew Gilden
Punishing Sexual Fantasy, Andrew Gilden
William & Mary Law Review
The Internet has created unprecedented opportunities for adults and teenagers to explore their sexual identities, but it has also created new ways for the law to monitor and punish a diverse range of taboo sexual communication. A young mother loses custody of her two children due to sexually explicit Facebook conversations. A teenager is prosecuted for child pornography crimes after sending a naked selfie to her teenage boyfriend. An NYPD officer is convicted for conspiracy to kidnap several women based on conversations he had on a “dark fetish” fantasy website. In each of these cases, online sexual exploration and fantasy …
Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive And Entrenchment Effects Of Historical Practice In Federal Courts Law, Ernest A. Young
Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive And Entrenchment Effects Of Historical Practice In Federal Courts Law, Ernest A. Young
William & Mary Law Review
Scholars examining the use of historical practice in constitutional adjudication have focused on a few high-profile separation of powers disputes, such as the recent decisions in NLRB v. Noel Canning and Zivotofsky v. Kerry. This Article argues that “big cases make bad theory”—that the focus on high-profile cases of this type distorts our understanding of how historical practice figures into constitutional adjudication more generally. I shift focus here to the more prosaic terrain of federal courts law, where practice plays a pervasive role. That shift reveals two important insights: First, while historical practice plays an important constitutive role structuring and …
Exploiting Ambiguity In The Supreme Court: Cutting Through The Fifth Amendment With Transferable Development Rights, Trevor D. Vincent
Exploiting Ambiguity In The Supreme Court: Cutting Through The Fifth Amendment With Transferable Development Rights, Trevor D. Vincent
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
Some Thoughts On The Study Of Judicial Behavior, Lee Epstein
Some Thoughts On The Study Of Judicial Behavior, Lee Epstein
William & Mary Law Review
Back in the 1940s the political scientist C. Herman Pritchett began tallying the votes and opinions of Supreme Court Justices. His goal was to use data to test the hypothesis that the Justices were not only following the “law,” but were also motivated by their own ideological preferences.
With the hindsight of nearly eighty years, we know that Pritchett’s seemingly small project helped to create a big field: Judicial Behavior, which I take to be the theoretical and empirical study of the choices judges make. Political scientists continue to play a central role, but they are now joined by economists, …