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Articles 1141 - 1170 of 2015

Full-Text Articles in Constitutional Law

The Disposing Power Of The Legislature, Thomas W. Merrill Jan 2010

The Disposing Power Of The Legislature, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

The Constitution as we understand it includes principles that have emerged over time in a common law fashion. One such principle is the disposing power of the legislature – the understanding that only the legislature has the power to arrange, order, and distribute the power to act with the force of law among the different institutions of society. This Essay illustrates the gradual emergence of the disposing power in criminal, civil, and administrative law, and offers some reasons why it is appropriate that the legislature be given this exclusive authority. One implication of the disposing power is that another type …


Iqbal And Supervisory Immunity, Kit Kinports Jan 2010

Iqbal And Supervisory Immunity, Kit Kinports

Faculty Scholarship

Prior to the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the federal courts generally acknowledged that high-ranking government officials could be held liable for the constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates, though they differed on the appropriate standard of supervisory liability. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court called this case law into question, holding that constitutional tort liability hinges on proof that each defendant, “through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” The Court’s cursory treatment of this issue, without the benefit of briefing or oral argument, was based entirely on the misguided assumption that the doctrine of …


The Supreme Court's Legislative Agenda To Free Government From Accountability For Constitutional Deprivations, Gary S. Gildin Jan 2010

The Supreme Court's Legislative Agenda To Free Government From Accountability For Constitutional Deprivations, Gary S. Gildin

Faculty Scholarship

In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court adopted a new standard of factual particularity a plaintiff must meet to satisfy the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) that a complaint plead a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court made clear that the Twombly pleading standard extended to civil actions seeking redress for deprivation of constitutional rights in particular, and universally to all Complaints filed in federal court. Commentators have debated whether after Iqbal, victims of constitutional wrongdoing will be able to …


The Continuity Of Statutory And Constitutional Interpretation: An Essay For Phil Frickey, Ernest A. Young Jan 2010

The Continuity Of Statutory And Constitutional Interpretation: An Essay For Phil Frickey, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay seeks to honor Phil by exploring the contributions of his Legal Process approach to a problem near and dear to his heart: the uses and legitimacy of canons of statutory construction. I focus, as Phil did in his most recent work, on the canon of constitutional avoidance—that is, the rule that courts should construe statutes to avoid significant ―doubt as to their constitutionality.


This Essay largely supports Phil‘s defense of the avoidance canon, but links that defense to another set of canons that Phil has criticized: the various clear statement rules of statutory construction that Phil and Bill …


Is Ashcroft V. Iqbal The Death (Finally) Of The “Historical Test” For Interpreting The Seventh Amendment?, Kenneth S. Klein Jan 2010

Is Ashcroft V. Iqbal The Death (Finally) Of The “Historical Test” For Interpreting The Seventh Amendment?, Kenneth S. Klein

Faculty Scholarship

There is the possibility that the recent Supreme Court decision of Ashcroft v. Iqbal finally will be the necessary impetus to revisit one of the more bizarre but enduring canards of American jurisprudence -- the way we interpret the Seventh Amendment's preservation of a right to a jury trial in federal civil litigation. The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n suits at common law ... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." To this day, the way we apply the Seventh Amendment-in other words, what we interpret to be the constitutional intent and mandate of our Founders-is to postulate …


Embedded International Law And The Constitution Abroad, Sarah H. Cleveland Jan 2010

Embedded International Law And The Constitution Abroad, Sarah H. Cleveland

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay explores the role of "embedded" international law in U.S. constitutional interpretation, in the context of extraterritorial application of the Constitution. Traditional U.S. understandings of the Constitution's application abroad were informed by nineteenth-century international law principles of jurisdiction, which largely limited the authority of a sovereign state to its geographic territory. Both international law and constitutional law since have developed significantly away from strictly territorial understandings of governmental authority, however. Modern international law principles of jurisdiction and state responsibility now recognize that states legitimately may exercise power in a number of extraterritorial contexts, and that legal obligations may apply …


Schrödinger’S Cross: The Quantum Mechanics Of The Establishment Clause, Joseph Blocher Jan 2010

Schrödinger’S Cross: The Quantum Mechanics Of The Establishment Clause, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

Perhaps the most famous character in modern physics is Schrödinger’s Cat, an unfortunate feline trapped in a box alongside a flask containing deadly poison that may or may not have been released. Thanks to the wonders of quantum mechanics, the cat is both alive and dead — “mixed or smeared out in equal parts” — until the box is opened, at which point the act of observation causes its state to collapse into either life or death.

Far away in the Mojave Desert, the “life” of a six-foot-tall cross is disputed: it is either a religious symbol or it is …


The Confrontation Clause And The Hearsay Rule: What Hearsay Exceptions Are Testimonial?, Paul W. Grimm, Jerome E. Deise, John R. Grimm Jan 2010

The Confrontation Clause And The Hearsay Rule: What Hearsay Exceptions Are Testimonial?, Paul W. Grimm, Jerome E. Deise, John R. Grimm

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Constitutionalising An Overlapping Consensus: The Ecj And The Emergence Of A Coordinate Constitutional Order, Charles F. Sabel, Oliver H. Gerstenberg Jan 2010

Constitutionalising An Overlapping Consensus: The Ecj And The Emergence Of A Coordinate Constitutional Order, Charles F. Sabel, Oliver H. Gerstenberg

Faculty Scholarship

The European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) jurisprudence of fundamental rights in cases such as Schmidberger and Omega extends the court's jurisdiction in ways that compete with that of Member States in matters of visceral concern. And just as the Member States require a guarantee that the ECJ respect fundamental rights rooted in national tradition, so the ECJ insists that international organisations respect rights constitutive of the EU. The demand of such guarantees reproduces between the ECJ and the international order the kinds of conflicting jurisdictional claims that have shadowed the relation between the ECJ and the courts of the Member …


The Role Of The Chief Executive In Domestic Administration, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2010

The Role Of The Chief Executive In Domestic Administration, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Written for an international working paper conference on administrative law, this paper sets the Supreme Court's decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in the context of general American concerns about the place of the President in domestic administration, a recurring theme in my writings.


Guns, Originalism, And Cultural Cognition, Jamal Greene Jan 2010

Guns, Originalism, And Cultural Cognition, Jamal Greene

Faculty Scholarship

In a legal regime whose canonical text is Marbury v. Madison, it should be unremarkable that the Supreme Court's actions are bounded rather severely by public opinion. What makes the proposition remarkable – enough to be well worth Barry Friedman's time – is also what makes Marbury remarkable: namely, that judges so often go out of their way to deny it. Though not unheard of, it is rare for a judge to advertise that the content of a constitutional rule she is announcing is motivated by public opinion. Such an admission would be self-defeating, since it invites the charge …


The So-Called Right To Privacy, Jamal Greene Jan 2010

The So-Called Right To Privacy, Jamal Greene

Faculty Scholarship

The constitutional right to privacy has been a conservative bugaboo ever since Justice Douglas introduced it into the United States Reports in Griswold v. Connecticut. Reference to the "so-called" right to privacy has become code for the view that the right is doctrinally recognized but not in fact constitutionally enshrined. This Article argues that the constitutional right to privacy is no more. The two rights most associated historically with the right to privacy are abortion and intimate sexual conduct, yet Gonzales v. Carhart and Lawrence v. Texas made clear that neither of these rights is presently justified by its …


'Struck' By Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg On Pregnancy Discrimination As Sex Discrimination, Neil S. Siegel, Reva B. Siegel Jan 2010

'Struck' By Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg On Pregnancy Discrimination As Sex Discrimination, Neil S. Siegel, Reva B. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

This is an attempt at recovery. This Essay hopes to call attention to then-Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg's merits brief in Struck v. Secretary of Defense. The brief has been under appreciated in part because the Supreme Court declined to decide the case. But anyone seeking to understand the origins and nature of Justice Ginsburg's views on sex discrimination would be well advised to read this brief. So would anyone interested in reimagining the bounds of constitutional possibility in the realm of gender equality.


A Coase Theorem For Constitutional Theory, Neil S. Siegel Jan 2010

A Coase Theorem For Constitutional Theory, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

There is much to admire about Barry Friedman’s new book, The Will of the People. Explaining how the institution of judicial review was made safe for democracy in America, Friedman’s story is extensively researched, beautifully written, scrupulously nonpartisan about the modern Court, and frequently humorous. What is more, his primary claim - that the Supreme Court of the United States is very much a democratic institution because judicial review always has been responsive to public opinion - is, to a large extent, convincing. I have taught The Will of the People in my first-year constitutional law course, and I plan …


The Politics Of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, And Democracy, Jedediah S. Purdy Jan 2010

The Politics Of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, And Democracy, Jedediah S. Purdy

Faculty Scholarship

Legal scholars’ discussions of climate change assume that the issue is one mainly of engineering incentives, and that “environmental values” are too weak, vague, or both to spur political action to address the emerging crisis. This Article gives reason to believe otherwise. The major natural resource and environmental statutes, from the acts creating national forests and parks to the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, have emerged from precisely the activity that discussions of climate change neglect: democratic argument over the value of the natural world and its role in competing ideas of citizenship, national purpose, and the role and …


Proportionality: An Assault On Human Rights: A Reply, Madhav Khosla Jan 2010

Proportionality: An Assault On Human Rights: A Reply, Madhav Khosla

Faculty Scholarship

In a recent article in I•CON, Stavros Tsakyrakis presents a passionate critique of the proportionality test. Tsakyrakis regards proportionality as an illusory attempt to infuse objectivity into rights adjudication. Moreover, he posits that it necessitates weighing public interests against individual rights. Proportionality has emerged, globally, as the leading framework for evaluating rights violations. It serves as the uniform standard of rights review in jurisdictions as diverse as Israel, Germany, Canada, and South Africa. Remarkably, recent opinions by Justice Stephen Breyer of the United States Supreme Court indicate that the approach is gaining currency within America's constitutional jurisprudence. Considering proportionality's …


Faithful Agent, Integrative, And Welfarist Interpretation, Thomas W. Merrill Jan 2010

Faithful Agent, Integrative, And Welfarist Interpretation, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

We are in the midst of a series of lively debates about how to interpret enacted laws such as written constitutions and statutes. In constitutional law, there is a spirited clash between "originalists" and "nonoriginalists". In the statutory arena, we have a three-way battle between "textualists," "intentionalists", and "pragmatists." A common feature of these contending schools is an insistence on a single, correct approach to interpretation. In this respect, however, each of these rival theories deviates from the Practice of interpretation. Real world interpreters – to a person – deploy a variety of interpretative methods when they seek to resolve …


Skelos V. Paterson: The Surprisingly Strong Case For The Governor's Surprising Power To Appoint A Lieutenant Governor, Richard Briffault Jan 2010

Skelos V. Paterson: The Surprisingly Strong Case For The Governor's Surprising Power To Appoint A Lieutenant Governor, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

On July 8, 2009, Governor David Paterson surprised New York's legal and political world by announcing his intention to appoint Richard Ravitch to fill the vacancy in the office of lieutenant governor. No New York governor had ever appointed a lieutenant governor before. Paterson's action was widely denounced as unauthorized and unconstitutional. Four months later, observers were even more astonished when the Court of Appeals in Skelos v. Paterson upheld the governor's action. This article explains why the governor and Court of Appeals were right to conclude that the governor had statutory and constitutional authority for his action. Indeed, the …


Making Social Rights Conditional: Lessons From India, Madhav Khosla Jan 2010

Making Social Rights Conditional: Lessons From India, Madhav Khosla

Faculty Scholarship

Recent years have witnessed important advancements in the discussion on social rights. The South African experience with social rights has revealed how such rights can be protected without providing for an individualized remedy. Comparative constitutional lawyers now debate the promise of the South African approach, and the possibility of weak-form judicial review in social rights cases. This article considers the Indian experience with social rights, and explains how it exhibits a new form of social rights adjudication. This is the adjudication of a conditional social right; an approach that displays a rare private law model of public law adjudication. This …


The Treatment Of Isolationist Minorities, Gabriel Rauterberg Jan 2010

The Treatment Of Isolationist Minorities, Gabriel Rauterberg

Faculty Scholarship

This Note examines what may be the most radical challenge posed by religious subcultures to the liberal politics of modern industrial nations – that of isolationist, nonliberal ( or even illiberal) religious minorities. These subcultures do not seek to integrate with mainstream society or gain power within it, but to withdraw in order to maintain norms widely discrepant from those that are socially dominant. They often seek to place restrictions upon their own members' freedom or activities, in part to maintain the group's differences from the greater society. These cultures, characterized by features as distinctive as collective property ownership, pacificism, …


Direct Voting By Property Owners, Thomas W. Merrill Jan 2010

Direct Voting By Property Owners, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Direct voting by property owners is a widespread but controversial tool for resolving disputes over local collective goods. Direct voting has powerful advantages, in that it can harness the superior knowledge of many local minds, resolve controversies in a way that is perceived to be legitimate, and eliminate corrupt dealmaking. But it also has serious pitfalls, if local voters are poorly informed, or if they ignore external effects on other communities, or if the process is distorted by majoritarian or minoritarian bias. To capitalize on the advantages of local voting, and minimize the risks, this Article proposes that direct voting …


Ordinary Administrative Law As Constitutional Common Law, Gillian E. Metzger Jan 2010

Ordinary Administrative Law As Constitutional Common Law, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

Henry Monaghan famously argued that much of constitutional interpretation takes the form of what he termed constitutional common law, a body of doctrines and rules that are constitutionally inspired but not constitutionally required and that can be altered or reversed by Congress. This Essay argues that a fair amount of ordinary administrative law qualifies as constitutional common law: Constitutional concerns permeate core administrative law doctrines and requirements, yet Congress enjoys broad power to alter ordinary administrative law notwithstanding its constitutional aspect. Unfortunately, the constitutional common law character of much of ordinary administrative law is rarely acknowledged by courts. A striking …


Supremacy Clause Textualism, Henry Paul Monaghan Jan 2010

Supremacy Clause Textualism, Henry Paul Monaghan

Faculty Scholarship

Whatever its status in the statutory interpretation "wars," originalism-driven textualism has assumed an increasingly prominent role in constitutional interpretation, at least within the academy. The focus of this Article is on one such form, namely, "Supremacy Clause textualism", that is, recent textualist claims about the implications of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. This Article addresses two such claims.

First, in important articles, Professor Bradford Clark argues that the clause is "at the epicenter of [our] constitutional structure" and it "recognizes only the 'Constitution,' 'Laws,' and 'Treaties' of the United States as 'the supreme Law of the Land."' Displacement of …


Who Judges? Who Cares? History Now And Then, Barbara Aronstein Black Jan 2010

Who Judges? Who Cares? History Now And Then, Barbara Aronstein Black

Faculty Scholarship

There are two strands of history: Call them strand A and strand B. A: "How independent are those who judge?" B: "Where is the judicial power located?" At a high enough level of abstraction the strands merge (as, at a high enough level of abstraction, what does not?). The issue then becomes whether in a given society all judging is in the hands of independent judges. And the point is that there are two ways of avoiding the decision of cases by independent judges, corresponding, naturally, to the two strands of history:

[A] Through the judges: Punish them, reward them, …


Administering The Second Amendment: Law, Politics, And Taxonomy , Nicholas J. Johnson Jan 2010

Administering The Second Amendment: Law, Politics, And Taxonomy , Nicholas J. Johnson

Faculty Scholarship

This article anticipates the post-McDonald landscape by assessing the right to arms in the context of several state regulations and the arguments that might be employed as challenges to them unfold. So far, the core test for determining the scope of the individual right to arms is the common use standard articulated in District of Columbia v. Heller. Measured against that, standard firearm regulations fit into three categories. The first category contains laws that are easily administered under the common use standard. The second category – and the primary focus of this article – consists of laws that can be …


Prudentialism In Mcdonald V. City Of Chicago, Neil S. Siegel Jan 2010

Prudentialism In Mcdonald V. City Of Chicago, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

At least two kinds of prudential argument have been identified in the literature on constitutional interpretation: court-centered prudentialism and system-centered prudentialism. Commentators often characterize court-centered prudentialism as animated by concern over the Supreme Court’s preservation of its public legitimacy, which can be undermined when the Justices decide controversial questions in ways that cause backlash. By contrast, system-centered prudentialism asks not only what judicial decision is best for the Court’s effectiveness, but also what response is best for the constitutional system as a whole when the Court’s legitimacy is not at stake.

The Court’s recent decision in McDonald v. City of …


Meditaciones Postmodernas Sobre El Castigo: Acerca De Los Límites De La Razón Y De Las Virtudes De La Aleatoriedad (Una Polémica Y Un Manifiesto Para El Siglo Xxi), Bernard E. Harcourt Jan 2010

Meditaciones Postmodernas Sobre El Castigo: Acerca De Los Límites De La Razón Y De Las Virtudes De La Aleatoriedad (Una Polémica Y Un Manifiesto Para El Siglo Xxi), Bernard E. Harcourt

Faculty Scholarship

Abstract in Spanish
Durante la Modernidad, el discurso sobre la pena ha girado circularmente en torno a tres grupos de interrogantes. El primero, surgido de la propia Ilustración, preguntaba: ¿En qué basa el soberano su derecho de penar? Nietzsche con mayor determinación, pero también otros, argumentaron que la propia pregunta implicaba ya su respuesta. Con el nacimiento de las ciencias sociales, este escepticismo hizo surgir un segundo conjunto de interrogantes: ¿Cuál es, entonces, la verdadera función de la pena? ¿Qué es lo que hacemos cuando penamos? Una serie de críticas ulteriores – de metanarrativas, funcionalistas o de objetividad científica – …


Constitutional Borrowing, Nelson Tebbe, Robert L. Tsai Jan 2010

Constitutional Borrowing, Nelson Tebbe, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

Borrowing from one domain to promote ideas in another domain is a staple of constitutional decisionmaking. Precedents, arguments, concepts, tropes, and heuristics all can be carried across doctrinal boundaries for purposes of persuasion. Yet the practice itself remains underanalyzed. This Article seeks to bring greater theoretical attention to the matter. It defines what constitutional borrowing is and what it is not, presents a typology that describes its common forms, undertakes a principled defense of borrowing, and identifies some of the risks involved. Our examples draw particular attention to places where legal mechanisms and ideas migrate between fields of law associated …


Profiling And Consent: Stops, Searches And Seizures After Soto, Jeffrey Fagan, Amanda Geller Jan 2010

Profiling And Consent: Stops, Searches And Seizures After Soto, Jeffrey Fagan, Amanda Geller

Faculty Scholarship

Following Soto v State (1999), New Jersey was among the first states to enter into a comprehensive Consent Decree with the U.S. Department of Justice to end racially selective enforcement on the state’s highways. The Consent Decree led to extensive reforms in the training and supervision of state police troopers, and the design of information technology to monitor the activities of the State Police. Compliance was assessed in part on the State’s progress toward the elimination of racial disparities in the patterns of highway stops and searches. We assess compliance by analyzing data on 257,000 vehicle stops on the New …


The "Principal" Reason Why The Pcaob Is Unconstitutional, Gary S. Lawson Nov 2009

The "Principal" Reason Why The Pcaob Is Unconstitutional, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The Constitution creates very few federal offices. It creates the House and Senate, the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, the President, the Vice President, and the Supreme Court--and that is it. The Constitution clearly contemplates that there will be other federal “Officers,” who the President must commission and who Congress may impeach and remove, but the document does not itself create those positions. Instead, it provides general authorization to Congress (in conjunction with the President's presentment power and the Vice President's modest voting authority) to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and …