Constitutional Law Commons^™

The Iron Rule, Jacob Bronsther, Guha Krishnamurthi

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Supreme Court's Reticent Qualified Immunity Retreat, Katherine Mims Crocker

Faculty Publications

The recent outcry against qualified immunity, a doctrine that disallows damages actions against government officials for a wide swath of constitutional claims, has been deafening. But when the Supreme Court in November 2020 and February 2021 invalidated grants of qualified immunity based on reasoning at the heart of the doctrine for the first time since John Roberts became Chief Justice, the response was muted. With initial evaluations and competing understandings coming from legal commentators in the months since, this Essay explores what these cases appear to say about qualified immunity for today and tomorrow.

The Essay traces idealistic, pessimistic, and …

Second Amendment Animus, Jacob D. Charles

Northwestern University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Brief Of Amicus Curiae Ethics And Public Policy Center In Support Of Petitioners And Reversal, Richard W. Garnett, Charles J. Cooper, Peter A. Patterson, Brian W. Barnes, John D. Ohlendorf

Court Briefs

No. 19-1392
Thomas E. Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

From the Introduction and Summary of the Argument

By the narrowest of margins, this Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), refused to overrule Roe—not because it thought Roe was correct, but because it thought Roe must endure as a matter of stare decisis. But 30 years later it has become clear that Casey, too, was egregiously wrong, for each one of the stare decisis factors cited by …

Fixing False Truths: Rethinking Truth Assumptions And Free-Expression Rationales In The Networked Era, Jared Schroeder

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

The First Amendment makes no mention of truth. Assumptions about truth, however, have become the foundations for free-expression rationales, the very bases for such freedoms in a democratic society. The Supreme Court gradually, over time, wedded Enlightenment assumptions about truth to the marketplace of ideas rationale for free expression. This Article examines, in light of massive, widespread adoption of networked technologies and AI and Supreme Court decisions that have undermined the distinctive role of truth, whether truth should be removed or replaced as a crucial, justifying concept in freedom of expression. The Article examines the marketplace approach’s history and assumptions, …

Law School News: Logan Article Central To Scotus Dissent, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

Seila Law As Separation-Of-Powers Posturing, Edward Cantu

Faculty Works

The Court rarely decides separation-of-powers cases, and when it does, academics usually scramble to fit such decisions into a broader doctrinal narrative. Such was the case when in June of 2020 the Supreme Court decided Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. In short, the Court ruled that it is unconstitutional for Congress to restrict the President’s removal power of an agency head if that agency is headed by a single person. For some reason, the Court concluded that such removal restrictions are permissible when applied to multi-headed agencies but not single-headed agencies. This Article argues that an attempt …

A Government Of Laws That Is A Government Of Men And Women, Mark Tushnet

Arkansas Law Review

I take Mark Killenbeck’s “provocative” article as an occasion for some informal comments about what Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii tell us about the saying, “a government of laws, not a government of men and women.” My basic thought is that the “not” in the saying has to be replaced “but also.” And, in some sense we have always had to have known that the saying was wrong as stated. Whatever the laws are, they don’t make themselves. Nor do they administer themselves, nor interpret themselves. Men and women appear at the stages of enactment, application, and adjudication. So, for …

A Proper Burial, Robert L. Tsai

Arkansas Law Review

In his article, Professor Mark Killenbeck defends both Korematsu v. United States and Trump v. Hawaii on their own terms, albeit on narrow grounds. He goes on to conclude that comparisons of the two decisions don’t hold up. Killenbeck has authored a thoughtful and contrarian paper, but I’m not sold. In my view, Korematsu simply isn’t worth saving; in fact, a more complete repudiation of the internment decisions is overdue. Trump v. Hawaii, too, must also be revisited at the earliest opportunity and its more alarming features that abet presidential discrimination against non-citizens rejected. Moreover, I believe that comparisons between …

Tainted Precedent, Darrell A.H. Miller

Arkansas Law Review

We have a common law system of constitutional adjudication, at least in the sense that constitutional practice in the United States relies on prior rulings rather than reasoning from first principles in each case. If there’s controlling precedent on point, it’s binding. Neither “inferior courts” in the federal system, nor state courts adjudicating federal law, are permitted to start anew with the “original public meaning” of the First Amendment or pronounce a fresh Dworkinian “moral reading” of the Fourth. Even the highest court in the land, the Supreme Court of the United States, for reasons of reputation, stability, and rule …

There Was Nothing "Neutral" About Executive Order 9066, Eric L. Muller

Arkansas Law Review

There is no more appropriate place to discuss the Japanese American cases of World War II than in the pages of the Arkansas Law Review. This is not only because Arkansas was the only state outside the Western Defense Command to host not one but two of the War Relocation Authority’s (WRA) concentration camps for Japanese Americans. It is because one of the most important lawyers to oversee the development and administration of all the WRA camps was the dean under whose leadership this law review was founded: Robert A. Leflar. Leflar’s is not a name that constitutional lawyers are …

Korematsu, Hawaii, And Pedagogy, Sanford Levinson

Arkansas Law Review

I begin with some reflections on my own career in teaching—or, perhaps, attempting to teach—American constitutional law to generations of students from 1975 to the present. Or, more accurately, until about three years ago, when I taught introductory constitutional law for the last time. I am quite happy to no longer be teaching that course, whatever joys it did provide me in the past, for a very simple reason: I became more and more frustrated by the demands of coverage, i.e., the duty to take up a variety of topics—including attendant cases and collateral materials—and the unfortunate certainty that what …

Korematsu As The Tribute That Vice Pays To Virtue, Jack M. Balkin

Arkansas Law Review

Mark Killenbeck wants to (partially) rehabilitate the reputation of one of the Supreme Court’s most despised legal decisions, Korematsu v. United States. He argues that “[w]e should accept and teach Korematsu as an exemplar of what the law regarding invidious discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, and national origin should be.” In both Korematsu (and Hirabayashi v. United States) the Court asserted that classifications based on race were subject to strict scrutiny. But “[t]he majority,” Killenbeck explains, “refused to heed their own mandate. In Hirabayashi they held that the government policy was ‘reasonable.’ In Korematsu, . . . they …

Sober Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered, Mark R. Killenbeck

Arkansas Law Review

How to best describe and treat Korematsu v. United States? A self-inflicted wound? It is certainly an exemplar of a case that in key respects tracks Justice Stephen Breyer’s caution about decisions that have “harm[ed] not just the Court, but the Nation.” Part of an “Anticanon,” resting on “little more than naked racism and associated hokum” and “embod[ying] a set of propositions that all legitimate constitutional decisions must be prepared to refute”? Perhaps. Or is it simply an opinion and result that “has long stood out as a stain that is almost universally recognized as a shameful mistake”?

Symposium: Giving Korematsu V. United States A Sober Second Thought, Nick Bell, Emily Levy, Julian Sharp

Arkansas Law Review

We are elated to present Professor Mark Killenbeck’s thought provoking article, Sober Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered. Killenbeck dives into the Korematsu opinion and its history with great care to determine whether it truly “has no place in law under the Constitution” as Chief Justice John Roberts declared in Trump v. Hawaii.1 While Korematsu’s result provides an understandable “impulse to condemn” it, Killenbeck shows us that focusing solely on the case’s result “stands apart from and in stark contrast to its most important place in the constitutional order: articulation of precepts and terminology that provide the foundations for strict scrutiny.”

“A Dollar Ain’T Much If You’Ve Got It”: Freeing Modern-Day Poll Taxes From Anderson-Burdick, Lydia Saltzbart

Journal of Law and Policy

How much should it cost to vote in the United States? The answer is clear from the Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections—nothing. Yet more than fifty years later, many U.S. voters must jump over financial hurdles to access the franchise. These hurdles have withstood judicial review because the Court has drifted away from Harper and has instead applied the more deferential Anderson-Burdick analysis to modern poll tax claims—requiring voters to demonstrate how severely the cost burdens them. As a result, direct and indirect financial burdens on the vote have proliferated. Millions of voters …

(Re)Framing Race In Civil Rights Lawyering, Anthony V. Alfieri, Angela Onwuachi-Willig

Articles

This Review examines the significance of Henry Louis Gates, Jr.'s new book, Stony the Road: Reconstruction, White Supremacy, and the Rise of Jim Crow, for the study of racism in our nation's legal system and for the regulation of race in the legal profession, especially in the everyday labor of civil-rights and poverty lawyers, prosecutors, and public defenders. Surprisingly, few have explored the relevance of the racial narratives distilled by Gates in Stony the Roa - the images, stereotypes, and tropes that Whites constructed of Blacks to deepen and ensure the life and legacy of white supremacy-to the practice …

The Varying Interpretations Of The United States Constitution, Joseph Longo

Helm's School of Government Conference - 2021-2024

The laws of these United States of America are in place to remedy the issues within and against American society by ensuring American’s citizens’ rights are protected against other citizens, organizations, and the government itself.[1] America’s founders gave future generations a framework, the supreme law of the land, to guide the path of the country in a way that they saw just.[2] The U.S. Constitution has been the framework for the American government and society for over 200 years to promote the country the founders of the nation had envisioned. The Constitutional debate today is over how this …

Getting Away With Murder: How California State Law Determined Recovery In First Roundup Cancer Case Johnson V. Monsato Co., Eliza L. Quattlebaum

Villanova Environmental Law Journal (1991 - )

No abstract provided.

The Cobra Effect: Kisor, Roberts, And The Law Of Unintended Consequences, Patrick Warczak Jr.

Akron Law Review

With its decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, the U.S. Supreme Court was expected to overturn Auer v. Robbins, under which courts are to defer to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations. This was an expected precursor to the Court eventually overturning Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., which prescribes judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes the agency administers. The Court instead chose to limit but not overturn Auer and leave Chevron untouched. This leaves lower courts with the challenge of determining when and how to properly apply Auer deference. But the Court’s decision …

Bucklew V. Precythe And The Resurgence Of The Method Of Execution Challenge, Hannah York

University of Colorado Law Review Forum

No abstract provided.

Recovering The Tort Remedy For Federal Official Wrongdoing, Gregory Sisk

Notre Dame Law Review

As the Supreme Court weakens the Bivens constitutional tort cause of action and federal officers avoid liability for unlawful behavior through qualified immunity, we should recollect the merit of the common-law tort remedy for holding the federal government accountable for official wrongdoing. For more than a century after ratification of the Constitution, federal officers who trespassed on the rights of American citizens could be held personally liable under common-law tort theories, but then routinely were indemnified by the government.

The modern Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) roughly replicates the original regime for official wrongdoing by imposing liability directly on the …

The Inconsistent Originalism Of Judge-Made Remedies Against Federal Officers, Stephen I. Vladeck

Notre Dame Law Review

Professor Carlos V´azquez and I have explained in depth why the Supreme Court’s evisceration of damages remedies for constitutional violations by federal officers is analytically and historically incoherent. And I have written elsewhere about the extent to which modern constitutional remedies doctrine has turned a remarkably blind eye to foundational principles of federalism—paying little more than lip service to the robust availability of common-law damages (and habeas) remedies against federal officers in state courts from the Founding through the Civil War—and, at least for damages, well into the twentieth century. I don’t mean to rehash (or relitigate) either argument here. …

Going Rogue: The Supreme Court's Newfound Hostility To Policy-Based Bivens Claims, Joanna C. Schwartz, Alexander Reinert, James E. Pfander

Notre Dame Law Review

In Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), the Supreme Court held that a proposed Bivens remedy was subject to an exacting special factors analysis when the claim arises in a “new context.” In Ziglar itself, the Court found the context of the plaintiffs’ claims to be “new” because, in the Court’s view, they challenged “large-scale policy decisions concerning the conditions of confinement imposed on hundreds of prisoners.” Bivens claims for damages caused by unconstitutional policies, the Court suggested, were inappropriate.

This Essay critically examines the Ziglar Court’s newfound hostility to policy-based Bivens claims. We show that an …

Bivens And The Ancien Régime, Carlos M. Vázquez

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay considers the relevance for Bivens claims of the Court’s shift to a nouveau régime to address the implication of private rights of action under statutes. Part I describes and assesses the Court’s reasons for shifting to the nouveau régime in the statutory context. Part II explains why the Court’s shift to a nouveau régime for implying damage remedies under federal statutes does not justify a similar shift with respect to constitutional remedies. The Constitution’s omission of specific remedies for violation of the Constitution’s substantive provisions does not reflect the Founders’ belief that such remedies are unnecessary to give …

Lessons For Bivens And Qualified Immunity Debates From Nineteenth-Century Damages Litigation Against Federal Officers, Andrew Kent

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay was written for a symposium marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. As the current Court has turned against Bivens—seemingly confining it to three specific contexts created by Bivens and two follow-on decisions in 1979 and 1980—scholars and litigants have developed a set of claims to respond to the Court’s critique. The Court now views the judicially created Bivens cause of action and remedy as a separation-of-powers foul; Congress is said to be the institution which should weigh the costs and benefits …

Was Bivens Necessary?, Ann Woolhandler, Michael G. Collins

Notre Dame Law Review

Some federal common-law skeptics have provided criteria for keeping federal common law in check. Although not specifically addressing Bivensactions, Professor Nelson has argued that when engaged in federal common lawmaking, federal courts should see themselves as more tied to custom, general principles of the common law, and precedent, rather than seeing themselves as engaged in a freewheeling search for the best policy. This methodology makes federal common law less subject to criticism as usurping the lawmaking roles of other government actors. Professor Merrill has argued that federal common law needs to be specifically intended by the framers of a …

A Scapegoat Theory Of Bivens, Katherine M. Crocker

Notre Dame Law Review

Some scapegoats are innocent. Some warrant blame, but not the amount they are made to bear. Either way, scapegoating can allow in-groups to sidestep social problems by casting blame onto out-groups instead of confronting such problems—and the in-groups’ complicity in perpetuating them—directly.

This Essay suggests that it may be productive to view the Bivens regime’s rise as countering various exercises in scapegoating and its retrenchment as constituting an exercise in scapegoating. The earlier cases can be seen as responding to social structures that have scapegoated racial, economic, and other groups through overaggressive policing, mass incarceration, and inequitable government conduct more …

Stare Decisis As Authority And Aspiration, Randy J. Kozel

Notre Dame Law Review

The doctrine of stare decisis remains a defining feature of American law despite challenges to its legitimacy and efficacy. Even so, there is space between the role that stare decisis currently plays and the potential that it offers. The gap is evident in the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court. Though the Justices continue to underscore the fundamental status of stare decisis, the Court’s opinions sometimes seem quick to depart from precedents whose reasoning has fallen out of favor.

Using Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents as a case study, this Article explains how the Court can invigorate the doctrine …

Reconsidering Section 1983'S Nonabrogation Of Sovereign Immunity, Katherine Mims Crocker

Faculty Publications

Motivated by civil unrest and the police conduct that prompted it, Americans have embarked on a major reexamination of how constitutional enforcement works. One important component is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows civil suits against any "person" who violates federal rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that "person" excludes states because Section 1983 flunks a condition of crystal clarity.

This Article reconsiders that conclusion--in legalese, Section 1983's nonabrogation of sovereign immunity--along multiple dimensions. Beginning with a negative critique, this Article argues that because the Court invented the crystal-clarity standard so long after Section 1983's enactment, the caselaw …