Constitutional Law Commons^™

Left With No Name: How Government Action In Intra-Church Trademark Disputes Violates The Free Exercise Clause Of The First Amendment, Mary Kate Nicholson

Washington and Lee Law Review

The United States was founded in part on the principle of freedom of religion, where citizens were free to practice any religion. The founding fathers felt so strongly about this principle that it was incorporated into the First Amendment. The Free Exercise Clause states that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” The Supreme Court later adopted the neutral principles approach to avoid Free Exercise violations resulting from courts deciding real property disputes. Without the application of the same neutral principles to intellectual property disputes between churches, however, there is …

Freedom Of Association, Extreme Partisan Gerrymandering, Justiciability And The Unmistakable Political Question Controversy, L. Darnell Weeden

Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law

No abstract provided.

The Enacted Purposes Canon, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article argues that the principle relied upon in King v. Burwell that courts "cannot interpret statutes to negate their stated purposes"-the enacted purposes canon-is and should be viewed as a bedrock element of statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court has relied upon this principle for decades, but it has done so in ways that do not call attention to this interpretive choice. As a result, the scope and patterns of the Court's reliance are easy to miss. After reconstructing the Court's practice, this Article defends this principle of interpretation on analytic, normative, and pragmatic grounds. Building on jurisprudence showing that …

The "Rational Federalist": Synthesizing Necessity And Propriety In The Sweeping Clause, Shane Magnetti

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

This Note will argue that flexibility as to what constitutes a “necessary” law combined with a rigid standard for what makes a law “proper” enables Congress to execute its enumerated powers without overreaching. Part I outlines differing scholarly theories as to the legal origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Sections A, B, and C outline the theories that the Clause stems from principles of agency law, administrative law, and corporate law, respectively. Section D examines the implied powers theory of the Clause’s genesis. Next, Part II examines the Supreme Court’s early Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence—namely McCulloch v. …

Preschool For All: Plyler V. Doe In The Context Of Early Childhood Education, Shiva Kooragayala

Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy

In its 1982 opinion in Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court held that a state could not deny undocumented children living within its borders a public and free K-12 education. This Note argues that Plyler’s protections extend to publicly-funded early childhood education programs that serve children between the ages of three and five. Due to the broad support of researchers, educators, and the general public, early childhood education programs funded by local, state, and the federal governments have become an integral part of a comprehensive public education today. While these early childhood education programs are nominally open to all students …

Physical Presence Is In No Wayfair!: Addressing The Supreme Court’S Removal Of The Physical Presence Rule And The Need For Congressional Action, Claire Shook

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

The Commerce Clause of Article I grants Congress the power to regulate commerce. In the past, an entity had to have a physical presence in a state for that state to impose taxes on the entity. Due to the changing landscape of online businesses, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in South Dakota v. Wayfair in June 2018 to remove the physical presence rule as it applied to the Commerce Clause analysis of state taxation. The Wayfair decision’s ramification is that states can now impose taxes on businesses conducting sales online without having any physical presence in those states. While the …

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Section 7: Constitutional Law, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

Financial Oversight And Management Board For Puerto Rico V. Aurelius Investment, Llc, Rafael Cox Alomar

Court Briefs

No abstract provided.

"Believe Me," We Do Not Have A Foreign Emoluments Clause Violation, Scotty N. Teal

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

President Trump was sued in New York District Court for allegedly violating the Foreign Emoluments Clause. In its brief, the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) alleged that the president's international businesses and real estate holdings positioned him to receive money from foreign governments. These business interests, or entanglements, could "sway" or create an opportunity for negative foreign influence in violation of the Emoluments Clause. CREW states that these "entanglements between American officials and foreign powers could pose a creeping, insidious threat to the Republic." CREW argued that President Trump violated the Emoluments Clause because the clause "cover[s] …

Peña-Rodriguez V. Colorado: Carving Out A Racial-Bias Exception To The No-Impeachment Rule, John Austin Morales

St. Mary's Law Journal

The Sixth Amendment safeguards an accused in criminal proceedings and affords them “the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.” Consistent with this right, the no-impeachment rule prohibits a juror from testifying after a verdict has been handed down about the jurors’ deliberations. While there are limited exceptions to the no-impeachment rule, juror expressed racial bias is not one of them. When presented with the dilemma of a juror using racial bias in deliberations, courts must weigh two competing doctrines that serve as the foundation to our judicial system: (1) affording a defendant his or her …

A Constellation Of Benefits And A Universe Of Equal Protection: The Extension Of The Right To Marry Under Pavan V. Smith, Brad Aldridge

Arkansas Law Review

In 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States in Obergefell v. Hodges recognized the constitutional right of all persons, including same-sex couples, to lawfully marry. In 2017, in Pavan v. Smith, the Court recognized that Obergefell extends that right to much more than the act of marriage in itself. Any person who would have been denied the right to marry the person of her choice before Obergefell now enjoys not only the rights of marriage licensing and recognition, but also the full “constellation” of rights and responsibilities that attend marriage among traditional opposite-sex couples. The Court believed that this …

Overruling Mcculloch?, Mark A. Graber

Arkansas Law Review

Daniel Webster warned Whig associates in 1841 that the Supreme Court would likely declare unconstitutional the national bank bill that Henry Clay was pushing through the Congress. This claim was probably based on inside information. Webster was a close association of Justice Joseph Story. The justices at this time frequently leaked word to their political allies of judicial sentiments on the issues of the day. Even if Webster lacked first-hand knowledge of how the Taney Court would probably rule in a case raising the constitutionality of the national bank, the personnel on that tribunal provided strong grounds for Whig pessimism. …

M'Culloch In Context, Mark R. Killenbeck

Arkansas Law Review

M’Culloch v. Maryland is rightly regarded as a landmark opinion, one that affirmed the ability of Congress to exercise implied powers, articulated a rule of deference to Congressional judgments about whether given legislative actions were in fact “necessary,” and limited the ability of the states to impair or restrict the operations of the federal government. Most scholarly discussions of the case and its legacy emphasize these aspects of the decision. Less common are attempts to place M’Culloch within the ebb and flow of the Marshall Court and the political and social realities of the time. So, for example, very few …

The Confusing Language Of Mcculloch V. Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (Or Meant)?, Sanford Levinson

Arkansas Law Review

All legal “interpretation” involves confrontation with inherently indeterminate language. I have distinguished in my own work between what I call the Constitution of Settlement and the Constitution of Conversation. The former includes those aspects of the Constitution that do indeed seem devoid of interpretive challenge, such as the unfortunate assignment of two senators to each state or the specification of the terms of office of representatives, senators, and presidents. I am quite happy to concede that “two,” “four,” and “six” have determinate meaning, though my concession is not based on a fancy theory of linguistics. It is, rather, a recognition …

Mcculloch At 200, David S. Schwartz

Arkansas Law Review

March 6, 2019 marked the 200th anniversary of the Supreme Court’s issuance of its decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, upholding the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States, the successor to Alexander Hamilton’s national bank. McCulloch v. Maryland involved a constitutional challenge by the Second Bank of the United States to a Maryland tax on the banknotes issued by the Bank’s Baltimore branch. The tax was probably designed to raise the Second Bank’s cost of issuing loans and thereby disadvantage it relative to Maryland’s own state-chartered banks. Marshall’s opinion famously rejected the Jeffersonian strict-constructionist argument that implied powers …

State Standing's Uncertain Stakes, Aziz Z. Huq

Notre Dame Law Review

I offer a quite modest contribution to debates on state standing. I do not offer “right answers.” Rather, I posit that it is useful to understand the “stakes” of state standing. By “stakes,” I mean the practical consequences of resolving, one way or another, the unsettled doctrinal choices respecting the ability of states to initiate a matter in federal courts. Why, that is, does state standing matter? An inquiry into stakes can usefully proceed stepwise. A first task is to identify the subset of state standing cases that presently elicit division among the Justices. A second task is to articulate …

Brief Amici Curiae Of Electronic Frontier Foundation, 1851 Center For Constitutional Law, And Profs. Jonathan Entin, David F. Forte, Andrew Geronimo, Raymond Ku, Stephen Lazarus, Kevin Francis O’Neill, Margaret Tarkington, Aaron H. Caplan, And Eugene Volokh In Support Of Respondent-Appellant, Joni Bey And Rebecca Rasawehr V. Jeffrey Rasawehr, Supreme Court Of Ohio (Case No. 2019-0295), David Forte, Stephen R. Lazarus, Kevin F. O'Neill, Jonathan L. Entin, Andrew Geronimo, Raymond Ku, Margaret Tarkington, Aaron H. Kaplan, Eugene Volokh

Law Faculty Briefs and Court Documents

The brief argues that the Third District Court of Appeals, in violation of the First Amendment, erred in upholding an injunction that barred defendant from any online postings regarding plaintiff, whether or not those postings were to plaintiff or to third parties.

Symposium: In “Gundy Ii,” Auer Survives By A Vote Of 4.6 To 4.4, Michael Herz

Online Publications

Under the “Auer doctrine,” named for the 1997 decision Auer v. Robbins, courts accept an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation unless that interpretation is clearly erroneous, or flatly inconsistent with the text of the regulation, or unreasonable, or something like that. Auer is a principle of long standing. Just how long is one of the sources of disagreement in Kisor v. Wilkie, but however you count, it is a doctrine universally understood as well-settled until relatively recently. But a revolt has been brewing.

Categorical Confusion In Personal Jurisdiction Law, Todd Peterson

Washington and Lee Law Review

In Part I, the Article discusses the history of the U.S. Supreme Court’s substantive due process limitations on personal jurisdiction and, in particular, the standards for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction before the Court’s recent cases on that issue. Part II discusses the Court’s failure to provide a convincing theoretical justification for imposing substantive due process limitations on personal jurisdiction. It also discusses the consequences of that failure in three doctrinal areas of personal jurisdiction law, the traditional basis of service on an individual in the forum state, specific jurisdiction and corporate-activities-based jurisdiction. Part III then analyzes in detail the four recent Supreme …

Chevron Deference In The States: Lessons From Three States, Carrie Townsend Ingram

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

The appointment of Justice Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court of the United States has left many wondering if a change to the Chevron doctrine is impending. Justice Gorsuch’s colleague on the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas, shares similar views on Chevron. This article will compare the federal rule to three different states: Indiana, Delaware, and Arizona. Each state has taken a different path in determining that the judiciary should not give deference to an agency’s interpretation of the statutes that it is charged with enforcing. Delaware has affirmatively declared that the Chevron doctrine is not applicable in its state. A …

The Need To Codify Roe V. Wade: A Case For National Abortion Legislation, Kathryn N. Peachman

Journal of Legislation

No abstract provided.

Compelled Commercial Speech And The First Amendment, Martin H. Redish

Notre Dame Law Review

For the most part, the First Amendment is viewed as a means of restricting government’s authority to suppress expression. Both speakers and listeners are assumed to benefit from speech, and, therefore, the more communication of opinion and information, the better it is for both society and the democratic system. However, for a variety of important reasons, the courts have extended First Amendment protection to limit government’s power to compel expression by private individuals and entities. The Court has wisely recognized that governmental compulsion to speak can often bring about many of the very same constitutional and democratic pathologies brought on …

On "Clear And Present Danger", Leslie Kendrick

Notre Dame Law Review

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dissent in United States v. Abrams gave us the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor and the “clear and present danger” test. Too often unremarked is the contradiction between the two. At the same time that Holmes says “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,” he also says that “the present danger of immediate evil” permits Congress to restrict the expression of opinion. When the anticipated harm comes about through acceptance of the speaker’s idea, then the imposition of the clear and present danger …

Equality Opportunity And The Schoolhouse Gate, Derek Black, Michelle Adams

Faculty Publications

Public schools have generated some of the most far-reaching cases to come before the Supreme Court. They have involved nearly every major civil right and liberty found in the Bill of Rights. The cases are often reflections of larger societal ills and anxieties, from segregation and immigration to religion and civil discourse over war. In that respect, they go to the core of the nation’s values. Yet constitutional law scholars have largely ignored education law as a distinct area of study and importance.

Justin Driver’s book cures that shortcoming, offering a three-dimensional view of how the Court’s education law jurisprudence …

Bakke’S Lasting Legacy: Redefining The Landscape Of Equality And Liberty In Civil Rights Law, Rachel F. Moran

Faculty Scholarship

The fortieth anniversary of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke is worth commemorating simply because the decision has survived. The United States Supreme Court’s opinion upholding the use of race in admissions has had remarkable staying power, even as other programs of affirmative action, for example, in government contracting, have been struck down as unconstitutional. That longevity might seem surprising because Bakke set forth an exacting standard of strict scrutiny under equal protection law that renders all race-based classifications suspect, whether government officials are motivated by benign or invidious purposes. That standard is one that few programs can …

Originalism And Second-Order Ipse Dixit Reasoning In Chisholm V. Georgia, D.A. Jeremy Telman

Cleveland State Law Review

This Article presents a new perspective on the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence during the Early Republic. It focuses on what I am calling second-order ipse dixit reasoning, which occurs when Justices have to decide between two incommensurable interpretive modalities. If first-order ipse dixit is unreasoned decision-making, second-order ipse dixit involves an unreasoned choice between or among two or more equally valid interpretive options. The early Court often had recourse to second-order ipse dixit because methodological eclecticism characterized its constitutional jurisprudence, and the early Court established no fixed hierarchy among interpretive modalities.

Chisholm, the pre-Marshall Court’s most important constitutional decision, illustrates …

Gamble V. United States: A Commentary, Kayla Mullen

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

Under the judicially created dual-sovereignty exception, a defendant may be prosecuted by state and federal governments for the same conduct, due to the fact that the state and federal government constitute two separate sovereignties. The doctrine is grounded in the idea that each sovereign derives its power from independent sources—the federal government from the Constitution and the states from their inherent police power, preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment—and thus, each sovereign may determine what constitutes an offense against its peace and dignity in an exercise of its own sovereignty. Under this exception, defendants, by a single act, may …

A Second Opinion: Can Windsor V. United States Survive President Trump’S Supreme Court?, Artem M. Joukov

Journal of Law and Policy

This Article examines President Donald Trump’s recent recomposition of the United States Supreme Court and the potential effects on Windsor v. United States and its progeny. The Article considers whether the shifting balance of the Court may lead to reconsideration of Windsor, particularly via attempted exploits of the weaknesses in the standard of review applied to reach the decision. The Article will conclude that while revolutionary, Windsor lacked the doctrinal clarity of its offspring, Obergefell v. Hodges, and therefore may be at greatest risk of reversal by the increasingly conservative Court. In particular, the Court may rely on the conflict …

Litigating War: The Justiciability Of Executive War Power, Chris Smith

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

Courts frequently dismiss claims against the Executive’s use of the war power as being non-justiciable political questions. This lack of a judicial check has created a situation in which meaningful checks and balances on the war power are found only in the Executive Branch itself. But the Constitution places the bulk of war powers in the hands of Congress. Executive usurpation of Congress’s constitutional prerogative to initiate hostilities has significantly weakened the separation of powers. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, Congress sought to reassert its constitutional authority over war-making decisions by passing the War Powers Resolution. The Resolution …