Constitutional Law Commons^™

Judicial Independence, William H. Rehnquist

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Legislative Restraint In The Confirmation Process, Kenneth W. Starr

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Judicial Independence And The Scope Of Article Iii--A View From The Federalist, Michael G. Collins

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Judge Keith, The Constitution And National Security From Haddad To Sinclair - The Damon J. Keith Law Collection Of African-American Legal History Wayne State University Spencer Partrich Auditorium November 18, 2003, Robert Allen Sedler

Law Faculty Research Publications

No abstract provided.

The Pace And Cause Of Change, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 357 (2004), Larry D. Kramer

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Foreword, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 317 (2004), Samuel R. Olken

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Province Of The Judiciary, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 325 (2004), William E. Nelson

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Secret Life Of The Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 441 (2004), Louis Michael Seidman

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Ironies Of Marbury V. Madison And John Marshall's Judicial Statesmanship, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 391 (2004), Samuel R. Olken

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Marbury V. Madison As The First Great Administrative Law Decision, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 481 (2004), Thomas W. Merrill

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 523 (2004), Mark Tushnet

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Judicial Independence In Virginia, W. Hamilton Bryson

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Most Rational Branch: Guinn V. Legislature And The Judiciary's Role As Helpful Arbiter Of Conflict, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

When the Nevada Supreme Court decided Guinn v. Legislature, one would have thought from reading the popular press accounts that the court had forcibly displaced the State legislature by means of a violent coup d'etat. Newspaper accounts of the decision referred to it as a usurpation of power in violation of clear constitutional language, belittling the court in language sometimes more appropriate to the baseball bleachers than to serious editorial commentary. Following suit, politicized elements of the citizenry began a recall effort (seemingly unsuccessful as of this writing) directed at the court as well as joining the chorus of criticisms. …

Functional Departmentalism And Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, Dawn E. Johnsen

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Published as part of a Duke Law School symposium on Conservative and Progressive Legal Orders, this article considers the appropriate role of the political branches - Congress and the President - in the development of constitutional meaning, including the extent of presidential and congressional authority to act on constitutional views at odds with judicial doctrine. The article discusses deficiencies in strong forms of both judicial supremacy (such as that behind the Rehnquist Court's recent limits on Congress's section 5 authority) and what is described in the academic literature as departmentalism (which emphasizes near-plenary authority for each branch to act on …

Judicial Independence: Whether, Why, And How To Defend It, Michael Boucai

Other Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Searching For The Soul Of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study Of Religious Freedom Decisions, Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, Andrew P. Morriss

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

During the past half century, constitutional theories of religious freedom have been in a state of great controversy, perpetual transformation, and consequent uncertainty. Given the vitality of religious faith for most Americans and the vigor of the enduring debate on the proper role of religious belief and practice in public society, a searching exploration of the influences upon judges in making decisions that uphold or reject claims implicating religious freedom is long overdue. Many thoughtful contributions have been to the debate about whether judges should allow their religious beliefs to surface in the exercise of their judicial role. Yet much …

Defining Democracy: The Supreme Court's Campaign Finance Dilemma, Lori A. Ringhand

Scholarly Works

On December 10, 2003 the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in McConnell v. FEC. In McConnell, the Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ("BCRA"). A divided Court, in a deeply fractured decision in which six justices wrote individual opinions, upheld the major provisions of the legislation. Yet despite the almost 300 pages of reasoning provided by the Court, and a voluminous record developed by the district court, the Justices could not agree on what purportedly is the central issue in campaign finance law: whether the challenged regulations were necessary …

The Original Meaning Of The Judicial Power, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this paper, the author refutes any claim that judicial review was invented in Marbury v. Madison, or that, because it is contrary to the original meaning of the Constitution, it must be justified by some nonoriginalist interpretive methodology. He will do so, not by discerning the shadowy and often counterfactual "intentions" of the founding generation, but by presenting as comprehensively as he can what the founders actually said during the constitutional convention, in state ratification conventions, and immediately after ratification. These statements, taken cumulatively, leave no doubt that the founders contemplated judicial nullification of legislation enacted by the …

Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party Of Minnesota V. White, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

The vast majority of judicial offices in the United States are subject to election. The votes of the people select or retain at least some judges in thirty-nine states, and all judges are elected in twenty-one states. By one count, 87% of the state and local judges in the United States have to face the voters at some point if they want to win or remain in office. Judicial elections, however, differ from elections for legislative or executive offices in a number of significant ways. In nineteen states, most judges are initially appointed but must later go before the voters …

Legislative Supremacy: Myth Or Reality?, James Oakes

Cardozo Public Law, Policy & Ethics Journal

No abstract provided.

Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure For Resolving Valuation Disputes, Keith Sharfman

Rutgers Law School (Newark) Faculty Papers

In this Article, Professor Sharfman addresses the problem of "discretionary valuation": that courts resolve valuation disputes arbitrarily and unpredictably, thus harming litigants and society. As a solution, he proposes the enactment of "valuation averaging," a new procedure for resolving valuation disputes modeled on the algorithmic valuation processes often agreed to by sophisticated private firms in advance of any dispute. He argues that by replacing the discretion of judges and juries with a mechanical valuation process, valuation averaging would cause litigants to introduce more plausible and conciliatory valuations into evidence and thereby reduce the cost of valuation litigation and increase the …

Republican Party Of Minnesota V. White: The Lifting Of Judicial Speech Restraint, David B. Bogard

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, Barry Friedman

Michigan Law Review

There are divergent views in the legal academy concerning judicial review, but at their core these views share a common (and possibly flawed) premise. The premise is that the exercise of judicial review is countermajoritarian in nature. There is a regrettable lack of clarity in the relevant scholarship about what "countermajoritarian" actually means. At bottom it often seems to be a claim, and perhaps must be a claim, that when judges invalidate governmental decisions based upon constitutional requirements, they act contrary to the preferences of the citizenry. Some variation on this premise seems to drive most normative scholarship regarding judicial …

Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review - And Why It May Not Matter, Alec Stone Sweet

Michigan Law Review

In this Article, I explore the question of why constitutional review, but not American judicial review, spread across Europe. I will also argue that, despite obvious organic differences between the American and European systems of review, there is an increasing convergence in how review actually operates. I proceed as follows. In Part I, I examine the debate on establishing judicial review in Europe, focusing on the French. In Parts II and III, I contrast the European and the American models of review, and briefly discuss why the Kelsenian constitutional court diffused across Europe. In Part IV, I argue that despite …

Moral Rights, Judicial Review, And Democracy: A Response To Horacio Spector, Laura S. Underkuffler

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Patriotism: Do We Know It When We See It?, A. Wallace Tashima

Michigan Law Review

In a small, triangular plot, a short distance north of the Capitol in Washington, D.C., is the recently dedicated "National Japanese American Memorial to Patriotism." One of the primary purposes of the memorial is to recall publicly the forced removal of Japanese Americans from the Pacific coast at the beginning of World War II and their imprisonment in government internment camps for the duration of the war. The incident is worth recalling, of course, if for no other reason than as a constant reminder that we must not let a similar tragedy befall any other group of Americans. But one …

A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus And Deference On The Supreme Court, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Over the past three decades, the Supreme Court has struck down federal statutes by a bare majority with unprecedented frequency. This Article shows that five-four decisions regularly overturning acts of Congress are a relatively recent phenomenon, whereas earlier Courts generally exercised judicial review by supermajority voting.

One option is to establish the following rule: The Supreme Court may not declare an act of Congress unconstitutional without a two-thirds majority. The Supreme Court itself could establish this rule internally, just as it has created its nonmajority rules for granting certiorari and holds, or one Justice who would otherwise be the fifth …

Reply: The Institutional Dimension Of Statutory And Constitutional Interpretation, Richard A. Posner

Michigan Law Review

Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule argue in Interpretation and lnstitutions that judicial interpretation of statutes and constitutions should take account both of the institutional framework within which interpretation takes place and of the consequences of different styles of interpretation; they further argue that this point has been neglected by previous scholars. The first half of the thesis is correct but obvious; the second half, which the authors state in terms emphatic to the point of being immodest, is incorrect. Moreover, the authors offer no feasible suggestions for how the relation between interpretation and the institutional framework might be studied better …

Interpretation And Institutions, Cass R. Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule

Michigan Law Review

Suppose that a statute, enacted several decades ago, bans the introduction of any color additive in food if that additive "causes cancer" in human beings or animals. Suppose that new technologies, able to detect low-level carcinogens, have shown that many potential additives cause cancer, even though the statistical risk is often tiny - akin to the risk of eating two peanuts with governmentally-permitted levels of aflatoxins. Suppose, finally, that a company seeks to introduce a certain color additive into food, acknowledging that the additive causes cancer, but urging that the risk is infinitesimal, and that if the statutory barrier were …

Disarming The Confirmation Process, Michael M. Gallagher

Cleveland State Law Review

To improve the current process and eliminate the bitter nature of confirmation hearings, Senators should not consider a nominee's ideology in determining whether to vote for that nominee. Ideological scrutiny lacks historical and constitutional support; it has led to repeated, prolonged battles that threaten to draw the confirmation process into a dangerous stalemate. Removing ideology from judicial nominations would return the confirmation process to its original understanding, one in which the President enjoys the dominant role. Those who argue that allowing the President, not the Senate, to consider a nominee's ideology would harm the federal judiciary and ignore the nature …