Constitutional Law Commons^™

Where Do We Draw The Line? Partisan Gerrymandering And The State Of Texas, Whitney M. Eaton

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Why Legislative Findings Can Pad-Lock Redistricting Plans In Racial-Gerrymandering Cases, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1371 (2006), Frank Adams

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Making Our Congressional Elections More Competitive; A Proposal For A Limited Number Of Statewide At-Large Elections In Our More Populous States, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1425 (2006), Walter M. Frank

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Preclearance, Discrimination, And The Department Of Justice: The Case Of South Carolina, Guy-Uriel Charles, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Limiting The Presidency To Natural Born Citizens Violates Due Process, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1343 (2006), Paul A. Clark

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Reflections On Bush V. Gore: The Role Of The United States Supreme Court, David Boies

Florida A & M University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Foreword: Representation Without Party: Lessons From State Constitutional Attempts To Control Gerrymandering, James A. Gardner

Journal Articles

Since the founding, all gerrymandering of election districts, at both the state and congressional levels, has been accomplished by state actors operating almost exclusively under state law. State constitutions have often served as a first line of defense against publicly disfavored practices, and the treatment of gerrymandering is no exception. The state constitutional record reveals a gradual introduction, diffusion, and evolution of a wide variety of provisions intended to control gerrymandering, including requirements of contiguity, compactness, respect for local political boundaries, and preservation of communities of interest, among others. Indeed, such provisions have been validated by the U.S. Supreme Court …

The End Of Preclearance As We Knew It: How The Supreme Court Transformed Section 5 Of The Voting Rights Act, Peyton Mccrary, Christopher Seaman, Richard Valelly

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

This Article’s analysis reveals that by the 1990s the intent, or purpose, prong of Section 5 had become the dominant basis for objections to discriminatory voting changes. During that decade an astonishing 43 percent of all objections were, according to this assessment, based on discriminatory purpose alone. Thus, a key issue for Congress in determining how to deal with the preclearance requirement of the Act due to expire in 2007-assuming it seeks to restore the protection of minority voting rights that existed before January 2000-is whether to revise the language of Section 5 so as to restore the long-accepted definition …

Getting The Math Right, Paul H. Edelman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Over the last 40 years of one person, one vote jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has distilled a stable and predictable test for resolving the basic numerical issue in equal representation: how much population difference between districts is permissible? Yet there remains one area of representation into which the Court has refused to venture: apportionment of Congress. In its only opinion on the mechanics of the decennial of apportionment, the Court deferred to Congress. It deferred because, unlike districting, it could not find a single workable measure for apportionment. But the reason it could not find such a measure was that …

Regulating Section 527 Organizations, Gregg D. Polsky, Guy-Uriel E. Charles

Scholarly Works

In this Essay, we consider whether the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has the authority to regulate independent 527 organizations (e.g., Swiftboat Veterans for Truth, Moveon.org, etc.) as political committees under the Federal Election Campaign Act. This issue, which was hotly debated during the last election cycle when it was considered and ultimately tabled by the FEC, is an extremely complex one that requires a deep understanding of election, tax, administrative, and constitutional law. After considering how these areas of law intersect, we conclude that the FEC lacks the authority to regulate independent 527 organizations as political committees.

The Case For Federal Anti-Gerrymandering Legislation, Brian O'Neill

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Partisan gerrymandering is a political tradition the United States can no longer afford. Due in part to the effects of partisan gerrymandering, very few congressional elections are meaningfully competitive. This Note argues that partisan gerrymandering damages both the quality of American democracy and the federal system of the United States. This Note concludes that the important federal interests at stake warrant action by Congress to halt partisan gerrymandering. The Note further concludes that any action by Congress should incorporate the principles of federalism by resisting the temptation to micromanage and Congress should instead require state commissions to draft the boundaries …

The Judicial Nominations Wars, William P. Marshall

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Campaign Finance Reform, Electioneering Communications, And The First Amendment: Resuscitating The Third Exception, 38 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1315 (2005), Daniel B. Roth

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Regulating Section 527 Organizations, Guy-Uriel Charles, Gregg D. Polsky

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Return Of Spending Limits: Campaign Finance After Landell V. Sorrell, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

On August 18, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the First Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, does not preclude mandatory limitations on campaign expenditures.In Landell v. Sorrell, the court concluded that limitations imposed by the state of Vermont on candidate spending in state election campaigns are "supported by [the state's] compelling interests in safeguarding Vermont's democratic process from 1) the corruptive influence of excessive and unbridled fundraising and 2) the effect that perpetual fundraising has on the time of candidates and elected officials.^" To …

A Post-Vieth Strategy For Litigating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims, James A. Gardner

Journal Articles

No abstract provided.

Campaign Finance Reform And The Social Inequality Paradox, Yoav Dotan

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The recent landmark decision by the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC opens the way for new and more decisive regulation of the vast amounts of private and corporate money poured into the political system. However, the theoretical grounds for campaign finance regulation - as reflected in the Court's opinion - remain highly perplexing. The purpose of the current article is to tie together the evolving constitutional principle of equality in election with modern process theory and to apply them to the field of campaign finance. The inherent tension between the stringent requirement for political equality on the one hand …

Rethinking Campaign-Finance Reform: The Pressing Need For Deregulation And Disclosure, 38 J. Marshall L. Rev. 633 (2004), Cecil C. Kuhne Iii

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Is There A First Amendment Defense For Bush V. Gore , Abner S. Greene

Faculty Scholarship

Could so many well-established scholars be wrong? Is it possible that Bush v. Gore is defensible, after all? The two pillars of the decision-the Equal Protection Clause justification for the merits holding and the "safe harbor" remedial ruling - indeed seem weak. The alternative merits view-that the Florida Supreme Court had engaged in statutory amendment under the guise of statutory interpretation, thus violating Article II of the federal Constitution-runs aground against the plausible (albeit not necessarily correct) readings of the state high court. If one agrees that these merits and remedial arguments are indefensible, then mustn't one agree with the …

Republican Party Of Minnesota V. White: The Lifting Of Judicial Speech Restraint, David B. Bogard

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Campain-Finance Crucible: Is Laissez Fair?, Jamin B. Raskin

Michigan Law Review

The 2001 passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ("BCRA"), popularly known as "McCain-Feingold," set the stage for a momentous constitutional conflict in the United States Supreme Court in the 2003-04 Term. Among other things, the new legislation bans "soft money" contributions to the national political parties by corporations, labor unions, and individuals; prohibits state parties that are authorized to accept such contributions to spend the proceeds on activities related to federal elections; forbids federal candidates to participate in raising soft money; doubles the amount of "hard money" an individual can contribute in a federal election from $1,000 to $2,000 …

Beggars Can't Be Voters: Why Washington's Felon Re-Enfranchisement Law Violates The Equal Protection Clause, Jill E. Simmons

Washington Law Review

The Washington State Constitution denies persons convicted of felonies the right to vote until their civil rights have been restored. Civil rights are restored when offenders complete all aspects of their sentence, including paying the legal-financial obligations imposed at sentencing. Payment of legal-financial obligations presents a significant hurdle to offenders trying to reclaim their right to vote. According to the Washington Department of Corrections, roughly 46,500 offenders in Washington have not had their right to vote restored solely because of unpaid legal-financial obligations. The right to vote is a fundamental right secured by the United States Constitution, yet the United …

Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, And The First Amendment Right Of Association, Guy-Uriel Charles

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Lame Ducks Of Marbury, John Copeland Nagle

Journal Articles

The election of 1800 was one of the most contested - and important - in American history. After it became clear that neither President John Adams nor a Federalist majority in Congress had been reelected, they acted during the lame-duck period to preserve their influences far into the future. They did so by appointing John Marshall as Chief Justice, ratifying the Treaty with France, creating numerous new federal judicial positions, and filling many of those positions with friends, family, and Federalists (including William Marbury). Not surprisingly, Jefferson and his supporters protested these actions as contrary to the will of the …

Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: A Review Of Voting With Dollars, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

On March 27, 2002, President George W. Bush signed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA") into law. The culmination of a six-year legislative and political struggle, BCRA works the most comprehensive change in federal campaign finance law in nearly three decades. BCRA addresses a broad range of issues, including soft money, issue-advocacy advertising, fundraising on federal property, campaign activities of foreign nationals, and penalties for violation of campaign finance laws. Enacted in the face of intense political opposition, BCRA, if it stands up in court, is a significant reform achievement.

Or is it? BCRA closely follows the main …

Insubstantial Questions And Federal Jurisdiction: A Footnote To The Term-Limits Debate, Jonathan L. Entin

Nevada Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The Supreme Court's Misplaced Concern With Selective Fairness: Bush V. Gore And Three Analogies To Grading Dilemmas, William K.S. Wang

Journal of Legal Education

No abstract provided.

Easing The Spring: Strict Scrutiny And Affirmative Action After The Redistricting Cases, Pamela S. Karlan

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Neutralizing The Incompetent Voter: A Comment On Cook V. Gralike, James A. Gardner

Journal Articles

No abstract provided.

Congressional Power Over Presidential Elections: Lessons From The Past And Reforms For The Future, Dan T. Coenen, Edward J. Larson

Scholarly Works

Presidential election controversies are nothing new. They have plagued our republic since 1801, when the fourth election for the office ended in a muddle that nearly deprived the rightful winner of the presidency. Each controversy has led to calls for reform. In every instance, the cryptic and troublesome constitutional text has hampered congressional efforts to correct the problems. Simply stated, the Constitution offers little explicit guidance on when and how Congress can regulate the selection of the President. In this Article, we explore the implications of this textual deficiency, looking both at what Congress has done in the past and …