Constitutional Law Commons^™

Beyond Absolutism: Legal Institutions In The War On Terror, Peter Margulies

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Reflections On Standing: Challenges To Searches And Seizures In A High Technology World, José F. Anderson

All Faculty Scholarship

Among the profound issues that surround constitutional criminal procedure is the obscure often overlooked issue of who has standing to challenge an illegal search, seizure or confession. Privacy interests are often overlooked because without a legal status that allows a person to complain in court, there is no way to challenge whether one is constitutionally protected from personal invasions. Standing is that procedural barrier often imposed to prevent a person in a case from objecting to improper police conduct because of his or her relationship of ownership, proximity, location, or interest in an item searched or a thing seized. Although …

Changing Expectations Of Privacy And The Fourth Amendment, Robert Power

ExpressO

Public attitudes about privacy are central to the development of fourth amendment doctrine in two respects. These are the two “reasonableness” requirements, which define the scope of the fourth amendment (it protects only “reasonable” expectations of privacy), and provide the key to determining compliance with its commands (it prohibits “unreasonable” searches and seizures). Both requirements are interpreted in substantial part through evaluation of societal norms about acceptable levels of privacy from governmental intrusions. Caselaw, poll data, newspaper articles, internet sites, and other vehicles for gauging public attitudes after the September 11 attacks indicate that public concerns about terrorism and the …

Halbert V. Michigan: The Application Of The Douglas-Ross Dichotomy In Constitutionalizing Indigency In States’ Appellate Court Processes, Omari O. Jackson

ExpressO

This note centers on a discussion of the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Halbert v. Michigan case. This case addressed the issue of whether an indigent defendant is entitled to assistance of counsel by the state to file a leave for appeal. The Court, in a 6-3 decision, held that an indigent defendant is entitled to assistance of counsel when an appeal is available by leave of the court. Prior decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court have addressed the issue of assistance of counsel during the trial and appellate stage of litigation. This note will present a historical …

Enforcing Fourth Amendment Rights Through Federal Habeas Corpus, Steven Semeraro

ExpressO

This article reassesses the use of federal habeas corpus to enforce the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court prohibited virtually all substantive review of search-and-seizure claims in federal habeas proceedings. A wave of critical commentary followed, arguing that there was no legitimate reason to distinguish the Fourth Amendment from other constitutional rights. In recent years, however, this anomaly in habeas corpus practice has gone almost entirely unexamined despite dramatic changes in the law governing both the Fourth Amendment and habeas corpus itself.

This article does two things. First, it reviews the history …

Fixing The Constable's Blunder: Can One Trial Judge In One County In One State Nudge A Nation Beyond The Exclusionary Rule?, H. Mitchell Caldwell

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Legality Of Governmental Responses To Terrorism And The Dichotomous Characterization Of Terrorists As Criminals Or Enemy Combatants, Gregory E. Maggs

ExpressO

This article argues that the United States and other nations ought to create specialized laws to regulate governmental responses to terrorism, rather than debating whether the current laws of war or the current rules of law enforcement should apply. These specialized laws would see terrorism as a problem that sometimes lies between traditional crime and traditional warfare, and would establish rules designed to address governmental responses to it.

Misplaced Angst---Another Look At Consent-Search Jurisprudence, Daniel R. Williams

ExpressO

Conventional scholarship misunderstands the judicial invocation of voluntariness when evaluating a purported consensual search. The key is to nail down more precisely what we mean by the term, consent. Most commentators mistakenly entwine consent and waiver, wrongly treating the act of consenting (to a search, to questioning, etc.) as an instance where the actor is waiving a constitutional right. That conceptual error promotes the view that consent refers to a subjective condition, a psychological state, which, in turn, spurs the expectation that voluntariness refers to a person's inner experience. On this view of consent, the person's inner experience is what …

The Suffocation Of Free Speech Under The Gravity Of Danger Of Terrorism, Tim Davis

ExpressO

On July 14, 2005, Ali al-Timimi was sentenced to life in prison plus 70 years for acts of pure speech. The United States government contended that Timimi, through his lectures and direct personal appeals, induced and/or aided and abetted local Muslim men to leave the country and pursue jihad training with the intent to defend the Taliban against all potential enemies, including the United States. Buried in nearly 200 pages of jury instructions was a single paragraph that unceremoniously described the law of protected speech under Brandenburg v. Ohio. At first blush, Brandenburg seemed to unequivocally lay down the rule …

Torture: Considering A Framework For Limiting Use, Scott J. Goldberg

ExpressO

Abu Graib, Guantanamo, the War on Terror—the debate over the use of torture is still very much alive in the world today. The debate can be divided into two questions: (1) whether there should be an actual absolute ban where torture is never allowed either ethically or legally, and (2) if torture should be allowed under certain circumstances what form of regulation is best able to ensure that it is used only in those most limited circumstances. Currently, there is an absolute ban in place, yet world leaders, applying a case-by-case utilitarian approach, in fact permit the use of torture …

American Indians, Crime, And The Law, Kevin K. Washburn

Michigan Law Review

This Article evaluates the federal Indian country criminal justice regime, not against norms of Indian law and policy, but against those of criminal law and policy. Specifically, this Article evaluates the federal constitutional norms that lie at the heart of American criminal justice and that are designed to ensure the legitimacy of federal criminal trials. Toward that end, Part I presents a critical description of key facets of the federal Indian country criminal justice system. Part II begins the critical evaluation by evaluating a key institutional player in the federal system, the federal prosecutor. It highlights the handicaps faced by …

The Price Of Pretrial Release: Can We Afford To Keep Our Fourth Amendment Rights?, Melanie D. Wilson

Scholarly Articles

The Fourth Amendment serves an important constitutional function. It protects the privacy of Americans from intrusions on their personal security. Few rights are held more sacred. When a person is arrested and faces the real likelihood of pretrial detention in jail, the person risks not only a reduction in his privacy rights, but also a loss of his liberty. In such circumstances, the arrested person should be able to bargain away some of his Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for the additional freedoms associated with release to home.

Undoubtedly, defendants forced to choose between incarceration and Fourth Amendment rights will …

Manson V. Brathwaite: The Supreme Court's Misunderstanding Of Eyewitness Identification, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 539 (2006), Ruth Yacona

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Adjudicated On The Merits?: Why The Aedpa Requires State Courts To Exhibit Their Reasoning, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 995 (2006), Ezra Spilke

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Dostoyevsky And The Therapeutic Jurisprudence Confession, 40 J. Marshall L. Rev. 41 (2006), Amy D. Ronner

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Second Chance For Justice: Reevaluation Of The United States Double Jeopardy Standard, 40 J. Marshall L. Rev. 371 (2006), Andrea Koklys

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, And The Supreme Court: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Joan S. Meier

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The Supreme Court’s consolidated decision in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana offers something for everyone: by “splitting the difference” between the two cases—affirming one and reversing the other—the opinion provides much grist for advocates’ mills on both sides of this issue. While advocates for defendants’ rights are celebrating the opinion’s continued revitalization of the right to confrontation, which began in Crawford v. Washington, advocates for victims have cause for celebration as well: the decision is notable for its reflection of the Court’s growing—albeit incomplete— awareness and understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence and their implications for justice. …

Stevens's Ratchet: When The Court Should Decide Not To Decide, Joel A. Flaxman

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Hidden underneath the racy death penalty issues in Kansas v. Marsh lurks a seemingly dull procedural issue addressed only in separate opinions by Justices Stevens and Scalia: whether the Court should have heard the case in the first place. As he did in three cases from the Court’s 2005 term, Justice Stevens argued in Marsh that the Court has no legitimate interest in reviewing state court decisions that overprotect federal constitutional rights. Instead, the Supreme Court should exercise its certiorari power to tip the scales against states and in favor of individuals. Granting certiorari in Marsh, Stevens argued, was not …

The High Court Remains As Divided As Ever Over The Death Penalty, George H. Kendall

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

More than three decades ago, in Furman v. Georgia, a sharply divided Supreme Court struck down all existing capital punishment schemes be-cause the results they generated were arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasoned. No member of that Court remains on the Court today, and the Court has grown increasingly conservative ever since. Nevertheless, impor-tant questions concerning the administration of capital punishment continue to wrought deep divisions within the Court, for instance in determining whether racial bias influences the system, in determining the sufficiency of new evidence of innocence to justify review of a defaulted claim in habeas corpus proceedings, in determining a …

Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana, Andrew C. Fine

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Clarification of the Supreme Court’s newly minted interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was desperately needed, and Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana promised to provide it. Two terms earlier, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court had worked a revolutionary transformation of Confrontation Clause analysis by overruling Ohio v. Roberts and severing the link between hearsay jurisprudence and the Clause. Crawford was hailed by the criminal defense bar, since it seemed to presage a sharp reduction in the frequency of so-called “victimless” trials by holding that “testimonial” hearsay, no matter how reliable, was constitutionally inadmissible in the absence of …

Davis And Hammon: A Step Forward, Or A Step Back?, Tom Lininger

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and lower court judges hoped that the Supreme Court’s ruling in the consolidated cases of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereafter simply Davis) would provide a primer on testimonial hearsay. In retrospect, these hopes were somewhat unrealistic. The Davis ruling could not possibly clear up all the confusion that followed Crawford v. Washington, the landmark 2004 case in which the Court strengthened the right of the accused to confront declarants of testimonial hearsay. In Davis, the Court focused on the facts under review and developed a taxonomy that will be useful in similar cases, but …

Still "Left In The Dark": The Confrontation Clause And Child Abuse Cases After Davis V. Washington, Anthony J. Franze, Jacob E. Smiles

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In his concurring opinion in Crawford v. Washington, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for holding that the Confrontation Clause applies to “testimonial” statements but leaving for “another day” any effort to define sufficiently what “testimonial” means. Prosecutors and defendants, he said, “should not be left in the dark in this manner.” Over the next two years, both sides grappled with the meaning of testimonial, each gleaning import from sections of Crawford that seemingly proved their test was the right one. When the Court granted certiorari in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereinafter Davis), hopes were high that …

Putting The Guesswork Back Into Capital Sentencing, Sean D. O'Brien

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court deemed it “incon-testable” that a death sentence is cruel and unusual if inflicted “by reason of [the defendant’s] race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.” Arbitrary and discriminatory patterns in capital sentencing moved the Court to strike down death penalty statutes that required judges or juries to cast thumbs-up or thumbs-down verdicts against offenders found guilty of capi-tal crimes. The issue of innocence was barely a footnote in Furman; the Court’s concerns focused on …

The Revolution Enters The Court: The Constitutional Significance Of Wrongful Convictions In Contemporary Constitutional Regulation Of The Death Penalty, Jordan Steiker

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Over the last decade, the most important events in American death pen-alty law have occurred outside the courts. The discovery of numerous wrongfully convicted death-sentenced inmates in Illinois led to the most substantial reflection on the American death penalty system since the late 1960s and early 1970s. Former Illinois Governor George Ryan, a Republi-can, first declared a moratorium on executions in 2000 and eventually commuted all 167 inmates on Illinois’s death row in 2003. The events in Illinois reverberated nationwide. Almost overnight, state legislative agendas shifted from expanding or maintaining the prevailing reach of the death penalty to studying its …

Legitimizing Error, Rebecca E. Woodman

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Since Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court has sought to harmonize competing constitutional demands under Eighth Amendment rules regulat-ing the two-step eligibility and selection stages of the capital decision-making process. Furman’s demand for rationality and consistency requires that, at the eligibility stage, the sentencer’s discretion be limited and guided by clear and objective fact-based standards that rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. The selection stage requires a determination of whether a specific death-eligible defendant actually deserves that punish-ment, as distinguished from other death-eligible defendants. Here, fundamental fairness and respect for the uniqueness of the individual are the cornerstones of …

Circling Around The Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not A Robust Right, Lisa Kern Griffin

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The Supreme Court’s consolidated ruling in United States v. Davis and United States v. Hammon is a classic of the genre of consensus opinions to which the Roberts Court aspired in its first, transitional term. The opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, contains practical accommodations unusual in a decision by the Court’s fiercest proponent of first principles. The restraint that characterized the term is, of course, more about considerations of logistics (including the desire to avoid re-arguments after the mid-term replacement of Justice O’Connor) than about the alignment of logic. Because it reflects temporary institutional constraints rather than intellectual agreement, the …

Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana: Beating Expectations, Robert P. Mosteller

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

I begin with a question of effectiveness: does the new Confrontation Clause doctrine effectively protect defendants with respect to the most im-portant types of problematic out-of-court statements? Although they leave much room for the introduction of hearsay in the immediate aftermath of crime generally, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (together hereinafter Davis) are better opinions from that broad perspective than I had feared. The new doctrine now covers and provides substantial procedural protection for a very important class of problematic hearsay—statements made to government agents investigating past crime.

Circling Around The Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not A Robust Right, Lisa Kern Griffin

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s consolidated ruling in United States v. Davis and United States v. Hammon is a classic of the genre of consensus opinions to which the Roberts Court aspired in its first, transitional term. The opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, contains practical accommodations unusual in a decision by the Court’s fiercest proponent of first principles. The restraint that characterized the term is, of course, more about considerations of logistics (including the desire to avoid re-arguments after the mid-term replacement of Justice O’Connor) than about the alignment of logic. Because it reflects temporary institutional constraints rather than intellectual agreement, the …

Limiting The Presidency To Natural Born Citizens Violates Due Process, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1343 (2006), Paul A. Clark

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Dickerson V. United States: The Case That Disappointed Miranda's Critics - And Then Its Supporters, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

It is difficult, if not impossible, to discuss Dickerson1 intelligently without discussing Miranda whose constitutional status Dickerson reaffirmed (or, one might say, resuscitated). It is also difficult, if not impossible, to discuss the Dickerson case intelligently without discussing cases the Court has handed down in the five years since Dickerson was decided. The hard truth is that in those five years the reaffirmation of Miranda's constitutional status has become less and less meaningful. In this chapter I focus on the Court's characterization of statements elicited in violation of the Miranda warnings as not actually "coerced" or "compelled" but obtained merely …