Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Disclosure Of The Irrelevant? –Impact Of The Sec’S Final Proxy Voting Disclosure Rules, Brian D. Stewart

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Multinational Enforcement Of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need For The Clear And Restrained Scope Of Extraterritorial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction., Kun Young Chang

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Corporate Responsibility And The Regulation Of Corporate Lawyers, James M. Mccauley

Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business

On July 30, 2002, in an effort to demonstrate to the American public a resolve to crack down on corporate scandals such as Enron, Adelphia, WorldCom, and Global Crossing, President Bush signed into law the “Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002”. Proclaiming that the new law will restore investor confidence, reform the oversight of public accounting and increase the transparency of corporate financial statements…

The Overwhelming Case For Elimination Of The Integration Doctrine Under The Securities Act Of 1933, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The thesis of this Article is that the Securities and Exchange Commission should entirely eliminate the integration doctrine from the Securities Act of1933. Under the integration doctrine, a single "offering" or "issue" of securities cannot be split. The doctrine is expensive for society and furthers no valid policy of the 1933 Act. More specifically, the doctrine does not promote investor protection but does retard capital formation, an outcome that is contrary to the presently articulated purposes of the 1933 Act.

Part II of this Article traces the history of the adoption of the integration doctrine both by the Commission and …

A Tribute To Sec Chairman Arthur Levitt: Inaugural A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecturer In Corporate Securities & Financial Law, John D. Ferrick

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Costs Paid With Other People's Money - Inaugural Address, A.A. Sommer, Jr. Annual Lecture In Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, Arthur Levitt

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

The Resolution Of Securities Disputes, Constantine N. Katsoris

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

The Sec's "Fair Value" Standard For Mutual Fund Investment In Restricted Shares And Other Illiquid Securities , Janet Kiholm Smith Dr.

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

The "Possession Vs. Use" Debate In The Context Of Securities Trading By Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never Be Golden, Donna M. Nagy

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Traditional insiders occupy a very special position in the scheme of federal securities regulation. However, in a misguided quest for a single answer to the possession vs. use debate, courts, commentators, and even the SEC have tended to marginalize the significant differences between traditional insiders and other securities traders who may possess material nonpublic information. In the aftermath of the circuit court decisions in United States v. Smith and Securities and Exchange Commission v. Adler, courts and the SEC should follow a categorical approach in addressing the possession vs. use question, and should recognize that silence can never be golden …

Trends In The Regulation Of Investment Companies And Investment Advisers, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

Statutes, rules and enforcement actions are tea leaves we can read to predict future trends of mutual fund regulation. While statutes and rules are specific, the trends they signify are far more speculative. This Essay engages in such speculation to envision the long-term implications of the recent new N- 1A disclosure form, I the plain English Rule,² and the profile. ³ More generally, the Essay speculates on future trends in Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") enforcement, and predicts a continued and stronger use of informal enforcement by the Commission.

The Impact Of Nsmia On Small Issuers, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Small businesses may account for 40% of the business activities in this country, but capital formation rules always have discriminated against small businesses and imposed rules that make it unreasonably difficult for small companies to exploit external sources of capital. NSMIA, through its broad statutory delegation to the SEC of the right to expand the preemption of state blue sky laws, provides a unique opportunity for the Commission to deliver much-needed and much-deserved help to small issuers engaged in capital formation and to finally break the hegemonic hold states have over the rules governing capital formation by small businesses. Society …

Institutional Investors: Agents Of Change, James E. Heard

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Organized Labor As Shareholder Activist: Building Coalitions To Promote Worker Capitalism, Marleen A. O'Connor

University of Richmond Law Review

In the past, the traditional question posed by unions was: "which side are you on?"--presenting a clear choice between labor and capital. As membership and bargaining power fall, however, unions are asserting their rights as shareholders to influence corporate decision making outside the conventional labor law framework. Because the National Labor Relations Act does not adequately protect workers' rights, unions have devised innovative methods as shareholders to exercise unprecedented power over managers. In only a few years, labor-shareholders have become highly visible players in the institutional shareholder movement. As a group, labor-shareholders submit one of the largest numbers of shareholder …

Reflections On Executive Compensation And A Modest Proposal For (Further) Reform, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Sec And The Future Of Corporate Governance, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Pros And Cons Of A Self-Regulatory Organization For Advisers And Mutual Funds, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

Congress is seriously considering bills to establish self-regulatory organizations (SROs) for investment advisers (advisers) and investment companies (Funds). These bills would require members of the investment management industry to regulate themselves under the watchful eye of the Securities and Exchange Commission, similar in approach to the regulation of broker-dealers by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) and the securities exchanges. Proposals to establish SRO for investment advisers have arisen before. However, those proposals did not cover Funds and their advisers,

Untenable Status Of Corporate Governance Listing Standards Under The Securities Exchange Act, Douglas C. Michael

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

United States securities markets operate under a system of supervised self-regulation created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). That system includes substantive regulation of the traders and the issuers of securities traded in those markets through the use of listing standards.

These listing standards have a unique status. They are part of a self-regulatory system, but are not classic self-regulation. The markets do not govern the traders of which it consists; rather, it governs outsiders—the issuers. The markets and the Securities and Exchange Commissions have sought to control issuers in ways not clearly related to trading in …

Annual Survey Of Virginia Law: Business And Corporate Law, George Clemon Freeman Iii.

University of Richmond Law Review

This article surveys major developments between May, 1991 and June 1, 1992 that affect business and corporate law in Virginia. Part I discusses major decisions in United States courts. Part II reviews major decisions in Virginia courts. Part III summarizes laws enacted by the Virginia General Assembly during the 1992 Session.

Reinventing The Outside Director: An Agenda For Institutional Investors, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman

Faculty Scholarship

Managerialist rhetoric puts the institutional investor between a rock and a hard place. The institutional investor is depicted as a paper colossus, alternatively greedy and mindless, but in all events a less important corporate constituency than that other kind of investor, the "real" shareholder. The unspoken corollary is that, regardless of the institution's investment strategy, its interests may appropriately be ignored.

An institution that trades stock frequently is considered a short-term shareholder without a stake in the future of the corporation. According to the familiar argument, the short-term shareholder has no more legitimate claim on management's attention than does a …

An Economic Justification For Corporate Reorganizations, Charles Adams

Articles, Chapters in Books and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

The Defensive And Offensive Use Of "Poison Pills" Within The Business Judgment Rule, Wendy B. Gayle

University of Richmond Law Review

Corporate directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders as a result of their position of control. In general, the standard for the duty of care owed by a director is one of a prudent person in similar circumstances. The duty of loyalty prohibits directors from engaging in self-dealing transactions and acts of bad faith.

Antitakeover Legislation: Not Necessary, Not Wise, Jeffrey A. Johnson

Cleveland State Law Review

This Note will consider the merits of antitakeover legislation with special emphasis on legislative proposals which, like second generation state takeover statutes, would subject tender offers to the approval of shareholders. But discussion and analysis are also applicable to federal proposals which seek to restrict takeovers through regulatory restrictions rather than a shareholder vote, as well as to second generation state takeover statutes. The view taken herein is that all antitakeover legislation, whether at the federal or state level, is neither necessary nor wise. In part II, this Note will examine the proposed antitakeover legislation which prescribes procedures for shareholder …

Of Lollipops And Law -- A Proposal For A National Policy Concerning Tender Offer Defenses, Ted J. Fiflis

Publications

Early last year, Mesa Petroleum Company made a tender offer for shares of Unocal Corporation in an effort to take over Unocal. Unocal responded by using the "lollipop" defense, which is a discriminatory issuer self-tender offer. Unocal's use of this defense resulted in huge economic losses to many of Unocal's small shareholders who were not knowledgeable about the ramifications of their participation or non-participation in the tender offer. The Delaware Supreme Court upheld Unocal's use of this defense as an appropriate exercise of business judgment. A federal district court in California refused to strike down the lollipop under federal law …

The Plight Of Small Issuers (And Others) Under Regulation D: Those Nagging Problems That Need Attention, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Regulation D traces its roots to section 4(2) and section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933. Both of these sections are designed to relieve an issuer from the pains of registration under the 1933 Act in situations where Congress deemed such registration inappropriate. Therefore, under section 4(2), no registration is required for "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering." Section 3(b) is not a self-executing exemption but instead permits the Securities and Exchange Commission to enact rules and regulations exempting issuers from registration requirements "if it finds that ... [registration] is not necessary in the public interest …

Panterv. Marshall Field & Co.: The Good Faith Standard For Corporate Directors, Lavinia A. James

University of Richmond Law Review

Corporate directors traditionally have been immunized from liability for corporate actions involving questions of policy or "business judgment," if such actions are taken in the exercise of due care, in good faith, and in compliance with applicable fiduciary duties. Judicial review of decisions made by corporate boards of directors in unsolicited takeovers generally has been barred by this business judgment rule. A recent challenge to this precept was brought in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., a Seventh Circuit decision which highlighted many of the issues surrounding application of the business judgment rule in the context of a take-over attempt.

Investment Company Advertising, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

SEC Regulation has changed from specific guidelines for advertisers to a general antifraud provision. Despite greater latitude, conflicts may arise between the commission's regulation and first amendment protection of commercial speech.

Choice Of Federal Or State Law For Attorneys' Professional Responsibility In Securities Matters, Ted J. Fiflis

Publications

Professional standards of duty are implicated in the federal securities laws in two types of cases: those instituted by the SEC to impose sanctions for lack of character or unethical conduct and those brought by the SEC or private parties for violations of substantive provisions of the securities laws. The question faced by Professor Fiflis is whether state or federal standards should define the duties imposed under these laws. He argues that the proper method of resolving this question is to apply an interest analysis. Analyzing the various state and federal interests leads Professor Fiflis to the conclusion that federal …

Standing Under Section 14(E) Of The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934: May A Tender Offeror Sue For Injunctive Relief?, James A. Scaduto

Fordham Urban Law Journal

This Note examines certain legal issues arising out of the increasing popularity of cash tender offers as a means for gaining control of public companies. Specifically, this Note will examine The Williams Act and its protection against possible fraud committed by parties attempting to use cash tender offers to take control of a company. Next, the Note will review the U.S. Supreme Court decision Piper Aircraft, Inc. v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. to see if a tender offeror can sue for damages under section 14(e) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 if it is defrauded by another tender offeror.

Stock Appreciation Rights And The Sec: A Case Of Questionable Rulemaking, Stuart R. Cohn

UF Law Faculty Publications

A stock appreciation rights (SARs) program is a form of deferred incentive compensation. Grantees are awarded SAR-units representing an equal number of the grantor’s equity shares currently being traded in public markets. SARs provide grantees the benefit of stock ownership without equity interest, investment, or risk of loss. Stock appreciation rights programs offer various advantages over other forms of executive compensation and have grown rapidly in number. These advantages include the availability of benefits without the requirement of monetary payments, the utilization of SARs as an interest-free form of financing the purchase of stock under tandem stock option programs, the …

Insider Transactions Under The 1940 Act, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.