Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Recent Developments Concerning Preferred Stockholder Rights Under Delaware Law, Marilyn Blumberg Cane, Joong-Sik Choi, Scott B. Gitterman

Faculty Scholarship

This is a timely article focusing on the conflicting duties owed to preferred and common stockholders. Delaware is the leading corporate law jurisdiction in the United States. Preferred stock is a key component in angel and venture capital transactions. Historically the Delaware courts have accepted as a general principle the proposition that since the preferred rights are contractual in nature, they must be expressly defined in the preferred stock contract in order for the preferred to successfully assert those rights. Accordingly, the directors owe correlative duties to the preferred to the extent that the rights are articulated in the contract. …

Meaningful Good Faith: Managerial Motives And The Duty To Obey The Law, Peter C. Kostant

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Failure Of A "Basic Assumption": The Emerging Standard For Excuse Under Mae Provisions, Nathan Somogie

Michigan Law Review

The onset of the current economic crisis has led many strategic and financial acquirers to reconsider the desirability of transactions to which they had previously agreed. Because many of these agreements contain substantial termination fees, buyers have increasingly sought to be excused from their contractual obligations by invoking Material Adverse Effect ("MAE") provisions. Reliance on MAE clauses as a basis for termination has historically been risky due to a lack of clarity in the case law regarding the standard for excuse under such provisions. A recent decision by the Delaware Chancery Court, Hexion v. Huntsman, the third in a …

London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Jurisdictional competition in corporate law has long been a staple of academic-and sometimes, political-debate in the United States. State corporate law, by long-standing tradition in the United States, determines most questions of internal corporate governance-the role of boards of directors, the allocation of authority between directors, managers and shareholders, etc.-while federal law governs questions of disclosure to shareholders-annual reports, proxy statements, and periodic filings. Despite substantial incursions by Congress, most recently in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, this dividing line between state and federal law persists, so state law arguably has the most immediate impact on corporate governance outcomes.

London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

In the United States, state corporate law determines most questions of internal corporate governance - the role of directors; the allocation of authority between directors, managers, and shareholders; etc. - while federal law governs questions of disclosure to shareholders - annual reports, proxy statements, and periodic filings. Despite substantial incursions by Congress, most recently with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this dividing line between state and federal law persists, so state law arguably has the most immediate effect on corporate governance outcomes.

The Diverging Meaning Of Good Faith, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

This article explores the meaning of "good faith" in the context of corporations and unincorporated entities. The courts, particularly in Delaware, have developed two different approaches. In the corporate arena, the courts are fashioning a notion of good faith that seems to require an examination of director motivations. In the unincorporated arena, good faith has a meaning grounded in contract law. These are two different concepts and reflect the fundamental differences between corporations and unincorporated entities, with the former based on fiduciary duties and the latter on contract. There are, however, indications that this "divergence" is starting to disappear, and …

Regulatory Competition, Choice Of Forum And Delaware’S Stake In Corporate Law, Faith Stevelman

Articles & Chapters

As Delaware corporate law confronts the twenty-first-century global economy, the state's legislators and jurists are becoming sensitive to increased threats to the law's sustained preeminence. The increased presence of federal laws and regulations in areas of corporate governance traditionally allocated to the states has been widely noted. The growth of federal corporate law standards may be undermining Delaware's confidence in the sustained prosperity of its chartering business - which has been a vital source of revenues and prestige for Delaware, its equity courts, and especially its corporate bar. The Delaware Court of Chancery appears to be concerned about the emigration …

Branding The Small Wonder: Delaware's Dominance And The Market For Corporate Law, Omari Scott Simmons

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Difficulty Of A Plaintiff's Playground Being Truly "Open For Buisiness": An Overview Of West Virginia's Corporate Law Governing Derivative Lawsuits, Heather Flangan

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Use Of Efficient Market Hypothesis: Beyond Sox, Dana M. Muir, Cindy A. Schipani

Michigan Law Review

This Article focuses on the regulatory use of finance theory, particularly the efficient market hypothesis ("EMH"), in two areas where securities pricing is at issue: shareholder appraisal cases and the use of employer stock in benefit plans. Regarding shareholder appraisal cases, the Article finds that the Delaware courts seem to implicitly respect the principles of EMH when ascertaining the fair value of stock, but recognize that markets cannot operate efficiently if information is withheld. Regarding employer stock in benefit plans, it concentrates on the explicit adoption of EMH by the Department of Labor to exempt directed trustees from traditional duties …

Managers’ Fiduciary Duties In Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos In Delaware (And Elsewhere), Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Christopher W. Frost

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The inherent conflict between creditors and shareholders has long occupied courts and commentators interested in corporate governance. Creditors holding fixed claims to the corporation's assets generally prefer corporate decision making that minimizes the risk of firm failure. Shareholders, in contrast, have a greater appetite for risk, because, as residual owners, they reap the rewards of firm success while sharing the risk of loss with creditors.

Traditionally, this conflict is mediated by a governance structure that imposes a fiduciary duty on the corporation's managers-its officers and directors-to maximize the value of the shareholders' interests in the firm. In this traditional view, …

Pandora's Ballot Box, Or A Proxy With Moxie? The Majority Voting Amendment To Delaware Corporate Law, John Verret

ExpressO

The Delaware General Assembly has recently adopted an amendment to the Delaware General Corporation Law which provides that where shareholders have adopted a majority voting bylaw for corporate elections over the traditional plurality scheme, a corporation may not subsequently amend its bylaws to return to plurality voting without shareholder approval. I will compare this provision to other approaches and try to explain the reasons underlying its adoption. I will also briefly summarize the evolving shareholder empowerment debate and analyze the majority voting provision in the context of that discussion. I will describe some unique and unanticipated interactions between majority voting …

Delaware Strikes Back: Newcastle Partners And The Fight For State Corporate Autonomy, Michael W. Ott

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Sarbanes-Oxley: The Delaware Perspective, Chief Justice Myron T. Steele

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo

Faculty Scholarship

Regulatory competition in corporate law is increasing in Europe and, not differently from what happens in the US, a market for corporate charters is developing in Europe. This article examines the differences between the US corporate law market, and the European one - to the extent that one exists. The basic idea is that, in Europe, there is a stronger competition for the (first) incorporation of rather small, closely-held corporations; while in the US a small closely-held corporation usually incorporates locally, where its shareholders and directors are located, and reincorporates - often in Delaware - when it is growing and, …

Megasubsidiaries And Asset Sales Under Section 271: Which Shareholders Must Approve Subsidiary Asset Sales, Yaman Shukairy

Michigan Law Review

Corporate law statutes determine the nature of the relationship between shareholders, the principal owners of the corporation, and the board of directors, those w ho run and operate the corporation. Under the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL"), many of the powers are delegated to the board of directors. More specifically, under section 141, "the business and affairs of every corporation . . . [are] managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . ." The Delaware courts have interpreted this provision by deferring to decisions by directors and their designated management under the business judgment …

Disloyalty Without Limits: “Independent” Directors And The Elimination Of The Duty Of Loyalty, J. Robert Brown Jr., Shkurupiy

Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

In discussing independent directors, most of the focus has been on the definitions employed by the stock exchanges. It is the Delaware definition, however, that is the more important one. Delaware provides that, in non-controlling shareholder cases, conflict of interest transactions approved by a board consisting of a majority of "independent" directors will receive the presumption of the business judgment rule. The result is to eliminate any judicial consideration of fairness in reviewing the transaction.

The Political Dynamics Of Corporate Legislation: Lessons From Israel, Yael T. Ben-Zion

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Disloyalty Without Limits: "Independent" Directors And The Elimination Of The Duty Of Loyalty, J. Robert Brown Jr.

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Excessive Compensation In Publicly Held Corporations: Is The Doctrine Of Waste Still Applicable, John W. Murrey Iii

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

Good Faith In The World Of Delaware Corporate Litigation: A Strategic Perspective On Recent Developments In Fiduciary Duty Law, Zachary S. Klughaupt

ExpressO

The Delaware Chancery’s new-found willingness to hold corporate directors accountable for breaching the duty of good faith has provoked widespread attention in both the business and legal communities. Legal practitioners and scholars recognize the novelty of Delaware’s recent good faith jurisprudence, as well as its potential to expose directors to gigantic personal damage awards, and in fact have published numerous articles that seek to delimit the boundaries of good faith conduct. But until now, most discussions of good faith as a fiduciary duty have approached the subject as an abstract measure of conduct, showing little regard for how a complaint …

Markets & Democracy: The Illegitimacy Of Corporate Law, Daniel J.H. Greenwood

ExpressO

Corporate law does not conform to ordinary democratic norms. Unlike human citizens, corporations may decide which law will govern their most fundamental acts of self-governance. The corporate law corporation choose in turn influences the corporate goals and decision-making processes that determine what the corporation looks for in corporate law in a reflexive system independent of ordinary political processes.

This system seems on its face to violate the most fundamental principle of popular sovereignty–all non-Delaware citizens of the United States are excluded from even formal participation in the process of determining American corporate law, and even Delaware citizens are reduced to …

Seven Points To Explain Why The Law Ought Not Allow The Elimination Of Fiduciary Duty Within Closely Held Businesses: Cardozo Is Dead; We Have Killed Him., Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

Prepared as part of the author's work as co-reporter for the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, this essay argues against legislation that empowers private agreements to eliminate fiduciary duty within a business organization. The essay considers: (i) the venerable role of fiduciary duty within business organizations and the limited predictive powers of those urging radical reform; (ii) the absence of prescience in contract drafters; (iii) the strict construction function of fiduciary law; (iv) the inevitable and inappropriate pressure that elimination would put on the obligation of good faith and fair dealing; (v) the differences in remedy available for fiduciary …

Kentucky Corporate Fiduciary Duties, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

In this article I offer an interpretation of Kentucky's corporate fiduciary law. The article is positive, in that it attempts to explain our law by reference to certain principles. The article is also normative, however, in that it offers constructive criticism regarding parts of Kentucky fiduciary law and suggests changes, refinements, and clarifications intended to promote fairness and economic efficiency in Kentucky corporations.

Both the positive and the normative aspects of this piece recognize the importance of the common law developments in Delaware (and other states) and the importance of the law and economics movement. I suggest, however, that Kentucky …

The Corporation As Insider Trader, Mark J. Loewenstein, William K.S. Wang

Publications

With regard to issuer purchases, some of the traditional policy rationales against insider trading do not apply or apply with less force. Nevertheless, courts, commentators, and the SEC have all stated or assumed that a public corporation violates rule 10b-5 by buying its own shares in the market based on material, nonpublic information. In rule 10b-5 cases involving face-to-face transactions, several circuit courts have ruled that the company may not purchase its own stock based on material information not known to the seller. No good reason exists not to apply these precedents to stock market trades by issuers, especially because …

Freeze-Out Transactions The Pure Way: Reconciling Judicial Asymmetry Between Tender Offers And Negotiated Mergers, Ely R. Levy

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

Tender Offers By Controlling Shareholders: The Specter Of Coercion And Fair Price, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Taking your company private has never been so appealing. The collapse of the tech bubble has left many companies whose stock prices bordered on the stratospheric now trading at small fractions of their historical highs. The spate of accounting scandals that followed the bursting of the bubble has taken some of the shine off the aura of being a public company-the glare of the spotlight from stock analysts and the business press looks much less inviting, notwithstanding the monitoring benefits that the spotlight purports to confer. Moreover, the regulatory backlash against those accounting scandals has made the costs of being …

Global Corporate Reorganization/ Global Corporate Governace: Imperfect Information And Credible Commitment, Bernhard Grossfield

Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business

No abstract provided.

Bring On 'Da Noise: The Sec's Proposals Concerning Professional Conduct For Attorneys Under Sarbanes-Oxley, Marilyn Blumberg Cane, Sarah Smith Kelleher

Faculty Scholarship

In the wake of Enron's and numerous other corporate scandals, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission) to establish rules of professional conduct for attorneys who appear before it. In November 2002, the Commission released a proposal where attorneys would be required to report perceived violations of corporate governance and Commission rules up-the-ladder. Additionally, if the company failed to make an appropriate response, the attorney would be required to make a noisy withdrawal. After an onslaught of comments against the proposal, the Commission issued an alternative proposal for comment.

Under the alternative rule, …

The Impact Of Modern Finance Theory In Acquisition Cases, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

In February of 1983, the Supreme Court of Delaware decided Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. The case holds that, in determining the present value of a corporation involved in an acquisition, courts are free to use “any techniques or methods [of valuation] which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community…”

The rule in Delaware prior to Weinberger required courts to determine the present value of a corporation by use of the Delaware block method of valuation exclusively. The Delaware block method, however, is a poor way to determine the present value of a corporation. As a result, even before the …