Business Organizations Law Commons^™

The Seventeenth Annual Albert A. Destefano Lecture On Corporate, Securities & Financial Law At The Fordham Corporate Law Center, Caroline M. Gentile, The Honorable Karen L. Valihura

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

The "New" Fiduciary Standards Under The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act: More Bottom Bumping From Nccusl, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Maine Law Review

Between 1995 and 2001, the influential National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) promulgated iterations of uniform laws pertaining to partnerships, limited partnerships and limited liability companies. One or more of those acts have been widely adopted by state legislatures. Each of the three acts—the Uniform Partnership Act (1997) (hereinafter RUPA), the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) (hereinafter ULPA (2001)), and the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996) (hereinafter ULLCA) —contains identical fiduciary duty provisions. The acts all adopt the same standards for the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, and offer parties the same limited …

Contracting Out Of The Fiduciary Duty Of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis Of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, Gabriel Rauterberg, Eric Talley

Articles

For centuries, the duty of loyalty has been the hallowed centerpiece of fiduciary obligation, widely considered one of the few “mandatory” rules of corporate law. That view, however, is no longer true. Beginning in 2000, Delaware dramatically departed from tradition by granting incorporated entities a statutory right to waive a crucial part of the duty of loyalty: the corporate opportunities doctrine. Other states have since followed Delaware’s lead, similarly permitting firms to execute “corporate opportunity waivers.” Surprisingly, more than fifteen years into this reform experiment, no study has attempted to either systematically measure the corporate response to these reforms or …

Lyman Johnson’S Invaluable Contribution To Delaware Corporate Jurisprudence, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Jack B. Jacobs

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Delineating The Implied Covenant And Providing For “Good Faith”, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

This column considers whether an operating or partnership agreement can delineate the implied contractual obligation, comparing ULLCA and the Delaware Act, and then warns of the dangers of carelessly imposing by contract an express requirement of "good faith."

Contracting Out Of Fiduciary Duties In Llcs: Delaware Will Lead, But Will Anyone Follow?, H. Justin Pace

Nevada Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Poison Pills: Recent Negative Economic Effects Justify Repealing The Related Legislation And Increasing Shareholder Ownership Rights, Wilton Robinson

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

No abstract provided.

Trending @ Rwu Law: Professor Tanya Monestier's Post: Is Corporate Registration A Proper Basis For General Jurisdiction?: 02-09-2016, Tanya Monestier

Law School Blogs

No abstract provided.

Delaware's Familiarity, Brian J. Broughman, Darian M. Ibrahim

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Delaware Corporate Law Recognizes The Fundamental Validity Of The Forum Selection Bylaw: A Survey Of The Boilermakers Litigation, Zachary R. Cormier

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp. represents a new and important chapter in the relationship between the forum selection clause and modern business relations. A forum selection clause is “[a] contractual provision in which the parties establish the place (such as the country, state, or type of court) for specified litigation between them.” Forum selection clauses have most often been analyzed by courts within contractual relationships between businesses, or a business and its customers. The Boilermakers case sets important precedent for forum selection in an equally fundamental business relationship--the corporation and its stockholders. This article will survey the …

Team Production And Securities Laws, Urska Velikonja

Seattle University Law Review

In the seminal paper that this symposium celebrates, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout made two related points. First, that Delaware law does not require shareholder primacy in public corporations. Rather, the broad deference afforded to the decisions of predominantly independent corporate boards of directors is consistent with a contrary theory, that of team production, or, as they call it, “the mediating hierarch” theory. The fundamental role of the board of directors is to mediate between the interests of various stakeholders that contribute to the corporation’s output. As a result, Delaware courts have repeatedly …

With The Emergence Of Public Benefit Corporations, Directors Of Traditional For-Profit Companies Should Tread Cautiously, But Welcome The Opportunity To Invest In Social Enterprise, Mckenzie Holden Granum

Seattle University Law Review

Social entrepreneurship has become the popular term used to describe business forms that aim to produce profits while also seeking to significantly advance one or more social or environmental goals. In response to an increase in social entrepreneurship across sectors—from progressive industries like organic farming to conservative industries such as insurance and banking—several states have adopted new corporate governance structures. Such legislation allows incorporating businesses to choose an off-the-shelf formation type that embeds a social mission into its legal structure. The bulk of the newly implemented statutory forms provide not only a new framework for social entrepreneurs to work within, …

Shareholder Wealth Maximization As Means To An End, Robert P. Bartlett, Iii

Seattle University Law Review

In several recent cases, the Delaware Chancery Court has emphasized that where a conflict of interest exists between holders of a company’s common stock and holders of its preferred stock, the standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its common stockholders rather than for its preferred stockholders. This article interrogates this view of directors’ fiduciary duties from the perspective of incomplete contracting theory. Building on the seminal work of Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, incomplete contracting theory examines the critical role of corporate control rights for addressing …

Piercing The Fiduciary Veil, Colin P. Marks

Faculty Works

Limited partnerships (LPs) and limited liability companies (LLCs) permit formation with a unique management structure in that these entities may be managed by another limited liability entity, such as a corporation. Thus, the true managers are those individuals who manage the manager. It is well settled that the managing entity, such as a corporate general partner, owes default fiduciary duties, but what of these second-tier managers? Technically, it is the managing entity that owes the duties, not the managing entity's owners, officers, and directors, yet courts have struggled with strict adherence to this separation when it would seem inequitable to …

Delaware’S Implied Contractual Covenant Of Good Faith And “Sibling Rivalry” Among Equity Holders, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

An obligation of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every common law contract and is codified in the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C”). The terminology differs: Some jurisdictions refer to an “implied covenant;” others to an “implied contractual obligation;” still others to an “implied duty.” But whatever the label, the concept is understood by the vast majority of U.S. lawyers as a matter of commercial rather than entity law. And, to the vast majority of corporate lawyers, “good faith” does not mean contract law but rather conjures up an important aspect of a corporate director’s duty of loyalty.

Nonetheless, …

Fiduciary Duties Of Llc Managers: Are They Subject To Prospective Waiver Under The New York Llc Statute?, Jack Graves, Yelena Davydan

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Unilateral Forum Selection Clauses In Corporate Bylaws: A Synopsis Of The Debate, Bryce Cullinane

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

No abstract provided.

Lessons Of 2013: The Perils Of "Ready, Fire, Aim" And The Importance Of An Integrated Litigation Strategy In Corporate Governance Matters, Thad A. Davis, Leslie A. Wulff

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

No abstract provided.

Fall 2013 Symposium: Contemporary Trends In Corporate Litigation, Robert Anderson Iv, Myron T. Steele, Katherine J. Blair, Thad A. Davis, James R. Griffin, James J. Moloney

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

No abstract provided.

Delaware’S Familiarity, Brian J. Broughman, Darian M. Ibrahim

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

Delaware Law As Lingua Franca: Theory And Evidence, Brian Broughman, Jesse M. Fried, Darian Ibrahim

Faculty Publications

Why would a firm incorporate in Delaware rather than in its home state? Prior explanations have focused on the inherent features of Delaware corporate law and on the positive network externalities created by so many other firms domiciling in Delaware. We offer an additional explanation: a firm may choose Delaware simply because its law is nationally known and thus can serve as a lingua franca for in-state and out-of-state investors. Analyzing the incorporation decisions of 1,850 venture-capitalist-backed start-ups, we find evidence consistent with this lingua franca explanation. Indeed, the lingua franca effect appears to be more important than other factors …

A Blended Approach To Reducing The Costs Of Shareholder Litigation, Valian A. Afshar

Michigan Law Review

Multiforum litigation and federal securities law class actions impose heavy costs on corporations and their shareholders without producing proportionate benefits. Both are largely the result of the agency problem between shareholders and their attorneys, driven more by the attorneys’ interests in generating fees than by the interests of their clients. In response to each of these problems, commentators have recommended a number of solutions. Chief among them are forum selection and mandatory arbitration provisions in a corporation’s charter or bylaws. This Note recommends that corporations unilaterally adopt both forum selection and mandatory arbitration bylaws to address shareholder lawsuits under state …

Up Close And Personal With Delaware, Darian M. Ibrahim, Brian J. Broughman

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

The Duty To Think Strategically, Nadelle Grossman

Louisiana Law Review

Under Delaware corporate law, directors and officers have a duty to oversee their firm's management of risk to limit losses. Corporate law does not, however, require directors or officers to oversee their firm's management of strategy to create gains. Yet, managing both risk and strategy is essential to a firm in creating value. In fact, as I argue in the Article, the current focus by courts and commentators only on risk management to prevent losses could actually undermine a firm's management of its strategy for gains. I therefore propose a model for how Delaware corporate law can drive firms to …

Delaware's Duty To Auction After Paramount Communications, Inc. V. Qvc Network, Inc., Robert D. Ming

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Agents Without Principals: Regulating The Duty Of Loyalty For Nonprofit Corporations Through The Intermediate Sanctions Tax Regulations, Carly B. Eisenberg, Kevin Outterson

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

Delaware corporate law imposes a duty of loyalty on officers and directors as a mechanism to regulate and deter self-dealing transactions. In nonprofit corporations, however, there are generally no shareholders with direct financial incentives to monitor against self-dealing. In the absence of shareholders and other principals, Congress and the IRS have articulated duty of loyalty rules for nonprofits that reach far beyond those applied to the for-profit world--most prominently the § 4958 intermediate sanctions. This article identifies the persons who owe a duty of loyalty to a nonprofit corporation, the applicable fiduciary standards for violating the duty of loyalty, and …

Delaware’S Balancing Act, John Armour, Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins

Indiana Law Journal

Delaware’s courts and well-developed case law are widely seen as integral elements of Delaware’s success in attracting incorporations. However, as we show using empirical evidence involving reported judicial decisions and filed cases concerning large mergers and acquisitions, leveraged buyouts, and options backdating, Delaware’s popularity as a venue for corporate litigation is under threat. Today, a majority of shareholder suits involving Delaware companies are being brought and decided elsewhere. We examine in this Article the implications of this “out-of-Delaware” trend, emphasizing a difficult balancing act that Delaware faces. If Delaware accommodates litigation too readily, companies, fearful of lawsuits, may incorporate elsewhere. …

The Delaware Series Llc: Sophisticated And Flexible Business Planning, Ann E. Conaway, Peter I. Tsoflias

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The authors conclude that the Delaware series supplies a beneficial, efficient use of a combined contractual Delaware entity form when pooled with sensible, informed planning by sophisticated business attorneys. Such benefits are particularly noticeable in investment vehicles where managers embark to minimize risk by diversifying the fund’s assets or receive funding with specific covenants attached that limit the acceptable uses of the funds. The series is not, however, for general practitioners who have the occasional client wishing for the latest benefit Delaware has to offer its investors. To provide context, Parts II-IV of this article provide a brief overview of …

Delaware's Non-Waivable Duties, Lyman P. Q. Johnson

Scholarly Articles

This Article disputes the view - seemingly settled among scholars, judges, and lawyers - that recently - enacted statutes in Delaware legally permit fiduciary duties to be waived in noncorporate business associations. The argument is a rarity in business law because it is a constitutional argument, not one initially based on policy considerations or statutory interpretation, and it seeks to harmonize judicial review of fiduciary duties in noncorporate businesses with that in Delaware corporations, where waivers are not permitted. Delaware’s Constitution vests the Delaware Court of Chancery with general equity jurisdiction and powers of a kind that cannot be curtailed …

Good Faith In Revlon-Land, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Articles

The Delaware Supreme Court has set a very high hurdle for plaintiffs challenging directors' good faith in the sale of a company. In Lyondell Chemical Company v. Ryan, the court held that unconflicted directors could be found to have breached the good faith component of their duty of loyalty in the transactional context only if they "knowingly and completely failed to undertake," and "utterly failed to attempt" to discharge their duties.

In this essay I argue that the Lyondell standard effectively imports into the transactional context the exacting standard previously applied in the oversight context — a move clearly aimed …