Business Organizations Law Commons^™

The Coming Privatization Of Corporate Law, Dorothy S. Lund, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

For more than a century, American corporate law has revolved around a simple competitive premise: State governments supply corporate law while companies choose their state of incorporation, and the market rewards the state offering the best corporate law product. Delaware’s longstanding market dominance (especially for public companies) is often explained through the confluence of its unusually attractive institutional package: expert judges, extensive precedent, a specialized bar, an enabling statute, and a legislature that — at least traditionally — treats corporate law as something to be calibrated technocratically rather than politicized.

Denizens Of Dexit: Why Controlled Companies Are The First To Leave The First State, Jack Kanzler

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

A series of high-profile companies announcing plans to leave the state of Delaware and reincorporate out of state has sparked many commentators to predict a coming wave of corporate exodus from the First State called “DExit.” This paper seeks to explore the DExit “movement” with a particular focus on “controlled companies” and the recent doctrinal developments that have created a perception that Delaware law has become hostile to such governance arrangements. I will begin by discussing a brief history of Delaware’s corporate law and its current role in the American corporate legal system. I will then move to a robust …

Corporate Law's Duty Of Data Loyalty, Andy Serwin, Neil Richards, Woodrow Hartzog, Ryan Durrie

Faculty Scholarship

Privacy law used to be a relatively tidy field, involving a few interesting but discrete topics like press disclosures of private facts, wiretapping, and the processing of personal data by internet companies. But as the digital revolution continues to disrupt area after area of human activity and software “is eating the world,” the core concerns of privacy law such as “when is it appropriate to process personal data?” have similarly entered field after field. Today, most fields of law, including discrimination law, antitrust, and international law, have found it necessary to reckon with the questions of informational harm and power …

Leaving Delaware? The Essential Role Of Specialized Corporate Courts, Zohar Goshen, Tomer S. Stein

Faculty Scholarship

Following the Delaware Court of Chancery’s invalidation of Elon Musk’s fifty-six- billion-dollar compensation package, Tesla moved its incorporation from Delaware to Texas. Shortly thereafter, Delaware’s legislature, seeking to protect Delaware’s dominant incorporation position, passed the most sweeping corporate law amendments in fifty years.

Both supporters of Musk and defenders of Delaware’s judiciary have accused each other of partisanship, but neither side has addressed the central question: What is the role of specialized corporate courts?

This Essay presents a novel theory of why such courts are necessary. Corporate disputes are distinct because they arise within ongoing relationships between shareholders and management, …

The Market Value Of Partisan Balance, Brian D. Feinstein, Daniel J. Hemel

Northwestern University Law Review

For the past century, Delaware’s constitution has provided that no more than a bare majority of judges on the state’s courts may hail from the same political party. Some scholars and jurists theorize that Delaware’s commitment to a politically balanced judiciary increases the state’s attractiveness to out-of-state corporations and adds value to Delaware-chartered firms. These claims echo a larger literature in law and the social sciences positing that ideological diversity improves decisional quality. Recently, a series of federal court decisions in the case of Adams v. Carney put these claims to the test. In December 2017, a federal district court …

Scrutinizing Succession, Carrie Stanton

Scholarly Articles

Businesses are at their most vulnerable during leadership transitions. Lack of succession planning has been recognized as a key risk factor, especially for closely held, family-owned businesses, but the problem is more extensive. Even public corporations with supposedly independent boards of directors too often fail to separate the corporation’s interests from those of charismatic leaders who enjoy the perquisites of control and may be loath to surrender it. Shareholders trust directors to manage business affairs, and ensuring leadership continuity is critical to this charge. Yet succession often remains overlooked in practice. It also remains understudied in the literature, and state …

Texas, Delaware, And The New Controller Primacy, Christine Hurt

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

In January 2024, Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla, Inc., initiated the process of moving Tesla’s state of incorporation from Delaware to Texas, citing concerns over Delaware corporate law. The move sparked discussions about the dominance of Delaware corporate law and its recent rulings, with critics accusing Court of Chancery judges of favoring shareholder interests over controller innovation and managerial discretion.

The shift away from Delaware is set against a backdrop of increasing judicial scrutiny in the Delaware Court of Chancery, where plaintiffs have recently seen successes in litigation against controlling shareholders, corporate directors, and officers. Concerns over Delaware’s evolving legal …

The Brussels Effect And The Extraterritoriality Of Delaware Corporate Law, William J. Moon

Faculty Scholarship

This essay explores possible shareholder claims in the United States that may arise  if and when member states of the European Union implement the proposed Directive  on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence. As a doctrinal matter, legal compliance  obligations for corporations incorporated in Delaware extend beyond the borders of  the United States. Under Delaware law, shareholders can bring viable fiduciary suits  against directors and officers when corporations violate applicable “positive law.”  This jurisprudence, principally aimed at ascertaining whether directors and officers  betrayed shareholders by engaging in or facilitating lawbreaking, is not limited to  complying with American law. As Delaware corporations expand …

Cleaning Up The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine Mess: A First Principles Approach, Yifat Naftali Ben Zion

Washington and Lee Law Review

Almost a century ago, a legal dispute over who is the rightful owner of Pepsi-Cola, at the time an unknown syrup company on the verge of bankruptcy, led the Supreme Court of Delaware to develop what is now famously known as the corporate opportunity doctrine. This doctrine is the central framework Delaware courts use to this day to determine whether an officer who seized a business opportunity has breached his fiduciary duties. Despite the doctrine’s old roots, it has thus far failed to reach stable ground. For one, while many corporate law scholars have supported the rule developed following this …

Anonymous Companies, William J. Moon

Faculty Scholarship

Hardly a day goes by without hearing about nefarious activities facilitated by anonymous “shell” companies. Often described as menaces to the financial system, the creation of business entities with no real operations in sun-drenched offshore jurisdictions offering “zero percent” tax rates remains in vogue among business titans, pop stars, multimillionaires, and royals. The trending headlines and academic accounts, however, have paid insufficient attention to the legal uses of anonymous companies that are both ubiquitous and almost infinite in their variations.

This Article identifies privacy as a functional feature of modern business entities by documenting the hidden virtues of anonymous companies—business …

Taking Corwin Seriously, Itai Fiegenbaum

Lewis & Clark Law Review

Corporate law’s most important development is founded on a misunderstanding of the channels and consequences of shareholder empowerment. The Article’s title references the seminal Delaware Supreme Court decision that ruled that a positive shareholder vote effectively insulates a friendly sale from judicial oversight. Central to Corwin’s reasoning is the notion that the shareholder vote provides an effective restraint against insider overreaching. Yet every deal that includes a premium over the market price is assured of shareholder approval. The doctrinal lynchpin’s real-life insignificance exposes a baffling inconsistency in contemporary takeover jurisprudence.

This Articles makes two novel contributions to the bourgeoning scholarship …

Delaware Law For Non-Corporate Entities: A Commentary, Peter Molk

UF Law Faculty Publications

Robert Rhee’s Article, The Irrelevance of Delaware Corporate Law, poses provocative questions about why Delaware dominates the market for corporate law given the apparent irrelevance of state incorporation choice for companies’ market valuations. He shows, first, that publicly traded companies incorporated in Delaware have similar valuations to companies incorporated in other states over time, and second, that market actors do not exhibit a preference to reincorporate existing firms in Delaware.

Rhee analyzes exclusively the realm of publicly traded corporations, which is understandable given that his analysis is necessarily limited to publicly available data. Publicly traded corporations are undeniably economically …

Artificially Intelligent Boards And The Future Of Delaware Corporate Law, Christopher Bruner

Scholarly Works

The prospects for Artificial Intelligence (AI) to impact the development of Delaware corporate law are at once over- and under-stated. As a general matter, claims to the effect that AI systems might ultimately displace human directors not only exaggerate the foreseeable technological potential of these systems, but also tend to ignore doctrinal and institutional impediments intrinsic to Delaware's competitive model – notably, heavy reliance on nuanced and context-specific applications of the fiduciary duty of loyalty by a true court of equity. At the same time, however, there are specific applications of AI systems that might not merely be accommodated by …

Delaware's Dominance, Wyoming's Dare: New Challenge, Same Outcome?, Pierluigi Matera

Faculty Scholarship

Despite increasing criticism, Delaware's dominance in corporate law has not experienced a significant decline: as of today, 67.8 percent of Fortune 500 companies are still incorporated in its jurisdiction. Nevada is known as Delaware's most important competitor, with an aggressive strategy that has overridden the efforts of any other jurisdiction. Yet, its success has been limited to a specific market segment: small firms with low institutional shareholding and high insider ownership.

Scholars suggest several explanations for both the rise and the staying power of Delaware. These explanations are essentially subsumed under the credible commitment theory and the network theory. According …

The Federal Option: Delaware As A De Facto Agency, Omari Scott Simmons

Washington Law Review

Despite over 200 years of deliberation and debate, the United States has not adopted a federal corporate chartering law. Instead, Delaware is the “Federal Option” for corporate law and adjudication. The contemporary federal corporate chartering debate is, in part, a referendum on its role. Although the federal government has regulated other aspects of interstate commerce and has the power to charter corporations and preempt Delaware pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, it has not done so. Despite the rich and robust scholarly discussion of Delaware’s jurisdictional dominance, its role as a de facto national regulator remains underdeveloped. This Article addresses …

Delaware's Global Competitiveness, William J. Moon

Faculty Scholarship

For about a hundred years, Delaware has been the leading jurisdiction for corporate law in the United States. The state, which deliberately embarked on a mission to build a haven for corporate law in the early twentieth century, now supplies corporate charters to over two thirds of Fortune 500 companies and a growing share of closely held companies. But Delaware’s domestic dominance masks the important and yet underexamined issue of whether Delaware maintains its competitive edge globally.

This Article examines Delaware’s global competitiveness, documenting Delaware’s surprising weakness competing in the emerging international market for corporate charters. It does so principally …

Is There A Delaware Effect For Controlled Firms?, Edward Fox

Articles

The impact of Delaware incorporation on firm value remains a central question in corporate law. Despite the difficulty scholars have had in agreeing on an answer to this question, there is a consensus that Delaware has long enjoyed stable and important advantages in the expertise of its judiciary and its extensive case law. These advantages are believed to be particularly important for firms with a controlling shareholder. This Article attempts to empirically measure the effect of Delaware incorporation on these controlled firms and thus helps us understand the market value of Delaware’s judiciary and case law. It finds, surprisingly, that …

Delaware’S Dominance And The Future Of Organizational Law, Peter Molk

Georgia Law Review

Delaware dominates the market for business formations.
Two main theoretical explanations have been offered to justify
Delaware’s continued success. One focuses on the state’s
credible commitment to producing responsive organizational
law in the future. The other looks to the network effects that
continue to encourage new formations once Delaware already
dominates. Yet, other than continued observation of Delaware’s
dominance, little empirical support exists for either theory.
This Article empirically tests entrepreneurs’, investors’, and
lawyers’ appetite for Delaware’s credible commitment. I use the
recent Delaware Supreme Court decision of Gatz Properties v.
Auriga Capital Corp., which was a negative shock to …

The Lost Lessons Of Shareholder Derivative Suits, Jessica Erickson

Washington and Lee Law Review

Merger litigation has changed dramatically. Today, nearly every announcement of a significant merger sparks litigation, and these cases look quite different from merger cases in the past. These cases are now filed primarily outside of Delaware, they typically settle without shareholders receiving any financial consideration, and corporate boards now have far more ex ante power to shape these cases. Although these changes are often heralded as unprecedented, they are not. Over the past several decades, derivative suits experienced many of the same changes. This Article explores the similarities between the recent changes in merger litigation and the longer history of …

Contract Design, Default Rules, And Delaware Corporate Law, Jeffrey Manns, Robert Anderson

Washington and Lee Law Review

Incomplete contract theory recognizes that contracts cannot be comprehensive and that state law necessarily has to fill in gaps when conflicts arise. The more complex the transaction, the more that lawyers face practical constraints that force them to limit the scope of drafting and broadly rely on legal defaults and open-ended terms to plug holes and address contingencies. In theory Delaware law serves as lawyers’ preferred jurisdiction and forum for merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions and other high-end corporate deals because of the state’s superior default rules for corporate law and its judiciary’s expertise in discerning the “hypothetical bargain” of …

The Limited Effect Of “Maximum Effect”, Daniel S. Kleinberger, Douglas K. Moll

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Mission Critical: How Fiduciary Duties Of Oversight Can Aid Corporations In Managing Stakeholder Interests, Krishna P. Pathak

Upper Level Writing Requirement Research Papers

After several public tragedies, corporate missteps, and catastrophes; politicians, certain investors, and other stakeholders have called for accountability in capitalism, proactive action to alleviate climate change, and performance of social obligations from corporations. The Business Roundtable and World Economic Forum have come out with proposals that signify a paradigm shift to the stakeholder approach to capitalism. Delaware, a haven for shareholder primacy, has permissive standards that allow a corporation to engage in any lawful business activity. However, concerns about fiduciary duties, especially the implied duties of good faith, legal compliance, and oversight, have created obligations for directors to engage in …

Land Of The Falling "Poison Pill" Understanding Defensive Measures In Japan On Their Own Terms, Alan K. Koh, Masafumi Nakahigashi, Dan W. Puchniak

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

Embraced by United States ("U.S.") managers in the 1980s as a lifeline in a sea of hostile takeovers, the poison pill fundamentally altered the trajectory of American corporate governance. When a hostile takeover wave seemed imminent in Japan in the mid-2000s, Japanese boards appeared to embrace this American invention with equal enthusiasm. Japan's experience should have been a ringing endorsement for the utility of American corporate governance solutions in foreign jurisdictions -but it was not to be. Japan's unique interpretation of the "poison pill" that was so eagerly adopted by Japanese companies in the mid-to-late 2000s has turned out to …

Chancery’S Greatest Decision: Historical Insights On Civil Rights And The Future Of Shareholder Activism, Omari Scott Simmons

Washington and Lee Law Review

This article builds upon the author's remarks at the 2018-2019 Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism at Washington and Lee University School of Law, February 15, 2019.

Shareholder activism—using an equity stake in a corporation to influence management—has become a popular tool to effectuate social change in the twenty-first century. Increasingly, activists are looking beyond financial performance to demand better corporate performance in such areas as economic inequality, civil rights, human rights, discrimination, and diversity. These efforts take many forms: publicity campaigns, litigation, proxy battles, shareholder resolutions, and negotiations with corporate management. However, a consensus on …

Corporate Charter Competition, Lynn M. Lopucki

UF Law Faculty Publications

The corporate charter competition has dominated the corporate law literature for four decades. This Article draws on the theoretical and empirical insights from that vast literature to present a systems analysis of the competition. The analysis shows the competition to be a system composed of three subsystems, joined by the internal affairs doctrine. The subsystems are those by which (1) corporations choose incorporation states, (2) states decide what packages to offer, and (3) states and stakeholders choose the courts that interpret and enforce corporate law. The analysis suggests that the standard account of charter competition should be revised in five …

The Elephant In The Room: Helping Delaware Courts Develop Law To End Systemic Short-Term Bias In Corporate Decision-Making, Kenneth Mcneil, Keith Johnson

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Short-termism in corporate decision-making is as problematic for long-term investors as relying on a three-mile radar on a supertanker. It is totally inadequate for handling the long-term risks and opportunities faced by the modern corporation. Yet recent empirical research shows that up to 85% of the S&P 1500 have no long-term planning. This is costing pension funds and other long-term investors dearly. For instance, the small minority of companies that do long-term planning and risk management had a long-term profitability that was 81% higher than their peers during the 2001–2014 period—with less stock volatility that costs investors dearly as well. …

Solely Beneficial: How Benefit Corporations May Change The Duty Of Care Analysis For Traditional Corporate Directors In Delaware, Dustin Womack

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Rather than adding to the voluminous literature assessing the necessity of benefit corporations themselves or the possible liability of their directors, this Note concerns itself only with how benefit corporations will impact the fiduciary duty of care analysis for the directors of traditional corporations constituted in the state of Delaware. Further, this Note is only concerned with liability arising from claims alleging that a day-to-day directorial decision resulted in a breach of the duty of care. As such, this Note does not address any other potential liability predicated on other situations or duties. Finally, this Note provides general background information …

A Rule-Based Method For Comparing Corporate Laws, Lynn M. Lopucki

UF Law Faculty Publications

Part I explains the processes for specifying a Scenario. It introduces the Scenario that will serve as the illustration in the remainder of this Article—a comparison of the liability of directors for the exercise of poor judgment in a Delaware corporation with the corresponding liability in a United Kingdom public limited company. Part II explains and illustrates the necessity of selecting specific entity types for comparison. Part III describes and illustrates the method for resolving the Scenario in both jurisdictions. Part IV explains and illustrates the novel process for close comparison—the extraction, juxtaposition, and comparison of decisional rules from the …

Caremark's Hidden Promise, Ezra Wasserman Mitchell

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

In re Caremark, decided in 1996, established for the first time a director’s duty to monitor under Delaware law. A significant amount of jurisprudence and commentary has developed. Almost all of this literature parses the language of the case and those following, and disregards the underlying claims for damages. As a result of this linguistic focus, many have concluded that the duty to monitor largely is toothless and, importantly, deals only with claims of failure to monitor legal risk. A duty to monitor business risk has been disavowed.

Following the money reveals a different story. Classifying the cases according to …

The Seventeenth Annual Albert A. Destefano Lecture On Corporate, Securities & Financial Law At The Fordham Corporate Law Center, Caroline M. Gentile, The Honorable Karen L. Valihura

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.