Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Lessons From Institutional Shareholder Services: Governing Benefit Corporations' Third-Party Standard, Tammi S. Etheridge

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Almost one hundred years ago, Henry Ford, as CEO of the Ford Motor Company, announced a plan to cease payment of special dividends to shareholders. Instead, the company would reinvest its profits to employ more workers and build more factories. Investing in new workers and factories would cut the cost of cars and make them affordable to more people. Ford publicly declared that his “ambition [was] to employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes. To do this we are putting …

The Institutional Appetite For Quack Corporate Governance, Alicia J. Davis

Articles

This Article offers evidence that higher quality internal corporate governance is associated with higher levels of ownership by institutional investors. This finding is consistent with the idea that institutions have greater reason than individual investors to prefer well-governed firms, but surprising given the substantial empirical evidence that casts doubt on the efficacy of internal governance mechanisms. The study described in this Article also finds that higher quality external governance is associated with lower proportions of ownership by certain types of institutional investors, also a somewhat surprising result given available empirical evidence on the positive relationship between external governance and firm …

The Business Purpose Doctrine In Corporate Divisions, Stephen Rigsby

Akron Law Review

The corporate division, however, lends itself to schemes for avoidance of tax. These schemes are attempts to convert ordinary income into income taxable at capital gains rates. An elaborate statutory mechanism has been created to prevent this conversion. In addition, the courts have created judicial doctrines which sometimes work by adding to the statutory framework and sometimes overlap. The resulting confusion of statute and judicial doctrine is the subject of this article. The investigation will focus on that part of the statute known as the device clause and its interaction with the judicial doctrines which together are known as the …

Savings And Loan Service Corporations: Regulations In Ohio, Ronald E. Alexander

Akron Law Review

The purpose of this article is to examine Ohio's scheme for regulating service corporations. This examination includes the history of service corporation regulation in Ohio, the scope of permissible business activities of these corporations, investment limitations for parent savings associations and the supervisory authority of the Ohio Division of Building and Loan Associations [Division]. Perhaps this article will also provide a useful vehicle for judging whether the risks perceived by the GAO and FHLBB can arise from a single state's regulatory scheme for service corporations. It must be remembered that any such risks inherent in Ohio's scheme threaten not only …

Shareholder Liability In Ohio: Confounding Attorneys And Others, South High Development Limited V. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co., L.P.A., Timothy J. O'Hearn

Akron Law Review

The purpose of this article is to explore the soundness and ramifications of South High Development Limited v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co., L.P.A. To begin, the case holding will be summarized and the history of professional corporations reviewed. Special emphasis will be placed on Ohio legal professional corporations. A critique of the court's rationale and analysis of its implications will then follow.

Kayser-Roth, Joslyn, And The Problem Of Parent Corporation Liability Under Cercla, James A. King

Akron Law Review

This article examines these issues by focusing on the responsibility of parent corporations as "owners" and as "operators" under section 107 of CERCLA. The scope of the analysis is limited to corporations that participate in the management of other corporations. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, the reach of the analysis is limited to the situation in which a corporation owns one hundred percent of the stock of the subsidiary.

Part I provides a general overview of the principle of limited shareholder liability as it applies to parent corporations and of its economic underpinnings. Part II reviews judicial applications of …

Beyond Crosby V. Beam: Ohio Courts Extend Protection Of Minority Stockholders Of Close Corporations, Kathleen L. Kuhlman

Akron Law Review

This Comment explores the possible ramifications of viewing working minority shareholders as term employees on both close corporation law and at-will-employment law in Ohio. Part I discusses the background and emergence of the heightened fiduciary duty owed by the majority stockholders to the minority stockholders in closely held corporations and the resultant protection of the minority. Part II discusses the current standing of the employment at-will doctrine and what protections exist for at-will employees in Ohio. Part III examines recent Ohio case law that compares close corporation employment with at-will-employment and analyzes the courts' reasoning behind creating a new exception …

Looking Back And Looking Forward: Sarbanes-Oxley And The Future Of Corporate Governance, Scott Harshbarger, Goutam U. Jois

Akron Law Review

In this Article, we argue that all groups: business leaders, regulators and shareholders, should recognize the steps that must be taken to create a competitive, fair and ethical corporate climate. We are not calling merely for “voluntary cooperation” from businesses to improve the current situation. Indeed, SOX exists and is appropriate for this situation precisely because it imposes baseline obligations with which corporations are required to comply. Moreover, other regulations regarding independent directors, expensing of stock options, etc. are needed and are vital to keeping business interests in line with society’s. However, business leaders and regulators will have an easier …

The Myth Of The Unbiased Director, Regina F. Burch

Akron Law Review

This Article seeks to use social science research to better understand why these and other corporate governance problems persist. One reason may be that boards are biased as to how they respond to these issues. Social science research on risk perception informs us that individuals’ “preferences among different types of risk taking (or avoiding), correspond to cultural biases—that is, to worldviews or ideologies entailing deeply held values and beliefs defending different patterns of social relations.” Cultural theorists have identified four competing worldviews: communitarian, individualistic, hierarchical, and egalitarian. The communitarian and individualistic worldviews are at opposite ends of a spectrum measuring …

Exile To Main Street: The I.R.S.'S Diminished Role In Overseeing Tax-Exempt Organizations, Evelyn Brody, Marcus Owens

Chicago-Kent Law Review

The Internal Revenue Service’s post-Citizens United approach to political activity by would-be tax-exempt organizations has threatened the financial health of the entire agency. Suffering from a siege mentality in the best of times, the IRS predictably and understandably responded to the asserted “scandal” by retreating into a shell of bureaucratic reshuffling, management mumbo-jumbo, and paper moving. A fresh cadre of senior management lacking relevant experience has overhauled the exempt-organization function and emphasized granting recognition of exemption now and (possibly) asking questions later. The new self-certification process of exemption for small charities could also be setting the agency up for the …

Corporate Social Responsibility And The New Governance: In Search Of Epstein's Good Company In The Employment Context, Michael B. Runnels, Elizabeth J. Kennedy, Rev. Timothy B. Brown S.J.

Akron Law Review

The purpose of this Article is to apply Epstein’s Good Company framework to corporate behavior that falls under three distinct employment law issues31 that continually challenge TNCs as they conduct business. Part I summarizes Epstein’s Good Company framework and his insights about the Good Company. Part II integrates Epstein’s Good Company framework with TNCs’ ability to curb the use of abusive forms of child labor (enact responsible child labor policies), foster open, democratic, and collaborative workplaces (improved employer-employee bargaining), and to create an ethic of care for employees (ethic of care). Part III briefly analyzes our findings, suggests modifications to …

Walking On Thin Ice: Does The Revenue Procedure 2013-13 Signify The Demise Of Leveraged Spin-Offs?, Natalia Caruso

William & Mary Business Law Review

Corporate taxpayers, when weighing leveraged spin-off transactions, have long relied on the comfort of Internal Revenue Service rulings to “bless” the deals. These transactions, when structured properly, are not subject to tax under section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) and can potentially provide great monetizing opportunities to public companies. Recent developments in the Internal Revenue Service’s ruling policy, however, removed the safety blanket companies had relied upon, as the Internal Revenue Service announced its decision to cease the issuance of the rulings addressing the deals’ qualification for tax-free treatment.

This Note will examine the history and the complex …

Thoughts On Religious Discrimination From The Cairo Geniza, Nathan B. Oman

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

Religion And For-Profit Corporations: A Real Issue Hidden By Flimsy Arguments, Nathan B. Oman

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

Time To Lift The Veil Of Inequality In Health Care Coverage: Using Corporate Law To Defend The Affordable Care Act, Seema Mohapatra

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Unlimited Liability In The Modern Context: An Examination Of Shareholder Liability In Nova Scotia Unlimited Liability Companies, Sarah P. Bradley

Dalhousie Law Journal

For over 30 years, unlimited liability companies have been ubiquitous in USCanadian M&A transactions. Typically interposed between a US parent company and a Canadian operating company, these entities quietly function to make such structures more tax efficient. They are facilitated by Nova Scotia's venerable Companies Act, which has allowed for the incorporation of corporations with unlimited liability for over a hundred years. Unlimited liability of shareholders is the singular defining characteristic of the ULC, but the precise nature of ULC shareholder liability was apparently regarded as something of a technicality and rarely, if ever, closely examined in the professional or …

Think Like A Businessperson: Using Business School Cases To Create Strategic Corporate Lawyers​., Alicia J. Davis

Articles

For the past twenty-five years, my academic and professional pursuits have straddled the line between business and law. I majored in business administration in college and then worked as an analyst in the Corporate Finance department at a bulge bracket Wall Street firm. After completing a JD/MBA, I returned to investment banking with a focus on middle-market mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and subsequently practiced law with a focus on private equity and M&A. Finally, in 2004, I found my current home as a corporate law professor. In my courses, which include Mergers & Acquisitions, Enterprise Organization, and Investor Protection, I …

The Derivative Nature Of Corporate Constitutional Rights, Margaret M. Blair, Elizabeth Pollman

William & Mary Law Review

This Article engages the two-hundred-year history of corporate constitutional rights jurisprudence to show that the Supreme Court has long accorded rights to corporations based on the rationale that corporations represent associations of people from whom such rights are derived. The Article draws on the history of business corporations in America to argue that the Court’s characterization of corporations as associations made sense throughout most of the nineteenth century. By the late nineteenth century, however, when the Court was deciding several key cases involving corporate rights, this associational view was already becoming a poor fit for some corporations. The Court’s failure …

The Long Road To Reformulating The Understanding Of Directors' Duties: Legalizing Team Production Theory?, Thomas Clarke

Seattle University Law Review

In this Article, the historical evolution of corporate governance is considered, highlighting the different eras of governance, the dominant theoretical and practical paradigms, and the reformulation of paradigms and counter paradigms. Two alternative and sharply contrasting theorizations, one collective and collaborative (the work of Berle and Means), the other individualistic and contractual (agency theory and shareholder value) are focused upon. The explanatory potential of Blair and Stout’s team production theory is elaborated, along with its conception of the complexity of business enterprise, with a mediating hierarch (the board of directors) securing a balance between the interests of different stakeholders. The …

The Future Direction Of Delaware Law (Including A Brief Exegesis On Fee Shifting Bylaws), J. Robert Brown Jr.

Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

Delaware sets the governance standards for most public companies. The ability to attract corporations could not be explained solely by the existence of a favorable statutory regime. Delaware was not invariably the first or the only state to implement management friendly provisions. Given the interpretive gaps in the statute and the critical importance of the common law in the governance process, courts played an outsized role in setting legal standards. The management friendly nature of the Delaware courts contributed significantly to the state’s attraction to public corporations.

A current example of a management friendly trend in the case law had …

Do Corporations Have Religious Beliefs?, Jason Iuliano

Indiana Law Journal

Despite two hundred years of jurisprudence on the topic of corporate personhood, the Supreme Court has failed to endorse a philosophically defensible theory of the corporation. In this Article, I attempt to fill that void. Drawing upon the extensive philosophical literature on personhood and group agency, I argue that corporations qualify as persons in their own right. This leads me to answer the titular question with an emphatic yes. Contrary to how it first seems, that conclusion does not warrant granting expansive constitutional rights to corporations. It actually suggests the opposite. Using the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate as a …

Anti-Primacy: Sharing Power In American Corporations, Robert B. Thompson

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Prominent theories of corporate governance frequently adopt primacy as an organizing theme. Shareholder primacy is the oldest and most used of this genre. Director primacy has grown dramatically, presenting in at least two distinct versions. A variety of alternatives have followed—primacy for CEOs, employees, creditors. All of these theories can’t be right. This article asserts that none of them are. The alternative developed here is one of shared power among the three actors named in corporations statutes with judges tasked to keep all players in the game. The debunking part of the article demonstrates how the suggested parties lack legal …

企業の社会的責任と戦略的租税行動 [Corporate Social Responsibility And Strategic Tax Behavior], Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Keisaku Koga Translator

Articles

This paper addresses two questions. First, from the perspective of the corporation, should the corporation cooperate and pay the corporate tax, or should it engage in "strategic" tax behavior designed to minimize or eliminate its corporate tax burden? Second, from the perspective of the state, should the state use the corporate tax just to raise revenue, or should it also try to use it as a regulatory tool to steer corporate behavior in directions that it deems beneficial to society? The paper argues that whatever our view of the nature of the corporation and of the legitimacy of corporate social …

Fighting Foreign-Corporate Political Access: Applying Corporate Veil-Piercing Doctrine To Domestic-Subsidiary Contributions, Ryan Rott

Michigan Law Review

Campaign finance regulations limit speech. The laws preclude foreign nationals, including foreign corporations, from participating in U.S. politics via campaign contributions. The unusual characteristics of corporations, however, may allow foreign corporations to exploit a loophole in the regulatory regime. A foreign corporation may contribute to political campaigns by acquiring a domestic subsidiary and dominating it. This Note addresses how these unusual corporate behaviors enable foreign corporations to illegally corrupt the political process. This Note concludes that to close the loophole without violating the free speech rights of domestic subsidiaries, Congress should enact legislation which would apply corporate veil-piercing theory to …

The Compliance Case For Social Enterprise, Joseph W. Yockey

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Social enterprises generate revenue to solve social, humanitarian, and ecological problems. Their products are not a means to the end of profits, but rather profits are a means to the end of their production. This dynamic presents many of the same corporate governance issues facing other forprofit firms, including legal compliance. The author contends, however, that traditional strategies for corporate compliance are incongruent to the social enterprise’s unique normative framework. Specifically, traditional compliance theory, with its prioritization of shareholder interests, stands at odds with the social enterprise’s mission-driven purpose. Attention to this distinction is essential for developing effective compliance and …

Enforceability Of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses For Shareholder-Corporation Disputes, Garry D. Hartlieb

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Investor litigation is an increasingly vexatious field of law. Nearly every time a significant change of control or corporate ownership occurs, plaintiffs’ attorneys file standardized complaints to set in motion class action suits. Ultimately, the settlements shareholders receive fail to achieve the practical effects that parties on both sides desire. Shareholders may receive pennies on the dollar of what they allege was lost by corporate wrongdoing, and, in some cases, shareholders may not receive monetary recovery as the settlement requires only that the corporation to make changes to its governing documents. These suits distract directors and management from the core …

Unanimous Shareholder Agreements, Nicolas William Juzda

PhD Dissertations

The unanimous shareholder agreement is a feature of most Canadian corporate statutes that allows the shareholders to, by creating an agreement meeting the necessary criteria, restrict the powers of the directors to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. One possible justification for this is the "nexus of contracts" theory that all corporations are notionally reducible to voluntary agreements. Three key areas of ambiguity surrounding unanimous shareholder agreements are examined in this dissertation, with specific reference to existing judgments. The requirements for their formation are reviewed, including the exact meaning and strictness of the unanimity criterion and the necessity …

Delaware Law As Lingua Franca: Theory And Evidence, Brian Broughman, Jesse M. Fried, Darian Ibrahim

Faculty Publications

Why would a firm incorporate in Delaware rather than in its home state? Prior explanations have focused on the inherent features of Delaware corporate law and on the positive network externalities created by so many other firms domiciling in Delaware. We offer an additional explanation: a firm may choose Delaware simply because its law is nationally known and thus can serve as a lingua franca for in-state and out-of-state investors. Analyzing the incorporation decisions of 1,850 venture-capitalist-backed start-ups, we find evidence consistent with this lingua franca explanation. Indeed, the lingua franca effect appears to be more important than other factors …

Reclassification Risks For Compensation Paid By S And C Corporations To Shareholder-Employees, Stephen R. Looney

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

A Blended Approach To Reducing The Costs Of Shareholder Litigation, Valian A. Afshar

Michigan Law Review

Multiforum litigation and federal securities law class actions impose heavy costs on corporations and their shareholders without producing proportionate benefits. Both are largely the result of the agency problem between shareholders and their attorneys, driven more by the attorneys’ interests in generating fees than by the interests of their clients. In response to each of these problems, commentators have recommended a number of solutions. Chief among them are forum selection and mandatory arbitration provisions in a corporation’s charter or bylaws. This Note recommends that corporations unilaterally adopt both forum selection and mandatory arbitration bylaws to address shareholder lawsuits under state …