Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Board Compliance, John Armour, Brandon L. Garrett, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Geeyoung Min

Faculty Scholarship

What role do corporate boards play in compliance? Compliance programs are internal enforcement programs, whereby firms train, monitor and discipline employees with respect to applicable laws and regulations. Corporate enforcement and compliance failures could not be more high-profile, and have placed boards in the position of responding to systemic problems. Both case law on boards’ fiduciary duties and guidance from prosecutors suggest that the board should have a continuing role in overseeing compliance activity. Yet very little is actually known about the role of boards in compliance. This paper offers the first empirical account of public companies’ engagement with compliance …

The Fallacy Of Director Independence, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

Director independence has become a key cornerstone of the contemporary corporate governance landscape. Over the past few decades, the composition of public firms’ boards of directors in the United States has changed dramatically, shifting towards an increased reliance on directors labeled as “independent.” Courts, regulators, and investors have come to increasingly rely on these independent directors and have made their presence on boards a priority.

However, despite the increased attention, the current system of selecting, anointing, and ensuring director independence is laden with gaps. This Essay highlights three key issues with the current independence framework. First, the current designation and …

Horizontal Directors, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

Directors wield increasing influence in corporate America, making pivotal decisions regarding corporate affairs and management. A robust literature recognizes directors’ important role and examines their incentives and performance. In particular, scholars have worried that “busy directors”—those who serve on multiple corporate boards—may face time constraints that affect their performance. Little attention, however, has been paid to directors who sit on the boards of multiple companies within the same industry. This Article terms them “horizontal directors” and spotlights, for the first time, the legal and policy issues they raise. The “horizontal” feature of directorships, a term often used in the antitrust …

Investigating Intersections Of Corporate Governance & Compliance, Veronica Root Martinez

Faculty Scholarship

In April 2019, Notre Dame Law in London hosted a conference entitled “Investigating Intersections of Corporate Governance & Compliance” with scholars from the United States, United Kingdom, and Ireland participating. The goal of the conference was to facilitate dialogue within and amongst legal scholarly disciplines regarding the ways in which governance and compliance intersect. The effort was a resounding success, and The University of Chicago Law Review Online graciously agreed to publish the six papers presented at the conference. This is the introduction to the symposium.

Golden Parachutes And The Limits Of Shareholder Voting, Albert H. Choi, Andrew C.W. Lund, Robert Schonlau

Articles

With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, Congress attempted to constrain change-in-control payments (also known as “golden parachutes”) by giving shareholders the right to approve or disapprove such payments on an advisory basis. This Essay is the first to empirically examine the experience with the Say-on-Golden-Parachute (“SOGP”) vote. We find that unlike shareholder votes on proposed mergers, there is a significant amount of variation with respect to votes on golden parachutes. Notwithstanding the variation, however, the SOGP voting regime is likely ineffective in controlling golden parachute (“GP”) compensation. First, proxy advisors seem …

Privately Ordered Fiduciaries, Megan Wischmeier Shaner

Faculty Articles

There exists a disconnect in corporate law between the outsized role officers play in managing the corporation and the scant attention these actors receive in statutes and case law. Out of the doctrinal void, a proposal by the ABA’s Officer Liability Task Force has emerged. Seizing on the private ordering movement in corporate law, the Task Force proposes contractual means for addressing the uncertainty surrounding the duties of officers. The Task Force’s proposal extends private ordering in a radical new direction, taking aim at bedrock principles of corporate law – fiduciary duties and the business judgment rule. This article takes …

The Corporate Chameleon, Megan Wischmeier Shaner

Faculty Articles

Who is an “officer” of a corporation? That is the straightforward, yet complex, question this Article seeks to examine and answer. Corporate law contemplates three distinct actors involved in the governance of the corporation–directors, stockholders, and officers. State corporate statutes make clear the identities of the first two actors, yet “officer” is left relatively undefined. The definitional uncertainty surrounding “officer” results in individuals moving in and out of officer status in a chameleon-like fashion. The variable nature of “officer” in corporate law is problematic because officer status carries with it distinct legal consequences. Linguistic precision is vital to the development, …

Global Investor-Director Survey On Climate Risk Management, Kristin Bresnahan, Jens Frankenreiter, Sophie L'Helias, Brea Hinricks, Nina Hodzic, Julian Nyarko, Sneha Pandya, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Changes in the global climate are having profound impacts on business operations, governance, and organizational management around the world. Boards of directors are searching for ways to account for these changes as they help guide their organizations, and investors are increasingly concerned about how these changes might impact their portfolios. This global survey, conducted by a team of researchers at the Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership at Columbia Law School and experts at LeaderXXchange, seeks to understand how – if at all – institutional investors and board directors incorporate climate-related issues in their investment decision …

Business Playing Politics: Strengthening Shareholders’ Rights In The Age Of Ceo Activism, Savannah J. Wolfe

Lewis & Clark Law Review

The United States has entered a new age of business: the Age of CEO Activism. “CEO activism” is the phenomenon where Chief Executive Officers (“CEOs”) and other C-Suite members use their executive platforms to speak out on political, social, and environmental topics not directly related to their businesses. These fiduciaries have become more and more vocal about their political or social ideology, especially around largescale political events.

In this age, however, shareholders are left with scant rights due to the overbroad protections granted by the business judgment rule. Instead, shareholders must sit passively as their C-Suite members charge blindly into …

Board Compliance, John Armour, Brandon Garrett, Jeffrey Gordon, Geeyoung Min

Faculty Scholarship

What role do corporate boards play in compliance? Compliance programs are internal enforcement programs, whereby firms train, monitor and discipline employees with respect to applicable laws and regulations. Corporate enforcement and compliance failures could not be more high-profile, and have placed boards in the position of responding to systemic problems. Both case law on boards’ fiduciary duties and guidance from prosecutors suggest that the board should have a continuing role in overseeing compliance activity. Yet very little is actually known about the role of boards in compliance. This paper offers the first empirical account of public companies’ engagement with compliance …

Designing Business Forms To Pursue Social Goals, Ofer Eldar

Faculty Scholarship

The long-standing debate about the purpose and role of business firms has recently regained momentum. Business firms face growing pressure to pursue social goals and benefit corporation statutes proliferate across many U.S. states. This trend is largely based on the idea that firms increase long-term shareholder value when they contribute (or appear to contribute) to society. Contrary to this trend, this Article argues that the pressing issue is whether policies to create social impact actually generate value for third-party beneficiaries—rather than for shareholders. Because it is difficult to measure social impact with precision, the design of legal forms for firms …

Shadow Governance, Yaron Nili, Cathy Hwang

Faculty Scholarship

Corporations have something to say about some of the most important social and economic issues of our time—and one way they say it is through shadow governance. This Article spotlights a group of influential corporate policies comprising what we call “shadow governance.” These non-charter, non-bylaw governance documents express a corporation’s commitment to and process on issues as wide-ranging as campaign finance, environmental sustainability, and sexual harassment, but are largely overlooked by scholars and practitioners alike. This Article addresses that gap, revealing how shadow governance documents influence corporate decision-making and corporate behavior.

This Article makes two contributions to the literature. First, …

Index Funds And The Future Of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, And Policy, Lucian Bebchuk, Scott Hirst

Faculty Scholarship

Index funds own an increasingly large proportion of American public companies. The stewardship decisions of index fund managers—how they monitor, vote, and engage with their portfolio companies—can be expected to have a profound impact on the governance and performance of public companies and the economy. Understanding index fund stewardship, and how policymaking can improve it, is thus critical for corporate law scholarship. In this Article we contribute to such understanding by providing a comprehensive theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis of index fund stewardship.
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/="/">We begin by putting forward an agency-costs theory of index fund incentives. Stewardship decisions by …

Civil Rights And Shareholder Activism: Sec V. Medical Committee For Human Rights, Sarah C. Haan

Washington and Lee Law Review

This article builds upon the author's remarks at the 2018-2019 Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism at Washington and Lee University School of Law, February 15, 2019.

What does “corporate democracy” mean? How far does federal law go to guarantee public company investors a say in a firm’s policies on important social, environmental, or political issues? In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court appeared ready to start sketching the contours of corporate democracy—and then, at the last minute, it pulled back. This Article tells the story of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Medical Committee for Human Rights …

Crashing The Boards: A Comparative Analysis Of The Boxing Out Of Women On Boards In The United States And Canada, Diana C. Nicholls Mutter

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

This paper will first provide a critical, comparative look at the Canadian and the federal American responses to the under-representation of women on boards of large, publicly traded corporations. There will be a discussion about the competing conceptions which emerge in addressing the regulation of women on boards in the United States and Canada and why each jurisdiction implemented its policy when it did. The conceptions arising out of questions about under-representation of women on boards tend to fall within two categories: business case rationales and normative rationales. Given the competing conceptions of this issue, this paper will attempt to …

Theory, Evidence And Policy On Dual-Class Shares: A Country-Specific Response To A Global Debate, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

Dual-class shares have become one of the most controversial issues in today´s capital markets and corporate governance debates around the world. Namely, it is not clear whether companies should be allowed to go public with dual-class shares and, if so, which restrictions (if any) should be imposed. Three primary regulatory models have been adopted to deal with dual-class shares: (i) prohibitions, existing in countries like the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Colombia, or Argentina; (ii) the permissive model adopted in several jurisdictions, including Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands, and particularly the United States; and (iii) the restrictive approach recently implemented in Hong …

The Case Against The Implementation Of Loyalty Shares In Spain, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

The Spanish Ministry of Economy has recently released a new bill that, among other aspects, proposes an amendment of the Spanish Companies Act to allow listed companies to adopt loyalty shares. These shares will confer additional voting rights to those shareholders staying in the corporation for at least two years. For that purpose, the company only needs to approve the adoption of loyalty shares by a qualified majority. Therefore, following the Italian (rather than the French) model of loyalty shares, the adoption of loyalty shares in Spain will be done as an opt-in rule.

Propuesta Para La Mejora Y Modernización De La Legislación Societaria En Ecuador [Proposal For The Improvement And Modernization Of Corporate Law In Ecuador] In Spanish, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez, Cesar Coronel Jones

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

This paper seeks to provide some policy recommendations for the improvement and modernization of corporate law in Ecuador. These proposals have been based on the international literature and the particular features of Ecuador (that is, a country with many micro and small companies, state-owned enterprises, underdeveloped capital markets, unsophisticated courts, among other aspects). Secondly, since the legal, economic and institutional features of Ecuador can be found in other Latin American countries, this paper also seeks to be helpful to other countries in the region planning to reform their corporate laws. Finally, this paper seeks to contribute to the improvement and …

Should Shareholders Be Rewarded For Loyalty? European Experiments On The Wedge Between Tenured Voting And Takeover Law, Chiara Mosca

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Corporate law reveals its democratic background when it comes to the general meetings of shareholders, finding, on both sides of the Atlantic, its most tangible expression in the “one share, one vote” principle. While, in the political landscape, the “one person, one vote” standard is absolute dogma and weighting votes according to people’s preferences and interests has never proved feasible, in the corporate scenario the one share, one vote principle is constantly challenged by the incentives of companies and their shareholders to shape corporate rights according to specific needs. In this respect, some legislators (specifically in France and Italy) have …

Board Governance For The Twenty-First Century, Faith Stevelman, Sarah C. Haan

Scholarly Articles

A decade after the global financial crisis, corporate governance is in a state of flux. A conceptual shift is underway. Years ago, in "first wave" governance, boards had a cozy relationship with the company C-suite. In "second wave" governance, which took hold in the 1970s, legal academics reimagined the board's role, conceptualizing directors as monitors charged with limiting waste and abuse that can arise in agency relationships. Now, we find ourselves at the threshold of "third wave" governance, in which boards are asked to grapple immediately and candidly with both the financial aspects of business and new environmental, social, and …

Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility? Legislative Innovation And Judicial Application In China, Li-Wen Lin

All Faculty Publications

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is often understood as voluntary corporate behavior beyond legal compliance. The recent emergence of CSR legislation is challenging this typical understanding. A number of countries including China, Indonesia and India have expressly stated in corporate law that companies shall undertake CSR. The CSR law is controversial. Critics of CSR see the law as an unwise effort to challenge profit maximization as the only social responsibility of the corporation. Even CSR advocates welcome the CSR law with great caution. Given the vague statutory language of CSR, the practical application of the law places high demands on the …

A One-Size-Fits-All Approach To Corporate Governance Codes And Compliance By Smaller Listed Firms: An Examination Of Companies Listed In Hong Kong And Singapore, Christopher C. H. Chen

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

This article examines the impact of a one-size-fits-all corporate governance code on smaller listed firms, which should have fewer resources to hire more qualified independent directors for their boards and board committees. After examining data from a sample of companies listed in Hong Kong and Singapore, we find some limited support for these resources-based arguments. While smaller firms do not necessarily have a lower proportion of board members who are independent directors, some evidence suggests that smaller firms do pay less to independent directors and that these directors have to serve on multiple board committees. Although many larger firms also …

Private Ownership At A Public Crossroads: Studying The Rapidly Evolving World Of Corporate Ownership, Ira M. Millstein Center For Global Markets And Corporate Ownership

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

Capital formation in the United States is currently in the midst of a significant transition with largely unexplored consequences for the ownership and control of American business, as well as significant implications for the future of the public equity markets. Although public equity markets remain vast and important, they are no longer the primary source of capital for business formation and growth. Increasingly, capital for business formation and growth is being raised — and held — privately from a relatively new set of institutional investors (most importantly, venture capital and private equity funds). As a result, ownership and control over …

Unraveling China's Capital Market Growth: A Political Economy Account, Tamar Groswald Ozery

SJD Dissertations

With modern, successful firms that operate globally and a capital market that is the second largest in the world, corporate governance in China has long passed the point of an “adjust or perish” prognostic. Yet its firm governance and capital market functions maintain strong idiosyncrasies that go against many fundamentals in economics and legal thought. These idiosyncrasies are products of the underlying configurations of China’s political economy and the shifts within it. Political economy in China has a determinant role on the ways corporate ownership is organized, firms operate, and the capital market functions. It is responsible for many of …

Board Diversity By Term Limits?, Darren Rosenblum, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

Four-fifths of the corporate board seats in the United States are held by men and a shocking number of companies lack any female representation on their boards. While institutional investors have pushed these companies for change, California took a more aggressive step and followed several European countries by mandating a quota for board representation. Heated argument has ensued over what diversity we should prioritize and what mechanisms should be used to promote diversity. Yet could these challenges be avoided altogether through the use of term limits?

This Article is the first academic inquiry exploring the connection between term limits and …

Nonvoting Shares And Efficient Corporate Governance, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

A growing number of technology companies, including Google, Zillow, and Snap, have issued stock that does not allow investors to vote on corporate decisions. But there is fundamental disagreement among scholars and investors about whether nonvoting stock is beneficial or harmful. Critics argue that nonvoting shares perpetually insulate corporate insiders from influence and oversight, and therefore increase agency costs. By contrast, proponents contend that nonvoting shares may provide benefits that exceed these agency costs, such as enabling corporate insiders to pursue their long-term vision for the company without interference from outside shareholders.

This Article offers a novel perspective on this …

Delegating Portfolio Management To Index Creators: The Consequences For Corporate Governance, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

The recent popularity of index investing and corresponding influx of assets into passively managed mutual funds has generated a large literature in law and in finance about the implications for securities markets, antitrust, corporate governance, and beyond. But few have explored the index landscape itself. Professor Robertson’s article is an important exception, and her findings — in particular, that indices are more diverse and dynamic than many would have expected — have implications for all of these debates.

Derivative Suit Under The Saudi Companies Law: Theory And Best Practice, Ahmed Saeed Khabti

Maurer Theses and Dissertations

Saudi Arabia has been focused on diversification of its economy and attracting foreign investors. Countries that provide strong shareholder protection are more likely to attract foreign investors. However, there is a need for greater protection of minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia. This is because Saudi’s companies law fails to equip minority shareholders with adequate protective rights. A current issue with the new Saudi companies law can be linked to derivative suit, which is very important for both foreign investors and local investors. Derivative suit in Saudi Arabia is very limited and difficult to pursue because under article 79 of Saudi …

Protecting Minority Shareholders In Close Corporations: An Analysis And Critique Of The Statutory Protection In The Saudi Companies Law, Abdulrahman Nabil Alsaleh

Maurer Theses and Dissertations

Worldwide, the protection of minority shareholders in public corporations has received most of the corporate scholars’ attention. This tendency, therefore, has been reflected in the negligence of the same group but in close corporations. A close corporation minority shareholder confronts distinctive issues caused by the locked-in structure of close corporations. The lack of liquid secondary market, the oppression by majority shareholders, and the high expectations held by minority shareholders all contribute to the minority shareholders’ concern that they may be deprived of a voice in management or opportunistically be taken advantage of by those in power. Although these structural issues …

Corporate Governance For Sustainability, Andrew Johnston, Jeroen Veldman, Robert G. Eccles, Simon Deakin, Jerry Davis, Marie-Laure Djelic, Katharina Pistor, Blanche Segrestin, William M. Gentry, Cynthia A. Williams, David Millon, Paddy Ireland, Beate Sjåfjell, Christopher M. Bruner, Lorraine E. Talbot, Hugh Christopher Willmott, Charlotte Villiers, Carol Liao, Bertrand Valiorgue, Jason Glynos, Todd L. Sayre, Bronwen Morgan, Rick Wartzman, Prem Sikka, Filip Gregor, David Carroll Jacobs, Roger Gill, Roger Brown, Vincenzo Bavoso, Neil Lancastle, Julie Matthaei, Scott Taylor, Ulf Larsson-Olaison, Jay Cullen, Alan J. Dignam, Thomas Wuil Joo, Ciarán O'Kelly, Con Keating, Roman Tomasic, Simon Lilley, Kevin Tennent, Keith Robson, Willy Maley, Iris H-Y Chiu, Ewan Mcgaughey, Chris Rees, Nina Boeger, Adam Leaver, Marc T. Moore, Leen Paape, Alan D. Meyer, Marcello Palazzi, Nitasha Kaul, Juan Felipe Espinosa-Cristia, Timothy Kuhn, David J. Cooper, Susanne Soederberg, Andreas Jansson, Susan Watson, Ofer Sitbon, Joan Loughrey, David Collison, Maureen Mcculloch, Navajyoti Samanta, Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Grahame F. Thompson, Andrew R. Keay, Alessia Contu, Andreas Rühmkorf, Richard Hull, Irene-Marie Esser, Nihel Chabrak

Faculty Scholarship

The current model of corporate governance needs reform. There is mounting evidence that the practices of shareholder primacy drive company directors and executives to adopt the same short time horizon as financial markets. Pressure to meet the demands of the financial markets drives stock buybacks, excessive dividends and a failure to invest in productive capabilities. The result is a ‘tragedy of the horizon’, with corporations and their shareholders failing to consider environmental, social or even their own, long-term, economic sustainability.

With less than a decade left to address the threat of climate change, and with consensus emerging that businesses need …