Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Ec Company Law - The European Company V. The European Economic Interest Grouping And The Harmonization Of The National Company Laws, Johan De Bruycker

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Books Received, Georgia Journal Of International And Comparative Law

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Trouble Abroad: Microsoft's Antitrust Problems Under The Law Of The European Union, Justin O'Dell

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

"Defensive Territoriality": A New Paradigm For The Prosecution Of Extraterritorial Business Crimes, Ellen S. Podgor

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

A Comparison Of Corporate Taxation In The United States And Germany: Different Ways Up The Mountain, Walter D. Schwidetzky

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002: Are Stricter Internal Controls Constricting International Companies?, Jennifer K. Coalson

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Greasing The Wheels: British Deficiencies In Relation To American Clarity In International Anti-Corruption Law, Todd Swanson

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Japan's Financial Instruments And Exchange Law: Hercules Or Hydra?, Clark T. Wisenbaker

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

The Business Of Business: Comparing Corporate Social Responsibility Initiatives In China And The United States, Jessica M. Conrad

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

In-Sourcing Corporate Responsibility For Enforcement Of The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Larry D. Thompson

Scholarly Works

In this article I first review our nation's long-standing and active aversion to corporate corruption overseas, as principally embodied in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. I then explain how achievement of the FCPA's goals is undermined by the uncertainty in current federal enforcement policies and the consequent ambivalence toward self disclosure exhibited by multinational corporations. Finally, I argue that the only realistic way to make up the shortcomings in FCPA enforcement that flow from the Justice Department's limited resources is to motivate corporations themselves to police corruption in their foreign subsidiaries by giving them a concrete incentive in the form …

The Problem Of Abusive Related-Partner Allocations, Gregg D. Polsky, Emily Cauble

Scholarly Works

This Article highlights a flaw in the existing rules regarding partnership tax allocations that has not yet received sufficient attention by existing literature. Namely, the partnership tax allocation rules are implicitly premised on the assumption that partners are unrelated and, thus, transact with each other at arm’s length. As a result, related partners can and do devise tax allocation schemes that exploit the gap in the current partnership tax allocation rules to achieve unwarranted tax savings.

This Article proposes to end this abuse by disallowing special allocations among related partners. Under the proposal, allocations among related partners would be required …

Where Do We Go Now? The Uncertain Future For 29 U.S.C. § 1301(B)(1), Private Equity Funds, And Multiemployer Pension Plans After Sun Capita, Crighton T. Allen

Georgia Law Review

The United States faces a growing problem concerning corporate indebtedness to pension plans, specifically, multi-employer pension plans (MEPPs). MEPPs are group pension plans in which a number of employers join together to contribute to a fund benefitting all employees of the participating companies. If an employer seeks to withdraw from a MEPP by ceasing to contribute into it, the company faces a withdrawal penalty-its proportionate share of the plan's vested but unfunded benefits. The recent decision by the First Circuit in Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund has the potential to greatly …

Acqui-Hiring, Gregg D. Polsky, John F. Coyle

Scholarly Works

Facebook, Google, and other leading technology companies in Silicon Valley have been buying start-up companies at a brisk pace. In many of these transactions, the buyer has little interest in acquiring the startup’s projects or assets. Instead, the buyer’s primary motivation is to hire some or all of the startup’s software engineers. These so-called “acqui-hires” represent a novel — and increasingly common — tool by which the largest and most successful technology companies in the world satisfy their intense demand for engineering talent.

To date, the acqui-hire has attracted no attention in the academic or professional legal literature. With this …

The Conundrum Of Corporate Liability Under The Alien Tort Statute, Joel Slawotsky

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

A Conflict Primacy Model Of The Public Board, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

e board of directors is the theoretical fulcrum of the corporate form: Statutes task the board with managing the corporation. Yet in the twentieth century, CEOs and other executives came to dominate the real-world control of the corporation. In light of this transformation, in the 1970s Melvin E. Eisenberg proposed reconceiving the board as an independent monitor. Eisenberg’s monitoring board is now the dominant regulatory model of the board. Recently two different visions of the board of directors have emerged. Stephen Bainbridge’s “director primacy” model calls directors “Platonic guardians,” and Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s “team production model” characterizes them …

Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

Securities law’s dirty little secret is that rich investors have access to special kinds of investments—hedge funds, private equity, private companies—that everyone else does not. This disparity stems from the fact that, from its inception, federal securities law has jealously guarded the manner in which firms can sell shares to the general public. Perhaps paternalistically, the law assumes that the average investor needs the protection of the full panoply of securities regulation and thus should be limited to buying public securities. In contrast, accredited—i.e., wealthy— investors, who it is presumed can fend for themselves, have the luxury of choosing between …

The Outside Investor: Citizen Shareholders & Corporate Alienation, Anne M. Tucker

Scholarly Works

This Article explores the creation and conundrum of citizen shareholders-investors who enter the securities market primarily through employer- sponsored defined-contribution plans, invest in mutual or index funds, and are saving for long-term goals like retirement. Citizen shareholders are a consequence of a retirement revolution, and are the fastest growing group of investors. Citizen shareholders are distinguishable from other shareholders on the grounds of choice, exit, and the number of intermediaries inserted into the investment chain in defined-contribution plans. They are largely missing from corporate policy and scholarship debates; few discussions have incorporated the growing reality that shareholder status has changed …

Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks In The Defined Contribution Society, Anne M. Tucker

Scholarly Works

A revolution in the retirement landscape over the last several decades shifted the predominant savings vehicle from traditional pensions (defined benefit plans) to self-directed accounts in defined contribution plans like the 401(k) and has drastically changed how people invest in the stock market and why. The prevalence of these self-directed accounts has created our defined contribution society and a new class of investors-the citizen shareholders-who enter the private securities market through self-directed retirement plans, invest for long-term savings goals, and are predominately indirect shareholders. With 90 million Americans invested in mutual funds, and nearly 75 million who do so through …

Can Executive Compensation Reform Cure Short-Termism?, Gregg Polsky, Andrew C. Lund

Scholarly Works

There is an increasingly pervasive view among corporate governance observers that senior managers are too focused on short-term results at the expense of long-term interests. Concerns about “short-termism” have been expressed within the financial industry context and outside of it, but because of the recent financial crisis, much of the discussion has been directed at financial institutions. To combat short-termism, several commentators have advocated executive compensation reform to encourage senior managers to adopt a longer-term perspective. Yet these reforms will likely prove ineffective because of other significant pressures on managers to maintain current stock prices.

Is The Corporate Director's Duty Of Care A "Fiduciary' Duty? Does It Matter?, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Works

While reference to "fiduciary duties" (plural) is routinely employed in the United States as a convenient short-hand for a corporate director's duties of care and loyalty, other common-law countries generally treat loyalty as the sole "fiduciary duty." This contrast prompts some important questions about the doctrinal structure for duty of care analysis adopted in Delaware, the principal jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S. public companies. Specifically, has the evolution of Delaware's convoluted and problematic framework for evaluating disinterested board conduct been facilitated by styling care a "fiduciary" duty? If so, then how should Delaware lawmakers and judges respond moving forward?

In …

Spacs And The Jobs Act, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

The law has long confined the average investor to trading in public securitieswhile allowing wealthy—or “accredited”—individual investors access to a panoply of private securities, including investment vehicles such as hedge funds and private equity funds. Nevertheless, pressure to let the general public into private equity has been growing. Two forces have contributed to this mounting pressure. First, public investors are eager to try their hand at investing in private enterprise. Second, private firms need capital. In the face of these forces, the sharp line that has long separated public and private firms has become increasingly blurred

Consider the story of …

Reconsidering The Separation Of Banking And Commerce, Mehrsa Baradaran

Scholarly Works

This Article examines the long-held belief that banking and commerce need to be kept separate to ensure a stable banking system. Specifically, the Article criticizes the Bank Holding Company Act (“BHCA”), which prohibits nonbanking entities from owning banks. The recent banking collapse has caused and exacerbated several problematic trends in U.S. banking, especially the conglomeration of banking entities and the homogenization of assets. The inflexible and outdated provisions of the BHCA are a major cause of these trends. Since the enactment of the BHCA, the landscape of U.S. banking has changed dramatically, but the strict separation of banking and commerce …

Social Proposals Under Rule 14a-8: A Fall-Back Remedy In An Era Of Congressional Inaction, Margaret V. Sachs

Scholarly Works

More than a decade ago, institutional investors, notably labor unions and pension plans, began using shareholder proposals as a vehicle for advancing progressive social causes. These proposals have recently garnered heightened levels of shareholder support. While even majority support for a proposal does not insure its adoption by the board of directors, appreciable (even if not majority) support can nonetheless sometimes precipitate adoption, or at least negotiation (which can lead to adoption). This Essay argues, first, that with Congress now largely dysfunctional, social proposals have acquired a whole new role—that of a company-by-company, fall-back mechanism for solving social problems that …

Exit, Voice, And Reputation: The Evolution Of Spacs, Usha Rodrigues, Mike Stegemoller

Scholarly Works

This Article tells the story of a new type of business—the special purpose acquisition corporation ("SPAC"). The promoters of a SPAC begin by forming a shell corporation with no assets. They then take the company public on little more than a promise that they will strive to complete the acquisition of a target in the near future. We present the first empirical study of the SPAC contract design, and use a hand-collected dataset to trace its evolution over the past nine years.

While SPACs are a new form, their contract design borrows heavily from private equity's playbook. Private equity managers …

The Citizen Shareholder: Modernizing The Agency Paradigm To Reflect How And Why A Majority Of Americans Invest In The Market Berle Iii: Theory Of The Firm: The Third Annual Symposium Of The Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center On Corporations, Law & Society, Anne M. Tucker

Scholarly Works

This Article examines corporate law from the perspective of personal investment and discusses the economic realities of modern investments in order to understand the role of shareholders within the agency paradigm. Corporate law, its scholars, and suggested reforms traditionally focus on the internal organization of the corporation. For example, agency principles inform corporate law by acknowledging a potential conflict of interest between the managers and shareholders of a corporation. Reforms such as increased shareholder voting rights and proxy access, which seek to give shareholders a more direct means to make their interests known to managers, illustrate corporate law’s focus on …

Agency And The Ontology Of The Corporation, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

The Diminishing Returns Of Incentive Pay In Executive Compensation Contracts, Gregg D. Polsky, Andrew Lund

Scholarly Works

For the past 30 years, the conventional wisdom has been that executive compensation packages should include very large proportions of incentive pay. This incentive pay orthodoxy has become so firmly entrenched that the current debates about executive compensation simply take it as a given. We argue, however, that in light of evolving corporate governance mechanisms, the marginal net benefit of incentive-laden pay packages is both smaller than appreciated and getting smaller over time. As a result, the assumption that higher proportions of incentive pay are beneficial is no longer warranted.

A number of corporate governance mechanisms have evolved to duplicate …

Good Faith In Revlon-Land, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Works

The Delaware Supreme Court has set a very high hurdle for plaintiffs challenging directors' good faith in the sale of a company. In Lyondell Chemical Company v. Ryan, the court held that unconflicted directors could be found to have breached the good faith component of their duty of loyalty in the transactional context only if they "knowingly and completely failed to undertake," and "utterly failed to attempt" to discharge their duties.

In this essay I argue that the Lyondell standard effectively imports into the transactional context the exacting standard previously applied in the oversight context — a move clearly aimed …

Ethical Issues In Business And The Lawyer's Role, Carol Morgan, Robert Rhee, Tamar Frankel, Mark Fagan

Scholarly Works

This is a transcript of a panel discussion on teaching Business Ethics.

Rational Coercion: Citizens United And A Modern Day Prisoner's Dilemma, Anne M. Tucker

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.