Business Organizations Law Commons^™

(At Least) Thirteen Ways Of Looking At Election Lies, Helen Norton

Publications

Lies take many forms. Because lies vary so greatly in their motivations and consequences (among many other qualities), philosophers have long sought to catalog them to help make sense of their diversity and complexity. Legal scholars too have classified lies in various ways to explain why we punish some and protect others. This symposium essay offers yet another taxonomy of lies, focusing specifically on election lies — that is, lies told during or about elections. We can divide and describe election lies in a wide variety of ways: by speaker, by motive, by subject matter, by audience, by means of …

Corporations As Conduits: A Cautionary Note About Regulating Hypotheticals, Douglas M. Spencer

Publications

No abstract provided.

Making Corporate Law More Communitarian: A Proposed Response To The Roberts Court's Personification Of Corporations, Robert M. Ackerman, Lance Cole

Brooklyn Law Review

Both Citizens United and Hobby Lobby are notable for the Roberts Court’s personification of the corporation. In Citizens United, the United States Supreme Court expanded corporate speech rights in a political context; in Hobby Lobby, it accorded religious rights to corporations in an unprecedented manner. This article explains how the Court’s expansion of corporate personification has ignored both traditional corporate law doctrine regarding shareholder primacy and the fundamental distinction in corporate law between the corporate entity and the shareholders who control it.

The article takes a communitarian approach to corporate law analysis, recognizing that corporations play useful roles …

Financing Corporate Elections, Andrew A. Schwartz

Publications

Elections for corporate directorships have become more competitive and expensive in recent years, raising important questions of corporate campaign finance, such as whether an insurgent campaign must disclose the source of its funding and whether a director is permitted to receive third-party compensation during her term in office (known as a "golden leash"). These present novel and unanswered issues of corporate law, but many analogous issues have been resolved in the political sphere using the First Amendment and a well-developed line of Supreme Court case law beginning with Buckley v. Valeo and continuing through Citizens United and other key precedents. …

Voter Primacy, Sarah C. Haan

Fordham Law Review

    This Article argues that Citizens United v. FEC expanded the audience for campaign finance disclosure to include a group that had never before been held relevant to campaign finance disclosure—corporate shareholders—and explores the constitutional, policy, and political consequences of this change. In part IV of Citizens United, the U.S. Supreme Court departed from more than thirty years of campaign finance disclosure analysis to treat corporate shareholders as a target audience for corporate electoral spending disclosure, holding that the governmental interest advanced by campaign finance disclosure laws includes an interest in helping corporate shareholders “determine whether their corporation’s political speech advances …

The Legal Quagmire Of Irc § 501(C)(4) Organizations And The Consequential Rise Of Dark Money In Elections, Daniel C. Kirby

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Section 501(c)(4) organizations have recently become a hot topic with respect to campaign finance. Following the 2010 Supreme Court case, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the number of IRC § 501(c)(4) organizations ballooned in number, and the amount of money flowing through § 501(c)(4) groups increased 2390 percent from the 2008 election cycle to the 2012 election cycle. This essay explores the dangers to the campaign finance system of the substantial increase in spending by IRC § 501(c)(4) organizations. The foundational claim of this essay is that IRC § 501(c) is in need of a statutory and regulatory overhaul …

The Uncertain Future Of The Corporate Contribution Ban, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

Concern about the role of corporate money in democracy has been a longstanding theme in American politics. In the late nineteenth century, the states began to adopt laws restricting the use of corporate funds in elections. The first permanent federal campaign finance law – the Tillman Act of 1907 – targeted corporations by prohibiting federally-chartered corporations from making contributions in any election and prohibiting all corporations from making contributions in federal elections. Subsequently amended, continued, and strengthened by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, and the Bipartisan …

Fighting Foreign-Corporate Political Access: Applying Corporate Veil-Piercing Doctrine To Domestic-Subsidiary Contributions, Ryan Rott

Michigan Law Review

Campaign finance regulations limit speech. The laws preclude foreign nationals, including foreign corporations, from participating in U.S. politics via campaign contributions. The unusual characteristics of corporations, however, may allow foreign corporations to exploit a loophole in the regulatory regime. A foreign corporation may contribute to political campaigns by acquiring a domestic subsidiary and dominating it. This Note addresses how these unusual corporate behaviors enable foreign corporations to illegally corrupt the political process. This Note concludes that to close the loophole without violating the free speech rights of domestic subsidiaries, Congress should enact legislation which would apply corporate veil-piercing theory to …

A Court For The One Percent: How The Supreme Court Contributes To Economic Inequality, Michele E. Gilman

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article explores the United States Supreme Court’s role in furthering economic inequality. The Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011 not only highlighted growing income and wealth inequality in the United States, but also pointed the blame at governmental policies that favor business interests and the wealthy due to their outsized influence on politicians. Numerous economists and political scientists agree with this thesis. However, in focusing ire on the political branches and big business, these critiques have largely overlooked the role of the judiciary in fostering economic inequality. The Court’s doctrine touches each of the major causes of economic inequality, …

Post-Citizens United: Using Shareholder Derivative Claims Of Corporate Waste To Challenge Corporate Independent Political Expenditures, William Alan Nelson Ii, Esq.

Nevada Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The Real Error In Citizens United, Joanna M. Meyer

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Selectica Resets The Trigger On The Poison Pill: Where Should The Delaware Courts Go Next?, Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Since their invention in 1982, shareholder rights plans have been the subject of intense controversy. Rights plans, or as they are known more pejoratively “poison pills,” enable a target board to “poison” a takeover attempt by making it prohibitively expensive for a bidder to acquire more than a certain percentage of the target company’s stock (until recently 15-20%). Not surprisingly, some commentators view rights plans as an inappropriate means of shifting power from shareholders to the board of directors.

In this Article, we critically examine Delaware law on the use of shareholder rights plans and propose a new approach to …

Commentary: Campaign Finance In The Wake Of Citizens United, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 583 (2011), Thomas E. Mann

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Capitalist Joker: The Strange Origins, Disturbing Past, And Uncertain Future Of Corporate Personhood In American Law, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 643 (2011), David H. Gans, Douglas T. Kendall

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

So What If Corporations Aren't People?, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 701 (2011), Ilya Shapiro, Caitlyn W. Mccarthy

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Citizens United And Tiered Personhood, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 717 (2011), Atiba R. Ellis

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Back To The Future? The Effects Of Citizens United V. Fec In The 2010 Election, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 595 (2011), Peter L. Francia

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Corporations, Corruption, And Complexity: Campaign Finance After Citizens United, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

Few campaign finance cases have drawn more public attention than the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. FEC. The Court's invalidation of a sixty-year-old federal law – and comparable laws in two dozen states – banning corporations from engaging in independent spending in support of or opposition to candidates strongly affirms the right of corporations to engage in electoral advocacy. Critics – and most, albeit not all, of both the popular and academic commentary on the decision has been critical – have condemned the idea that corporations enjoy the same rights to spend on elections as natural persons. …

The Transformation Of Freedom Of Speech: Unsnarling The Twisted Roots Of Citizens United V. Fec, 44 J. Marshall L. Rev. 69 (2010), Steven J. André

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Seductive Comparison Of Shareholder And Civic Democracy, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

This Comment takes the common comparison of shareholder democracy and political democracy in a new direction by exploring the parallels between the board of directors and the Electoral College, examining both institutions in light of the differences between nation and corporation and their contrasting histories. Both are "once removed" representative democracies, because both systems only give the voters the right to vote for representatives who then select those who actually govern. The Comment next considers, with a critical eye, the underlying premise that shareholder and civic democracies can be compared at all, given the radically different nature of the corporate …

Regulating Section 527 Organizations, Gregg D. Polsky, Guy-Uriel E. Charles

Scholarly Works

In this Essay, we consider whether the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has the authority to regulate independent 527 organizations (e.g., Swiftboat Veterans for Truth, Moveon.org, etc.) as political committees under the Federal Election Campaign Act. This issue, which was hotly debated during the last election cycle when it was considered and ultimately tabled by the FEC, is an extremely complex one that requires a deep understanding of election, tax, administrative, and constitutional law. After considering how these areas of law intersect, we conclude that the FEC lacks the authority to regulate independent 527 organizations as political committees.

University Of Richmond Law Review

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

University Of Richmond Law Review

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Survey Of Developments In West Virginia Law: 1980

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

Corporate Political Speech: The Effect Of First National Bank Of Boston V. Bellotti Upon Statutory Limitations On Corporate Referendum Spending, Francis H. Fox

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Federal Statues And Government Regulation, Various Editors

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

A Corporation May Not Contribute Funds To Affect The Outcome Of A Referendum., Larry D. Brockman

St. Mary's Law Journal

Abstract Forthcoming.

Corporate Contributions To Ballot-Measure Campaigns, Gail L. Achterman

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

It is not clear that the perceived dangers of corporate participation in politics are real dangers, or that outright prohibition of such participation is the best means of preserving the democratic character of the electoral process. Any controls on corporate spending in initiative campaigns should be firmly based upon articulated conceptions of the corporation's legitimate role in society. This article examines some of these conceptions and their relationship to the process of direct legislation and thereafter makes recommendations for workable controls in light of that analysis.

Corporations - Political Activities - Interpretation Of Statute Prohibiting Political Contributions By Corporation, George Kircos

Michigan Law Review

Defendant corporation, organized to promote the recall of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, was charged with violating section 346.12 of the Wisconsin statutes, which prohibits corporations doing business in Wisconsin from paying or contributing any money, etc., to promote or defeat the candidacy of any person for nomination, appointment, or election to any political office. The trial court entered a forfeiture judgment against the defendant. On appeal, held, reversed. The statutory phrase "doing business" was intended to limit the scope of the prohibition to corporations organized for profit. Corporations, such as the defendant, organized solely for political purposes are not …