Banking and Finance Law Commons^™

Reforming The Global Value Chain Through Transnational Private Regulation, Kishanthi Parella

South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business

No abstract provided.

Putting The 'Financial Stability' In Financial Stability Oversight Council, Hilary Allen

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

For all the ink that has been spilled on the topic of financial regulation since the financial crisis of 2007-2008, there has been little examination of the competing normative goals of financial regulation. Should the financial system be treated as an end in itself such that the efficiency of that system is the primary goal? Or should financial regulation instead treat the financial system as a means to the end of broader economic growth? This Article argues for the latter approach, and stakes out the controversial normative position that financial stability, rather than efficiency, should be the paramount focus of …

Through The Looking Glass To A Shared Reflection: The Evolving Relationship Between Administrative Law And Financial Regulation, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

Administrative law and financial regulation have an uneasy relationship today. It was not always so. Indeed, the two were closely intertwined at the nation's birth. The Treasury Department was a major hub of early federal administration, with Alexander Hamilton crafting the first iterations of federal administrative law in his oversight of revenue generation and customs collection. One hundred and fifty years later, administrative law and financial regulation were conjoined in the New Deal's creation of the modern administrative state. This time it was James Landis, Chair of the newly formed Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and author of the leading …

Reframing International Financial Regulation After The Global Financial Crisis: Rational States And Interdependence, Not Regulatory Networks And Soft Law, Matthew C. Turk

Michigan Journal of International Law

The British bank Northern Rock failed on September 14, 2007; U.S. investment bank Bear Stearns collapsed on March 17, 2008 and was subject to a government-engineered takeover by J.P. Morgan Chase; and, on the night of September 15, 2008, U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and sent global financial markets into disarray the following Monday morning. These financial institutions shared several features in common prior to their downfall, but perhaps the most curious is that they were each considered fully compliant with the second generation framework for the Basel Accords on Capital Adequacy (Basel II), an international agreement …

Judicial Inactivitism In Protecting Financial Consumer Against Predatory Sale Of Retail Structured Products: A Reflection From Retail Structured Notes Lawsuits In Taiwan, Chao-Hung Chen

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

This article analyzes 310 structured note lawsuits in Taiwan between 2000 and 2013 to examine courts’ attitude in dealing with claims of misselling retail structured notes. We find that courts were generally not favorable to retail investors. This provides a contrast with the financial regulator’s efforts to improve financial consumer protection since 2008. By examining plaintiffs’ key arguments and courts’ rulings, we find that it was difficult for investors to fulfill their burden of proof and courts were reluctant to award remedies when investors did sign on a contractual document confirming his knowledge on a few matters. While regulators are …

The Systemic Risk Paradox: Banks And Clearinghouses Under Regulation, Felix B. Chang

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

Consolidation in the financial industry threatens competition and increases systemic risk. Recently, banks have seen both high-profile mergers and spectacular failures, prompting a flurry of regulatory responses. Yet consolidation has not been as closely scrutinized for clearinghouses, which facilitate trading in securities and derivatives products. These nonbank intermediaries can be thought of as middlemen who collect deposits to ensure that each buyer and seller has the wherewithal to uphold its end of the deal. Clearinghouses mitigate the credit risks that buyers and sellers would face if they dealt directly with each other.

Yet here lies the dilemma: large clearinghouses reduce …

Death To Credit As Leverage: Using The Bank Anti-Tying Provision To Curb Financial Risk, Felix B. Chang

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

Today, the need for nimble financial regulation is paramount. The Dodd-Frank financial reform bill has not prevented further scandals and will not stop banks from selling risky products. Yet one understudied law is a surprisingly versatile device that has the potential to temper financial risk: the Bank Holding Company Act’s Anti-Tying Provision. The Anti-Tying Provision prohibits banks from requiring borrowers to purchase additional products in order to obtain a loan. It applies antitrust principles to bank sales and lending practices. Under antitrust law, a seller cannot condition the availability of one item (the desired product) on the consumer’s purchase of …

Breaking Up Is Hard To Do: The Interconnection Problem In Financial Markets And Financial Regulation, A European (Banking) Union Perspective, Caroline Bradley

Articles

No abstract provided.

The Empty Call For Benefit-Cost Analysis In Financial Regulation, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

The call for benefit-cost analysis (BCA) in financial regulation misunderstands the origins and utility of BCA as a guide to administrative rule making. Benefit-cost analysis imagines an omniscient social planner who can calculate costs and benefits from a natural system that generates prices (costs and benefits) that do not change (or change much) no matter what the central planner does. For example, the toxicity of chemicals, the health hazards of emissions, the statistical value of life – these do not change in response to health-and-safety regulation. For the financial sector, however, the system that generates costs and benefits is constructed …

Three Discount Windows, Kathryn Judge

Faculty Scholarship

It is widely assumed that the Federal Reserve is the lender of last resort in the United States and that the Fed's discount window is the primary mechanism through which it fulfills this role. Yet, when banks faced liquidity constraints during the 2007-2009 financial cfisis (the Cisis), the discount window played a relatively small role in providing banks much needed liquidity. This is not because banks forewent government-backed liquidity; rather, they sought it elsewhere. First, they increased their reliance on collateralized loans, known as advances, from the Federal Home Loan Bank System, a little-known government-sponsored enterprise that grew in size …

Market Efficiency After The Financial Crisis: It's Still A Matter Of Information Costs, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman

Faculty Scholarship

Contrary to the views of many commentators, the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis ("ECMH"), as originally framed in financial economics, was not "disproven" by the Subprime Crisis of 2007-2008, nor has it been shown to be irrelevant to the project of regulatory reform of financial markets. To the contrary, the ECMH points to commonsense reforms in the wake of the Crisis, some of which have already been adopted. The Crisis created a lot of losers – from individual investors to pension funds and German Landesbanken – who purchased mortgage-backed securities that they did not, and perhaps could not, understand, and it …

Is Financial Instability A Tax Problem With A Tax Solution?, Hilary Allen

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

Financial regulation and taxation are two fields of law that are notoriously complex and specialized. Given this circumstance, it is perhaps not surprising that financial regulators often pay little attention to tax, and focus instead on their own sphere of influence. Unfortunately, financial regulators ignore tax incentives at the peril of financial stability.

Reverse Regulatory Arbitrage: An Auction Approach To Regulatory Assignments, M Todd Henderson, Fred Tung

Faculty Scholarship

In the years before the Financial Crisis, banks got to pick their regulators, engaging in a form of regulatory arbitrage that we now know was a race to the bottom. We propose to turn the tables on the banks by allowing regulators, specifically, bank examiners, to choose the banks they regulate. We call this “reverse regulatory arbitrage,” and we think it can help improve regulatory outcomes. Building on our prior work that proposes to pay bank examiners for performance — by giving them financial incentives to avoid bank failures — we argue that bank supervisory assignments should be set through …

Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: An Alternative To Harmonization, Annelise Riles

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This policy-oriented article argues for deploying conflict of laws doctrines as a tool of coordination in international financial governance.

A New Perspective On The Costs And Benefits Of Financial Regulation: Inefficiency Of Capital Intermediation In A Deregulated System , Wallace C. Turbeville

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

The New Investor, Tom C. W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

A sea change is happening in finance. Machines appear to be on the rise and humans on the decline. Human endeavors have become unmanned endeavors. Human thought and human deliberation have been replaced by computerized analysis and mathematical models. Technological advances have made finance faster, larger, more global, more interconnected, and less human. Modern finance is becoming an industry in which the main players are no longer entirely human. Instead, the key players are now cyborgs: part machine, part human. Modern finance is transforming into what this Article calls cyborg finance.

This Article offers one of the first broad, descriptive, …

Assessing Transnational Private Regulation Of The Otc Derivatives Market: Isda, The Bba, And The Future Of Financial Reform, Gabriel Rauterberg, Andrew Verstein

Faculty Scholarship

For the last twenty years, the dominant narrative of the over-the-counter derivatives market has been one of absent regulation, deregulation, and regulatory conflict, predictably resulting in disaster. This Article challenges this narrative, arguing that the global derivatives market has been subject to pervasive and harmonized regulation by what should be recognized as transnational private regulators. Recognizing the reality of widespread transnational private regulation of derivatives has significant implications, which this Article explores. Appreciating the actual regulatory status quo is essential if policymakers are to correctly diagnose problems, avoid past regulatory errors, and plan effective remedies. There are also advantages to …

Bretton Woods 1.0: A Constructive Retrieval For Sustainable Finance, Robert C. Hockett

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Global trade imbalance and domestic financial fragility are intimately related. When a nation runs persistently massive current account deficits to maintain global liquidity as has the United States now for decades, its central bank effectively relinquishes exchange rate flexibility to become a de facto central bank to the world. That in turn prevents the bank from playing its essential credit-modulatory role at home, at least absent strict capital controls that are difficult to administer and have long been taboo. And this can in turn render credit-fueled asset price bubbles and busts all but impossible to prevent, irrespective of the nation's …

Interbank Discipline, Kathryn Judge

Faculty Scholarship

As banking has evolved over the last three decades, banks have become increasingly interconnected. This Article draws attention to an effect of this development that has important policy ramifications yet remains largely unexamined – a dramatic rise in interbank discipline. The Article demonstrates that today's large, complex banks have financial incentives to monitor risk taking at other banks, They also have the infrastructure, competence, and information required to be fairly effective monitors and mechanisms through which they can respond when a bank changes its risk profile. Interbank discipline thus affects bank risk taking, discouraging banks from taking some types of …

The Goldilocks Approach: Financial Risk And Staged Regulation, Charles K. Whitehead

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Financial firms engage in a wide range of private conduct. New rules that address financial risk can regulate elements of that conduct but not all conduct or all the factors that affect conduct. There is, therefore, a real concern that new regulation will have unanticipated consequences, particularly in a system as complex as the financial markets. The result may be new risks or a shift in risk taking away from regulated conduct — responses that regulators can anticipate but may not be able to accurately predict or control.

This Article cautions against the rush to adopt new financial risk regulation …

Book Review: Derivatives Traders Do What, Again?, Heather Hughes

Book Reviews

Critics of financial regulation sing a classic refrain, associated with Friedrich Hayek’s theories: Regulation cannot match the temporality of capitalism, as it is based on analysis of what has already transpired in markets that are perpetually evolving. In Collateral Knowledge, Annelise Riles disrupts the Hayekian critique of financial regulation. She presents collateral in derivatives markets as a technique and an aesthetic practice and then contends that state actors also can deploy private actors’ techniques in response to the temporal nature of markets. There is nothing inherently private about the methods of self-governance that private actors use to accommodate temporality. This …

Fragmentation Nodes: A Study In Financial Innovation, Complexity, And Systemic Risk, Kathryn Judge

Faculty Scholarship

This Article resents a case study in how complexity arising from the evolution and proliferation of a financial innovation can increase systemic risk. The subject of the case study is the securitization of home loans, an innovation which played a critical and still not fully understood role in the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The Article introduces the term "fragmentation node" for these transaction structures, and it shows how specific sources of complexity inherent in fragmentation nodes limited transparency and flexibility in ways that undermined the stability of the financial system. In addition to shedding new light on the processes through which …

That Which We Call A Bank: Revisiting The History Of Bank Holding Company Regulations In The United States, Saule T. Omarova, Tahyar E. Margaret

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This Article does not purport to present an exhaustive and detailed analysis of the entire political or economic history of bank holding company regulation in the United States. Rather, its goal is to examine one particular aspect of that history-the evolution of the BHCA definition of "bank" and the principal exemptions from that definition. Incomplete as it may be, this story highlights some of the key economic, social and political factors that shaped the current institutional structure of the U.S. financial services market and regulation. Without a thorough understanding of the genesis of that structure, it is difficult to envision …

The Political Economy Of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends To Be Frustrated And Systemic Risk Perpetuated, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

A good crisis should never go to waste. In the world of financial regulation, experience has shown – since at least the time of the South Sea Bubble three hundred years ago – that only after a catastrophic market collapse can legislators and regulators overcome the resistance of the financial community and adopt comprehensive "re-form" legislation. U.S. financial history both confirms and conforms to this generalization. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were the product of the 1929 stock-market crash and the Great Depression, with their enactment following the inauguration of President Franklin Roosevelt …

Recoupment Under Dodd-Frank: Punishing Financial Executives And Perpetuating "Too Big To Fail", Joshua Mitts

Faculty Scholarship

In July 2011, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) promulgated new rules implementing Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. These rules define a cause of action to recoup compensation paid to senior executives and directors of failed nonbank financial institutions placed into the FDIC's "orderly liquidation authority" receivership. An action for recoupment is based on a negligence theory of liability, but it does not require establishing that an executive's conduct caused the financial institution any harm. The rules presume liability merely for having held executive responsibility prior to the firm entering receivership. The executive …

The Volcker Rule And Evolving Financial Markets, Charles K. Whitehead

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The Volcker Rule prohibits proprietary trading by banking entities - in effect, reintroducing to the financial markets a substantial portion of the Glass-Steagall Act’s static divide between banks and securities firms. This Article argues that the Glass-Steagall model is a fixture of the past - a financial Maginot Line within an evolving financial system. To be effective, new financial regulation must reflect new relationships in the marketplace. For the Volcker Rule, those relationships include a growing reliance by banks on new market participants to conduct traditional banking functions.

Proprietary trading has moved to less-regulated businesses, in many cases, to hedge …

Overwhelming A Financial Regulatory Black Hole With Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank's Attack On Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused By An Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market, Michael Greenberger

Journal of Business & Technology Law

No abstract provided.

Living Wills And Pre-Commitment, Adam Feibelman

American University Business Law Review

No abstract provided.

Financial Regulation Reform And Too Big To Fail, Brett Mcdonnell

American University Business Law Review

No abstract provided.

Regulating Informational Intermediation, Onnig H. Dombalagian

American University Business Law Review

No abstract provided.