Banking and Finance Law Commons^™

When Governments Write Contracts: Policy And Expertise In Sovereign Debt Markets, W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati, Anna Gelpern

Faculty Scholarship

At least three times in the past two decades, national governments and institutions at the regional and international levels have tried to reform sovereign bond contracts to facilitate debt restructuring. Increasingly, these efforts have focused on promoting majority modifications clauses, a species of collective action clause (CAC) that facilitates a binding debt restructuring. Rather than legislate or regulate, governments have convened expert commissions, produced model CACs, and aggressively marketed these clauses to debtors and creditors. When events prove the existing CAC template inadequate or irrelevant, the process begins anew. This paper considers this mode of government intervention, which has a …

Banking And Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter provides a basic overview of banking and financial regulation for the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics (Francesco Paris, ed.). Among other things, the chapter compares traditional and shadow banking and their regulation, differentiating “micro prudential” regulation (which focuses on protecting individual components of the financial system, such as banks) and “macro prudential” regulation (which focuses on protecting against systemic risk). The chapter also examines how regulation can help to correct market failures that undermine financial efficiency. In that context, it discusses, among other things, capital requirements, ring-fencing, and stress testing. Finally, the chapter examines how regulation …

Putting The 'Financial Stability' In Financial Stability Oversight Council, Hilary Allen

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

For all the ink that has been spilled on the topic of financial regulation since the financial crisis of 2007-2008, there has been little examination of the competing normative goals of financial regulation. Should the financial system be treated as an end in itself such that the efficiency of that system is the primary goal? Or should financial regulation instead treat the financial system as a means to the end of broader economic growth? This Article argues for the latter approach, and stakes out the controversial normative position that financial stability, rather than efficiency, should be the paramount focus of …

Russia’S Contract Arbitrage, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Ukraine is poised to restructure its debt, but Russia may hold the best cards in the negotiation. Russia bought $3 billion in Ukrainian Eurobonds in late 2013 to prop up a political ally, since-deposed. As Russian President Vladimir Putin himself has pointed out, these bonds have unique terms that let Russia call for early repayment, putting it ahead of Ukraine’s private creditors. Meanwhile, Russia and its proxies hold enough bonds to block a restructuring vote or hold out, sticking more losses on other creditors. Russia has refused to restructure the bonds in the Paris Club of government-to-government creditors, claiming that …

Treading Water: Can Municipal Efforts To Condemn Underwater Mortgages Prevail?, Michael S. Moskowitz

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Incentivizing Credit Rating Agencies Under The Issuer Pay Model Through A Mandatory Compensation Competition, Robert J. Rhee

Faculty Scholarship

Credit rating agencies are important institutions of the global capital markets. If they had performed properly, the financial crisis of 2008-2009 would not have occurred. This article offers the simplest fix proposed thus far, and it is contrarian. This Article accepts the central role of rating agencies in the regulation of bond investments, the realities of a duopoly, and the issuer-pay model of compensation. The status quo is the baseline. The role of regulation should be to create the conditions necessary to induce competition. This article proposes that a small, recurring portion of revenue earned by the largest rating agencies …

Regulatory Arbitrage, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, And Dodd-Frank: The Implications Of Us Global Otc Derivative Regulation, Christian Johnson

Nevada Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Drastic Times Call For Drastic Risk Measures: Why Value-At-Risk Is (Still) A Flawed Preventative Of Financial Crises And What Regulators Can Do About It, Andrew L. Mcelroy

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

Bank regulators recently proposed the most fundamental reforms to U.S. banking law in decades, yet the value-at-risk statistic--replete with known deficiencies--remains the basis of the capital adequacy requirement. Consequently, there exists an unresolved tension in the law: the purpose of the banking rules is to require riskier financial institutions to hold additional capital, yet the value-at-risk statistic used to make this assessment induces a perverse incentive to hold the riskiest securities. Overlaid on this framework is the wide latitude afforded to banks in designing their value-at-risk models. This Article explores foreseeable issues with the regulatory reliance on value-at-risk. Moreover, it …

Revisiting The Causes Of The Financial Crisis, Antony Page

Faculty Publications

Much has been written on the legal causes of the financial crisis and its aftermath, often referred to as the Great Recession. Presumably the debate will continue for many years to come, much as scholars continue to debate the causes of the Great Depression. Lost, however, in the descriptions of arcane laws and complex derivative financial products, is a relatively brief and straightforward account of the crisis and its most likely causes for interested lawyers, law students, or graduate students who are not specialists and do not want to become specialists. This Essay, based on a presentation at the Indiana …

How To Improve The Financial Architecture And Its Resilience, Dirk Helbing, Eve Mitleton-Kelly, Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, Fabio Caccioli, J. Doyne Farmer, Steve Keen, Katharina Pistor, Dennis J. Snower, Olsen Richard, Angelo Ranaldo, Norbert Häring, Edward Fullbrook

Faculty Scholarship

This financial resilience survey was circulated on behalf of a working group of the Complexity Council of the World Economic Forum comprised of Prof. Eve Mitleton-Kelly of London School of Economics and Prof. Dirk Helbing at ETH Zurich's Risk Center. It was sent to a few dozens of financial experts with the aim to create an inventory of ideas of how the financial system might be improved and made more resilient. Unconventional ideas were also welcome.

Three Discount Windows, Kathryn Judge

Faculty Scholarship

It is widely assumed that the Federal Reserve is the lender of last resort in the United States and that the Fed's discount window is the primary mechanism through which it fulfills this role. Yet, when banks faced liquidity constraints during the 2007-2009 financial cfisis (the Cisis), the discount window played a relatively small role in providing banks much needed liquidity. This is not because banks forewent government-backed liquidity; rather, they sought it elsewhere. First, they increased their reliance on collateralized loans, known as advances, from the Federal Home Loan Bank System, a little-known government-sponsored enterprise that grew in size …

Market Efficiency After The Financial Crisis: It's Still A Matter Of Information Costs, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman

Faculty Scholarship

Contrary to the views of many commentators, the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis ("ECMH"), as originally framed in financial economics, was not "disproven" by the Subprime Crisis of 2007-2008, nor has it been shown to be irrelevant to the project of regulatory reform of financial markets. To the contrary, the ECMH points to commonsense reforms in the wake of the Crisis, some of which have already been adopted. The Crisis created a lot of losers – from individual investors to pension funds and German Landesbanken – who purchased mortgage-backed securities that they did not, and perhaps could not, understand, and it …

Rolling Back The Repo Safe Harbors, Edward R. Morrison, Mark J. Roe, Christopher S. Sontchi

Faculty Scholarship

Recent decades have seen substantial expansion in exemptions from the Bankruptcy Code's normal operation for repurchase agreements. These repos, which are equivalent to very short-term (often one-day) secured loans, are exempt from core bankruptcy rules such as the automatic stay that enjoins debt collection, rules against prebankruptcy fraudulent transfers, and rules against eve-of-bankruptcy preferential payment to favored creditors over other creditors. While these exemptions can be justified for United States Treasury securities and similarly liquid obligations backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government, they are not justified for mortgage-backed securities and other securities that could …

Reverse Regulatory Arbitrage: An Auction Approach To Regulatory Assignments, M Todd Henderson, Fred Tung

Faculty Scholarship

In the years before the Financial Crisis, banks got to pick their regulators, engaging in a form of regulatory arbitrage that we now know was a race to the bottom. We propose to turn the tables on the banks by allowing regulators, specifically, bank examiners, to choose the banks they regulate. We call this “reverse regulatory arbitrage,” and we think it can help improve regulatory outcomes. Building on our prior work that proposes to pay bank examiners for performance — by giving them financial incentives to avoid bank failures — we argue that bank supervisory assignments should be set through …

Never Again,' Again: A Functional Examination Of The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Andrew W. Hartlage

Michigan Law Review

Despite the benefit of five years to heal its wounds, the United States remains hobbled from the devastating economic injuries of the 2007-08 global financial crisis. Families across the country still struggle with overwhelming debt and debilitating joblessness. The financial innovations that were once seen as a path to broader homeownership and greater financial equality nearly led to a once-unthinkable catastrophe, and ironically, have worked to widen the gap between rich and poor. These events took many top business leaders and regulators by surprise. After the crisis abated, legislators and other policymakers sought to understand how a financial crisis of …

A Specter Is Haunting The Financial Industry - The Specter Of The Global Financial Crisis: A Comment On The Imminent Expansion Of Consumer Financial Protection In The United States, The United Kingdom, And The European Union, Daniel Lamb

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

This Comment explores the regulatory fallout from the global financial crisis. Across borders, policy makers are united in their conviction to reconcile the perceived failures of their predecessors to foresee and prevent the crisis, the effects of which show no signs of abating. A critical component of what caused the crisis was the inability to correct failures in the consumer credit market, specifically in subprime mortgages. Exacerbated by an influx of capital and a generally weak regulatory environment, this market failure manifested itself forcefully through a tidal wave of defaults in the American mortgage market that sent shock waves around …

Was The Congressional Grant Of 'Bailout' Authority To Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson Really So "Unprecedented?": A Historical Analysis And Comparison Of Treasury Secretary Authority During Financial Crisis, Zachary Cormier

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

No abstract provided.

The New Investor, Tom C. W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

A sea change is happening in finance. Machines appear to be on the rise and humans on the decline. Human endeavors have become unmanned endeavors. Human thought and human deliberation have been replaced by computerized analysis and mathematical models. Technological advances have made finance faster, larger, more global, more interconnected, and less human. Modern finance is becoming an industry in which the main players are no longer entirely human. Instead, the key players are now cyborgs: part machine, part human. Modern finance is transforming into what this Article calls cyborg finance.

This Article offers one of the first broad, descriptive, …

Consumer Financial Protection And Community Banks, John T. Adams

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

The Dodd-Frank Act (Dodd-Frank) was enacted following the 2007-2008 financial crisis as the result of calls in Washington to protect average Americans from the depredations of Wall Street. Specifically, proponents of Dodd-Frank pointed to greed, carried out through the business practices at large commercial and investment banks, as the cause of the financial crisis. Accordingly, Dodd-Frank sought to place the most stringent restrictions on the activities of large commercial and investment banks of any legislation since the Great Depression.

However, the perception of rapacious business practices on Wall Street does not apply as directly to community banks. Situated somewhere between …

A Legal Theory Of Finance, Katharina Pistor

Faculty Scholarship

This paper develops the building blocks for a legal theory of finance. LTF holds that financial markets are legally constructed and as such occupy an essentially hybrid place between state and market, public and private. At the same time, financial markets exhibit dynamics that frequently put them in direct tension with commitments enshrined in law or contracts. This is the case especially in times of financial crisis when the full enforcement of legal commitments would result in the self-destruction of the financial system. This law-finance paradox tends to be resolved by suspending the full force of law where the survival …

Keynote Address, Brooksley Born

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

Myths About Shareholder Value, Faith Stevelman

Articles & Chapters

The concept of unitary "shareholder value" and its reflection in nearterm stock prices formed the centrepiece of contemporary corporate governance up to the 2008 financial crisis. The crisis has elicited both more critical and clearer, book-length accounts of the relationship of law, corporate governance and finance. The concepts analysed in Lynn Stout's The Shareholder Value Myth are considered herein, as part of a commentary on the continuing evolution of academic corporate law and governance.

The Modern Corporation Magnified: Managerial Accountability In Financial Services Holding Companies, Anita K. Krug

Articles

This Article's goal is to revisit early and thoughtful commentary on the fundamental problem of the large corporate enterprise--managerial accountability to shareholders-- to show that this fundamental problem is dramatically pronounced--magnified, if you will--in the types of enterprises that were at the center of the financial crisis, whether too big to fail or not. In particular, The Modern Corporation articulated that the evolution of economic organization has separated the beneficial ownership of property from those who control it and that this disjunction has created an irresolvable tension between shareholders and management. Nowhere is that tension more pronounced than in the …

The Basel Iii Liquidity Coverage Ratio And Financial Stability, Andrew W. Hartlage

Michigan Law Review

Banks and other financial institutions may increase the amount of credit available in the financial system by borrowing for short terms and lending for long terms. Though this "maturity transformation" is a useful and productive function of banks, it gives rise to the possibility that even prudently managed banks could fail due to a lack of liquid assets. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 revealed the extent to which the U.S. financial system is exposed to the risk of a system-wide failure from insufficient liquidity. Financial regulators from economies around the world have responded to the crisis by proposing new, internationally …

Basel Iii And Credit Risk Measurement: Variations Among G20 Countries, Matt Schlickenmaier

San Diego International Law Journal

Most countries require banks to hold extra capital to protect against unforeseen financial calamities; banks with riskier loans must hold more capital than those with safer loans. Basel II, a set of international banking standards, allows banks to measure a loan’s risk in different ways: some banks make their own judgments; others use outside agencies. The recent mortgage crisis prompted banks to reevaluate these methods, in part due to banks having failed to perceive the high level of risk inherent in securitized mortgages. The international community’s response was Basel III, an updated version of its previous standards. This Comment will …

The Inherent Instability Of The Financial System, Kim De Glossop

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

The article explores one of the causes of the financial crisis of 2008 and of financial crises generally. The argument of the paper is that rather than tend toward equilibrium, financial and asset markets have a tendency to become unstable after prolonged periods of stability. The main driver of this process is the expansion of credit. Debt feeds its way into higher asset prices which in turn justify the accumulation of more debt to purchase further assets, and so on. The basis for the idea is Hyman Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis, itself a reinterpretation of The General Theory of Employment, …

The Federal Reserve As Last Resort, Colleen Baker

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The Federal Reserve, the central bank of the United States, is one of the most important and powerful institutions in the world. Surprisingly, legal scholarship hardly pays any attention to the Federal Reserve or to the law structuring and governing its legal authority. This is especially curious given the amount of legal scholarship focused on administrative agencies that do not have anywhere near as critical a domestic and international role as that of the Federal Reserve. At the core of what the Federal Reserve does and should do is to conduct monetary policy so as to safeguard pricing, including that …

Paying Bank Examiners For Performance, M. Todd Henderson, Frederick Tung

Faculty Scholarship

Investigations into the recent financial crisis have found that banking regulators knew or should have known of many of the problems that would ultimately cripple the finance industry. We argue that their failure to address those problems prior to the crisis was at least partly due to misaligned incentives for bank examiners that encourage inadequate inspection and forbearance and discourage the curbing of ill-advised risk taking. We recommend changing examiners’ incentives to better align them with the public good. Specifically, banking regulators should be “paid for performance” — rewarded for nurturing long-term health for the banks they oversee as well …

The Financial Crisis And The Path Of Reform, Michael S. Barr

Articles

In the lead-up to the financial crisis, the U.S. financial sector was overleveraged, short-funded, risky, and opaque. "Shadow banking" permitted institutions to avoid comprehensive supervision and capital requirements. Innovation outpaced the ability or willingness of private- and public-sector guardians to rein in risks. An asset bubble fed the system, until the market imploded in the fall of 2008. When the crisis hit, our society found itself illequipped to deal with the failure of leading financial firms. In the wake of the crisis, the Obama Administration proposed a set of reforms that were eventually embodied, in large part, in the Dodd-Frank …

Bank Ceos, Inside Debt Compensation, And The Global Financial Crisis, Frederick Tung, Xue Wang

Faculty Scholarship

Bank executives’ compensation has been widely identified as a culprit in the Global Financial Crisis, and reform of banker pay is high on the public policy agenda. While Congress targeted its reforms primarily at bankers’ equity-based pay incentives, empirical research fails to show any correlation between bank CEO equity incentives and bank performance in the Financial Crisis. We offer an alternative analysis, hypothesizing that bank CEOs’ inside debt incentives correlate with reduced bank risk taking and improved bank performance in the Crisis. A nascent literature shows that inside debt may dampen CEOs’ risk taking incentives. Unlike the industrial firms that …