Banking and Finance Law Commons^™

Disintermediating Avarice: A Legal Framework For Commercially Sustainable Microfinance, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Although microfinance is emerging as a key tool to alleviate poverty, the need for microfinance lending vastly exceeds the amount of funds that can be raised from charitable donors. Commercial bank lending is supplementing donor money, but microfinance loans made by banks are extremely expensive and sometimes even exploitive. This article examines how innovative legal structures can enable microfinance loans to be funded directly from lower-cost, and virtually limitless, capital market sources by removing, or “disintermediating,” the need for a bank intermediary. In that context, the article identifies and attempts to resolve the resulting law-and-business issues of first impression and …

Adaptive Regulation In The Amoral Bazaar, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

Twelfth Oliver Schreiner Memorial Lecture,delivered on 20 October 2010 at the School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. Many gradual changes in science, law and society are crystallizing to shape a significant transformation in administrative law. The doctrinal framework within which Justice Schreiner himself attempted to modernize how law should regulate government and private economic activity seems from our vantage point to be quite antiquated. In explaining why, my examples will come from the world of financial services, but they could easily be found anywhere in the area of law and regulation. First I will outline the …

Exploring The Wfo Option For Global Banking Regulation, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

The Global Financial Crisis and the global operations by participants in the financial services industry has led observers and even senior public representatives to call for global regulatory solutions that go beyond the current, transnational regulatory network (TRN) framework provided by the G20, the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The concept of a global banking regulator has often been advocated, but this is not remotely politically viable. Recently the imaginative concept of a World Financial Organization (WFO), that would follow the model of the World Trade Organization (WTO), has been proposed. Although attractive in that …

Keynote Address: Identifying And Managing Systemic Risk: An Assessment Of Our Progress, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This short address attempts to provide a succinct overview, critiquing how well the Dodd-Frank Act identifies and manages systemic risk.

Greek Debt: The Endgame Scenarios, Mitu Gulati, Lee C. Buchheit

Faculty Scholarship

Perhaps Greece -- a country with a debt to GDP already approaching 150 percent and set to move even higher -- avoids a debt restructuring. Perhaps not.

What are the possible scenarios if Greece cannot return to the capital markets to refinance this gargantuan debt stock once its EU/IMF bailout package expires in two years time? What would a Greek debt restructuring look like after mid-2013? And (sharp intake of breath here) what would happen if such a debt restructuring were undertaken before that point?

Drafting A Model Collective Action Clause For Eurozone Sovereign Bonds, Mitu Gulati, Lee C. Buchheit

Faculty Scholarship

In the wake of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the European financial authorities announced last November that all Eurozone sovereign bonds issued after mid-2013 must contain an identical collective action clause (CAC) in order, if necessary, to facilitate a restructuring of those
instruments.

CACs in sovereign bonds have been the subject of considerable attention over the last ten years. They were introduced into sovereign bonds governed by U.S. law only in early 2003. Yet a surprising number of versions of the clause can be found in modern sovereign bonds.

The history of the research and development of this contractual provision …

Financial Industry Self-Regulation: Aspiration And Reality, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This essay on financial industry self-regulation responds to Professor Saule Omarova’s recent article on that topic, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011).

Identifying And Managing Systemic Risk: An Assessment Of Our Progress, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Although a chain of bank failures remains an important symbol of systemic risk, the ongoing trend towards disintermediation—or enabling companies to directly access the ultimate source of funds, the capital (i.e., financial) markets, without going through banks or other financial intermediaries—is making these failures less critical than in the past. While banks and other financial institutions remain important sources of capital, companies today are able to obtain most of their financing through financial markets without the use of intermediaries. As a result, financial markets themselves are increasingly central to any examination of systemic risk.

Helping Microfinance Become Commercially Sustainable, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Microfinance primarily refers to the making of small loans to low-income individuals and the poor, to enable them to start or expand small businesses. Currently, most microfinance loans are made through nonprofit microfinance institutions (MFIs) that receive donor money. However, donor-funded loans can account for only a small portion of the need. Microfinance analysts estimate, for example, that total market potential is $300 billion, of which only ten percent is currently being captured. Increasingly, the shortfall in funding is being met by commercial banks. But commercial-bank intermediation is expensive, with a global average effective interest rate (on commercial microfinance loans) …

Keynote Address: A Regulatory Framework For Managing Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This accessible analysis of systemic risk regulation was delivered as the keynote speech at an October 20, 2011 European Central Bank conference on regulation of financial services. Many regulatory responses, like the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, consist largely of politically motivated reactions to the financial crisis, looking for villains (whether or not they exist). To be most effective, however, the regulation must be situated within a more analytical framework. In this speech, I attempt to build that framework, showing that preventive regulation is insufficient and that regulation also must be designed to limit the transmission of systemic risk …

Foreword: The Three And A Half Minute Transaction: Boilerplate And The Limits Of Contract Design, Mitu Gulati, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

The Hofstra Law Review has organized an “Ideas” symposium around our book manuscript “The Three and a Half Minute Transaction” (see http://ssrn.com/abstract=1937900). The idea for this symposium came from a debate that occurred at a faculty workshop at the Hofstra Law School some months ago where we were presenting our book manuscript. The topics of conversation included the following: the future of the current big-law-firm model, what value lawyers add in commercial transactions that use boilerplate contracts, why (and whether) boilerplate contracts are so slow to change, why law firms do not generally have R&D departments, the resolution of the …

The Paradoxes Of Dodd-Frank, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Complex Financial Institutions And Systemic Risk, Utset A. Utset

Georgia Law Review

Modern financial institutions are large, complex, and
highly interconnected. In the wake of the financial crisis
of 2007-2009, commentators and policymakers have given
considerable attention to large institutions, particularly
those that can become "too-big-to-fail." This Article takes

a novel approach to this general problem. It begins by
asking a foundational question: given the extraordinary
volume of transactions between large, complex
institutions, what mechanisms do they use to protect
themselves from the risks created by their complexity, and
how do those mechanisms affect the stability of the
financial system? To keep the problem manageable, the
Article focuses on one type of …

Issues And Challenges In Introducing Islamic Finance In Korea., Jong Choon Park

Student Works (2010-2019)

The interest in Islamic finance in Korea has rapidly increased since the 2008 global financial crisis which was caused by unprecedented level of financial leverage. Hence, many are interested in the effective implementation of Islamic finance as they believed that it can contribute to a more stable and sounder financial market. This study explores the issues and challenges in introducing Islamic finance in Korea and discusses the practical insights for the relevant parties such as the regulatory body and market players through a qualitative-based study. An interview method was adopted to gather the views of the key players in the …

Empathy's White Elephant: Responding To The Subprime Mortgage Crisis Without Denigrating The Poor, Adam J. Macleod

Faculty Articles

Empathy is the new coverture. Before state legislatures abolished it in the nineteenth century, the plea of coverture nullified any attempts by a married woman to exercise sovereignty over her property. Just as coverture did to married women, the now-well-known call for empathy in our nation's judgments threatens to deny poor borrowers, as a class, the freedom and responsibility to manage their assets. Empathy, as the ideal judge would employ it, would impede the agency of, and thus denigrate, persons within that class. The injustice (and ground for the ultimate abolition) of coverture arose from its failure to respect women …

Credit Derivatives, Leverage, And Financial Regulation's Missing Macroeconomic Dimension, Erik F. Gerding

Publications

Of all OTC derivatives, credit derivatives pose particular concerns because of their ability to generate leverage that can increase liquidity - or the effective money supply - throughout the financial system. Credit derivatives and the leverage they create thus do much more than increase the fragility of financial institutions and increase counterparty risk. By increasing leverage and liquidity, credit derivatives can fuel rises in asset prices and even asset price bubbles. Rising asset prices can then mask mistakes in the pricing of credit derivatives and in assessments of overall leverage in the financial system. Furthermore, the use of credit derivatives …