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Articles 211 - 240 of 329
Full-Text Articles in Banking and Finance Law
Social Enterprise And Investment Professionals: Sacrificing Financial Interests?, J. Haskell Murray
Social Enterprise And Investment Professionals: Sacrificing Financial Interests?, J. Haskell Murray
Seattle University Law Review
Over the past decade, more than three dozen jurisdictions in the United States passed some form of social enterprise legislation. Social enterprise statutes allow for the formation of for-profit entities that expressly require directors to consider the interests of corporate constituents beyond merely shareholders. Proponents of these social enterprise statutes argue that such statutes are needed because traditional corporate law prevents sacrificing the financial interests of shareholders in the interest of a broader social good, or in the interest of other stakeholders. Recently, social enterprises have started exploring public markets and showing up on the radar of investment professionals, including …
Financing The Benefit Corporation, Dana Brakman Reiser, Steven A. Dean
Financing The Benefit Corporation, Dana Brakman Reiser, Steven A. Dean
Seattle University Law Review
The hybrid organizational forms designed with social enterprises in mind have proven to be hothouse flowers. Flourishing in state legislatures, even those with the most distinguished pedigrees—such as Delaware’s public benefit corporation—have so far failed to thrive in the marketplace. Fortunately, hybrid financial instruments offer a source of strength and stability that can help social enterprise to take root. This Article examines the valuable role that financial instruments can play in providing social enterprises with the capital they need to grow. Debt with equity features and equity with debt characteristics constitute the lion’s share of such financial tools. More exotic …
In Pursuit Of Good & Gold: Data Observations Of Employee Ownership & Impact Investment, Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto, Anne M. Tucker
In Pursuit Of Good & Gold: Data Observations Of Employee Ownership & Impact Investment, Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto, Anne M. Tucker
Seattle University Law Review
A startup’s path to self-sustaining profitability is risky and hard, and most do not make it. Venture capital (VC) investors try to improve these odds with contractual terms that focus and sharpen employees’ incentives to pursue gold. If the employees and investors expect the startup to balance the goal of profitability with another goal—the goal of good—the risks are likely to both grow and multiply. They grow to the extent that profits are threatened, and they multiply to the extent that balancing competing goals adds a dimension to the incentive problem. In this Article, we explore contracting terms specific to …
Balancing The Governance Of Financial Institutions, David Min
Balancing The Governance Of Financial Institutions, David Min
Seattle University Law Review
Part I briefly describes the traditional agency–cost approach to corporate governance and the rationale that is offered for elevating the agency–cost concerns of shareholders over those of other stakeholders (especially creditors). But as Part I goes on to argue, even if this justification for shareholder primacy is convincing in corporate governance generally (and there are many who do not find it so), several unique characteristics of banks obviate the reasoning behind shareholder primacy. Banks are highly leveraged, which exacerbates creditor–shareholder agency conflicts and places greater importance on the interests of creditors. Banks enjoy government guarantees, and thus their corporate governance …
Priority Of Condominium Associations’ Assessment Liens Vis–À–Vis Mortgages: Navigating In The Super-Priority Lien Jurisdictions, Aušra Gaigalaitė
Priority Of Condominium Associations’ Assessment Liens Vis–À–Vis Mortgages: Navigating In The Super-Priority Lien Jurisdictions, Aušra Gaigalaitė
Seattle University Law Review
This Note will discuss the issues concerning laws regulating lien priority in association foreclosure sales and argue that lenders, because they are in the best position to do so, should implement proactive strategies to protect their interests in association foreclosures. Part I provides an overview of uniform law development and a history of Washington’s governing laws with a focus on recent problems relating to association lien priority. Part II presents analysis of the important court decisions applying the lien priority statute and discussion regarding current and proposed Washington law. Finally, Part III discusses potential solutions lenders should implement to balance …
Prostitution Policy: Legalization, Decriminalization And The Nordic Model, Ane Mathieson, Easton Branam, Anya Noble
Prostitution Policy: Legalization, Decriminalization And The Nordic Model, Ane Mathieson, Easton Branam, Anya Noble
Seattle Journal for Social Justice
No abstract provided.
Don’T Risk It; Wait Until She’S Sober, Patrick John White
Don’T Risk It; Wait Until She’S Sober, Patrick John White
Seattle Journal for Social Justice
No abstract provided.
Let’S Talk About Sex: A Call For Guardianship Reform In Washington State, Sage Graves
Let’S Talk About Sex: A Call For Guardianship Reform In Washington State, Sage Graves
Seattle Journal for Social Justice
No abstract provided.
Living Under The Boot: Militarization And Peaceful Protest, Charlotte Guerra
Living Under The Boot: Militarization And Peaceful Protest, Charlotte Guerra
Seattle Journal for Social Justice
No abstract provided.
Let’S Invest In People, Not Prisons: How Washington State Should Address Its Ex-Offender Unemployment Rate, Sara Taboada
Let’S Invest In People, Not Prisons: How Washington State Should Address Its Ex-Offender Unemployment Rate, Sara Taboada
Seattle Journal for Social Justice
No abstract provided.
His Feminist Facade: The Neoliberal Co-Option Of The Feminist Movement, Anjilee Dodge, Myani Gilbert
His Feminist Facade: The Neoliberal Co-Option Of The Feminist Movement, Anjilee Dodge, Myani Gilbert
Seattle Journal for Social Justice
No abstract provided.
In Her Words: Recognizing And Preventing Abusive Litigation Against Domestic Violence Survivors, David Ward
In Her Words: Recognizing And Preventing Abusive Litigation Against Domestic Violence Survivors, David Ward
Seattle Journal for Social Justice
No abstract provided.
"Special," Vestigial, Or Visionary? What Banking Regulation Tells Us About The Corporation—And Vice Versa, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova
"Special," Vestigial, Or Visionary? What Banking Regulation Tells Us About The Corporation—And Vice Versa, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova
Seattle University Law Review
A remarkable yet seldom noted set of parallels exists between modern U.S. bank regulation, on the one hand, and what used to be garden-variety American corporate law, on the other hand. For example, just as bank charters are matters not of right but of conditional privilege even today, so were all corporate charters not long ago. Just as chartered banks are authorized to engage only in limited, enumerated activities even today, so were all corporations restricted not long ago. And just as banks are subject to strict capital regulation even today, so were all corporations not long ago. In this …
Bringing Continuity To Cryptocurrency: Commercial Law As A Guide To The Asset Categorization Of Bitcoin, Evan Hewitt
Bringing Continuity To Cryptocurrency: Commercial Law As A Guide To The Asset Categorization Of Bitcoin, Evan Hewitt
Seattle University Law Review
This Note will undertake to analyze bitcoin under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)—two important sources of commercial law—to see whether any existing asset categories adequately protect bitcoin’s commercial viability. This Note will demonstrate that although commercial law dictates that bitcoin should—nay must—be regulated as a currency in order to sustain its existence, the very definition of currency seems to preclude that from happening. Therefore, this Note will recommend that we experiment with a new type of asset that receives currency-like treatment, specifically designed for cryptocurrencies, under which bitcoin can be categorized in order to …
Agency Theory As Prophecy: How Boards, Analysts, And Fund Managers Perform Their Roles, Jiwook Jung, Frank Dobbin
Agency Theory As Prophecy: How Boards, Analysts, And Fund Managers Perform Their Roles, Jiwook Jung, Frank Dobbin
Seattle University Law Review
In 1976, Michael Jensen and William Meckling published a paper reintroducing agency theory that explained how the modern corporation is structured to serve dispersed shareholders. They purported to describe the world as it exists but, in fact, they described a utopia, and their piece was read as a blueprint for that utopia. We take a page from the sociology of knowledge to argue that, in the modern world, economic theories function as prescriptions for behavior as much as they function as descriptions. Economists and management theorists often act as prophets rather than scientists, describing the world not as it is, …
Of More Than Usual Interest: The Taxing Problem Of Debt Principal, Charlene D. Luke
Of More Than Usual Interest: The Taxing Problem Of Debt Principal, Charlene D. Luke
Seattle University Law Review
Leverage is an essential but often troubling component of the U.S. market. The financial crisis highlighted the risks and complexity of a leverage web that includes flesh-and-blood people from all walks of life and paper people from all corners of the business and investment world. In the tax area, the potentially problematic incentive effects of interest deductibility have long engaged a wide array of tax commentators and policymakers. While interest deductibility rightly receives widespread scrutiny, a more comprehensive approach to leverage is needed. This Article focuses on the surprisingly complicated tax treatment of cash (and cash equivalent) borrowings. This Article …
Balance And Team Production, Kelli A. Alces
Balance And Team Production, Kelli A. Alces
Seattle University Law Review
For decades, those holding the shareholder primacy view that the purpose of a corporation is to earn a profit for its shareholders have been debating with those who believe that corporations exist to serve broader societal interests. Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd began the conversation over eighty years ago, and it continues today, with voices at various places along a spectrum of possible corporate purposes participating. Unfortunately, over time, the various sides of the debate have begun to talk past each other rather than engage with each other and have lost sight of whatever common ground they may be able …
The Boundaries Of "Team" Production Of Corporate Governance, Anthony J. Casey, M. Todd Henderson
The Boundaries Of "Team" Production Of Corporate Governance, Anthony J. Casey, M. Todd Henderson
Seattle University Law Review
We examine the cooperative production of corporate governance. We explain that this production does not occur exclusively within a “team” or “firm.” Rather, several aspects of corporate governance are quintessentially market products. Like Blair and Stout, we view the shareholder as but one of many stakeholders in a corporation. Where we depart from their analysis is in our view of the boundaries of a firm. We suggest that they overweight the intrafirm production of control. Focusing on the primacy of a board of directors, Blair and Stout posit a hierarchical team that governs the economic enterprise. We observe, however, that …
The Team Production Model As A Paradigm, Brian R. Cheffins
The Team Production Model As A Paradigm, Brian R. Cheffins
Seattle University Law Review
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout suggested a few years after the publication of their 1999 Virginia Law Review article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, that their team production model was poised to emerge as part of a new corporate law “paradigm.” In so doing, they specifically invoked Thomas Kuhn’s well-known analysis of scientific revolutions. This Article revisits Blair and Stout’s team production theory by offering a critique of their claim that their model is destined to become a new corporate law paradigm in the Kuhnian sense. In so doing the Article draws upon key corporate law theories and …
Testing The Normative Desirability Of The Mediating Hierarch, Zachary J. Gubler
Testing The Normative Desirability Of The Mediating Hierarch, Zachary J. Gubler
Seattle University Law Review
In their influential article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout explained how corporate law might be viewed as an attempt at solving what is known as the team production problem. At its core, this problem has to do with the opportunistic behavior that arises when multiple economic actors make investments—whether of labor, capital, or otherwise—in a business venture where these investments are said to be “firm specific” because they cannot be easily withdrawn and redeployed in other projects. The problem is how to construct a governance regime that will create incentives for the …
Team Production & The Multinational Enterprise, Virginia Harper Ho
Team Production & The Multinational Enterprise, Virginia Harper Ho
Seattle University Law Review
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s path-breaking article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, advances a dual thesis: first, that team production theory does a better job than its competitors (in particular, principal–agent theory) of explaining the advantages of the public corporation and key features of corporate law; and second, that, as a matter of corporate law, corporate boards are charged with advancing the collective interest of all the contributors to the corporate enterprise rather than the shareholders’ interests alone. Its central insight is that the role of the independent, or insulated, corporate board is to serve as a “mediating …
Hostile Takeovers And Overreliance, Anthony Niblett
Hostile Takeovers And Overreliance, Anthony Niblett
Seattle University Law Review
Commentators have argued that employees should be compensated in the event of a hostile takeover; otherwise, the threat of such a takeover will fail to incentivize firm-specific investments by employees. Such deferred compensation is analogous to the payment of damages following a breach of contract. The analogous breach, here, is the breach of an implicit contract between management and employees. Employees trusted management to compensate them for firm-specific investments not explicitly contracted for. This Article uses a familiar result from the contract law literature: There is no measure of damages for breach of contract that can generate both efficient breach …
Buying Teams, Andres Sawicki
Buying Teams, Andres Sawicki
Seattle University Law Review
The Sixth Annual Berle Symposium reflects on Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s classic article: A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law. Blair and Stout recast the modern law of public corporations through the lens of the team production theory of the firm. Here, I apply Blair and Stout’s insights—emphasizing the value of team production, independent monitors, and intellectual property rights—to a novel corporate transaction structure: the acqui-hire. In an acqui-hire, a publicly owned technology firm wants to add a start-up’s engineers. Instead of simply hiring them, though, it buys the start-up, discards most of its assets, and retains the start-up’s …
Team Production And Securities Laws, Urska Velikonja
Team Production And Securities Laws, Urska Velikonja
Seattle University Law Review
In the seminal paper that this symposium celebrates, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout made two related points. First, that Delaware law does not require shareholder primacy in public corporations. Rather, the broad deference afforded to the decisions of predominantly independent corporate boards of directors is consistent with a contrary theory, that of team production, or, as they call it, “the mediating hierarch” theory. The fundamental role of the board of directors is to mediate between the interests of various stakeholders that contribute to the corporation’s output. As a result, Delaware courts have repeatedly …
With The Emergence Of Public Benefit Corporations, Directors Of Traditional For-Profit Companies Should Tread Cautiously, But Welcome The Opportunity To Invest In Social Enterprise, Mckenzie Holden Granum
With The Emergence Of Public Benefit Corporations, Directors Of Traditional For-Profit Companies Should Tread Cautiously, But Welcome The Opportunity To Invest In Social Enterprise, Mckenzie Holden Granum
Seattle University Law Review
Social entrepreneurship has become the popular term used to describe business forms that aim to produce profits while also seeking to significantly advance one or more social or environmental goals. In response to an increase in social entrepreneurship across sectors—from progressive industries like organic farming to conservative industries such as insurance and banking—several states have adopted new corporate governance structures. Such legislation allows incorporating businesses to choose an off-the-shelf formation type that embeds a social mission into its legal structure. The bulk of the newly implemented statutory forms provide not only a new framework for social entrepreneurs to work within, …
Shareholder Wealth Maximization As Means To An End, Robert P. Bartlett, Iii
Shareholder Wealth Maximization As Means To An End, Robert P. Bartlett, Iii
Seattle University Law Review
In several recent cases, the Delaware Chancery Court has emphasized that where a conflict of interest exists between holders of a company’s common stock and holders of its preferred stock, the standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its common stockholders rather than for its preferred stockholders. This article interrogates this view of directors’ fiduciary duties from the perspective of incomplete contracting theory. Building on the seminal work of Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, incomplete contracting theory examines the critical role of corporate control rights for addressing …
Lobbying, Pandering, And Information In The Firm, Adam B. Badawi
Lobbying, Pandering, And Information In The Firm, Adam B. Badawi
Seattle University Law Review
In their classic and insightful article on team production in corporate law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout identify the minimization of rent-seeking as one of the chief benefits of vesting ultimate authority over a firm with the board of directors. In their analysis, this problematic rent-seeking arises when parties need to divide the gains from production after the fact. The squabbling that is likely to ensue may threaten to eat away most, or all, of the gains that come from productive activity. If parties know that this sort of rent-seeking will occur, they may not engage in productive activity in …
The History Of Team Production Theory, Ron Harris
The History Of Team Production Theory, Ron Harris
Seattle University Law Review
In this short Essay, the author consider the team production theory developed by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout1 from a historical perspective, in three senses. First, does the theory fit the historical use of the corporate form? Second, can it explain the development of corporation law doctrines? And third, can we place the development of the theory as such into the intellectual history of corporation theories at large? The author will state my bottom line up front: while the Article finds the team production theory insightful and useful for my historical research, for teaching corporation law, and for thinking about …
Choosing The Partnership: English Business Organization Law During The Industrial Revolution, Ryan Bubb
Choosing The Partnership: English Business Organization Law During The Industrial Revolution, Ryan Bubb
Seattle University Law Review
For most of the period associated with the Industrial Revolution in Britain, English law restricted access to incorporation and the Bubble Act explicitly outlawed the formation of unincorporated joint stock companies with transferable shares. Furthermore, firms in the manufacturing industries most closely associated with the Industrial Revolution were overwhelmingly partnerships. These two facts have led some scholars to posit that the antiquated business organization law was a constraint on the structural transformation and growth that characterized the British economy during the period. Importantly, however, the vast majority of manufacturing firms in the modern sector were partnerships. An easy explanation for …
Boards Of Directors As Mediating Hierarchs, Margaret M. Blair
Boards Of Directors As Mediating Hierarchs, Margaret M. Blair
Seattle University Law Review
In June of 2014, the board of directors of Demoulas Supermarkets, Inc.—better known as Market Basket, a mid-sized chain of grocery stores in New England—decided to oust the man who had been CEO for the previous six years, Arthur T. Demoulas. Most likely, the board of directors did not anticipate what happened next: Thousands of employees, customers, and fans of Market Basket boycotted the stores and staged noisy public protests asking the board to reinstate “Arthur T.” The reaction by employees and customers made what had been a simmering, nasty, intrafamily feud within the closely held Market Basket chain into …