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Articles 61 - 90 of 200

Full-Text Articles in Banking and Finance Law

Don't End Or Audit The Fed: Central Bank Independence In An Age Of Austerity, Neil H. Buchanan, Michael C. Dorf Nov 2016

Don't End Or Audit The Fed: Central Bank Independence In An Age Of Austerity, Neil H. Buchanan, Michael C. Dorf

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The Federal Reserve (the Fed) is the central bank of the United States. Because of its power and importance in guiding the economy, the Fed's independence from direct political influence has made it a target of ideologically motivated attacks throughout its history, with an especially aggressive round of attacks coming in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and ongoing today. We defend Fed independence. We point to the Fed's exemplary performance during and after the 2008 crisis, and we offer the example of a potential future crisis in which Congress falls to increase the debt ceiling to show how …


Legitimacy And Impartiality As Basic Principles For Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Odette Lienau Oct 2016

Legitimacy And Impartiality As Basic Principles For Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Odette Lienau

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This essay suggests that attentiveness to the principles of legitimacy and impartiality may contribute to the instrumental success of any sovereign debt restructuring, and highlights institutional elements or practices often associated with these goals. An additional question can be raised as to whether these principles might have a further claim to special consideration, as part of emerging customary international law or general principles of law. Any determination along these lines is made difficult by the fact that legitimacy is a composite principle, constituted of multiple procedural and substantive norms, and perhaps lacks the necessary specificity to be a legal rule …


Fhfa Single Security/Common Securitization Platform Comment, David J. Reiss Aug 2016

Fhfa Single Security/Common Securitization Platform Comment, David J. Reiss

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

No abstract provided.


Ffiec Consumer Compliance Comment Letter, David J. Reiss Jul 2016

Ffiec Consumer Compliance Comment Letter, David J. Reiss

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) issued a notice and request for comment regarding the Uniform Interagency Consumer Compliance Rating System (CC Rating System). The FFIEC is seeking to revise the CC Rating System “to reflect the regulatory, examination (supervisory), technological, and market changes that have occurred in the years since the current rating system was established.” 81 F.R. 26553. It is a positive development that the federal government is seeking to implement a consistent approach to consumer protection across a broad swath of the financial services industry. Nonetheless, the proposed CC Ratings System can be refined to further …


Underwriting Sustainable Homeownership: The Federal Housing Administration And The Low Down Payment Loan, David Reiss Jul 2016

Underwriting Sustainable Homeownership: The Federal Housing Administration And The Low Down Payment Loan, David Reiss

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The United States Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) has been a versatile tool of government since it was created during the Great Depression. The FHA was created in large part to inject liquidity into a moribund mortgage market. It succeeded wonderfully, with rapid growth during the late 1930s. The federal government repositioned it a number of times over the following decades to achieve a variety of additional social goals. These goals included supporting civilian mobilization during World War II; helping veterans returning from the War; stabilizing urban housing markets during the 1960s; and expanding minority homeownership rates during the 1990s. It …


Ensuring That Homeownership Is Sustainable, David Reiss May 2016

Ensuring That Homeownership Is Sustainable, David Reiss

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This short article argues that the Federal Housing Administration has suffered as a result of many of the same unrealistic underwriting assumptions that led to problems for many lenders during the 2000s. It, too, was harmed by a housing market as bad as any since the Great Depression. As a result, the federal government announced in 2013 that the FHA would require the first bailout in the agency’s history. While facing financial challenges, the FHA has also come under attack for the poor execution of policies designed to expand homeownership opportunities.

Leading commentators have called for the federal government to …


Sloppy, Sloppy, Sloppy: The State Of The Mortgage Market, David Reiss May 2016

Sloppy, Sloppy, Sloppy: The State Of The Mortgage Market, David Reiss

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Much of the discussion about the recent California Supreme Court case Yvanova v New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 C4th 919 has focused on the scope of the Court’s narrow holding, “a borrower who has suffered a nonjudicial foreclosure [in California] does not lack standing to sue for wrongful foreclosure based on an allegedly void assignment merely because he or she was in default on the loan and was not a party to the challenged assignment.” 62 C4th at 924.This is an important question, no doubt, but I want to spend a little time contemplating the types of sloppy behavior …


Cfpb Collection Activities Comment Letter, David J. Reiss Apr 2016

Cfpb Collection Activities Comment Letter, David J. Reiss

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

No abstract provided.


Fhfa Duty To Serve Comment Letter, David J. Reiss Mar 2016

Fhfa Duty To Serve Comment Letter, David J. Reiss

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

No abstract provided.


The Federal Housing Administration (Fha) And Private Mortgage Insurance (Pmi): A Bibliography, David J. Reiss Mar 2016

The Federal Housing Administration (Fha) And Private Mortgage Insurance (Pmi): A Bibliography, David J. Reiss

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

This is an unannotated bibliography of writings through 2015 primarily about the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), but it also includes materials regarding the private mortgage insurance (PMI) industry. While it is comprehensive, it is not exhaustive, with a focus on work published by government agencies, economists, legal and policy scholars, private sector analysts and think tanks. The bibliography also includes other materials about the housing finance market in the early and mid-20th Century. These broader materials provide some context for the operations of the FHA and PMI.

This bibliography will be posted on Wikipedia so that others can make additions …


Systemically Significant Prices, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova Mar 2016

Systemically Significant Prices, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Some prices and indices in national or transnational markets take on particular market-wide importance, either because (a) they are associated with ubiquitous inputs to production, (b) they are associated with highly popular asset classes, (c) they tend by convention to be used as benchmarks in determining other prices, or (d) some combination of the above. Examples include prevailing wage and salary rates, certain energy and commodity prices, and such indices and borrowing rates as the Standard & Poor’s 500, the Federal Funds Rate, and the Libor and Euribor interbank lending rate benchmarks.

We call such prices and indices 'systemically important' …


"Special," Vestigial, Or Visionary? What Bank Regulation Tells Us About The Corporation - And Vice Versa, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova Jan 2016

"Special," Vestigial, Or Visionary? What Bank Regulation Tells Us About The Corporation - And Vice Versa, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

A remarkable yet seldom noted set of parallels exists between modern U.S. bank regulation, on the one hand, and what used to be garden-variety American corporate law, on the other hand. For example, just as bank charters are matters not of right but of conditional privilege even today, so were all corporate charters not long ago. Just as chartered banks are authorized to engage only in limited, enumerated activities even to- day, so were all corporations restricted not long ago. And just as banks are subject to strict capital regulation even today, so were all corporations not long ago.

In …


The Challenge Of Legitimacy In Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Odette Lienau Jan 2016

The Challenge Of Legitimacy In Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Odette Lienau

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Since the emergence of the post-World War II international economic system, policymakers have lamented the absence of a global sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. This disappointment has only intensified in recent years, as the failure to provide prompt, comprehensive, and lasting debt relief becomes even more apparent. As a result, scholars and key international actors have argued for the development of a more coherent global approach to debt workouts. But to date this discussion lacks a sustained focus on questions of legitimacy—a fact that is exceptionally puzzling in light of the voluminous scholarship on the legitimacy deficits of international economic institutions …


Recursive Collective Actions Problems: The Structure Of Procyclicality In Financial And Monetary Markets, Macroeconomies And Formally Similar Contexts, Robert C. Hockett Jul 2015

Recursive Collective Actions Problems: The Structure Of Procyclicality In Financial And Monetary Markets, Macroeconomies And Formally Similar Contexts, Robert C. Hockett

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The hallmark of a collective action problem is its aggregating multiple individually rational decisions into a collectively irrational outcome. Arms races, “commons tragedies” and “prisoners’ dilemmas” are well-known, indeed well-worn examples. What seem to be less widely appreciated are two complementary propositions: first, that some collective action problems bear iterative, self-exacerbating structures that render them particularly destructive; and second, that some of the most formidable challenges faced by economies, societies, and polities are iteratively self-worsening problems of precisely this sort. Financial markets, monetary systems and macroeconomies in particular are rife with them – as are other complex systems subject to …


Paying For Risk: Bankers, Compensation, And Competition, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead Mar 2015

Paying For Risk: Bankers, Compensation, And Competition, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead

Cornell Law Review

Efforts to control bank risk address the wrong problem in the wrong way. They presume that the financial crisis was caused by CEOs who failed to super­vise risk-taking employees. The responses focus on exe­cutive pay, believing that exe­cu­tives will bring non-execu­tives into line—using incen­­­­tives to manage risk-taking—once their own pay is regu­lated. What they over­look is the effect on non-executive pay of the com­pe­­ti­­tion for talent. Even if exe­­cu­tive pay is regu­lated, and exe­cu­tives act in the bank’s best interests, they will still be trapped into providing incentives that encourage risk-taking by non-executives due to the negative exter­nality that arises …


Law And Finance In The Chinese Shadow Banking System, Dan Awrey Feb 2015

Law And Finance In The Chinese Shadow Banking System, Dan Awrey

Cornell International Law Journal

No abstract provided.


The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional 'Safety And Soundness' To Systematic 'Financial Stability' In Financial Supervision, Robert C. Hockett Jan 2015

The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional 'Safety And Soundness' To Systematic 'Financial Stability' In Financial Supervision, Robert C. Hockett

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Since the global financial dramas of 2008-09, authorities on financial regulation have come increasingly to counsel the inclusion of macroprudential policy instruments in the standard ‘toolkit’ of finance-regulatory measures employed by financial supervisors. The hallmark of this perspective is its focus not simply on the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions, as is characteristic of the traditional ‘microprudential’ perspective, but also on certain structural features of financial systems that can imperil such systems as wholes. Systemic ‘financial stability’ thus comes to supplement, though not to supplant, institutional ‘safety and soundness’ as a regulatory desideratum.

The move from primarily micro- …


Size Matters: Commercial Banks And The Capital Markets, Charles K. Whitehead Jan 2015

Size Matters: Commercial Banks And The Capital Markets, Charles K. Whitehead

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The conventional story is that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act broke down the Glass-Steagall Act’s wall separating commercial and investment banking in 1999, increasing risky business activities by commercial banks and precipitating the 2007 financial crisis. But the conventional story is only one-half complete. What it omits is the effect of change in commercial bank regulation on financial firms other than the commercial banks. After all, it was the failure of Lehman Brothers — an investment bank, not a commercial bank — that sparked the meltdown.

This Article provides the rest of the story. The basic premise is straightforward: By 1999, the …


Public Actors In Private Markets: Toward A Developmental Finance State, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova Jan 2015

Public Actors In Private Markets: Toward A Developmental Finance State, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The recent financial crisis brought into sharp relief fundamental questions about the social function and purpose of the financial system, including its relation to the “real” economy. This Article argues that, to answer these questions, we must recapture a distinctively American view of the proper relations among state, financial market, and development. This programmatic vision – captured in what we call a “developmental finance state” – is based on three key propositions: (1) that economic and social development is not an “end-state” but a continuing national policy priority; (2) that the modalities of finance are the most potent means of …


Response: Who Should Be Providing Mortgage Credit To American Households?, David Reiss Nov 2014

Response: Who Should Be Providing Mortgage Credit To American Households?, David Reiss

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Who should be providing mortgage credit to American households? Given that the residential mortgage market is a ten-trillion-dollar one, the answer we come up with had better be right, or we may suffer another brutal financial crisis sooner than we would like. Indeed, the stakes are as high as they were in the Great Depression when the foundation of our current system was first laid down. Unfortunately, the housing finance experts of the 1930s seemed to have a greater clarity of purpose when designing their housing finance system. Part of the problem today is that debates over the housing finance …


Comment On Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Proposed Rulemaking, David J. Reiss Oct 2014

Comment On Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Proposed Rulemaking, David J. Reiss

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

No abstract provided.


Comment On The Fhfa's Small Multifamily Subgoal, David J. Reiss, Jeffrey Lederman Oct 2014

Comment On The Fhfa's Small Multifamily Subgoal, David J. Reiss, Jeffrey Lederman

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

As the FHFA sets the housing goals for 2015-2017, it should focus on maximizing the creation and preservation of affordable housing. Less efficient proposed subgoals should be rejected unless the FHFA has explicitly identified a compelling rationale to adopt them. The FHFA has not identified one in the case of the proposed small multifamily subgoal. Thus, it should be withdrawn.


The Fhfa's Proposed Single Security Structure, David J. Reiss Oct 2014

The Fhfa's Proposed Single Security Structure, David J. Reiss

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) has posted a Request for Input on “the proposed structure for a Single Security that would be issued and guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.” The FHFA states it is most concerned with achieving “maximum secondary market liquidity” (Request for Input, at 8)

I am skeptical about the reasons for this move to a Single Security and whether it will achieve maximum liquidity. Moreover, it is unclear to me that this move reflects an urgent need for the FHFA, the two companies, originating lenders or borrowers. While I have no doubt that it …


The Future Of The Private Label Securities Market, David J. Reiss Aug 2014

The Future Of The Private Label Securities Market, David J. Reiss

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

The PLS market, like all markets, cycles from greed to fear, from boom to bust. The mortgage market is still in the fear part of the cycle and recent government interventions in it have, undoubtedly, added to that fear. In recent days, there has been a lot of industry pushback against the government’s approach, including threats to pull out of various sectors. But the government should not chart its course based on today’s news reports. Rather, it should identify fundamentals and stick to them. In particular, its regulatory approach should reflect an attempt to align incentives of market actors with …


Armed, Unarmed Or Harmed By Knowledge? A Comment On The Fha's Housing Counseling Pilot Program, David J. Reiss Jul 2014

Armed, Unarmed Or Harmed By Knowledge? A Comment On The Fha's Housing Counseling Pilot Program, David J. Reiss

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

The FHA has requested input on its Homeowners Armed with Knowledge (HAWK) for New Homebuyers pilot program. This comment letter argues that housing counseling is not a proven solution to the problem it is meant to solve, excessive defaults by FHA borrowers. HAWK is a traditional housing counseling program but the scholarly literature casts into doubt the efficacy of such programs. It would be better to take time to research which counseling strategies, if any, are proven to be effective. This is true for the FHA but also for other government agencies, such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, that …


Legitimacy And Impartiality In A Sovereign Debt Workout Mechanism, Odette Lienau Jul 2014

Legitimacy And Impartiality In A Sovereign Debt Workout Mechanism, Odette Lienau

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Particularly in light of recent developments in sovereign debt litigation, there is a pressing need for discussion of more robust sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms. This paper contends that any sovereign debt workout mechanism (DWM) should embody the principles of legitimacy and impartiality, to the extent possible, in order to garner the stable and long-term adherence of international stakeholders. These two elements are important both for attracting support ex ante, i.e. in the initial development of any treaty, ad hoc, or soft law restructuring mechanism, and for ensuring ex post that a DWM is ultimately utilized by states and their creditors. …


Remic Tax Enforcement As Financial-Market Regulator, Bradley T. Borden, David Reiss Apr 2014

Remic Tax Enforcement As Financial-Market Regulator, Bradley T. Borden, David Reiss

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Lawmakers, prosecutors, homeowners, policymakers, investors, news media, scholars and other commentators have examined, litigated, and reported on numerous aspects of the 2008 Financial Crisis and the role that residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) played in that crisis. Big banks create RMBS by pooling mortgage notes into trusts and selling interests in those trusts as RMBS. Absent from prior work related to RMBS securitization is the tax treatment of RMBS mortgage-note pools and the critical role tax enforcement should play in ensuring the integrity of mortgage-note securitization.

This Article is the first to examine federal tax aspects of RMBS mortgage-note pools formed …


The Future Of Fannie And Freddie, Mark Calabria, David Reiss, Lawrence White, Mark Willis Apr 2014

The Future Of Fannie And Freddie, Mark Calabria, David Reiss, Lawrence White, Mark Willis

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This is a transcript of a panel discussion titled, “The Future of Fannie and Freddie.” The panelists were Dr. Mark Calabria from the Cato Institute; Professor David Reiss from Brooklyn Law School; Professor Lawrence White from NYU Stern School of Business; and Dr. Mark Willis from NYU’s Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy. The panel was moderated by Professor Michael Levine from NYU School of Law. Panelists looked at economic policy and future prospects for Fannie and Freddie. The remarks have not been edited by the panelists.


An Overview Of The Fannie And Freddie Conservatorship Litigation, David Reiss Apr 2014

An Overview Of The Fannie And Freddie Conservatorship Litigation, David Reiss

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The fate of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are subject to the vagaries of politics, regulation, public opinion, the economy, and not least of all the numerous cases that have been filed in 2013 against various government entities arising from the placement of the two companies into conservatorship. This short article will provide an overview of the last of these. The litigation surrounding Fannie and Freddie’s conservatorship raises all sorts of issues about the federal government’s involvement in housing finance. These issues are worth setting forth as the proper role of these two companies in the housing finance system is …


Paying For Risk: Bankers, Compensation, And Competition, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead Feb 2014

Paying For Risk: Bankers, Compensation, And Competition, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

Efforts to control bank risk address the wrong problem in the wrong way. They presume that the financial crisis was caused by CEOs who failed to super­vise risk-taking employees. The responses focus on exe­cutive pay, believing that exe­cu­tives will bring non-execu­tives into line—using incen­­­­tives to manage risk-taking—once their own pay is regu­lated. What they over­look is the effect on non-executive pay of the com­pe­­ti­­tion for talent. Even if exe­­cu­tive pay is regu­lated, and exe­cu­tives act in the bank’s best interests, they will still be trapped into providing incentives that encourage risk-taking by non-executives due to the negative exter­nality that arises …