Banking and Finance Law Commons^™

Shadow Banking, Financial Markets, And The Real Estate Sector, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This is a relatively brief “firestarter” talk prepared by the author for the World Economic Forum’s Industry Partnership Strategists Meeting 2012 (held on October 3, 2012) on transformation of the real estate sector in light of ongoing shifts in the financial markets and broader global trends.

Direct And Indirect U.S. Government Debt, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Shadow Banking, Financial Markets, And The Real Estate Sector, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This is a relatively brief “firestarter” talk prepared by the author for the World Economic Forum’s Industry Partnership Strategists Meeting 2012 (held on October 3, 2012) on transformation of the real estate sector in light of ongoing shifts in the financial markets and broader global trends.

Chevron, Greenwashing, And The Myth Of 'Green Oil Companies', Miriam A. Cherry, Judd F. Sneirson

All Faculty Scholarship

As green business practices grow in popularity, so does the temptation to “greenwash” one’s business to appear more environmentally and socially responsible than it actually is. We examined this phenomenon in an earlier paper, using BP and the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe as a case study and developing a framework for policing dubious claims of corporate social responsibility. This Article revisits these issues focusing on Chevron, an oil company that claims in its advertisements to care deeply about the environment and the communities in which it operates, even as it faces an $18 billion judgment for polluting the Ecuadorean Amazon and …

Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcker Rule And Goldman Sachs, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

In many areas of regulation, rules require one person to act with loyalty to another person, or at least constrain one person’s pursuit of self-interest by restricting the extent to which that person may act in conflict with the interests of another person. These rules are typically justified on the basis of reducing (economic) agency costs. However, recently-adopted provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which include the so-called Volcker Rule, impose such conflict of interest rules on underwriters selling securities to investors, including sophisticated investors - a context in which agency costs do not arise. …

In-House Counsel’S Role In The Structuring Of Mortgage-Backed Securities, Steven L. Schwarcz, Shaun Barnes, Kathleen G. Cully

Faculty Scholarship

The authors introduce the financial crisis and the role played by mortgage-backed securities. Then describe the controversy at issue: whether, in order to own and enforce the mortgage loans backing those securities, a special-purpose vehicle “purchasing” mortgage loans must take physical delivery of the notes and security instruments in the precise manner specified by the sale agreement. Focusing on this controversy, the authors analyze (i) the extent, if any, that the controversy has merit; (ii) whether in-house counsel should have anticipated the controversy; and (iii) what, if anything, in-house counsel could have done to avert or, after it arose, to …

The 2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture Protecting Investors In Securitization Transactions: Does Dodd–Frank Help, Or Hurt?, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Securitization has been called into question because of its role in the recent financial crisis. Schwarcz examines the potential flaws in the securitization process and compare how the Dodd–Frank Act treats them. Although Dodd–Frank addresses one of the flaws, it underregulates or fails to regulate other flaws. It also overregulates by addressing aspects of securitization that are not flawed.

Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An Analytical Comparison, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

The recent financial woes of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and other nations have reinvigorated the debate over whether to bail out defaulting countries or, instead, restructure their debt. Bailouts are expensive, both for residents of the nation being bailed out and for parties providing the bailout funds. Because the IMF, which is subsidized by most nations (including the United States), is almost always involved in country debt bailouts, we all share the burden. Yet bailouts are virtually inevitable under the existing international framework; defaults are likely to have systemic consequences, whereas an orderly debt restructuring is currently impractical. This article analyzes …

The Eurozone Debt Crisis: The Options Now, Mitu Gulati, Lee C. Bechheit

Faculty Scholarship

The Eurozone debt crisis is entering its third year. The original objective of the official sector’s response to the crisis -- containment -- has failed. All of the countries of peripheral Europe are now in play; three of them (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) operate under full official sector bailout programs.

The prospect of the crisis engulfing the larger peripheral countries, Spain and Italy, has sparked a new round of official sector containment measures. These will involve active intervention by official sector players such as the European Central Bank in order to preserve market access for the affected countries.

This article …

The Political Economy Of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends To Be Frustrated And Systemic Risk Perpetuated, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

A good crisis should never go to waste. In the world of financial regulation, experience has shown – since at least the time of the South Sea Bubble three hundred years ago – that only after a catastrophic market collapse can legislators and regulators overcome the resistance of the financial community and adopt comprehensive "re-form" legislation. U.S. financial history both confirms and conforms to this generalization. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were the product of the 1929 stock-market crash and the Great Depression, with their enactment following the inauguration of President Franklin Roosevelt …

Institutionalization, Investment Adviser Regulation, And The Hedge Fund Problem, Anita Krug

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article contends that more effective regulation of investment advisers could be achieved by recognizing that the growth of hedge funds, private equity funds, and other private funds in recent decades is a manifestation of institutionalization in the investment advisory context. That is, investment advisers today commonly advise these “institutions,” which have supplanted other, smaller investors as advisory clients. However, the federal securities statute governing investment advisers, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, does not address the role of private funds as institutions that now intermediate those smaller investors’ relationships to investment advisers. Consistent with that failure, investment adviser regulation …

Memo To The Sec On The Proposed Rule On Disclosure Of Payments By Resource Extraction Issuers, Perrine Toledano

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

CCSI strongly supports the transparency of contracts and tax flows. CCSI shares the belief of many stakeholders that transparency is essential to leverage extractive industries for sustainable development and is in the mutual interest of all stakeholders. However, some industry players continue to voice the concern that increased transparency would be harmful for their business. Therefore, CCSI is working to also establish the business case for transparency.

In one such case, some industry players have been lobbying against the regulations developed by the Security and Exchange Commission to implement the mandatory disclosure provisions of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform …

Derivatives: A Twenty-First Century Understanding, Timothy E. Lynch

Faculty Works

Derivatives are commonly defined as some variation of the following: a financial instrument whose value is derived from the performance of a secondary source such as an underlying bond, commodity or index. But this definition is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. Thus, not surprisingly, derivatives are largely misunderstood, including by many policy makers, regulators and legal analysts. It is important for interested parties such as policy makers to understand derivatives, because the types and uses of derivatives have exploded in the last few decades, and because these financial instruments can provide both social benefits and cause social harms. This Article presents …

The Trouble With Investment Banking: Cluelessness, Not Greed, Will Bunting

San Diego Law Review

We assume that the set of marketable financial instruments can be divided into two distinct categories: (1) easy to price and (2) difficult to price, and then isolate two behavioral effects as most important with respect to securities trading in difficult-to-price securities; specifically, the "house money effect" and the "earned money effect." It is shown that these behavioral effects discourage profitable investment in research effort.

We then argue that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) safe harbor should not apply to investment banks that issue/underwrite difficult-to-price securities. We also advocate for the return of the private investment banking partnership …

Toward Transatlantic Convergence In Financial Regulation, Hwa-Jin Kim

Law & Economics Working Papers

This Article reviews the historical background of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 along with the developments in the markets that led to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. It analyzes the discussions on the Volcker Rule in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 from a comparative perspective. It shows how the reform in the United States may impact financial institutions and markets in other jurisdictions. Germany and Switzerland, where universal banking is the hallmark of the financial services industry, are the primary jurisdictions of interest. After taking a historical and political look at the regulation of …

Implementing Dodd-Frank: A Review Of The Cftc‟S Rulemaking Process: Testimony, Michael Greenberger

Congressional Testimony

The Relationship of Unregulated OTC Derivatives to the Meltdown. It is now accepted wisdom that it was the non-transparent, poorly capitalized, and almost wholly unregulated over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives market that lit the fuse that exploded the highly vulnerable worldwide economy in the fall of 2008. Because tens of trillions of dollars of these financial products were pegged to the economic performance of an overheated and highly inflated housing market, the sudden collapse of that market triggered under-capitalized or non-capitalized OTC derivative guarantees of the subprime housing investments. Moreover, the many undercapitalized insurers of that collapsing market had other multi-trillion dollar …

Regulating Financial Innovation: A More Principles-Based Proposal?, Dan Awrey

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Modem financial markets are characterized by complexity, seemingly perpetual innovation, chronic asymmetries of information and expertise, and pervasive agency costs. Perhaps nowhere are these characteristics-or their attendant regulatory challenges-more pronounced than within OTC derivatives markets. Mounting effective responses to these challenges must be considered amongst the most difficult and important tasks confronting financial regulators. Prescriptive, rules-based approaches toward financial regulation have thus far proven inadequate to this task. Through the utilization of outcome-oriented principles, enhanced dialogic relationships, intensive supervision, and targeted and proportional (yet vigorous) enforcement, "more principles-based" financial regulation (MPBR) manifests the potential to overcome these challenges and, in …

Derivatives And The Legal Origin Of The 2008 Credit Crisis, Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Experts still debate what caused the credit crisis of 2008. This Article argues that dubious honor belongs, first and foremost, to a little-known statute called the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA). Put simply, the credit crisis was not primarily due to changes in the markets; it was due to changes in the law. In particular, the crisis was the direct and foreseeable (and in fact foreseen by the author and others) consequence of the CFMA’s sudden and wholesale removal of centuries-old legal constraints on speculative trading in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.

Derivative contracts are probabilistic bets on future events. …

Overseeing Controlling Shareholders: Do Independent Directors Constrain Tunneling In Taiwan?, Yu-Hsin Lin

San Diego International Law Journal

This Article intends to explore the extent to which independent directors constrain tunneling by controlling shareholders in Taiwan. Taiwan serves as an appropriate jurisdiction for research since the private benefits agency problem is prevalent among Taiwanese public companies. A further twist in Taiwan?s case is that independent directors were newly introduced to Taiwan?s corporate boards, which follow dual-board system where the traditional monitoring function is served by statutory supervisors, instead of board committees, which adds to the complexity in analyzing the effectiveness of independent directors in constraining tunneling activities. Part II reviews relevant literature and lays the foundation for this …

Reflections On The Securities Law Of Jordan , Bashar H. Malkawi, Haitham A. Haloush

American University International Law Review

No abstract provided.

Reflections On The Securities Law Of Jordan , Bashar H. Malkawi, Haitham A. Haloush

American University International Law Review

No abstract provided.

Chapman Dialogue And Law Review Symposium Keynote Address: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches To Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Ideal financial regulation would work ex ante, to prevent financial failures. Once a failure occurs, there may already be economic damage, and it may be difficult to stop the failure from spreading and becoming systemic. The reality, though, is that preventing financial failures should be only one role for regulators. Even an optimal prophylactic regulatory regime cannot anticipate and prevent every failure. This paper, which formed my Chapman Dialogue Address at Chapman University School of Law and the keynote speech at Chapman Law Review’s 2011 Symposium on the Future of Financial Regulation, attempts to contrast fundamental differences between ex ante …

Political Risk And Sovereign Debt Contracts, Mitu Gulati, Stephen J. Choi, Eric A. Posner

Faculty Scholarship

Default on sovereign debt is a form of political risk. Issuers and creditors have responded to this risk both by strengthening the terms in sovereign debt contracts that enable creditors to enforce their debts judicially and by creating terms that enable sovereigns to restructure their debts. These apparently contradictory approaches reflect attempts to solve an incomplete contracting problem in which debtors need to be forced to repay debts in good states of the world; debtors need to be granted partial relief from debt payments in bad states; debtors may attempt to exploit divisions among creditors in order to opportunistically reduce …

The Paradoxes Of Dodd-Frank, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

A Behavioral Framework For Securities Risk, Tom C.W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

This article provides the first critical analysis and redesign of the existing securities risk disclosure framework given new insights from the emerging, interdisciplinary field of behavioral economics. Disclosure is the principle at the heart of federal securities regulation. Beneath that core principle of disclosure is the basic assumption that the reasonable investor is the idealized über-rational person of neoclassical economic theory. Therefore, once armed with the requisite information investors presumably can protect themselves through rational choice. Descriptively, however, real investors are not like their rational, neoclassical kin. This article examines this incongruence between the idealized rational investor and the imperfect …

Overwhelming A Financial Regulatory Black Hole With Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank’S Attack On Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused By An Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market, Michael Greenberger

Faculty Scholarship

It is now accepted wisdom that it was the non-transparent, poorly capitalized and almost wholly unregulated over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives market that lit the fuse that exploded the highly vulnerable worldwide economy in the fall of 2008.[1] Because tens of trillions of dollars of these financial products were pegged to the economic performance of an overheated and highly inflated housing market, the sudden collapse of that market triggered under-capitalized OTC derivative guarantees of the subprime housing market; and the guarantors’ multi-trillion dollar interconnectedness with thousands of other OTC derivatives’ counterparties within that OTC market (through interest rate, currency, foreign exchange, and …

Keynote Address: A Regulatory Framework For Managing Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This accessible analysis of systemic risk regulation was delivered as the keynote speech at an October 20, 2011 European Central Bank conference on regulation of financial services. Many regulatory responses, like the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, consist largely of politically motivated reactions to the financial crisis, looking for villains (whether or not they exist). To be most effective, however, the regulation must be situated within a more analytical framework. In this speech, I attempt to build that framework, showing that preventive regulation is insufficient and that regulation also must be designed to limit the transmission of systemic risk …

Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards An Analytical Framework, Steven L. Schwarcz, Iman Anabtawi

Faculty Scholarship

The global financial crisis demonstrated the inability and unwillingness of financial market participants to safeguard the stability of the financial system. It also highlighted the enormous direct and indirect costs of addressing systemic crises after they have occurred, as opposed to attempting to prevent them from arising. Governments and international organizations are responding with measures intended to make the financial system more resilient to economic shocks, many of which will be implemented by regulatory bodies over time. These measures suffer, however, from the lack of a theoretical account of how systemic risk propagates within the financial system and why regulatory …

323 Non-Managing Underwriters’ Role In Securities Offerings: Just Eye Candy?, Elena Marty-Nelson

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

While there is considerable scholarship on the due diligence defense of lead underwriters in defective corporate securities offerings, there is surprisingly little analysis of the due diligence defense of non-managing underwriters. This article challenges the common perception that lead and non-managing underwriters necessarily “sink or swim” together for purposes of due diligence. An analysis of the statutory structure of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 reveals that non-managing underwriters are not inextricably tethered to the lead. Rather, non-managing underwriters who actively question the lead’s due diligence investigation should be able to meet their own affirmative defense even when …

Chasing The Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’S Guide To The Psychology, Culture And Ethics Of Financial Risk-Taking, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The current financial crisis has once again focused attention on lawyers, corporate directors and auditors as gatekeepers, who are expected to introduce some degree of cognitive independence to the task of risk assessment and risk management in public companies, including financial services firms. This essay examines the psychological and cultural forces that may distort risk perception and risk motivation in hyper-competitive firms, beyond the standard economic incentives associated with agency costs and moral hazards, warning gatekeepers against too easily assuming that all is well when insiders display high levels of intensity, focus and devotion to hard-to-achieve goals. In fact, these …