Banking and Finance Law Commons^™

Liquidity Facilities Provided To Banks During The Dominican Republic Financial Crisis Of 2003, Marco Porfirio Martínez

Journal of Financial Crises

As part of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic (CBDR) released a comprehensive document providing an overview of the origins and handling of the 2003 financial crisis. This Archive Note builds on the highlights of that document by discussing primary factors that led to problems within Banco Intercontinental (Baninter), the bank that triggered the crisis; detailing measures the CBDR implemented to mitigate the situation; and addressing the consequences for two other major banks, Banco Mercantil and Bancrédito.

United States: Lehman Brothers Broker-Dealer Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Ayodeji George, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

On Sunday, September 14, 2008, a deal to sell the United States investment bank Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LBHI) to United Kingdom–based Barclays fell apart. US authorities informed LBHI that, given the lack of rescue funds, it would need to file for bankruptcy before Monday morning to avoid additional chaos for the firm and markets. However, authorities understood Barclays was still interested in buying Lehman’s broker-dealer subsidiary, Lehman Brothers Inc. (LBI). Federal Reserve and Treasury officials were concerned about the impact that the sudden failure of LBI could have on financial markets. LBI had $87 billion in secured overnight repurchase …

United States: First Republic Bank Emergency Liquidity Program, 2023, Salil Gupta, Jack French, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

First Republic Bank, a California-based institution with $212.6 billion in assets, lost $25 billion in deposits on Friday, March 10, 2023, following the closing of Silicon Valley Bank that morning. On Sunday, March 12, First Republic announced that it had access to $70 billion in unused liquidity owing to its borrowing capacity at the Federal Reserve, the Federal Home Loan Bank System, and JPMorgan Chase (JPMC). But First Republic’s depositors withdrew a further $40 billion of deposits on Monday, March 13. First Republic’s borrowings from the Federal Reserve rose as high as $109 billion between Friday, March 10, and Wednesday, …

United States: Citigroup Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

By November 21, 2008, against the backdrop of heavy losses during the Global Financial Crisis, Citigroup counterparties were substantially pulling back from the firm. On November 23, the US Department of the Treasury, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Federal Reserve announced a support package for Citi composed of a capital injection and a loss-sharing arrangement on $300.8 billion of assets. Under the Asset Guarantee Program (AGP), Citi would absorb the first $39.5 billion in losses on a mutually agreed upon pool of risky assets; the Treasury and FDIC provided $15 billion in loss protection after that, combined with Citi’s …

United States: Bear Stearns Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2008, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

On Thursday, March 13, 2008, the US investment bank Bear Stearns Companies approached the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), saying it expected many of its repurchase agreement (repo) counterparties would not “roll,” or renew, their repo agreements the next day. As a result, the firm would be obligated to repay many of its repo liabilities. Without an emergency loan, Bear would be forced to file for bankruptcy on Friday morning, March 14. Before the market opened on Friday, the FRBNY made an overnight loan for $12.9 billion through JPMorgan Chase Bank (JPMC) on a nonrecourse basis, which on-lent …

United Kingdom: Northern Rock Emergency Liquidity Program, 2007, Bailey Decker, Jack French, Eming Shyu

Journal of Financial Crises

Northern Rock plc was a bank in the United Kingdom (UK) that experienced rapid growth from 1998 to 2007. The bank was a large issuer of UK residential mortgage-backed securities. Its funding was primarily wholesale as its retail deposit growth had not kept up with its asset growth. By August 2007, Northern Rock’s credit default swap spreads were widening and its share price falling as conditions deteriorated in the markets on which it relied for short-term funding. To meet the bank’s substantial liquidity needs, the Bank of England (BoE) announced on September 14, 2007, that it would extend an emergency …

United States: Bank Of America Emergency Liquidity Program, 2009, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

On December 31, 2008, Bank of America (BofA) finalized its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, absorbing losses of $15.5 billion as a result. Regulators were concerned about BofA’s short-term liquidity position and ability to post more collateral if its credit rating was downgraded. On January 16, 2009, the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Department of the Treasury announced an interagency support package to BofA, which included an asset guarantee wherein all three agencies shared losses with BofA on a “ring-fenced” $118 billion pool of assets. Under the ring-fencing arrangement, known as the Asset Guarantee Program (AGP), BofA would …

United Kingdom: Hbos And Rbs Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Bailey Decker, Jack French

Journal of Financial Crises

Two United Kingdom–based banks, Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) and Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBS), faced substantial liquidity needs during fall of 2008. To provide funding until recapitalization, the Bank of England (BoE) extended ad hoc emergency liquidity facilities to HBOS on October 1 and to RBS on October 7, 2008, comprising US dollars (USD) and British pounds sterling (GBP). As collateral for the 2008 assistance, HBOS and RBS posted pools of loans that were ineligible for the BoE’s market-wide operations. Aggregate usage of the two ad hoc facilities peaked at GBP 61.5 billion (USD 106.0 billion) on October …

Sweden: Carnegie Investment Bank Ab Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Sophia Alden, Jack French

Journal of Financial Crises

In October 2008, Carnegie Investment Bank AB (Carnegie) had trouble obtaining financing amid concerns about its financial health. However, Sweden’s central bank, the Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank), and the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) still viewed Carnegie as solvent. Between October 27 and 28, the Riksbank lent Carnegie 2.4 billion Swedish kronor (SEK). As collateral for the loan, Carnegie and its holding company, D. Carnegie & Co. AB (D. Carnegie), provided all shares and subsidiaries in Carnegie as well as all shares in a sister subsidiary under D. Carnegie, Max Matthiessen Holding AB (Max Matthiessen). On November 10, 2008, the FSA …

Switzerland: Credit Suisse Emergency Liquidity Program, 2023, Jack French, Owen Heaphy, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

Credit Suisse (CS) faced multiple challenges leading up to March 2023 including a significant outflow of client funds in the fourth quarter of 2022 and reputational loss resulting from a number of scandals in the preceding years. On Wednesday, March 15, 2023, shortly after two high-profile bank failures in the United States, a high-ranking official of the Saudi National Bank, a major shareholder, publicly said it would not provide any more capital for the company. Despite a joint statement from the Swiss National Bank (SNB) and the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) that CS was in compliance with capital …

Spain: Caja De Ahorros Castilla–La Mancha Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2009, Vincient Arnold, Lakshimi Swaminathan

Journal of Financial Crises

Following years of rapid credit expansion in the real estate sector and reliance on wholesale funding between 2000 and 2008, Caja de Ahorros de Castilla–La Mancha (CCM) found itself on the brink of insolvency in early 2009. Normally, a Eurosystem bank in CCM’s position would turn to the European Central Bank (ECB) to obtain liquidity through its standing financing facilities, but CCM lacked eligible collateral to tap them. Consequently, in February 2009, the Bank of Spain (BoS) provided emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) of EUR 900 million to CCM, secured against CCM assets, to help meet its liquidity needs. In March, …

Russia: Otkritie Emergency Liquidity Program, 2017, Benjamin Hoffner

Journal of Financial Crises

In July and August 2017, Otkritie Bank, Russia’s largest privately owned bank, experienced deposit runs related to concerns over Otkritie’s recent acquisitions, including a large, troubled bank and insurance company. The runs prompted Otkritie to heavily rely on the Central Bank of Russia’s (CBR’s) standing fixed-rate repurchase agreement (repo) facility to meet the outflow. By July, Otkritie had RUB 338.1 billion in outstanding repo loans from the CBR. As depositors continued to withdraw funds in August, the CBR provided Otkritie with an unsecured emergency loan of RUB 330 billion while Otkritie continued to borrow from the repo facility. On August …

Moldova: Consortium Of Banks Emergency Liquidity Program, 2014, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

In the fall of 2014, a bank fraud involving illegal loans and transfers resulted in USD 1 billion being stolen from the government of Moldova, which amounted to more than an eighth of Moldova’s GDP. In September 2014, it became clear to the National Bank of Moldova (NBM) that the banks involved in the fraud—Banca de Economii, Banca Sociala, and Unibank—were deeply insolvent and had been hiding that fact from regulators. In late November, the NBM issued 9.4 billion Moldovan lei (MDL; USD 640 million) in emergency credit to the banks at an interest rate of 10 basis points against …

Latvia: Parex Bank Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

Heading into the Global Financial Crisis, JSC Parex banka was Latvia’s second-largest bank in terms of assets, comprising 13.8% of total assets in the Latvian banking sector. In autumn 2008, Parex faced a capital shortfall owing to massive credit and market losses in addition to liquidity problems and deposit runs of 240 million Latvian lats (LVL; USD 428.6 million). Parex had two senior syndicated loans maturing in February and June 2009, totaling EUR 775 million (USD 992 million). Latvian authorities said they doubted that Parex would be able to pay back, extend, or replace these loans. Authorities intervened at the …

Ireland: Anglo Irish Bank Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2009, Salil Gupta, Mahdi Khairallah, Nik Adlina Nik Moktar

Journal of Financial Crises

At the height of the Global Financial Crisis in September 2008, Anglo Irish Bank (Anglo), one of Ireland’s six core banks, specializing in commercial and residential real estate with EUR 101.3 billion in assets, faced severe losses. Irish authorities announced a blanket deposit and liability guarantee for the six banks including Anglo. At the same time, Anglo was offered standby liquidity facilities of EUR 3 billion from the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) and EUR 10 billion from the two largest Irish commercial banks, which were not drawn on at the time. Anglo was nationalized in January 2009, as deposit …

Italy: Banco Ambrosiano Emergency Liquidity Program, 1982, Kopal Ardimento

Journal of Financial Crises

On June 14, 1982, prompted by the disappearance of Banco Ambrosiano (BA) CEO Roberto Calvi, the Bank of Italy opened an investigation into BA, which revealed to the market BA’s 1.9 trillion–2.2 trillion Italian lire (ITL; USD 1.4 billion–USD 1.6 billion) in questionable foreign loans. The Treasury Ministry deemed intervention necessary because BA’s collapse would compromise the credibility of the Italian banking system abroad. Attempts to appeal to the Vatican Bank to honor guarantees it had made against these foreign loans failed. The Bank of Italy worried that runs on deposits would further impair BA while authorities explored alternatives to …

Indonesia: Bank Century Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

By the autumn of 2008, the effects of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 had struck Indonesia, as liquidity in interbank markets dried up, capital flows reversed, and economic growth slowed. On October 30, 2008, Bank Indonesia—the central bank of Indonesia—passed Regulation No. 10/26/PBI/2008, establishing a Short-Term Funding Facility for Commercial Banks (SFF). On October 31, 2008, the capital adequacy ratio of Bank Century, a relatively small Indonesian bank, was –3.35%. On November 14, 2008, after Bank Century failed to conduct payment clearing the day before, Bank Indonesia approved Bank Century for access to the SFF and began disbursements of …

Iceland: Kaupthing Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Sophia Alden, Léo Brougher

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the privatization of Iceland’s state-owned banks between 1998 and 2003, the three largest banks in Iceland—Glitnir, Landsbanki, and Kaupthing—grew rapidly, with consolidated assets increasing from 100% of Iceland’s GDP in 2004 to nearly 900% by the end of 2007. Initially, this growth was funded by debt issuances in the European medium-term note market; however, as cracks in the international financial system appeared in 2006, the banks turned to offering high-interest savings accounts through their foreign subsidiaries. Beginning in October 2006, Kaupthing launched “Kaupthing Edge,” an online savings and deposit platform operating in markets outside Iceland. When the United States …

Germany: Ikb Deutsche Industriebank Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Ayodeji George, Sophia Alden

Journal of Financial Crises

In the summer of 2007, IKB Deutsche Industriebank (IKB) faced heavy losses owing to the liquidity support it had provided on commercial paper issued by Rhineland Funding Capital Corporation, its off-balance-sheet vehicle, which held distressed collateralized debt obligations backed by US subprime mortgages. In July 2007, authorities became aware that IKB itself had lost access to liquidity from Deutsche Bank and other funding partners. Publicly owned development bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) held a 38% stake in IKB, exposing it to potentially heavy losses in the event of an IKB failure. KfW, German financial authorities, and German banks pursued a …

Cyprus: Laiki Bank Ad Hoc Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2011, Stella Schaefer-Brown

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the European Union’s decision to restructure Greek debt in October 2011, Laiki Bank’s depositors began to withdraw their funds from the bank in growing numbers after it reported that its portfolio of Greek government bonds had lost EUR 2.3 billion in value. Beginning October 2011 and lasting until the bank’s resolution in 2013, Laiki Bank requested and received emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) from the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) so that the bank could continue to fund itself as depositors withdrew their funds. In June 2012, Cypriot authorities recapitalized Laiki Bank, and the government became an 84% shareholder. From …

Denmark: Roskilde Bank Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

Roskilde Bank A/S (Roskilde) was the eighth-largest bank in Denmark at the time of the Global Financial Crisis, with approximately 43 billion Danish kroner (DKK; USD 9.1 billion) in consolidated assets as of March 2008. Roskilde had considerable exposure to real estate and construction firms, prompting ratings downgrades and larger write-downs than expected in July 2008. On July 10, 2008, Roskilde asked for liquidity assistance from the Danish central bank, Danmarks Nationalbank (DNB). Later that day, DNB and the banking sector’s self-insurance group, the Private Contingency Association (PCA), announced emergency liquidity assistance to Roskilde in the form of an unlimited …

Canada: Canadian Commercial Bank Emergency Liquidity Program, 1985, Adam Keanie, Léo Brougher

Journal of Financial Crises

In March 1985, the Canadian Commercial Bank (CCB)—Canada’s 10th largest bank, with CAD 2.9 billion in assets—reported to the Office of the Inspector General of Banks (OIGB) and the Bank of Canada (BoC) that CCB would not survive owing to large losses on its United States energy loans portfolio. In response, the BoC assembled an emergency CAD 255 million rescue package, secured through contributions from a consortium composed of the federal government, the provincial government of Alberta, the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Canada’s six largest banks. Despite the BoC’s reassurances, including a public announcement promising virtually unlimited liquidity support, …

Ad Hoc Emergency Liquidity Programs In The 21st Century, Steven Kelly, Vincient Arnold, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper surveys 22 case studies of 21st century instances when financial crisis-fighters implemented ad hoc emergency liquidity (AHEL) interventions, interventions designed to provide liquidity to a troubled institution that the authorities believe is systemically important. While emergency liquidity support is often introduced with the real or communicated intention of preventing illiquidity from leading to insolvency, the liquidity crisis should instead be viewed as the manifestation of the market’s assessing the firm as nonviable as a going concern. For that reason, authorities should provide AHEL assistance only to institutions that they have deemed viable or that they have committed to …

Brazil: Banco Btg Pactual Emergency Liquidity Program, 2015, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

On November 25, 2015, André Esteves, then CEO of Banco BTG Pactual, a large Brazilian investment bank, was arrested by Brazilian authorities in connection with suspected involvement in a corruption scandal. Although the arrest did not involve BTG in any capacity and Esteves was later acquitted, the company’s stock quickly collapsed and depositors and other creditors rushed to reduce their exposures to the company. Depositors withdrew certificates of bank deposits, which BTG relied on to fund its daily operations. By November 27, BTG shares had fallen 26%. On December 2, the top seven shareholders of BTG took control of the …

Containing Runs On Solvent Banks: Prioritizing Recovery Over Resolution, Edoardo David Martino, Enrico C. Perotti

Journal of Financial Crises

The sudden banking defaults in the spring of 2023 proved current prudential norms insufficient to prevent bank distress. Capital and liquidity norms need to be adjusted. The experience also shows how a lack of credible supervisory tools led to forbearance and finally chaotic public bailouts. An intervention gap arises when viable but undercapitalized banks are at the mercy of runs. Once outflows start to escalate, all that is left is to prepare for resolution and assign losses. We call for new Pillar II – i.e. activated by the supervisor – stabilizing measures, as contingent capital and liquidity tools.

A timely …

Against Monetary Primacy, Yair Listokin, Rory Van Loo

Northwestern University Law Review

To reduce inflation, the Federal Reserve (Fed) raises interest rates. But every month with high interest rates increases the risk of a devastating recession. Recessions impose not only short-term pain in the form of widespread unemployment but also lifelong harm for many, as vulnerable workers and those who start their careers during a downturn never fully recover. Yet hiking interest rates is the centerpiece of U.S. inflation-fighting policy. When inflation is high, the Fed raises interest rates until inflation is tamed, regardless of the consequent sacrifices. We call this inflation-fighting paradigm “monetary primacy.” Despite its great risks, monetary primacy has …

Legal Market Decartelization, Milan Markovic, Nuno Garoupa

Faculty Scholarship

American lawyers’ grip on the legal market is receding. Scholars and policymakers increasingly agree that the public has little to lose and potentially much to gain from legal market decartelization - the weakening of the lawyers’ monopoly over the legal services market. Harkening to deregulatory initiatives abroad and in Arizona and Utah, reformers contend that removing restrictions on the corporate delivery of legal services and unauthorized practice of law will slash costs and expand access to justice.

Drawing on economic theory and recent market developments, this Article offers a cautionary rejoinder. Understandable concerns about cartelization and lawyer rent-seeking have led …

Debt Tokens, Andrea Tosato, Diane Lourdes Dick, Christopher K. Odinet

Faculty Scholarship

The worlds of crypto and bankruptcy have collided. Once-prominent, fast-growing, and even politically influential platforms for trading cryptocurrencies have imploded spectacularly. Gone are the glossy advertisements, celebrity endorsements, and proclamations that blockchain operates as a law unto itself. Instead, insolvent crypto businesses—including the crypto exchange giant FTX—find themselves in bankruptcy court, no different from any other failed enterprise. These bankruptcies reveal a startling reality: individual investors who placed their trust in these platforms have been stripped of their digital assets. In their stead, they hold hard-to-collect claims against these defunct platforms.

Amid the chill of the crypto winter, bankruptcy has …

We The People... Deserve Fair Taxes, Doron Narotzki, Tamir Shanan

Cardozo Journal of Equal Rights & Social Justice

In a world where economic inequality is deepening, tax law has emerged as one of the most powerful tools for shaping social justice. This Article explores how progressive taxation serves not only as a fiscal mechanism but as a reflection of societal values and the moral obligations of wealth. With legal methodologies such as Purposivism, Originalism, and Living Constitutionalism providing different interpretative lenses, this Article delves into the crucial discourse surrounding income, tax avoidance, deductions, and wealth taxation.

Through an analysis of real-world tax policies and legal precedents, the Article examines how these methodologies either perpetuate or challenge the current …

Corporate Evolution, Omari Scott Simmons

Cardozo Law Review

Political entrepreneurs have declared war on environmental, social, and governance policies ("ESG"), going so far as to attempt to criminalize ESG-influenced investing. They seek a return to some real or imagined past. They amplify and elevate their efforts into mainstream public discourse. They pursue extraordinary goals and tactics to disrupt and even dismantle institutional structures, norms, and established processes. The contemporary anti-ESG backlash is not simply a battle over corporate purpose and the dueling perspectives of shareholder primacy versus stakeholderism or disputes concerning sustainable investment and operational strategies. It reflects aggressive political entrepreneurship and the tension between competing narratives: stasis, …