Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

The Twilight Of Comity, Spencer Weber Waller

Faculty Publications & Other Works

This article analyzes one of the most contentious issues over the past fifty years in international economic law-the extent to which a nation may apply its law on an extra territorial basis and the limits, if any, posed by the doctrine of international comity. This article, based on Professor Waller's paper presented at the 1999 Wolfgang Friedmann conference, examines the reasons why the doctrine of international comity once represented the primary battleground for conflict over the extent of permissible extraterritoriality in United States antitrust law but no longer represents the forefront of current thought on this important issue. The article …

Antitrust Immunity, The First Amendment & Settlements: Defining The Boundaries Of The Right To Petition, Raymond Shih Ray Ku

Faculty Publications

Specifically, this Article examines whether settlement agreements and consent decrees resulting from what would otherwise be immunized litigation are protected from antitrust scrutiny and liability under Noerr. In order to conduct this analysis, this Article develops a methodology for determining immunity by focusing the immunity examination upon the means used to petition government and the source of the alleged injuries. Ultimately, private conduct is immune from antitrust scrutiny when it represents a valid attempt to persuade an independent governmental decision-maker in an effort to solicit government action, and the alleged injuries result from that persuasive effort. The validity of any …

The Market Power Requirement In Antitrust Rule Of Reason Cases: A Rhetorical History, Mark R. Patterson

San Diego Law Review

Under section 1 of the Sherman Act,' on which this Article will focus, a central position for market power has been mandated neither by statute nor by the Supreme Court. Section 1 refers only to "contract[s] ... in restraint of trade,"' language that suggests no market power requirement. Nor has the Supreme Court imposed any general market power requirement under section 1. To be sure, the Court has imposed market power requirements in certain categories of section 1 cases, but they are only those cases in which the plaintiff proceeds under a per se theory.' Indeed, the Court has on …

Competitive Effects Of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest And Corporate Control, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. O'Brien

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this article, we set up an economic framework for analyzing the competitive effects of partial ownership interests. We have three main goals. First, we conceptually derive and explain the competitive effects of partial ownership, explaining its key elements and drawing analogies to the key ideas behind the analysis of horizontal mergers. Second, we present a general framework for evaluating the competitive effects of partial ownership that is analogous to, but at the same time recognizes key differences in the standard analysis for evaluating horizontal mergers. Third, we examine several methods of quantifying these competitive effects.

Still Preying On Strategic Reputation Models Of Predation, Peter H. Huang

Publications

No abstract provided.

Department Of Justice Antitrust Enforcement, 1955-1997: An Empirical Study, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Joseph C. Gallo, Joseph L. Craycraft, Charles J. Parker

Articles by Maurer Faculty

This is an empirical study of Department of Justice (DOJ) enforcement of the antitrust laws. Its purpose is fourfold:

1.To update Posner's study "A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement" (Posner, 1970, pp. 365-419).

2.To provide consistent and comparable measures of antitrust enforcement effort by the Department of Justice.

3.To report these measurements in a concise and systematic way in order to encourage empirical studies of antitrust issues.

4.To explore some implications for antitrust issues.

The purpose is to present the overall historical record of DOJ antitrust activity as well as some patterns in that history. More detailed analysis is left …

University Of Richmond Law Review

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Market Power Requirement In Antitrust Rule Of Reason Cases: A Rhetorical History, The, Mark R. Patterson

Faculty Scholarship

The requirement that an antitrust plaintiff show market power in rule of reason cases has an uninspiring history and unconvincing justifications. Such a requirement has never been adopted by the Supreme Court, and is currently imposed by only the Seventh and Fourth Circuits. Indeed, the requirement was never imposed very widely, despite frequent claims to the contrary. More significantly, the Seventh Circuit cases that initially established the requirement, and that continue to be cited for it, did so with misleading citations to cases from other circuits. Furthermore, the justifications that have been offered for the requirement have generally been either …

Paradigm Changes In Telecommunications Regulation, Phil Weiser

Publications

No abstract provided.

Shaping Competition On The Internet: Who Owns Product And Pricing Information, Maureen A. O'Rourke

Faculty Scholarship

Historically, markets have almost always fallen short of satisfying the conditions for and providing consumers with the benefits of perfect competition. Certain characteristics of electronic markets, however, enhance the possibility that e-commercel will be conducted in an environment that comes closer to attaining the perfectly competitive ideal than that of most conventional markets.

Symposium: Antitrust At The Millennium (Part I), Jonathan Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

To commemorate the new millennium, the Antitrust Law Journal commissioned essays from a diverse group of antitrust specialists-legal academics, practitioners, and economists. The authors were asked to take a decision or other significant text from antitrust's past and use it as a springboard to discuss some important aspect of antitrust's future. The results of this unique publishing project will be printed in two parts, the first half in Volume 68, Issue 1 (this issue) and the second half in Volume 68, Issue 3 (later this year).

Stepping Out In An Old Brown Shoe: In Qualified Praise Of Submarkets, Jonathan Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

No abstract provided.

The Three Types Of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, And Rules, Robert H. Lande, Howard P. Marvel

All Faculty Scholarship

Collusion can profitably be classified into three distinct types. In our classification, "Type I" collusion is the familiar direct agreement among colluding firms (a cartel) to raise prices or, equivalently, restrict output. Alternatively, firms can collude to disadvantage rivals in ways that causes those rivals to cut output. We term this "Type II" collusion. Its indirect effect is an increase in market prices.

A number of important collusion cases neither direct manipulation of prices or output, nor direct attacks on rivals. Examples include Supreme Court cases such as National Society of Professional Engineers v. US, Bates v. State Bar of …

Awards In Pope & Talbot, Inc. V. Government Of Canada: Introduction, William S. Dodge

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The First Principles Approach To Antitrust, Kodak, And Antitrust At The Millenium, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this essay, I reflect on an important contribution to the development of antitrust reasoning and law that arises out of the Supreme Court's decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Technical Services, Inc. In particular, I discuss the decision's relationship to what I have termed the "first principles" approach to market power and antitrust. In my view, one reason that Kodak is important is that it does not take a wooden approach in its economic reasoning. Instead, the opinion nimbly applies the basic principles of competitive analysis to a difficult dynamic context. This enables the majority to avoid rigid adherence …

Training Mediators To Listen: Deconstructing Dialogue And Constructing Understanding, Agendas, And Agreements, Lela P. Love

Articles

This article examines the unique components of dialogue between disputing parties that mediators extract and reframe to move the discussion forward. The same components provide the building blocks of the discussion agenda and the framework of the mediation agreement. The article suggests a number of teaching strategies for training mediators to listen effectively and proactively.