Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

The Game Of Radiopoly: An Antitrust Perspective Of Consolidation In The Radio Industry, Sarah Elizabeth Leeper

Federal Communications Law Journal

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 eliminated nationwide radio ownership restrictions and liberalized local ownership caps. As a result of this deregulation, the radio industry has experienced mass consolidation. Faced with an unprecedented number of proposed mergers, the federal antitrust enforcement agencies play an increasingly important role in the outcome of media mergers. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the primary vehicle of antitrust enforcement, address primarily economic factors to prevent anticompetitive mergers. Despite the healthy revenues generated through economies of scope and scale, it is questionable whether a sufficient regulatory mechanism exists to ensure diversity of voices. Although it is still too …

Copyright And Antitrust: The Effects Of The Digital Performance Rights In Sound Recordings Act Of 1995 In Foreign Markets, Connie C. Davis

Federal Communications Law Journal

The licensing of copyrighted nondramatic works by performance rights societies has long been recognized as a potential source of antitrust violations. In 1995, the Congress passed the Digital Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act in an effort to deal with the licensing problems associated with nondramatic musical works. The DPRSRA created a right in sound recordings to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission as well as establishing compulsory licensing scheme. However, the DPRSRA failed to address the problem of licensing of nondramatic works in foreign markets. This Note identifies the anticompetitive licensing scheme practiced …

Online Auction Fraud: Are The Auction Houses Doing All They Should Or Could To Stop Online Fraud?, James M. Snyder

Federal Communications Law Journal

In April 1998, the FTC released a consumer alert pertaining to the increasing problem of online auction fraud. As the number of online auction participants increased, online auction fraud was becoming more prevalent. The FTC requested comments regarding methods that would be appropriate for curbing the increase in consumer deception. Many in the online auction industry proposed voluntary self-regulation. This Note exposes the inadequacy of industry self-regulation by analogizing online auction abuse with the misuse and near downfall of the 900-number industry. This Note proposes that only a regime of strict industry guidelines that the FTC initiates will halt online …

The Meaning Of "Agreement" Under The Sherman Act: Thoughts From The "Facilitating Practices" Experience, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

While the Economic Policy Office was involved in a number of interesting and important matters during the six years I was Director (1973–1979), for the most part my involvement in individual investigations and cases was vicarious, i.e., supervising, supporting, and advising the staff economists assigned to the particular matter. The one major exception – a matter in which I became personally involved in an intensive way – was the General Electric (GE)-Westinghouse price signaling matter. In what follows, I provide a brief summary of what transpired in the GE-Westinghouse matter and then trace through some of the longer term consequences …

Copyright Misuse And Modified Copyleft: New Solutions To The Challenges Of Internet Standardization, Chip Patterson

Michigan Law Review

The Internet is a truly global community within which myriad economic, social and technological forces interplay to cause its standardization. Much of the competition in the industry has revolved around which product will become the standard for a given market sector. Some markets have seen victors; for example, TCP/IP is the Internet communication protocol, MP3 appears to be dominating music compression, and Microsoft Corporation's Windows ("Windows") is clearly the standard operating system. Similarly, the Internet must adopt a standard for web browsing and searching, for email, and for web programming. In many cases, the competition for this standard will be …

Bargaining Theory And Regulatory Reform: The Political Logic Of Inefficient Regulation, David B. Spence, Lekha Gopalakrishnan

Vanderbilt Law Review

In this Article David Spence and Lekha Gopalakrishnan pro- pose a new understanding of regulatory bargaining. Economists and others have long argued that the American regulatory system is unnecessarily inefficient. Critics charge that the system is both substantively inefficient, in that it sometimes mandates the use of inefficient means for achieving a regulatory goal, and procedurally inefficient, in its over-reliance on rules. These arguments have led to a wave of regulatory reform experiments in the federal bureaucracy, many of which seek to promote positive-sum changes in regulatory policy through bargaining among private- and public-sector stakeholders. As several commentators have noted, …

Antitrust In Japan: The Original Intent, Harry First

Washington International Law Journal

This Article examines the "original intent" of those involved in drafting Japan's Antimonopoly Act, passed in 1947. Japanese sources generally assume this legislation to be pure American invention, a foreign transplant that the Japanese did not understand and that was improperly imposed on a country in which antitrust was, and continues to be, irrelevant. Drawing on original Occupation documents, however, this Article shows that negotiators from Japan's government understood perfectly well what the legislation was about. More than understanding, the government of Japan in fact drafted the statute that was finally enacted, and its provisions reflect the success Japan's negotiators …

Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, And The Challenge Of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, Peter J. Hammer

Michigan Law Review

Should antitrust law ever sanction the accumulation of market power or permit other restraints of trade if such conduct would increase social welfare? This is the challenge raised by intramarket second- best tradeoffs. The lesson of second-best analysis is that one market failure can sometimes counteract the effects of another market failure. In the presence of multiple market failures, it is conceivable that mergers or other restraints traditionally viewed as anticompetitive may be welfare-enhancing. A social planner, given the mandate of maximizing total welfare, would permit such restraints. Could an antitrust judge come to the same result under a defensible …

Afterword: Antitrust And American Business Abroad Revisited, David J. Gerber

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Commentary On Professor Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing Globalism Home: Lessons From Antitrust And Beyond, W. David Braun

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Professor Waller's Un-American Approach To Antitrust, Robert H. Lande

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

No abstract provided.

A Comparative Study Of The Question Of Extraterritorial Application Of The Competition Law, Il Hyung Jung

Penn State International Law Review (1982 - 2011)

No abstract provided.

Competition Laws Of The European Union In The Face Of The New Single Currency Market, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 715 (2000), Rebecca Schoenfeldt

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Can U.S. Antitrust Laws Open International Markets?, Spencer Weber Waller

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

The vigorous and non-discriminatory enforcement of antitrust law can contribute to promoting an international marketplace characterized by an open competitive process. However, antitrust law is, at best, a supporting player in constructing a liberal multilateral trading order, and is incapable of promoting any single country's exports. This article suggests a small, but important, role for United States antitrust law in promoting that competitive marketplace in conjunction with a developing wave of competition law around the globe.

Transnational Competition Law Aspects Of Mergers And Acquisitions, William M. Hannay

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

As more and more U.S. companies engage in overseas operations, even the most routine merger or acquisition seems to have a transnational component which requires analysis and perhaps premerger notification under an increasing number of foreign "competition laws" (or what we call antitrust laws). An understanding of those competition rules has become an imperative for American lawyers.

The Three Types Of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, And Rules, Robert H. Lande, Howard P. Marvel

All Faculty Scholarship

Collusion can profitably be classified into three distinct types. In our classification, "Type I" collusion is the familiar direct agreement among colluding firms (a cartel) to raise prices or, equivalently, restrict output. Alternatively, firms can collude to disadvantage rivals in ways that causes those rivals to cut output. We term this "Type II" collusion. Its indirect effect is an increase in market prices.

A number of important collusion cases neither direct manipulation of prices or output, nor direct attacks on rivals. Examples include Supreme Court cases such as National Society of Professional Engineers v. US, Bates v. State Bar of …

California Dental Association: Not The Quick Look But Not The Full Monty, Stephen Calkins

Law Faculty Research Publications

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, And The Challenge Of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, Peter J. Hammer

Law Faculty Research Publications

No abstract provided.

Bringing Globalism Home: Lessons From Antitrust And Beyond, Spencer Weber Waller

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Guideposts For B2b Electronic Marketplaces, Hillary Greene, Gail F. Levine

Faculty Articles and Papers

No abstract provided.

Is The Use Of The Doctrine Of Equivalents To Fix Mistakes A Mistake?, Martin Adelman

Law Faculty Research Publications

No abstract provided.

Bringing Globalism Home: Lessons From Antitrust And Beyond, Spencer Weber Waller

Faculty Publications & Other Works

No abstract provided.

Can U.S. Antitrust Law Open International Markets?, Spencer Weber Waller

Faculty Publications & Other Works

No abstract provided.

The Twilight Of Comity, Spencer Weber Waller

Faculty Publications & Other Works

This article analyzes one of the most contentious issues over the past fifty years in international economic law-the extent to which a nation may apply its law on an extra territorial basis and the limits, if any, posed by the doctrine of international comity. This article, based on Professor Waller's paper presented at the 1999 Wolfgang Friedmann conference, examines the reasons why the doctrine of international comity once represented the primary battleground for conflict over the extent of permissible extraterritoriality in United States antitrust law but no longer represents the forefront of current thought on this important issue. The article …

Still Preying On Strategic Reputation Models Of Predation, Peter H. Huang

Publications

No abstract provided.

National Courts And International Arbitration: Exhaustion Of Remedies And Res Judicata Under Chapter Eleven Of Nafta, William S. Dodge

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Awards In Pope & Talbot, Inc. V. Government Of Canada: Introduction, William S. Dodge

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Market Power Requirement In Antitrust Rule Of Reason Cases: A Rhetorical History, Mark R. Patterson

San Diego Law Review

Under section 1 of the Sherman Act,' on which this Article will focus, a central position for market power has been mandated neither by statute nor by the Supreme Court. Section 1 refers only to "contract[s] ... in restraint of trade,"' language that suggests no market power requirement. Nor has the Supreme Court imposed any general market power requirement under section 1. To be sure, the Court has imposed market power requirements in certain categories of section 1 cases, but they are only those cases in which the plaintiff proceeds under a per se theory.' Indeed, the Court has on …

Antitrust Immunity, The First Amendment & Settlements: Defining The Boundaries Of The Right To Petition, Raymond Shih Ray Ku

Faculty Publications

Specifically, this Article examines whether settlement agreements and consent decrees resulting from what would otherwise be immunized litigation are protected from antitrust scrutiny and liability under Noerr. In order to conduct this analysis, this Article develops a methodology for determining immunity by focusing the immunity examination upon the means used to petition government and the source of the alleged injuries. Ultimately, private conduct is immune from antitrust scrutiny when it represents a valid attempt to persuade an independent governmental decision-maker in an effort to solicit government action, and the alleged injuries result from that persuasive effort. The validity of any …

Department Of Justice Antitrust Enforcement, 1955-1997: An Empirical Study, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Joseph C. Gallo, Joseph L. Craycraft, Charles J. Parker

Articles by Maurer Faculty

This is an empirical study of Department of Justice (DOJ) enforcement of the antitrust laws. Its purpose is fourfold:

1.To update Posner's study "A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement" (Posner, 1970, pp. 365-419).

2.To provide consistent and comparable measures of antitrust enforcement effort by the Department of Justice.

3.To report these measurements in a concise and systematic way in order to encourage empirical studies of antitrust issues.

4.To explore some implications for antitrust issues.

The purpose is to present the overall historical record of DOJ antitrust activity as well as some patterns in that history. More detailed analysis is left …