Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Price Theory, Competition, And The Rule Of Reason, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Challenging traditional antitrust jurisprudence, Professor Alan J. Meese argues that the present structure of Rule of Reason analysis, applied pursuant to Standard Oil v. United States, has become outdated. The Rule of Reason as currently applied by the courts rests upon neoclassical price theory, an economic paradigm that assumes that legitimate competition consists of unbridled technological rivalry, unconstrained by nonstandard contracts. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has begun to apply a competing paradigm- Transaction Cost Economics-when determining whether a contract is unreasonable "per se" or instead deserving of Rule of Reason scrutiny. Professor Meese argues that Transaction Cost Economics more …

Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

A Proposed Antitrust Approach To High Technology Competition, Thomas A. Piraino Jr.

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Why Premerger Review Needed Reform - And Still Does, Andrew G. Howell

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Local Law Of Global Antitrust, Edward T. Swaine

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Antitrust And The Information Age: Section 2 Monopolization Analyses In The New Economy, A. Benjamin Spencer

Faculty Publications

On April 3, 2000, U.S. District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson declared that the Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") had maintained monopoly power in the personal computer operating system market by anticompetitive means, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. A case of enormous significance, Microsoft raises difficult questions regarding how antitrust laws should be applied to information technology ("IT') companies. Specifically, many characteristics of what has come to be called the "New Economy" - and of the IT companies within it - suggest that traditional monopolization analysis may need modification. As the U.S. has moved toward an information- based …

Farewell To The Quick Look: Redefining The Scope And Content Of The Rule Of Reason, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Regulation Of Franchisor Opportunism And Production Of The Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly Or Competition Between The States?, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Most scholars would agree that a merger between General Motors and Ford should not be judged solely by Delaware corporate law, even if both firms are incorporated in Delaware. Leaving the standards governing such mergers to state law would assuredly produce a race to the bottom that would result in unduly permissive treatment of such transactions. Similarly, if the two firms agreed to divide markets, most would agree that some regulatory authority other than Michigan or Delaware should have the final word on the agreement. Thus, in order to forestall monopoly or its equivalent, the national government must itself exercise …

Monopoly Bundling In Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft Sell?, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Liberty And Antitrust In The Formative Era, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Economic Theory, Trader Freedom And Consumer Welfare: State Oil Co. V. Khan And The Continuing Incoherence Of Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Multiemployer Bargaining, Antitrust Law, And Team Sports: The Contingent Choice Of A Broad Exemption, Michael C. Harper

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Price Theory And Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The Chicago School of antitrust analysis has exerted a strong influence over the law of vertical restraints in the past two decades, leading the Supreme Court to abandon much of its traditional hostility toward such agreements. Chicago's success has provoked a vigorous response from Populists, who support the traditional approach. Chicago, Populists claim, has improperly relied upon neoclassical price theory to inform the normative and descriptive assumptions that drive its analysis of trade restraints generally and of vertical restraints in particular. This reliance is misplaced, Populists assert, because the real world departs from that portrayed by price-theoretic models and, at …

Tying Meets The New Institutional Economics: Farewell To The Chimera Of Forcing, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Balancing In A (Near) Coasean World: The Case Of Franchise Tying Contracts, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Preventing Predatory Abuses In Litigation Between Business Competitors: Focusing On A Litigant's Reasons For Initiating The Litigation To Ensure A Balance Between The Constitutional Right To Petition And The Sherman Act's Guarantee Of Fair Competition In Business, Scott D. Helsel

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Bank Mergers And The Antitrust Laws: The Case For Dual State And Federal Enforcement, Robert F. Roach

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Reconciling Competition And Cooperation: A New Antitrust Standard For Joint Ventures, Thomas A. Piraino Jr.

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Struggle To "Green" G.A.T.T.: Free Trade And Environmental Responsibility In The Wake Of The United States-Mexico Tuna-Dolphin Dispute, Timothy Goplerud

William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review

No abstract provided.

Public Choice, Public Interest, And The Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act: Time To Derail The "Root Beer Express"?, Allan W. Vestal

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

An Antitrust Solution To The New Wave Of Predatory Patent Infringement Litigation, Michael Paul Chu

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

When First Amendment Values And Competition Policy Collide: Resolving The Dilemma Of Mixed-Motive Boycotts, Kay P. Kindred

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Premerger Review And Bankruptcy: The Meaning Of Section 363(B)(2), Robert B. Greenbaum, Alan J. Meese

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

Liability Of Alcoholic Beverage Manufacturers: No Longer A Pink Elephant, Clay Campbell

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Using Currie's Interest Analysis To Resolve Conflicts Between State Regulation And The Sherman Act, James R. Ratner

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Nonefficiency Goals In The Antitrust Law Of Mergers, David W. Barnes

William & Mary Law Review

Robert Bork, former judge for the District of Columbia Circuit and antitrust scholar, has characterized the social and political goals underlying merger law as "pure intellectual mush."' Social and political values have formed the foundation of the most famous United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting section 7 of the Clayton Act, the primary statutory standard for judging the legality of corporate acquisitions. Judge Bork's dismissive and derogatory comments challenge both judges and scholars to provide a rigorous intellectual foundation and a procedure for incorporating these values into the merger law enforcement process.

Current trends in antitrust policy also force decision …

Physician Staff Priviledge Cases: Antitrust Liability And The Health Care Quality Improvement Act, John Neff

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Insurance And Antitrust Law: The Mccarran-Ferguson Act And Beyond, Alan M. Anderson

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Ftc Rulemaking Through Negotiation, Charles H. Koch Jr., Beth Martin

Faculty Publications

The Federal Trade Commission, along with other administrative agencies, has been especially affected by the current emphasis on deregulation. Some proponents of the free market system view the Commission as an unnecessary and costly impediment to market functioning. In this article, Professor Koch and Ms. Martin review past FTC regulatory efforts in light of the FTC's mandate: to maintain an efficient, competitive free market Although the FTC has deviated from its market maintenance goal, this deviation should not serve as a basis for constricting Commission rulemaking activity. Rather, the authors demonstrate that past Commission practices illustrate the need for an …