Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Section 2 Enforcement And The Great Recession: Why Less (Enforcement) Might Mean More (Gdp), Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The Great Recession has provoked calls for more vigorous regulation in all sectors, including antitrust enforcement. After President Obama took office, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice abandoned the Bush Administration’s standard of liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act, which forbids unlawful monopolization, as insufficiently interventionist. Based on the premise that similarly lax antitrust enforcement caused and deepened the Great Depression, the Obama Administration outlined a more intrusive and consumer-focused approach to section 2 enforcement as part of a larger national strategy to combat the “extreme” economic crisis the nation was then facing.

This Essay draws …

Ncaa Scholarship Restrictions As Anticompetitive Measures: The One-Year Rule And Scholarship Caps As Avenues For Antitrust Society, Neil Gibson

William & Mary Business Law Review

By referencing the historical record to expose the NCAA’s one-year rule and per sport scholarship limits as cost-cutting, anticompetitive measures imposing harmful effects upon scholarship-seeking student athletes, this Note argues that despite the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana’s unfavorable ruling in Agnew v. NCAA, a Sherman Act claim against the NCAA linking bachelor’s degrees and scholarships could be legally viable. In particular, just application of the quick look rule of reason, an abbreviated form of antitrust analysis, could lead a court to find the NCAA’s one-year rule and per sport scholarship caps as violative of …

Standard Oil As Lochner's Trojan Horse, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Competition And Regulation In The Gold Industry: An American Perspective, Jared A. Wilkerson

W&M Law Student Publications

When taken from a domestic viewpoint, the primary gold market appears to be noncompetitive and marred by concentration. However, when seen at the global scale, it is clear that the primary gold market is competitive and diluted. Further, even if the primary market were noncompetitive and concentrated at the global level, that market probably could not readily affect the price of gold. Regardless of competitiveness, gold mines in the United States and elsewhere are subject to environmental and safety regulations that increase the cost of production; Regulations are stringently enforced in the United States as compared to competitor countries, potentially …

Reframing Antitrust In Light Of Scientific Revolution: Accounting For Transaction Costs In Rule Of Reason Analysis, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

This Article contends that modern rule of reason analysis, informed by workable competition’s partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm, is suitable for evaluating only a subset of agreements that may reduce transaction costs. The Article distinguishes between “technological” and “non-technological” transaction costs. Technological transaction costs entail the bargaining and information costs first emphasized by Ronald Coase, while non-technological transaction costs result from more fundamental departures from perfect competition, departures creating a risk of opportunism that accompanies relationship-specific investments. Modern law does accurately assess restraints that may reduce technological transaction costs—costs that are analogous to the sort of production costs recognized by the …

Antitrust Error, Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs

William & Mary Law Review

Fueled by economics, antitrust has evolved into a highly sophisticated body of law. Its malleable doctrine enables courts to tailor optimal standards to a wide variety of economic phenomena. Indeed, economic theory has been so revolutionary that modern U.S. competition law bears little resemblance to that which prevailed fifty years ago. Yet, for all the contributions of economics, its explanatory powers are subject to important limitations. Profound questions remain at the borders of contemporary antitrust enforcement, but answers remain elusive. It is because of the epistemological limitations of economic analysis that antitrust remains unusually vulnerable to error. The fear of …

Federal Pleading And State Presuit Discovery, Scott Dodson

Faculty Publications

This Article explores the role that state presuit discovery could play in rectifying the information imbalance caused by Twombly and Iqbal - when a plaintiff in federal court requires information in the hands (or minds) of defendants or third parties in order to properly plead her claim, but such information is not discoverable unless the claim can survive a motion to dismiss. First, this Article provides an account of the development of federal pleading standards from before Twombly through their current post-Iqbal state. Second, this Article describes the effects of the post-Iqbal federal pleading standards and highlights the harsh results …

The New Doj: Lessons Learned From The Ticketmaster Live Nation Decision (Updated), Alan J. Meese, Barak Richman

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitve Realities, And Antitrust Policy, Peter C. Carstensen

William & Mary Business Law Review

The existence and exploitation of buyer power is emerging as an important concern for antitrust as the public enforcement of antitrust law itself is re-emerging as part of the renewed recognition that markets require rules in order to operate efficiently and in socially desirable ways. Buyer cartels are per se illegal but buying groups are subject to the "rule of reason" in antitrust law; yet, the two types of activity are hard to distinguish in a variety of circumstances. Moreover, neither courts nor commentators have provided very satisfactory explanations and justifications for the "per se'" and "rule of reason" results. …

Debunking The Purchaser Welfare Account Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us A Total Welfare Standard And Why We Should Keep It, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The last several years have seen a vigorous debate among antitrust scholars and practitionersa bout the appropriates tandardf or evaluating the conduct of monopolists under section 2 of the Sherman Act. While most of the debate over possible standards has focused on the empirical question of each standard's economic utility, this Article undertakes a somewhat different task: It examines the normative benchmark that courts have actually chosen when adjudicating section 2 cases. This Article explores three possible benchmarks-producer welfare, purchaser welfare, and total welfare-and concludes that courts have opted for a total welfare normative approach to section 2 since the …

Revisiting Allied Tube And Noerr: The Antitrust Implications Of Green Building Legislation & Case Law Considerations For Policymakers, Stephen Del Percio

William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review

No abstract provided.

The Economics Of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through Mac Clauses In Business Combination Agreements, Robert T. Miller

William & Mary Law Review

In any large corporate acquisition, there is an interim period between the time that the parties enter into a merger agreement and the time the transaction is effected and the purchase price paid. During this period, the business of the acquired company may deteriorate, thus raising the question of whether the counterparty must perform on the agreement and pay the purchase price. Merger agreements typically address this problem through "material adverse change" (MAC) clauses, which provide that a party may walk away from the transaction without penalty if the counterparty has suffered a MAC. Although the definition of MAC is …

Dr. Miles Is Dead. Now What?: Structuring A Rule Of Reason For Evaluating Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, Thomas A. Lambert

William & Mary Law Review

In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court overruled its 1911 precedent declaring vertical minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) to be per se illegal. The Leegin Court held that the practice should instead be examined on a case-by-case basis under antitrust's rule of reason. The Court further exhorted the lower courts to craft a "structured" rule of reason for evaluating RPM. This Article critiques six proposed approaches for evaluating minimum RPM and offers an alternative approach. The six approaches critiqued are: (1) the Brandeisian, unstructured rule of reason; (2) Judge Posner's rule of per se …

Tying Conspiracies, Christopher R. Leslie

William & Mary Law Review

Antitrust law has long condemned tying arrangements when they are imposed by a single dominant firm. However, tying jurisprudence does not recognize that tie-ins can also occur as the result of a conspiracy among competitors. Consequently, antitrust doctrine fails to appreciate the unique anticompetitive dangers of concerted tying arrangements. After providing real-world examples of tying conspiracies, Professor Leslie explains how concerted tying arrangements present a far greater threat to competitive markets than traditional, unilaterally imposed tying arrangements. Because tying jurisprudence evolved without considering the existence or effects of concerted tie-ins, the current test for evaluating the legality of tying arrangements …

Guideline Institutionalization: The Role Of Merger Guidelines In Antitrust Discourse, Hillary Greene

William & Mary Law Review

With the growth of the administrative state, agency-promulgated enforcement policy statements, typically referred to as guidelines, have become ubiquitous in the U.S. federal system. Yet, the actual usage and impact of such guidelines is poorly understood. Often the issuing agencies declare the guidelines to be nonbinding, even for themselves. Notwithstanding this disclaimer, the government, private parties, and even the courts frequently rely on the guidelines in a precedent-like manner. In this Article, Professor Greene examines the evolution of one system of enforcement policy guidelines-the U.S. federal antitrust merger guidelines--and finds that these guidelines have acted as a stealth force on …

The Procompetitive Interest In Intellectual Property Law, Thomas F. Cotter

William & Mary Law Review

When government recognizes intellectual property (IP) rights, it is often viewed as sanctioning the existence of private "monopolies," in contrast to the general antimonopoly thrust of the antitrust laws. And yet, on occasion IP law itself condemns conduct on the part of IP owners-or excuses otherwise infringing activity on the part of IP defendants-expressly for the purpose of promoting competition. It does so even though antitrust law -if one were to apply it at all under analogous circumstances-would not find anticompetitive harm without conducting a more thorough analysis of whether the antitrust defendant possesses power over a well-defined market. Salient …

The Elephant In The Courtroom: Litigating The Premerger Fix In Arch Coal And Beyond, Katherine A. Ambrogi

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Competition And Market Failure In The Antitrust Jurisprudence Of Justice Stevens, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Collaborative Governance In The Restructured Electricity Industry, Charles H. Koch Jr.

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Property, Aspen, And Refusals To Deal, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Market Failure And Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost Of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Trade Promotion Authority: Fast Track For The Twenty-First Century, Laura L. Wright

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

No abstract provided.

The New Doj: Lessons Learned From The Ticketmaster Live Nation Decision, Alan J. Meese

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

Conservation Through Collusion: Antitrust As An Obstacle To Marine Resource Conservation, Jonathan H. Adler

Faculty Publications

Although it is not a new environmental problem, overfishing is arguably one of the most serious environmental problems today. Despite decades of government regulation, fisheries are in trouble the world over.

With little doubt, the federal fishery regulations adopted in the last twenty-five years have failed to ensure sustainable utilization of U.S. fisheries. The existing regulatory framework is "a failed experiment that has led to the destruction of United States coastal fisheries." At the same time that the federal government adopted an elaborate regulatory structure, federal law has impeded the development of cooperative fishery management institutions that may have helped …

Intrabrand Restraints And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Property Rights And Intrabrand Restraints, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Intrabrand restraints limit the discretion of one or more sellers-usually dealers-with respect to the disposition of a product sold under a single brand. While most scholars believe that such contracts can help assure optimal promotion of a manufacturer's products, there is disagreement about the exact manner in which such restraints accomplish this objective. Many scholars believe that such restraints themselves induce dealers to engage in promotional activities desired by the manufacturer. Others believe that such restraints merely serve as "performance bonds," which dealers will forfeit if they fail to follow the manufacturer's precise promotional instructions. Some scholars reject both approaches, …

The Political Economy Of International Antitrust Harmonization, John O. Mcginnis

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Surviving The Shipwreck: A Proposal To Revive The Failing Division Defense, Amanda L. Wait

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.