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Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Agency
Pernicious Loyalty, Andrew S. Gold
Pernicious Loyalty, Andrew S. Gold
William & Mary Law Review
Fiduciary loyalty is generally considered valuable, and in the usual case it is. Yet some of the very features of loyalty that make it valuable also encourage behaviors harmful to beneficiaries, third parties, or society as a whole. Examples include the corporate director whose concern with shareholder wealth maximization leads to considerable environmental harm and the skillful attorney whose zealous representation undermines justice between the parties. In short, actions that are motivated by good-faith fiduciary loyalty may be undesirable in individual cases. I will describe such cases as cases of pernicious loyalty. Outside the law, pernicious loyalty is often limited …
Cartels, Agency Costs, And Finding Virtue In Faithless Agents, Christopher R. Leslie
Cartels, Agency Costs, And Finding Virtue In Faithless Agents, Christopher R. Leslie
William & Mary Law Review
Although price-fixing conspiracies are inherently unstable, many cartels manage to endure, often for long periods. Many successful cartels have hierarchical structures made up of high-level executives (principals) and lower-level managers (agents). For these cartels, agency cost theory could provide some insights as to how to destabilize them from within. Agency costs exist when a faithless agent pursues her own interests instead of those of the principal. Although agency costs are generally considered inefficient, when the principal's goals are undesirable, the acts of a faithless agent can be beneficial. Because one traditional approach to reducing agency costs is to align the …
The Consequences Of Doj Control Of Litigation Authority On Agency Programs, Michael Herz, Neal Devins
The Consequences Of Doj Control Of Litigation Authority On Agency Programs, Michael Herz, Neal Devins
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Corporate Philanthropy, Executives' Pet Charities And The Agency Problem, Jayne W. Barnard
Corporate Philanthropy, Executives' Pet Charities And The Agency Problem, Jayne W. Barnard
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Tempest In An Envelope: Reflections On The Bush White House's Failed Takeover Of The U.S. Postal Service, Neal Devins
Tempest In An Envelope: Reflections On The Bush White House's Failed Takeover Of The U.S. Postal Service, Neal Devins
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
An Issue-Driven Strategy For Review Of Agency Decisions, Charles H. Koch Jr.
An Issue-Driven Strategy For Review Of Agency Decisions, Charles H. Koch Jr.
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Fraud Liability Under Agency Principles: A New Approach, Steven N. Bulloch
Fraud Liability Under Agency Principles: A New Approach, Steven N. Bulloch
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
Agency, Dudley Warner Woodbridge
Agency (1959-1967), Dudley Warner Woodbridge
Agency - Assault In The Course Of Employment (Baskett V. Banks, 1947), Ira B. Dworkin
Agency - Assault In The Course Of Employment (Baskett V. Banks, 1947), Ira B. Dworkin
William and Mary Review of Virginia Law
No abstract provided.