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Full-Text Articles in Law
Are They All Textualists Now?, Austin Peters
Are They All Textualists Now?, Austin Peters
Northwestern University Law Review
Recent developments at the U.S. Supreme Court have rekindled debates over textualism. Missing from the conversation is a discussion of the courts that decide the vast majority of statutory interpretation cases in the United States—state courts. This Article uses supervised machine learning to conduct the first-ever empirical study of the statutory interpretation methods used by state supreme courts. In total, this study analyzes over 44,000 opinions from all fifty states from 1980 to 2019.
This Article establishes several key descriptive findings. First, since the 1980s, textualism has risen rapidly in state supreme court opinions. Second, this rise is primarily attributable …
Rejecting Word Worship: An Integrative Approach To Judicial Construction Of Insurance Policies, Jeffrey W. Stempel, Erik S. Knutsen
Rejecting Word Worship: An Integrative Approach To Judicial Construction Of Insurance Policies, Jeffrey W. Stempel, Erik S. Knutsen
University of Cincinnati Law Review
Insurance coverage litigation is a quest for discerning meaning: Does the insurance policy cover the loss at issue? Construing the insurance policy, courts attempt to give legal effect to what the document purports to command. But what were the intentions and expectations of insurer and insured? Do those intentions even matter? Or is only the written text of the policy relevant to the coverage result? Courts addressing these questions typically frame the interpretative choice as one of strict textualism versus contextual functionalism.
In many, perhaps even most situations, text and context align to create an “easy” case. If a factory …
The Dilemma Of Interstatutory Interpretation, Anuj C. Desai
The Dilemma Of Interstatutory Interpretation, Anuj C. Desai
Washington and Lee Law Review
Courts engage in interstatutory cross-referencing all the time, relying on one statute to help interpret another. Yet, neither courts nor scholars have ever had a satisfactory theory for determining when it is appropriate. Is it okay to rely on any other statute as an interpretive aid? Or, are there limits to the practice? If so, what are they? To assess when interstatutory cross-referencing is appropriate, I focus on one common form of the technique, the in pari materia doctrine. When a court concludes that two statutes are in pari materia or (translating the Latin) “on the same subject,” the court …
Supreme Silence And Precedential Pragmatism: King V. Burwell And Statutory Interpretation In The Federal Courts Of Appeals, Michael J. Cedrone
Supreme Silence And Precedential Pragmatism: King V. Burwell And Statutory Interpretation In The Federal Courts Of Appeals, Michael J. Cedrone
Marquette Law Review
This Article studies statutory interpretation as it is practiced in the federal
courts of appeal. Much of the academic commentary in this field focuses on the
Supreme Court, which skews the debate and unduly polarizes the field. This
Article investigates more broadly by looking at the seventy-two federal
appellate cases that cite King v. Burwell in the two years after the Court issued
its decision. In deciding that the words “established by the State” encompass
a federal program, the Court in King reached a pragmatic and practical result
based on statutory scheme and purpose at a fairly high level of …
A Matter Of Interpretation: Federal Courts And The Law, Charles R. Priest
A Matter Of Interpretation: Federal Courts And The Law, Charles R. Priest
Maine Law Review
Justice Scalia's engaging essay, “Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,” and the four comments it provokes, should provide lawyers, judges, and other lawmakers with an interesting evening. Instead of presenting a theoretical view of the role of the federal courts in interpretation, Justice Scalia sketches out a case for “textualism.” “Textualism” is one of several currently contending methods of interpreting statutes and the United States Constitution, and is currently popular among federal judges who see their role as restricting government's powers to those expressly stated in the …
Justice Scalia And Tonto Fistfight In Heaven, Ray Martin
Justice Scalia And Tonto Fistfight In Heaven, Ray Martin
American Indian Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Eliminating Circuit-Split Disparities In Federal Sentencing Under The Post-Booker Guidelines, Elliot Edwards
Eliminating Circuit-Split Disparities In Federal Sentencing Under The Post-Booker Guidelines, Elliot Edwards
Indiana Law Journal
This Note will explore the rarely discussed consequences that result when courts of appeals freely interpret the Sentencing Guidelines. This Note will not address appellate review of sentences in general, nor will it discuss disparities caused by trial courts. Instead, the discussion below will address a very specific situation, namely when a court of appeals vacates a sentence because, in its estimation, the trial court misapplied the Guidelines. Part I will relate the history of the recent sentencing re-form movement in America, noting particularly which bodies have the authority to decide sentencing policy. Part II will then analyze the interpretive …
Judge Posner's Simple Law, Mitchell N. Berman
Judge Posner's Simple Law, Mitchell N. Berman
Michigan Law Review
The world is complex, Richard Posner observes in his most recent book, Reflections on Judging. It follows that, for judges to achieve “sensible” resolutions of real-world disputes—by which Judge Posner means “in a way that can be explained in ordinary language and justified as consistent with the expectations of normal people” (p. 354)—they must be able to navigate the world’s complexity successfully. To apply legal rules correctly and (where judicial lawmaking is called for) to formulate legal rules prudently, judges must understand the causal mechanisms and processes that undergird complex systems, and they must be able to draw sound factual …
Textualism And Obstacle Preemption, John D. Ohlendorf
Textualism And Obstacle Preemption, John D. Ohlendorf
Georgia Law Review
Commentators, both on the bench and in the academy,
have perceived an inconsistency between the Supreme
Court's trend, in recent decades, towards an increasingly
formalist approach to statutory interpretation and the
Court's continued willingness to find state laws preempted
as "obstacles to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress'"--so-called
"obstacle preemption." This Article argues that by giving
the meaning contextually implied in a statutory text
ordinary, operative legal force, we can justify most of the
current scope of obstacle preemption based solely on
theoretical moves textualism already is committed to
making.
The Article first sketches …
Interpreting Regulations, Kevin M. Stack
Interpreting Regulations, Kevin M. Stack
Michigan Law Review
The age of statutes has given way to an era of regulations, but our jurisprudence has fallen behind. Despite the centrality of regulations to law, courts have no intelligible approach to regulatory interpretation. The neglect of regulatory interpretation is not only a shortcoming in interpretive theory but also a practical problem for administrative law. Canonical doctrines of administrative law - Chevron, Seminole Rock/Auer, and Accardi - involve interpreting regulations, and yet courts lack a consistent approach. This Article develops a method for interpreting regulations and, more generally, situates regulatory interpretation within debates over legal interpretation. It argues that a purposive …
Text(Plus-Other-Stuff)Ualism:Textualists' Perplexing Use Of The Attorney General's Manual On The Administrative Procedure Act, K. M. Lewis
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
Textualist judges, such as U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, are well known for their outspoken, adamant refusal to consult legislative history and its analogues when interpreting ambiguous provisions of statutory terms. Nevertheless, in administrative law cases, textualist judges regularly quote the Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, an unenacted Department of Justice document that shares all the characteristics of legislative history that textualists find odious: unreliability, bias, and failure to pass through the bicameralism and presentment processes mandated by the U.S. Constitution. As a result, judges that rely on the Manual in administrative law cases arguably reach …
Stare Decisis And Constitutional Text, Jonathan F. Mitchell
Stare Decisis And Constitutional Text, Jonathan F. Mitchell
Michigan Law Review
Almost everyone acknowledges that stare decisis should play a significant role when the Supreme Court of the United States resolves constitutional cases. Yet the academic and judicial rationales for this practice tend to rely on naked consequentialist considerations, and make only passing efforts to square the Court's stare decisis doctrines with the language of the Constitution. This Article offers a qualified defense of constitutional stare decisis that rests exclusively on constitutional text. It aims to broaden the overlapping consensus of interpretive theories that can support a role for constitutional stare decisis, but to do this it must narrow the circumstances …
Constitutional Interpretation And Judicial Review: A Case Of The Tail Wagging The Dog, Michael Halley
Constitutional Interpretation And Judicial Review: A Case Of The Tail Wagging The Dog, Michael Halley
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
A response to John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2003 (2009). Professor John Manning's analysis of the Supreme Court's recent federalism decisions works as a platform to further the cause of textualism. His argument fails to persuade, however, because the textualism he says the Court should embrace in federalism cases is antithetical to the atextual nature of the Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of legislation. Manning prefaces his work by telling readers that his analysis is not an end in itself. His aim, rather, is to "use the methodology" the …
Interpretation And Institutions, Cass R. Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule
Interpretation And Institutions, Cass R. Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule
Michigan Law Review
Suppose that a statute, enacted several decades ago, bans the introduction of any color additive in food if that additive "causes cancer" in human beings or animals. Suppose that new technologies, able to detect low-level carcinogens, have shown that many potential additives cause cancer, even though the statistical risk is often tiny - akin to the risk of eating two peanuts with governmentally-permitted levels of aflatoxins. Suppose, finally, that a company seeks to introduce a certain color additive into food, acknowledging that the additive causes cancer, but urging that the risk is infinitesimal, and that if the statutory barrier were …
Medicaid And The Unconstitutional Dimensions Of Prior Authorization, Jagan Nicholas Ranjan
Medicaid And The Unconstitutional Dimensions Of Prior Authorization, Jagan Nicholas Ranjan
Michigan Law Review
The political outcry over prescription drug costs has been one of the most vociferous in recent memory. From tales depicting renegade seniors sneaking cheap prescriptions of Vioxx out of Tijuana across the border, to the promises of reduced prices made by front-runners during the 2000 Presidential election, the calls for lower drug prices have been forceful and demanding. This war for lower-priced pharmaceuticals fought by consumers, interest groups and politicians against the pharmaceutical industry itself has recently developed yet another front. The latest battle is over Medicaid. The new victims are the poor. Presently, federal statutory provisions in the Medicaid …
Statutory Interpretation And The Idea Of Progress, Daniel A. Farber
Statutory Interpretation And The Idea Of Progress, Daniel A. Farber
Michigan Law Review
A Review of William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation